fix: block remaining email tracking vectors #457
This commit is contained in:
Linus Rath
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import DOMPurify from "dompurify";
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import { Email, ContactCard, Mailbox } from "@/lib/jmap/types";
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import { emailExportFilename, attachmentDownloadFilename, DEFAULT_EMAIL_TEMPLATE, DEFAULT_ATTACHMENT_TEMPLATE } from "@/lib/download-filename";
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import { EML_IMPORT_ACCEPT, expandImportableEmails } from "@/lib/eml-import";
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import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
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import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, blockExternalResourcesOnNode, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
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import { hasMeaningfulHtmlBody } from "@/lib/signature-utils";
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import { withBasePath } from "@/lib/browser-navigation";
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import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
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@@ -2462,7 +2462,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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// Sanitize and prepare email HTML content
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const emailContent = useMemo(() => {
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if (!email) return { html: "", isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
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if (!email) return { html: "", isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
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// Check if we have body values
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if (email.bodyValues) {
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@@ -2530,38 +2530,14 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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}
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DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
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const htmlNode = node as HTMLElement;
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if (shouldBlockExternal) {
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if (node.tagName === 'IMG') {
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const src = node.getAttribute('src');
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if (src && (src.startsWith('http://') || src.startsWith('https://') || src.startsWith('//'))) {
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node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src);
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node.setAttribute('src', '');
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node.setAttribute('alt', '');
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htmlNode.style.display = 'none';
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blockedExternalContent = true;
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}
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}
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const bgAttr = node.getAttribute?.('background');
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if (bgAttr && (bgAttr.startsWith('http://') || bgAttr.startsWith('https://') || bgAttr.startsWith('//'))) {
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node.setAttribute('data-blocked-background', bgAttr);
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node.removeAttribute('background');
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// Blocks every external-resource vector (img src incl.
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// whitespace/newline tricks, srcset, <source>, <video poster>,
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// media src, background attr, inline style url() incl. CSS
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// escapes). The strict iframe CSP below is the network backstop.
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if (blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node)) {
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blockedExternalContent = true;
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}
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if (htmlNode.style) {
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const style = htmlNode.style.cssText;
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if (style && style.includes('url(')) {
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const urlMatch = style.match(/url\(['"]?(https?:\/\/[^'")\s]+)['"]?\)/gi);
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if (urlMatch) {
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node.setAttribute('data-blocked-style', style);
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htmlNode.style.cssText = style.replace(/url\(['"]?https?:\/\/[^'")\s]+['"]?\)/gi, 'url()');
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blockedExternalContent = true;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (node.tagName === 'A') {
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@@ -2592,6 +2568,11 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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html: cleanHtml,
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isHtml: true,
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hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(htmlContent),
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// Drives the strict iframe CSP: when we're in blocking mode the
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// iframe forbids external img/media/font fetches entirely, so any
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// vector the DOM walk above missed (e.g. <style>-tag url()) still
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// can't phone home. Cleared once the user allows / trusts.
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externalBlocked: shouldBlockExternal,
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};
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}
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@@ -2603,6 +2584,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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html: plainTextToSafeHtml(textContent),
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isHtml: false,
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hasStyleTag: false,
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externalBlocked: false,
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};
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}
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}
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@@ -2618,6 +2600,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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html: `<div style="color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-style: italic;">${previewHtml}</div>`,
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isHtml: false,
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hasStyleTag: false,
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externalBlocked: false,
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};
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}
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@@ -2625,12 +2608,16 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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html: `<p style="color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-style: italic;">${t('no_body_content')}</p>`,
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isHtml: false,
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hasStyleTag: false,
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externalBlocked: false,
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};
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// Intentionally omit allowExternalContent and trust state from deps:
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// toggling permission imperatively unblocks content via restoreBlockedContent
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// in an effect below, so the iframe srcDoc stays stable and doesn't reload/flash.
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// Recompute when permission changes so the srcDoc rebuilds with the
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// unblocked content AND the permissive CSP. The strict blocking-mode CSP
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// can't be relaxed in place (a document's CSP is fixed at load), so the
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// "Load images" / "Trust sender" buttons (both flip allowExternalContent)
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// intentionally trigger a fresh srcDoc. Trust selectors are read inside and
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// re-read on that rebuild, so they're deliberately omitted from deps.
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// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
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}, [email, externalContentPolicy, cidBlobUrls, t]);
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}, [email, externalContentPolicy, allowExternalContent, cidBlobUrls, t]);
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// Override email content with S/MIME decrypted content when available
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const effectiveEmailContent = useMemo(() => {
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@@ -2642,26 +2629,26 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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}
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);
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const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(htmlWithCidUrls, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
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return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(smimeDecryptedHtml) };
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return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(smimeDecryptedHtml), externalBlocked: false };
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}
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if (smimeDecryptedText) {
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return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(smimeDecryptedText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
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return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(smimeDecryptedText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
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}
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// TNEF (winmail.dat) extracted content
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if (tnefHtml) {
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const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(tnefHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
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return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(tnefHtml) };
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return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(tnefHtml), externalBlocked: false };
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}
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if (tnefText) {
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return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(tnefText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
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return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(tnefText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
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}
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// Embedded message/rfc822 unwrapped content
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if (embeddedEmailHtml) {
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const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(embeddedEmailHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
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return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(embeddedEmailHtml) };
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return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(embeddedEmailHtml), externalBlocked: false };
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}
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if (embeddedEmailText) {
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return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(embeddedEmailText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
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return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(embeddedEmailText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
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}
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return emailContent;
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}, [cidBlobUrls, emailContent, smimeDecryptedHtml, smimeDecryptedText, tnefHtml, tnefText, embeddedEmailHtml, embeddedEmailText]);
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@@ -2941,16 +2928,25 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 0 0 6px; }
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` : '';
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// Defense-in-depth CSP inside srcDoc: even if the sanitizer ever lets a
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// <script> tag through, the iframe document forbids script execution
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// (default-src 'none'). img/style/font remain permissive to match what the
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// sanitizer is allowed to emit and what the host already permits when
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// external content is loaded.
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const iframeCsp = "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob: http: https:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data: http: https:; media-src data: blob: http: https:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'";
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// Defense-in-depth CSP inside srcDoc. default-src 'none' forbids script
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// execution even if the sanitizer ever lets a <script> through.
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//
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// When external content is blocked, img/media/font are restricted to
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// data:/blob: only — this is the network-level backstop for every tracking
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// vector, including ones the DOM-walk blocker can't see (CSS escapes,
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// <style>-tag url(), @font-face). When the user loads/trusts the sender the
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// srcDoc is rebuilt (see emailContent) with the permissive variant so real
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// images, web fonts and media load. cid:/inline images are pre-rewritten to
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// blob: URLs, so they survive the strict variant.
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const iframeCsp = effectiveEmailContent.externalBlocked
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? "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data:; media-src data: blob:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'"
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: "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob: http: https:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data: http: https:; media-src data: blob: http: https:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'";
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return `<!DOCTYPE html>
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<html style="color-scheme: ${colorScheme};"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
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<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${iframeCsp}">
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<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
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<meta http-equiv="x-dns-prefetch-control" content="off">
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<style>
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/* Force content height: some emails set html/body { height: 100% }, which -
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combined with overflow:hidden and our scrollHeight-based auto-resize -
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@@ -2977,64 +2973,14 @@ export function EmailViewer({
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${wordHtmlCSS}
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${darkModeCSS}
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</style></head><body>${effectiveEmailContent.html}<style>html,body{height:auto!important;min-height:0!important;max-height:none!important}</style></body></html>`;
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}, [effectiveEmailContent.html, effectiveEmailContent.isHtml, effectiveEmailContent.hasStyleTag, isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode]);
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}, [effectiveEmailContent.html, effectiveEmailContent.isHtml, effectiveEmailContent.hasStyleTag, effectiveEmailContent.externalBlocked, isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode]);
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// Imperatively restore blocked external content inside the iframe document.
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// Avoids re-rendering the iframe srcDoc (which would reload and flash) when
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// the user clicks "Load images" or "Trust sender".
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const restoreBlockedContent = useCallback(() => {
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const doc = iframeRef.current?.contentDocument;
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if (!doc) return;
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doc.querySelectorAll('img[data-blocked-src]').forEach((node) => {
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const el = node as HTMLImageElement;
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const src = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-src');
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if (src) {
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el.setAttribute('src', src);
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el.style.display = '';
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el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-src');
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}
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});
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doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-style]').forEach((node) => {
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const el = node as HTMLElement;
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const style = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-style');
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if (style !== null) {
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el.style.cssText = style;
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el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-style');
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}
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});
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doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-background]').forEach((node) => {
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const el = node as HTMLElement;
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const bg = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-background');
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if (bg) {
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el.setAttribute('background', bg);
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el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-background');
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}
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});
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doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-collapsed-style]').forEach((node) => {
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const el = node as HTMLElement;
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const style = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-collapsed-style');
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if (style !== null) {
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el.style.cssText = style;
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el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-collapsed-style');
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}
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});
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}, []);
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// Whenever permission is granted (allow toggled, or sender becomes trusted),
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// restore blocked content in the existing iframe - no srcDoc rebuild.
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const senderEmailLower = email?.from?.[0]?.email?.toLowerCase();
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const senderIsTrustedNow = senderEmailLower
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? isSenderTrusted(senderEmailLower) || (trustedSendersAddressBook && isTrustedAddressBookSender(senderEmailLower))
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: false;
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useEffect(() => {
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if (!hasBlockedContent) return;
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if (!allowExternalContent && !senderIsTrustedNow) return;
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restoreBlockedContent();
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}, [allowExternalContent, senderIsTrustedNow, hasBlockedContent, restoreBlockedContent]);
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// Unblocking external content is handled by rebuilding the iframe srcDoc:
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// toggling allowExternalContent (both "Load images" and "Trust sender" set
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// it) recomputes emailContent without blocking and swaps the strict CSP for
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// the permissive one. In-place restore isn't possible because a document's
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// CSP is fixed at load — the strict blocking-mode CSP would keep refusing the
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// restored URLs.
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// Tracks the last rendered body height so the loading skeleton can hold
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// the same size - avoids the body shrink/expand flash when switching emails.
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@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@ import {
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hasRichFormatting,
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plainTextToSafeHtml,
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EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
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EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
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isExternalResourceUrl,
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decodeCssEscapes,
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styleHasExternalUrl,
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stripExternalCssUrls,
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blockExternalResourcesOnNode,
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TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
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} from '../email-sanitization';
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describe('email-sanitization', () => {
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@@ -324,6 +331,205 @@ describe('email-sanitization', () => {
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});
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});
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describe('isExternalResourceUrl', () => {
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it('detects http(s) and protocol-relative URLs', () => {
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('http://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('//tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('sees through leading whitespace/newlines (imgNewlineSrc bypass)', () => {
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('\n\nhttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl(' \t https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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// Tab/newline removed anywhere in the URL by the parser.
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('h\nttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('ht\ttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
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});
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it('treats inline/local schemes as not external', () => {
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('blob:http://localhost/abc')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('cid:image001@example.com')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('/relative/path.png')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl(null)).toBe(false);
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expect(isExternalResourceUrl(undefined)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe('decodeCssEscapes', () => {
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it('decodes hex escapes (cssEscape bypass)', () => {
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expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68ttp://x')).toBe('http://x');
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expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\000068ttps://x')).toBe('https://x');
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// Hex escape consumes one trailing whitespace separator.
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expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68 ttp')).toBe('http');
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});
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it('decodes single-character escapes', () => {
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expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\h\\t\\t\\p')).toBe('http');
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});
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});
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describe('styleHasExternalUrl / stripExternalCssUrls', () => {
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it('detects and strips plain external url()', () => {
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const style = 'background:url(https://tracker.example/p.png)';
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expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
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expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
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});
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it('detects and strips CSS-escaped external url()', () => {
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const style = 'background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)';
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expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
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expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
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});
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it('detects url() with whitespace/quotes', () => {
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expect(styleHasExternalUrl("background: url( '\n https://t/p.png' )")).toBe(true);
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});
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it('leaves data: and relative url() untouched', () => {
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const style = "background:url('')";
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expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(false);
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expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe(style);
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});
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});
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describe('blockExternalResourcesOnNode (anti-tracking vectors)', () => {
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function el(html: string): Element {
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return parseHtmlSafely(`<body>${html}</body>`).body.firstElementChild!;
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}
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it('blocks an img whose src is hidden behind a leading newline', () => {
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const img = el('<img src="">');
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img.setAttribute('src', '\n\nhttps://tracker.example/pixel.png');
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expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
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expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toBe('https://tracker.example/pixel.png');
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expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
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});
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it('blocks img srcset', () => {
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const img = el('<img srcset="https://tracker.example/1x.png 1x, https://tracker.example/2x.png 2x">');
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expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
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expect(img.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
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expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('tracker.example');
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});
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it('blocks <picture><source srcset> (pictureSource)', () => {
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const source = el('<source srcset="https://tracker.example/pic.webp" type="image/webp">');
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expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
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expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
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});
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it('blocks <source src> for media', () => {
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const source = el('<source src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4">');
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expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
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expect(source.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
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expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('tracker.example');
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});
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||||
it('blocks <video poster> (videoPoster)', () => {
|
||||
const video = el('<video poster="https://tracker.example/poster.jpg"></video>');
|
||||
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('blocks video src', () => {
|
||||
const video = el('<video src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4"></video>');
|
||||
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('blocks the legacy background attribute', () => {
|
||||
// <td> is foster-parented out of <body>, so build it directly.
|
||||
const td = document.createElement('td');
|
||||
td.setAttribute('background', 'https://tracker.example/bg.png');
|
||||
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(td)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(td.hasAttribute('background')).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(td.getAttribute('data-blocked-background')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('strips external inline style url() including CSS escapes (cssEscape)', () => {
|
||||
const div = el('<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)">x</div>');
|
||||
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(div)).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(div.getAttribute('style')).not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
||||
expect(div.getAttribute('data-blocked-style')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not block inline/local resources', () => {
|
||||
const img = el('<img src="blob:http://localhost/inline">');
|
||||
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe('blob:http://localhost/inline');
|
||||
|
||||
const dataImg = el('<img src="">');
|
||||
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(dataImg)).toBe(false);
|
||||
|
||||
const cidImg = el('<img src="cid:logo@example.com">');
|
||||
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(cidImg)).toBe(false);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('works as a DOMPurify afterSanitizeAttributes hook across all vectors', () => {
|
||||
const html = `
|
||||
<img src=" https://tracker.example/a.png">
|
||||
<picture><source srcset="https://tracker.example/b.webp"><img src="https://tracker.example/c.png"></picture>
|
||||
<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/d.png)">bg</div>
|
||||
`;
|
||||
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
|
||||
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element);
|
||||
});
|
||||
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
||||
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
|
||||
|
||||
const doc = parseHtmlSafely(clean);
|
||||
// No live src/srcset/style references the tracker anymore.
|
||||
doc.querySelectorAll('img, source').forEach((node) => {
|
||||
expect(node.getAttribute('src') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
||||
expect(node.getAttribute('srcset') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(doc.querySelector('div')?.getAttribute('style') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
||||
// The originals are stashed for the banner/affordance.
|
||||
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-src');
|
||||
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-srcset');
|
||||
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-style');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('Email Privacy Tester exact payloads (iframe render path)', () => {
|
||||
function render(html: string): string {
|
||||
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) =>
|
||||
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element)
|
||||
);
|
||||
const out = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
||||
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
it('pictureSource: <picture><source srcset> does not keep a live external ref', () => {
|
||||
const source = parseHtmlSafely(render('<picture><source srcset="http://TRACK/"><img src="#"></picture>')).querySelector('source')!;
|
||||
expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('TRACK');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('imgNewlineSrc: newline after the first slash (protocol-relative) is blocked', () => {
|
||||
const img = parseHtmlSafely(render('<img src="/\n/TRACK_HOST/PATH">')).querySelector('img')!;
|
||||
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
||||
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('TRACK_HOST');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('videoPoster: poster and src are both stripped', () => {
|
||||
const video = parseHtmlSafely(render('<video poster="http://TRACK/" autoplay="true" src="http://OTHER/"></video>')).querySelector('video')!;
|
||||
expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('TRACK');
|
||||
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('OTHER');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('anchor href is preserved (links stay clickable; DNS prefetch is disabled via iframe meta)', () => {
|
||||
const out = render('<a href="http://TRACK/">link</a>');
|
||||
expect(out).toContain('href="http://TRACK/"');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('plainTextToSafeHtml', () => {
|
||||
it('escapes HTML-special characters in surrounding text', () => {
|
||||
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('<script>alert(1)</script> & "q" \'q\'');
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -140,6 +140,161 @@ export function sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(html: string): string {
|
||||
return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, PLAIN_TEXT_RENDERED_CONFIG);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* 1x1 transparent SVG used to replace a blocked external <img> so the layout
|
||||
* doesn't reflow to a broken-image icon. The real URL is stashed in
|
||||
* `data-blocked-src` for restore.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export const TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL =
|
||||
'';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* True if a resource URL would trigger an external (network) fetch once the
|
||||
* browser normalizes it. The URL parser removes ASCII tab/newline characters
|
||||
* anywhere in the string and trims leading/trailing C0-control + space before
|
||||
* resolving, so `"\n\nhttps://t"` and `"h\ttps://t"` are both external even
|
||||
* though they don't literally start with "https://" (the `imgNewlineSrc`
|
||||
* tracking bypass). Protocol-relative `//host` is external too. data:, blob:,
|
||||
* and cid: are inline/local and never count as external.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function isExternalResourceUrl(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
|
||||
if (!value) return false;
|
||||
// Mirror the URL parser: drop every ASCII C0-control and space char it
|
||||
// ignores (leading/trailing trim plus tab/newline/CR removed anywhere).
|
||||
// eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
|
||||
const normalized = value.replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '');
|
||||
return /^(?:https?:\/\/|\/\/)/i.test(normalized);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Decode CSS escape sequences so escaped tracking URLs can be recognised.
|
||||
* `\68ttp://x` and `\000068ttp://x` both decode to `http://x` (the `cssEscape`
|
||||
* bypass). Handles the two CSS escape forms: 1-6 hex digits (optionally
|
||||
* followed by one whitespace) and a backslash before any other character.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function decodeCssEscapes(value: string): string {
|
||||
return value.replace(/\\([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6})\s?|\\(.)/g, (_full, hex, char) => {
|
||||
if (hex) {
|
||||
const code = parseInt(hex, 16);
|
||||
return code ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : '';
|
||||
}
|
||||
return char ?? '';
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const CSS_URL_PATTERN = /url\(\s*(['"]?)([^)]*?)\1\s*\)/gi;
|
||||
|
||||
/** True if any `url(...)` in a CSS string resolves to an external resource. */
|
||||
export function styleHasExternalUrl(style: string): boolean {
|
||||
let found = false;
|
||||
style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) => {
|
||||
if (isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner))) found = true;
|
||||
return full;
|
||||
});
|
||||
return found;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Replace every external `url(...)` in a CSS string with an empty `url()`. */
|
||||
export function stripExternalCssUrls(style: string): string {
|
||||
return style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) =>
|
||||
isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner)) ? 'url()' : full
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** True if a srcset attribute lists at least one external candidate URL. */
|
||||
function srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset: string): boolean {
|
||||
return srcset
|
||||
.split(',')
|
||||
.some((candidate) => isExternalResourceUrl(candidate.trim().split(/\s+/)[0]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Neutralise every external-resource vector on a single sanitized element,
|
||||
* stashing the original value in a `data-blocked-*` attribute for later
|
||||
* restore. Covers the vectors Email Privacy Tester exercises beyond a bare
|
||||
* `<img src>`: whitespace/newline in src, `<picture><source srcset>`,
|
||||
* `<video poster>`/media src, the legacy `background` attribute, and inline
|
||||
* `style` url() (including CSS-escaped URLs).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This is the first line of defence (it drives the "external content blocked"
|
||||
* banner and placeholder swap); the iframe's strict img-src/media-src/font-src
|
||||
* CSP is the guaranteed network-level backstop for anything expressed in ways
|
||||
* the DOM walk can't see (e.g. `<style>`-tag rules).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @returns true if anything on the node was blocked.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node: Element): boolean {
|
||||
let blocked = false;
|
||||
const tag = node.tagName;
|
||||
|
||||
if (tag === 'IMG') {
|
||||
const src = node.getAttribute('src');
|
||||
if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
|
||||
node.setAttribute('src', TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
||||
node.setAttribute('alt', '');
|
||||
(node as HTMLElement).style.display = 'none';
|
||||
blocked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Responsive images: <img srcset> and <picture><source srcset>.
|
||||
if (tag === 'IMG' || tag === 'SOURCE') {
|
||||
const srcset = node.getAttribute('srcset');
|
||||
if (srcset && srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset)) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-srcset', srcset);
|
||||
node.removeAttribute('srcset');
|
||||
blocked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// <source src> for <video>/<audio> (and rare <picture> src).
|
||||
if (tag === 'SOURCE') {
|
||||
const src = node.getAttribute('src');
|
||||
if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
|
||||
node.removeAttribute('src');
|
||||
blocked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// <video poster> and direct <video>/<audio> src.
|
||||
if (tag === 'VIDEO' || tag === 'AUDIO') {
|
||||
const poster = node.getAttribute('poster');
|
||||
if (isExternalResourceUrl(poster)) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-poster', poster!.trim());
|
||||
node.removeAttribute('poster');
|
||||
blocked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const src = node.getAttribute('src');
|
||||
if (isExternalResourceUrl(src)) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src!.trim());
|
||||
node.removeAttribute('src');
|
||||
blocked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Legacy table/cell background attribute.
|
||||
const bgAttr = node.getAttribute('background');
|
||||
if (isExternalResourceUrl(bgAttr)) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-background', bgAttr!.trim());
|
||||
node.removeAttribute('background');
|
||||
blocked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Inline style url() — read the raw attribute so CSS escapes survive for
|
||||
// decoding, then strip only the external urls.
|
||||
const styleAttr = node.getAttribute('style');
|
||||
if (styleAttr && styleHasExternalUrl(styleAttr)) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-style', styleAttr);
|
||||
node.setAttribute('style', stripExternalCssUrls(styleAttr));
|
||||
blocked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return blocked;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Safe HTML parsing without execution
|
||||
* Use instead of innerHTML for detection/parsing
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user