From d0ed4b4dfe9ebe52ae21e5228f60f2da29a69a9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Linus Rath <139418639+rathlinus@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:07:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] fix: block remaining email tracking vectors #457

---
 components/email/email-viewer.tsx        | 154 ++++++-----------
 lib/__tests__/email-sanitization.test.ts | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/email-sanitization.ts                | 155 +++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 411 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)

diff --git a/components/email/email-viewer.tsx b/components/email/email-viewer.tsx
index 239c86f8..e8b8aadd 100644
--- a/components/email/email-viewer.tsx
+++ b/components/email/email-viewer.tsx
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import DOMPurify from "dompurify";
 import { Email, ContactCard, Mailbox } from "@/lib/jmap/types";
 import { emailExportFilename, attachmentDownloadFilename, DEFAULT_EMAIL_TEMPLATE, DEFAULT_ATTACHMENT_TEMPLATE } from "@/lib/download-filename";
 import { EML_IMPORT_ACCEPT, expandImportableEmails } from "@/lib/eml-import";
-import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
+import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, blockExternalResourcesOnNode, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
 import { hasMeaningfulHtmlBody } from "@/lib/signature-utils";
 import { withBasePath } from "@/lib/browser-navigation";
 import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
@@ -2462,7 +2462,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
 
   // Sanitize and prepare email HTML content
   const emailContent = useMemo(() => {
-    if (!email) return { html: "", isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
+    if (!email) return { html: "", isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
 
     // Check if we have body values
     if (email.bodyValues) {
@@ -2530,38 +2530,14 @@ export function EmailViewer({
         }
 
         DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
-          const htmlNode = node as HTMLElement;
-
           if (shouldBlockExternal) {
-            if (node.tagName === 'IMG') {
-              const src = node.getAttribute('src');
-              if (src && (src.startsWith('http://') || src.startsWith('https://') || src.startsWith('//'))) {
-                node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src);
-                node.setAttribute('src', '');
-                node.setAttribute('alt', '');
-                htmlNode.style.display = 'none';
-                blockedExternalContent = true;
-              }
-            }
-
-            const bgAttr = node.getAttribute?.('background');
-            if (bgAttr && (bgAttr.startsWith('http://') || bgAttr.startsWith('https://') || bgAttr.startsWith('//'))) {
-              node.setAttribute('data-blocked-background', bgAttr);
-              node.removeAttribute('background');
+            // Blocks every external-resource vector (img src incl.
+            // whitespace/newline tricks, srcset, <source>, <video poster>,
+            // media src, background attr, inline style url() incl. CSS
+            // escapes). The strict iframe CSP below is the network backstop.
+            if (blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node)) {
               blockedExternalContent = true;
             }
-
-            if (htmlNode.style) {
-              const style = htmlNode.style.cssText;
-              if (style && style.includes('url(')) {
-                const urlMatch = style.match(/url\(['"]?(https?:\/\/[^'")\s]+)['"]?\)/gi);
-                if (urlMatch) {
-                  node.setAttribute('data-blocked-style', style);
-                  htmlNode.style.cssText = style.replace(/url\(['"]?https?:\/\/[^'")\s]+['"]?\)/gi, 'url()');
-                  blockedExternalContent = true;
-                }
-              }
-            }
           }
 
           if (node.tagName === 'A') {
@@ -2592,6 +2568,11 @@ export function EmailViewer({
           html: cleanHtml,
           isHtml: true,
           hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(htmlContent),
+          // Drives the strict iframe CSP: when we're in blocking mode the
+          // iframe forbids external img/media/font fetches entirely, so any
+          // vector the DOM walk above missed (e.g. <style>-tag url()) still
+          // can't phone home. Cleared once the user allows / trusts.
+          externalBlocked: shouldBlockExternal,
         };
       }
 
@@ -2603,6 +2584,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
           html: plainTextToSafeHtml(textContent),
           isHtml: false,
           hasStyleTag: false,
+          externalBlocked: false,
         };
       }
     }
@@ -2618,6 +2600,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
         html: `<div style="color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-style: italic;">${previewHtml}</div>`,
         isHtml: false,
         hasStyleTag: false,
+        externalBlocked: false,
       };
     }
 
@@ -2625,12 +2608,16 @@ export function EmailViewer({
       html: `<p style="color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-style: italic;">${t('no_body_content')}</p>`,
       isHtml: false,
       hasStyleTag: false,
+      externalBlocked: false,
     };
-    // Intentionally omit allowExternalContent and trust state from deps:
-    // toggling permission imperatively unblocks content via restoreBlockedContent
-    // in an effect below, so the iframe srcDoc stays stable and doesn't reload/flash.
+    // Recompute when permission changes so the srcDoc rebuilds with the
+    // unblocked content AND the permissive CSP. The strict blocking-mode CSP
+    // can't be relaxed in place (a document's CSP is fixed at load), so the
+    // "Load images" / "Trust sender" buttons (both flip allowExternalContent)
+    // intentionally trigger a fresh srcDoc. Trust selectors are read inside and
+    // re-read on that rebuild, so they're deliberately omitted from deps.
     // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
-  }, [email, externalContentPolicy, cidBlobUrls, t]);
+  }, [email, externalContentPolicy, allowExternalContent, cidBlobUrls, t]);
 
   // Override email content with S/MIME decrypted content when available
   const effectiveEmailContent = useMemo(() => {
@@ -2642,26 +2629,26 @@ export function EmailViewer({
         }
       );
       const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(htmlWithCidUrls, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
-      return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(smimeDecryptedHtml) };
+      return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(smimeDecryptedHtml), externalBlocked: false };
     }
     if (smimeDecryptedText) {
-      return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(smimeDecryptedText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
+      return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(smimeDecryptedText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
     }
     // TNEF (winmail.dat) extracted content
     if (tnefHtml) {
       const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(tnefHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
-      return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(tnefHtml) };
+      return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(tnefHtml), externalBlocked: false };
     }
     if (tnefText) {
-      return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(tnefText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
+      return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(tnefText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
     }
     // Embedded message/rfc822 unwrapped content
     if (embeddedEmailHtml) {
       const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(embeddedEmailHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
-      return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(embeddedEmailHtml) };
+      return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(embeddedEmailHtml), externalBlocked: false };
     }
     if (embeddedEmailText) {
-      return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(embeddedEmailText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
+      return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(embeddedEmailText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
     }
     return emailContent;
   }, [cidBlobUrls, emailContent, smimeDecryptedHtml, smimeDecryptedText, tnefHtml, tnefText, embeddedEmailHtml, embeddedEmailText]);
@@ -2941,16 +2928,25 @@ export function EmailViewer({
       p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 0 0 6px; }
     ` : '';
 
-    // Defense-in-depth CSP inside srcDoc: even if the sanitizer ever lets a
-    // <script> tag through, the iframe document forbids script execution
-    // (default-src 'none'). img/style/font remain permissive to match what the
-    // sanitizer is allowed to emit and what the host already permits when
-    // external content is loaded.
-    const iframeCsp = "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob: http: https:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data: http: https:; media-src data: blob: http: https:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'";
+    // Defense-in-depth CSP inside srcDoc. default-src 'none' forbids script
+    // execution even if the sanitizer ever lets a <script> through.
+    //
+    // When external content is blocked, img/media/font are restricted to
+    // data:/blob: only — this is the network-level backstop for every tracking
+    // vector, including ones the DOM-walk blocker can't see (CSS escapes,
+    // <style>-tag url(), @font-face). When the user loads/trusts the sender the
+    // srcDoc is rebuilt (see emailContent) with the permissive variant so real
+    // images, web fonts and media load. cid:/inline images are pre-rewritten to
+    // blob: URLs, so they survive the strict variant.
+    const iframeCsp = effectiveEmailContent.externalBlocked
+      ? "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data:; media-src data: blob:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'"
+      : "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob: http: https:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data: http: https:; media-src data: blob: http: https:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'";
 
     return `<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html style="color-scheme: ${colorScheme};"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
 <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${iframeCsp}">
+<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
+<meta http-equiv="x-dns-prefetch-control" content="off">
 <style>
   /* Force content height: some emails set html/body { height: 100% }, which -
      combined with overflow:hidden and our scrollHeight-based auto-resize -
@@ -2977,64 +2973,14 @@ export function EmailViewer({
   ${wordHtmlCSS}
   ${darkModeCSS}
 </style></head><body>${effectiveEmailContent.html}<style>html,body{height:auto!important;min-height:0!important;max-height:none!important}</style></body></html>`;
-  }, [effectiveEmailContent.html, effectiveEmailContent.isHtml, effectiveEmailContent.hasStyleTag, isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode]);
+  }, [effectiveEmailContent.html, effectiveEmailContent.isHtml, effectiveEmailContent.hasStyleTag, effectiveEmailContent.externalBlocked, isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode]);
 
-  // Imperatively restore blocked external content inside the iframe document.
-  // Avoids re-rendering the iframe srcDoc (which would reload and flash) when
-  // the user clicks "Load images" or "Trust sender".
-  const restoreBlockedContent = useCallback(() => {
-    const doc = iframeRef.current?.contentDocument;
-    if (!doc) return;
-
-    doc.querySelectorAll('img[data-blocked-src]').forEach((node) => {
-      const el = node as HTMLImageElement;
-      const src = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-src');
-      if (src) {
-        el.setAttribute('src', src);
-        el.style.display = '';
-        el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-src');
-      }
-    });
-
-    doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-style]').forEach((node) => {
-      const el = node as HTMLElement;
-      const style = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-style');
-      if (style !== null) {
-        el.style.cssText = style;
-        el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-style');
-      }
-    });
-
-    doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-background]').forEach((node) => {
-      const el = node as HTMLElement;
-      const bg = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-background');
-      if (bg) {
-        el.setAttribute('background', bg);
-        el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-background');
-      }
-    });
-
-    doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-collapsed-style]').forEach((node) => {
-      const el = node as HTMLElement;
-      const style = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-collapsed-style');
-      if (style !== null) {
-        el.style.cssText = style;
-        el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-collapsed-style');
-      }
-    });
-  }, []);
-
-  // Whenever permission is granted (allow toggled, or sender becomes trusted),
-  // restore blocked content in the existing iframe - no srcDoc rebuild.
-  const senderEmailLower = email?.from?.[0]?.email?.toLowerCase();
-  const senderIsTrustedNow = senderEmailLower
-    ? isSenderTrusted(senderEmailLower) || (trustedSendersAddressBook && isTrustedAddressBookSender(senderEmailLower))
-    : false;
-  useEffect(() => {
-    if (!hasBlockedContent) return;
-    if (!allowExternalContent && !senderIsTrustedNow) return;
-    restoreBlockedContent();
-  }, [allowExternalContent, senderIsTrustedNow, hasBlockedContent, restoreBlockedContent]);
+  // Unblocking external content is handled by rebuilding the iframe srcDoc:
+  // toggling allowExternalContent (both "Load images" and "Trust sender" set
+  // it) recomputes emailContent without blocking and swaps the strict CSP for
+  // the permissive one. In-place restore isn't possible because a document's
+  // CSP is fixed at load — the strict blocking-mode CSP would keep refusing the
+  // restored URLs.
 
   // Tracks the last rendered body height so the loading skeleton can hold
   // the same size - avoids the body shrink/expand flash when switching emails.
diff --git a/lib/__tests__/email-sanitization.test.ts b/lib/__tests__/email-sanitization.test.ts
index b2426a68..4691b0e0 100644
--- a/lib/__tests__/email-sanitization.test.ts
+++ b/lib/__tests__/email-sanitization.test.ts
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ import {
   hasRichFormatting,
   plainTextToSafeHtml,
   EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
+  EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
+  isExternalResourceUrl,
+  decodeCssEscapes,
+  styleHasExternalUrl,
+  stripExternalCssUrls,
+  blockExternalResourcesOnNode,
+  TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
 } from '../email-sanitization';
 
 describe('email-sanitization', () => {
@@ -324,6 +331,205 @@ describe('email-sanitization', () => {
     });
   });
 
+  describe('isExternalResourceUrl', () => {
+    it('detects http(s) and protocol-relative URLs', () => {
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('http://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('//tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('sees through leading whitespace/newlines (imgNewlineSrc bypass)', () => {
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('\n\nhttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('  \t https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      // Tab/newline removed anywhere in the URL by the parser.
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('h\nttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('ht\ttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('treats inline/local schemes as not external', () => {
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('blob:http://localhost/abc')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('cid:image001@example.com')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('/relative/path.png')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl(null)).toBe(false);
+      expect(isExternalResourceUrl(undefined)).toBe(false);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('decodeCssEscapes', () => {
+    it('decodes hex escapes (cssEscape bypass)', () => {
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68ttp://x')).toBe('http://x');
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\000068ttps://x')).toBe('https://x');
+      // Hex escape consumes one trailing whitespace separator.
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68 ttp')).toBe('http');
+    });
+
+    it('decodes single-character escapes', () => {
+      expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\h\\t\\t\\p')).toBe('http');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('styleHasExternalUrl / stripExternalCssUrls', () => {
+    it('detects and strips plain external url()', () => {
+      const style = 'background:url(https://tracker.example/p.png)';
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
+      expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
+    });
+
+    it('detects and strips CSS-escaped external url()', () => {
+      const style = 'background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)';
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
+      expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
+    });
+
+    it('detects url() with whitespace/quotes', () => {
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl("background: url( '\n https://t/p.png' )")).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('leaves data: and relative url() untouched', () => {
+      const style = "background:url('')";
+      expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(false);
+      expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe(style);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('blockExternalResourcesOnNode (anti-tracking vectors)', () => {
+    function el(html: string): Element {
+      return parseHtmlSafely(`<body>${html}</body>`).body.firstElementChild!;
+    }
+
+    it('blocks an img whose src is hidden behind a leading newline', () => {
+      const img = el('<img src="">');
+      img.setAttribute('src', '\n\nhttps://tracker.example/pixel.png');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toBe('https://tracker.example/pixel.png');
+      expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks img srcset', () => {
+      const img = el('<img srcset="https://tracker.example/1x.png 1x, https://tracker.example/2x.png 2x">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
+      expect(img.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('blocks <picture><source srcset> (pictureSource)', () => {
+      const source = el('<source srcset="https://tracker.example/pic.webp" type="image/webp">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
+      expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks <source src> for media', () => {
+      const source = el('<source src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
+      expect(source.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
+      expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('blocks <video poster> (videoPoster)', () => {
+      const video = el('<video poster="https://tracker.example/poster.jpg"></video>');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
+      expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('blocks video src', () => {
+      const video = el('<video src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4"></video>');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('blocks the legacy background attribute', () => {
+      // <td> is foster-parented out of <body>, so build it directly.
+      const td = document.createElement('td');
+      td.setAttribute('background', 'https://tracker.example/bg.png');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(td)).toBe(true);
+      expect(td.hasAttribute('background')).toBe(false);
+      expect(td.getAttribute('data-blocked-background')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('strips external inline style url() including CSS escapes (cssEscape)', () => {
+      const div = el('<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)">x</div>');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(div)).toBe(true);
+      expect(div.getAttribute('style')).not.toContain('tracker.example');
+      expect(div.getAttribute('data-blocked-style')).toContain('tracker.example');
+    });
+
+    it('does not block inline/local resources', () => {
+      const img = el('<img src="blob:http://localhost/inline">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(false);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe('blob:http://localhost/inline');
+
+      const dataImg = el('<img src="">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(dataImg)).toBe(false);
+
+      const cidImg = el('<img src="cid:logo@example.com">');
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(cidImg)).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('works as a DOMPurify afterSanitizeAttributes hook across all vectors', () => {
+      const html = `
+        <img src="&#10;&#10;https://tracker.example/a.png">
+        <picture><source srcset="https://tracker.example/b.webp"><img src="https://tracker.example/c.png"></picture>
+        <div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/d.png)">bg</div>
+      `;
+      DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
+        blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element);
+      });
+      const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+      DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
+
+      const doc = parseHtmlSafely(clean);
+      // No live src/srcset/style references the tracker anymore.
+      doc.querySelectorAll('img, source').forEach((node) => {
+        expect(node.getAttribute('src') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
+        expect(node.getAttribute('srcset') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
+      });
+      expect(doc.querySelector('div')?.getAttribute('style') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
+      // The originals are stashed for the banner/affordance.
+      expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-src');
+      expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-srcset');
+      expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-style');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('Email Privacy Tester exact payloads (iframe render path)', () => {
+    function render(html: string): string {
+      DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) =>
+        blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element)
+      );
+      const out = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+      DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
+      return out;
+    }
+
+    it('pictureSource: <picture><source srcset> does not keep a live external ref', () => {
+      const source = parseHtmlSafely(render('<picture><source srcset="http://TRACK/"><img src="#"></picture>')).querySelector('source')!;
+      expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
+      expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('TRACK');
+    });
+
+    it('imgNewlineSrc: newline after the first slash (protocol-relative) is blocked', () => {
+      const img = parseHtmlSafely(render('<img src="/\n/TRACK_HOST/PATH">')).querySelector('img')!;
+      expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
+      expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('TRACK_HOST');
+    });
+
+    it('videoPoster: poster and src are both stripped', () => {
+      const video = parseHtmlSafely(render('<video poster="http://TRACK/" autoplay="true" src="http://OTHER/"></video>')).querySelector('video')!;
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
+      expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
+      expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('TRACK');
+      expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('OTHER');
+    });
+
+    it('anchor href is preserved (links stay clickable; DNS prefetch is disabled via iframe meta)', () => {
+      const out = render('<a href="http://TRACK/">link</a>');
+      expect(out).toContain('href="http://TRACK/"');
+    });
+  });
+
   describe('plainTextToSafeHtml', () => {
     it('escapes HTML-special characters in surrounding text', () => {
       const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('<script>alert(1)</script> & "q" \'q\'');
diff --git a/lib/email-sanitization.ts b/lib/email-sanitization.ts
index f1452c98..f1b39c90 100644
--- a/lib/email-sanitization.ts
+++ b/lib/email-sanitization.ts
@@ -140,6 +140,161 @@ export function sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(html: string): string {
   return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, PLAIN_TEXT_RENDERED_CONFIG);
 }
 
+/**
+ * 1x1 transparent SVG used to replace a blocked external <img> so the layout
+ * doesn't reflow to a broken-image icon. The real URL is stashed in
+ * `data-blocked-src` for restore.
+ */
+export const TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL =
+  '';
+
+/**
+ * True if a resource URL would trigger an external (network) fetch once the
+ * browser normalizes it. The URL parser removes ASCII tab/newline characters
+ * anywhere in the string and trims leading/trailing C0-control + space before
+ * resolving, so `"\n\nhttps://t"` and `"h\ttps://t"` are both external even
+ * though they don't literally start with "https://" (the `imgNewlineSrc`
+ * tracking bypass). Protocol-relative `//host` is external too. data:, blob:,
+ * and cid: are inline/local and never count as external.
+ */
+export function isExternalResourceUrl(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!value) return false;
+  // Mirror the URL parser: drop every ASCII C0-control and space char it
+  // ignores (leading/trailing trim plus tab/newline/CR removed anywhere).
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  const normalized = value.replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '');
+  return /^(?:https?:\/\/|\/\/)/i.test(normalized);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Decode CSS escape sequences so escaped tracking URLs can be recognised.
+ * `\68ttp://x` and `\000068ttp://x` both decode to `http://x` (the `cssEscape`
+ * bypass). Handles the two CSS escape forms: 1-6 hex digits (optionally
+ * followed by one whitespace) and a backslash before any other character.
+ */
+export function decodeCssEscapes(value: string): string {
+  return value.replace(/\\([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6})\s?|\\(.)/g, (_full, hex, char) => {
+    if (hex) {
+      const code = parseInt(hex, 16);
+      return code ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : '';
+    }
+    return char ?? '';
+  });
+}
+
+const CSS_URL_PATTERN = /url\(\s*(['"]?)([^)]*?)\1\s*\)/gi;
+
+/** True if any `url(...)` in a CSS string resolves to an external resource. */
+export function styleHasExternalUrl(style: string): boolean {
+  let found = false;
+  style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) => {
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner))) found = true;
+    return full;
+  });
+  return found;
+}
+
+/** Replace every external `url(...)` in a CSS string with an empty `url()`. */
+export function stripExternalCssUrls(style: string): string {
+  return style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) =>
+    isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner)) ? 'url()' : full
+  );
+}
+
+/** True if a srcset attribute lists at least one external candidate URL. */
+function srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset: string): boolean {
+  return srcset
+    .split(',')
+    .some((candidate) => isExternalResourceUrl(candidate.trim().split(/\s+/)[0]));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Neutralise every external-resource vector on a single sanitized element,
+ * stashing the original value in a `data-blocked-*` attribute for later
+ * restore. Covers the vectors Email Privacy Tester exercises beyond a bare
+ * `<img src>`: whitespace/newline in src, `<picture><source srcset>`,
+ * `<video poster>`/media src, the legacy `background` attribute, and inline
+ * `style` url() (including CSS-escaped URLs).
+ *
+ * This is the first line of defence (it drives the "external content blocked"
+ * banner and placeholder swap); the iframe's strict img-src/media-src/font-src
+ * CSP is the guaranteed network-level backstop for anything expressed in ways
+ * the DOM walk can't see (e.g. `<style>`-tag rules).
+ *
+ * @returns true if anything on the node was blocked.
+ */
+export function blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node: Element): boolean {
+  let blocked = false;
+  const tag = node.tagName;
+
+  if (tag === 'IMG') {
+    const src = node.getAttribute('src');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
+      node.setAttribute('src', TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
+      node.setAttribute('alt', '');
+      (node as HTMLElement).style.display = 'none';
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Responsive images: <img srcset> and <picture><source srcset>.
+  if (tag === 'IMG' || tag === 'SOURCE') {
+    const srcset = node.getAttribute('srcset');
+    if (srcset && srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-srcset', srcset);
+      node.removeAttribute('srcset');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // <source src> for <video>/<audio> (and rare <picture> src).
+  if (tag === 'SOURCE') {
+    const src = node.getAttribute('src');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
+      node.removeAttribute('src');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // <video poster> and direct <video>/<audio> src.
+  if (tag === 'VIDEO' || tag === 'AUDIO') {
+    const poster = node.getAttribute('poster');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(poster)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-poster', poster!.trim());
+      node.removeAttribute('poster');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+    const src = node.getAttribute('src');
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
+      node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
+      node.removeAttribute('src');
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Legacy table/cell background attribute.
+  const bgAttr = node.getAttribute('background');
+  if (isExternalResourceUrl(bgAttr)) {
+    node.setAttribute('data-blocked-background', bgAttr!.trim());
+    node.removeAttribute('background');
+    blocked = true;
+  }
+
+  // Inline style url() — read the raw attribute so CSS escapes survive for
+  // decoding, then strip only the external urls.
+  const styleAttr = node.getAttribute('style');
+  if (styleAttr && styleHasExternalUrl(styleAttr)) {
+    node.setAttribute('data-blocked-style', styleAttr);
+    node.setAttribute('style', stripExternalCssUrls(styleAttr));
+    blocked = true;
+  }
+
+  return blocked;
+}
+
 /**
  * Safe HTML parsing without execution
  * Use instead of innerHTML for detection/parsing