fix: block remaining email tracking vectors #457

2026-06-22 00:09:09 +02:00
parent bfc8ba851a
commit d0ed4b4dfe
3 changed files with 411 additions and 104 deletions
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ import {
  hasRichFormatting,
  plainTextToSafeHtml,
  EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
+  EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
+  isExternalResourceUrl,
+  decodeCssEscapes,
+  styleHasExternalUrl,
+  stripExternalCssUrls,
+  blockExternalResourcesOnNode,
+  TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
 } from '../email-sanitization';

 describe('email-sanitization', () => {
@@ -324,6 +331,205 @@ describe('email-sanitization', () => {
    });
  });

+  describe('isExternalResourceUrl', () => {
+    it('detects http(s) and protocol-relative URLs', () => {
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('http://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('//tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('sees through leading whitespace/newlines (imgNewlineSrc bypass)', () => {
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('\n\nhttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('  \t https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      // Tab/newline removed anywhere in the URL by the parser.
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('h\nttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('ht\ttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('treats inline/local schemes as not external', () => {
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('blob:http://localhost/abc')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('cid:image001@example.com')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('/relative/path.png')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl(null)).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl(undefined)).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('decodeCssEscapes', () => {
+    it('decodes hex escapes (cssEscape bypass)', () => {
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68ttp://x')).toBe('http://x');
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\000068ttps://x')).toBe('https://x');
+      // Hex escape consumes one trailing whitespace separator.
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68 ttp')).toBe('http');
+    });
+
+    it('decodes single-character escapes', () => {
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\h\\t\\t\\p')).toBe('http');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('styleHasExternalUrl / stripExternalCssUrls', () => {
+    it('detects and strips plain external url()', () => {
+      const style = 'background:url(https://tracker.example/p.png)';
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
+      expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
+    });
+
+    it('detects and strips CSS-escaped external url()', () => {
+      const style = 'background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)';
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
+      expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
+    });
+
+    it('detects url() with whitespace/quotes', () => {
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl("background: url( '\n https://t/p.png' )")).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('leaves data: and relative url() untouched', () => {
+      const style = "background:url('')";
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(false);
+      expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe(style);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('blockExternalResourcesOnNode (anti-tracking vectors)', () => {
+    function el(html: string): Element {
+      return parseHtmlSafely(`<body>${html}</body>`).body.firstElementChild!;
+    }
+
+    it('blocks an img whose src is hidden behind a leading newline', () => {
+      const img = el('<img src="">');
+      img.setAttribute('src', '\n\nhttps://tracker.example/pixel.png');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toBe('https://tracker.example/pixel.png');
+      expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks img srcset', () => {
+      const img = el('<img srcset="https://tracker.example/1x.png 1x, https://tracker.example/2x.png 2x">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
+      expect(img.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('blocks <picture><source srcset> (pictureSource)', () => {
+      const source = el('<source srcset="https://tracker.example/pic.webp" type="image/webp">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
+      expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks <source src> for media', () => {
+      const source = el('<source src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
+      expect(source.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
+      expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('blocks <video poster> (videoPoster)', () => {
+      const video = el('<video poster="https://tracker.example/poster.jpg"></video>');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
+      expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('blocks video src', () => {
+      const video = el('<video src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4"></video>');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks the legacy background attribute', () => {
+      // <td> is foster-parented out of <body>, so build it directly.
+      const td = document.createElement('td');
+      td.setAttribute('background', 'https://tracker.example/bg.png');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(td)).toBe(true);
+      expect(td.hasAttribute('background')).toBe(false);
+      expect(td.getAttribute('data-blocked-background')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('strips external inline style url() including CSS escapes (cssEscape)', () => {
+      const div = el('<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)">x</div>');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(div)).toBe(true);
+      expect(div.getAttribute('style')).not.toContain('tracker.example');
+      expect(div.getAttribute('data-blocked-style')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('does not block inline/local resources', () => {
+      const img = el('<img src="blob:http://localhost/inline">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(false);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe('blob:http://localhost/inline');
+
+      const dataImg = el('<img src="">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(dataImg)).toBe(false);
+
+      const cidImg = el('<img src="cid:logo@example.com">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(cidImg)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('works as a DOMPurify afterSanitizeAttributes hook across all vectors', () => {
+      const html = `
+        <img src="&#10;&#10;https://tracker.example/a.png">
+        <picture><source srcset="https://tracker.example/b.webp"><img src="https://tracker.example/c.png"></picture>
+        <div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/d.png)">bg</div>
+      `;
+      DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
+        blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element);
+      });
+      const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+      DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
+
+      const doc = parseHtmlSafely(clean);
+      // No live src/srcset/style references the tracker anymore.
+      doc.querySelectorAll('img, source').forEach((node) => {
+        expect(node.getAttribute('src') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
+        expect(node.getAttribute('srcset') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
+      });
+      expect(doc.querySelector('div')?.getAttribute('style') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
+      // The originals are stashed for the banner/affordance.
+      expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-src');
+      expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-srcset');
+      expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-style');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('Email Privacy Tester exact payloads (iframe render path)', () => {
+    function render(html: string): string {
+      DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) =>
+        blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element)
+      );
+      const out = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+      DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
+      return out;
+    }
+
+    it('pictureSource: <picture><source srcset> does not keep a live external ref', () => {
+      const source = parseHtmlSafely(render('<picture><source srcset="http://TRACK/"><img src="#"></picture>')).querySelector('source')!;
+      expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
+      expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('TRACK');
+    });
+
+    it('imgNewlineSrc: newline after the first slash (protocol-relative) is blocked', () => {
+      const img = parseHtmlSafely(render('<img src="/\n/TRACK_HOST/PATH">')).querySelector('img')!;
+      expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('TRACK_HOST');
+    });
+
+    it('videoPoster: poster and src are both stripped', () => {
+      const video = parseHtmlSafely(render('<video poster="http://TRACK/" autoplay="true" src="http://OTHER/"></video>')).querySelector('video')!;
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
+      expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('TRACK');
+      expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('OTHER');
+    });
+
+    it('anchor href is preserved (links stay clickable; DNS prefetch is disabled via iframe meta)', () => {
+      const out = render('<a href="http://TRACK/">link</a>');
+      expect(out).toContain('href="http://TRACK/"');
+    });
+  });
+
  describe('plainTextToSafeHtml', () => {
    it('escapes HTML-special characters in surrounding text', () => {
      const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('<script>alert(1)</script> & "q" \'q\'');
@@ -140,6 +140,161 @@ export function sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(html: string): string {
  return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, PLAIN_TEXT_RENDERED_CONFIG);
 }

+/**
+ * 1x1 transparent SVG used to replace a blocked external <img> so the layout
+ * doesn't reflow to a broken-image icon. The real URL is stashed in
+ * `data-blocked-src` for restore.
+ */
+export const TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL =
+  '';
+
+/**
+ * True if a resource URL would trigger an external (network) fetch once the
+ * browser normalizes it. The URL parser removes ASCII tab/newline characters
+ * anywhere in the string and trims leading/trailing C0-control + space before
+ * resolving, so `"\n\nhttps://t"` and `"h\ttps://t"` are both external even
+ * though they don't literally start with "https://" (the `imgNewlineSrc`
+ * tracking bypass). Protocol-relative `//host` is external too. data:, blob:,
+ * and cid: are inline/local and never count as external.
+ */
+export function isExternalResourceUrl(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!value) return false;
+  // Mirror the URL parser: drop every ASCII C0-control and space char it
+  // ignores (leading/trailing trim plus tab/newline/CR removed anywhere).
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  const normalized = value.replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '');
+  return /^(?:https?:\/\/|\/\/)/i.test(normalized);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Decode CSS escape sequences so escaped tracking URLs can be recognised.
+ * `\68ttp://x` and `\000068ttp://x` both decode to `http://x` (the `cssEscape`
+ * bypass). Handles the two CSS escape forms: 1-6 hex digits (optionally
+ * followed by one whitespace) and a backslash before any other character.
+ */
+export function decodeCssEscapes(value: string): string {
+  return value.replace(/\\([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6})\s?|\\(.)/g, (_full, hex, char) => {
+    if (hex) {
+      const code = parseInt(hex, 16);
+      return code ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : '';
+    }
+    return char ?? '';
+  });
+}
+
+const CSS_URL_PATTERN = /url\(\s*(['"]?)([^)]*?)\1\s*\)/gi;
+
+/** True if any `url(...)` in a CSS string resolves to an external resource. */
+export function styleHasExternalUrl(style: string): boolean {
+  let found = false;
+  style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) => {
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner))) found = true;
+    return full;
+  });
+  return found;
+}
+
+/** Replace every external `url(...)` in a CSS string with an empty `url()`. */
+export function stripExternalCssUrls(style: string): string {
+  return style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) =>
+    isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner)) ? 'url()' : full
+  );
+}
+
+/** True if a srcset attribute lists at least one external candidate URL. */
+function srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset: string): boolean {
+  return srcset
+    .split(',')
+    .some((candidate) => isExternalResourceUrl(candidate.trim().split(/\s+/)[0]));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Neutralise every external-resource vector on a single sanitized element,
+ * stashing the original value in a `data-blocked-*` attribute for later
+ * restore. Covers the vectors Email Privacy Tester exercises beyond a bare
+ * `<img src>`: whitespace/newline in src, `<picture><source srcset>`,
+ * `<video poster>`/media src, the legacy `background` attribute, and inline
+ * `style` url() (including CSS-escaped URLs).
+ *
+ * This is the first line of defence (it drives the "external content blocked"
+ * banner and placeholder swap); the iframe's strict img-src/media-src/font-src
+ * CSP is the guaranteed network-level backstop for anything expressed in ways
+ * the DOM walk can't see (e.g. `<style>`-tag rules).
+ *
+ * @returns true if anything on the node was blocked.
+ */
+export function blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node: Element): boolean {
+  let blocked = false;
+  const tag = node.tagName;
+
+  if (tag === 'IMG') {
+    const src = node.getAttribute('src');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
+      node.setAttribute('src', TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
+      node.setAttribute('alt', '');
+      (node as HTMLElement).style.display = 'none';
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Responsive images: <img srcset> and <picture><source srcset>.
+  if (tag === 'IMG' || tag === 'SOURCE') {
+    const srcset = node.getAttribute('srcset');
+    if (srcset && srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-srcset', srcset);
+      node.removeAttribute('srcset');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // <source src> for <video>/<audio> (and rare <picture> src).
+  if (tag === 'SOURCE') {
+    const src = node.getAttribute('src');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
+      node.removeAttribute('src');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // <video poster> and direct <video>/<audio> src.
+  if (tag === 'VIDEO' || tag === 'AUDIO') {
+    const poster = node.getAttribute('poster');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(poster)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-poster', poster!.trim());
+      node.removeAttribute('poster');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+    const src = node.getAttribute('src');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
+      node.removeAttribute('src');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Legacy table/cell background attribute.
+  const bgAttr = node.getAttribute('background');
+  if (isExternalResourceUrl(bgAttr)) {
+    node.setAttribute('data-blocked-background', bgAttr!.trim());
+    node.removeAttribute('background');
+    blocked = true;
+  }
+
+  // Inline style url() — read the raw attribute so CSS escapes survive for
+  // decoding, then strip only the external urls.
+  const styleAttr = node.getAttribute('style');
+  if (styleAttr && styleHasExternalUrl(styleAttr)) {
+    node.setAttribute('data-blocked-style', styleAttr);
+    node.setAttribute('style', stripExternalCssUrls(styleAttr));
+    blocked = true;
+  }
+
+  return blocked;
+}
+
 /**
 * Safe HTML parsing without execution
 * Use instead of innerHTML for detection/parsing