fix: block remaining email tracking vectors #457
This commit is contained in:
Linus Rath
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import DOMPurify from "dompurify";
|
||||
import { Email, ContactCard, Mailbox } from "@/lib/jmap/types";
|
||||
import { emailExportFilename, attachmentDownloadFilename, DEFAULT_EMAIL_TEMPLATE, DEFAULT_ATTACHMENT_TEMPLATE } from "@/lib/download-filename";
|
||||
import { EML_IMPORT_ACCEPT, expandImportableEmails } from "@/lib/eml-import";
|
||||
import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
|
||||
import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, blockExternalResourcesOnNode, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
|
||||
import { hasMeaningfulHtmlBody } from "@/lib/signature-utils";
|
||||
import { withBasePath } from "@/lib/browser-navigation";
|
||||
import { Button } from "@/components/ui/button";
|
||||
@@ -2462,7 +2462,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
|
||||
// Sanitize and prepare email HTML content
|
||||
const emailContent = useMemo(() => {
|
||||
if (!email) return { html: "", isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
|
||||
if (!email) return { html: "", isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we have body values
|
||||
if (email.bodyValues) {
|
||||
@@ -2530,38 +2530,14 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
|
||||
const htmlNode = node as HTMLElement;
|
||||
|
||||
if (shouldBlockExternal) {
|
||||
if (node.tagName === 'IMG') {
|
||||
const src = node.getAttribute('src');
|
||||
if (src && (src.startsWith('http://') || src.startsWith('https://') || src.startsWith('//'))) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src);
|
||||
node.setAttribute('src', '');
|
||||
node.setAttribute('alt', '');
|
||||
htmlNode.style.display = 'none';
|
||||
blockedExternalContent = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const bgAttr = node.getAttribute?.('background');
|
||||
if (bgAttr && (bgAttr.startsWith('http://') || bgAttr.startsWith('https://') || bgAttr.startsWith('//'))) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-background', bgAttr);
|
||||
node.removeAttribute('background');
|
||||
// Blocks every external-resource vector (img src incl.
|
||||
// whitespace/newline tricks, srcset, <source>, <video poster>,
|
||||
// media src, background attr, inline style url() incl. CSS
|
||||
// escapes). The strict iframe CSP below is the network backstop.
|
||||
if (blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node)) {
|
||||
blockedExternalContent = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (htmlNode.style) {
|
||||
const style = htmlNode.style.cssText;
|
||||
if (style && style.includes('url(')) {
|
||||
const urlMatch = style.match(/url\(['"]?(https?:\/\/[^'")\s]+)['"]?\)/gi);
|
||||
if (urlMatch) {
|
||||
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-style', style);
|
||||
htmlNode.style.cssText = style.replace(/url\(['"]?https?:\/\/[^'")\s]+['"]?\)/gi, 'url()');
|
||||
blockedExternalContent = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (node.tagName === 'A') {
|
||||
@@ -2592,6 +2568,11 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
html: cleanHtml,
|
||||
isHtml: true,
|
||||
hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(htmlContent),
|
||||
// Drives the strict iframe CSP: when we're in blocking mode the
|
||||
// iframe forbids external img/media/font fetches entirely, so any
|
||||
// vector the DOM walk above missed (e.g. <style>-tag url()) still
|
||||
// can't phone home. Cleared once the user allows / trusts.
|
||||
externalBlocked: shouldBlockExternal,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2603,6 +2584,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
html: plainTextToSafeHtml(textContent),
|
||||
isHtml: false,
|
||||
hasStyleTag: false,
|
||||
externalBlocked: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2618,6 +2600,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
html: `<div style="color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-style: italic;">${previewHtml}</div>`,
|
||||
isHtml: false,
|
||||
hasStyleTag: false,
|
||||
externalBlocked: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2625,12 +2608,16 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
html: `<p style="color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-style: italic;">${t('no_body_content')}</p>`,
|
||||
isHtml: false,
|
||||
hasStyleTag: false,
|
||||
externalBlocked: false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Intentionally omit allowExternalContent and trust state from deps:
|
||||
// toggling permission imperatively unblocks content via restoreBlockedContent
|
||||
// in an effect below, so the iframe srcDoc stays stable and doesn't reload/flash.
|
||||
// Recompute when permission changes so the srcDoc rebuilds with the
|
||||
// unblocked content AND the permissive CSP. The strict blocking-mode CSP
|
||||
// can't be relaxed in place (a document's CSP is fixed at load), so the
|
||||
// "Load images" / "Trust sender" buttons (both flip allowExternalContent)
|
||||
// intentionally trigger a fresh srcDoc. Trust selectors are read inside and
|
||||
// re-read on that rebuild, so they're deliberately omitted from deps.
|
||||
// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
|
||||
}, [email, externalContentPolicy, cidBlobUrls, t]);
|
||||
}, [email, externalContentPolicy, allowExternalContent, cidBlobUrls, t]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Override email content with S/MIME decrypted content when available
|
||||
const effectiveEmailContent = useMemo(() => {
|
||||
@@ -2642,26 +2629,26 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(htmlWithCidUrls, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
||||
return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(smimeDecryptedHtml) };
|
||||
return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(smimeDecryptedHtml), externalBlocked: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (smimeDecryptedText) {
|
||||
return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(smimeDecryptedText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
|
||||
return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(smimeDecryptedText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
// TNEF (winmail.dat) extracted content
|
||||
if (tnefHtml) {
|
||||
const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(tnefHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
||||
return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(tnefHtml) };
|
||||
return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(tnefHtml), externalBlocked: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (tnefText) {
|
||||
return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(tnefText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
|
||||
return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(tnefText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Embedded message/rfc822 unwrapped content
|
||||
if (embeddedEmailHtml) {
|
||||
const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(embeddedEmailHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
||||
return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(embeddedEmailHtml) };
|
||||
return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(embeddedEmailHtml), externalBlocked: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (embeddedEmailText) {
|
||||
return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(embeddedEmailText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false };
|
||||
return { html: plainTextToSafeHtml(embeddedEmailText), isHtml: false, hasStyleTag: false, externalBlocked: false };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return emailContent;
|
||||
}, [cidBlobUrls, emailContent, smimeDecryptedHtml, smimeDecryptedText, tnefHtml, tnefText, embeddedEmailHtml, embeddedEmailText]);
|
||||
@@ -2941,16 +2928,25 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 0 0 6px; }
|
||||
` : '';
|
||||
|
||||
// Defense-in-depth CSP inside srcDoc: even if the sanitizer ever lets a
|
||||
// <script> tag through, the iframe document forbids script execution
|
||||
// (default-src 'none'). img/style/font remain permissive to match what the
|
||||
// sanitizer is allowed to emit and what the host already permits when
|
||||
// external content is loaded.
|
||||
const iframeCsp = "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob: http: https:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data: http: https:; media-src data: blob: http: https:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'";
|
||||
// Defense-in-depth CSP inside srcDoc. default-src 'none' forbids script
|
||||
// execution even if the sanitizer ever lets a <script> through.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// When external content is blocked, img/media/font are restricted to
|
||||
// data:/blob: only — this is the network-level backstop for every tracking
|
||||
// vector, including ones the DOM-walk blocker can't see (CSS escapes,
|
||||
// <style>-tag url(), @font-face). When the user loads/trusts the sender the
|
||||
// srcDoc is rebuilt (see emailContent) with the permissive variant so real
|
||||
// images, web fonts and media load. cid:/inline images are pre-rewritten to
|
||||
// blob: URLs, so they survive the strict variant.
|
||||
const iframeCsp = effectiveEmailContent.externalBlocked
|
||||
? "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data:; media-src data: blob:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'"
|
||||
: "default-src 'none'; img-src data: blob: http: https:; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; font-src data: http: https:; media-src data: blob: http: https:; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-src 'none'";
|
||||
|
||||
return `<!DOCTYPE html>
|
||||
<html style="color-scheme: ${colorScheme};"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
|
||||
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${iframeCsp}">
|
||||
<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
|
||||
<meta http-equiv="x-dns-prefetch-control" content="off">
|
||||
<style>
|
||||
/* Force content height: some emails set html/body { height: 100% }, which -
|
||||
combined with overflow:hidden and our scrollHeight-based auto-resize -
|
||||
@@ -2977,64 +2973,14 @@ export function EmailViewer({
|
||||
${wordHtmlCSS}
|
||||
${darkModeCSS}
|
||||
</style></head><body>${effectiveEmailContent.html}<style>html,body{height:auto!important;min-height:0!important;max-height:none!important}</style></body></html>`;
|
||||
}, [effectiveEmailContent.html, effectiveEmailContent.isHtml, effectiveEmailContent.hasStyleTag, isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode]);
|
||||
}, [effectiveEmailContent.html, effectiveEmailContent.isHtml, effectiveEmailContent.hasStyleTag, effectiveEmailContent.externalBlocked, isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Imperatively restore blocked external content inside the iframe document.
|
||||
// Avoids re-rendering the iframe srcDoc (which would reload and flash) when
|
||||
// the user clicks "Load images" or "Trust sender".
|
||||
const restoreBlockedContent = useCallback(() => {
|
||||
const doc = iframeRef.current?.contentDocument;
|
||||
if (!doc) return;
|
||||
|
||||
doc.querySelectorAll('img[data-blocked-src]').forEach((node) => {
|
||||
const el = node as HTMLImageElement;
|
||||
const src = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-src');
|
||||
if (src) {
|
||||
el.setAttribute('src', src);
|
||||
el.style.display = '';
|
||||
el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-src');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-style]').forEach((node) => {
|
||||
const el = node as HTMLElement;
|
||||
const style = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-style');
|
||||
if (style !== null) {
|
||||
el.style.cssText = style;
|
||||
el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-style');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-background]').forEach((node) => {
|
||||
const el = node as HTMLElement;
|
||||
const bg = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-background');
|
||||
if (bg) {
|
||||
el.setAttribute('background', bg);
|
||||
el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-background');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
doc.querySelectorAll('[data-blocked-collapsed-style]').forEach((node) => {
|
||||
const el = node as HTMLElement;
|
||||
const style = el.getAttribute('data-blocked-collapsed-style');
|
||||
if (style !== null) {
|
||||
el.style.cssText = style;
|
||||
el.removeAttribute('data-blocked-collapsed-style');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}, []);
|
||||
|
||||
// Whenever permission is granted (allow toggled, or sender becomes trusted),
|
||||
// restore blocked content in the existing iframe - no srcDoc rebuild.
|
||||
const senderEmailLower = email?.from?.[0]?.email?.toLowerCase();
|
||||
const senderIsTrustedNow = senderEmailLower
|
||||
? isSenderTrusted(senderEmailLower) || (trustedSendersAddressBook && isTrustedAddressBookSender(senderEmailLower))
|
||||
: false;
|
||||
useEffect(() => {
|
||||
if (!hasBlockedContent) return;
|
||||
if (!allowExternalContent && !senderIsTrustedNow) return;
|
||||
restoreBlockedContent();
|
||||
}, [allowExternalContent, senderIsTrustedNow, hasBlockedContent, restoreBlockedContent]);
|
||||
// Unblocking external content is handled by rebuilding the iframe srcDoc:
|
||||
// toggling allowExternalContent (both "Load images" and "Trust sender" set
|
||||
// it) recomputes emailContent without blocking and swaps the strict CSP for
|
||||
// the permissive one. In-place restore isn't possible because a document's
|
||||
// CSP is fixed at load — the strict blocking-mode CSP would keep refusing the
|
||||
// restored URLs.
|
||||
|
||||
// Tracks the last rendered body height so the loading skeleton can hold
|
||||
// the same size - avoids the body shrink/expand flash when switching emails.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user