feat: strip external url()/@import from <style> blocks in sanitizer (#457)

Defence-in-depth on top of the strict iframe img-src/media-src/font-src CSP that already blocks <style>-tag fetches at the network level. The per-node DOM walk in blockExternalResourcesOnNode only sees element attributes, so a tracker hidden in a kept <style> block (background url(), @font-face, @import) never passed through it. Adds stripExternalStyleSheetCss(), wired into blockExternalResourcesOnNode for STYLE nodes (so it's gated on shouldBlockExternal and drives the blocked-content banner like every other vector). Decodes CSS escapes over the whole block first so the escaped-keyword form \75\72\6C( -> url( is caught - a literal `url(` match would miss it. Removes remote @import in both url() and bare-string forms.
2026-07-21 20:56:08 +02:00
parent b4739c111f
commit abd493fb4c
2 changed files with 87 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
  decodeCssEscapes,
  styleHasExternalUrl,
  stripExternalCssUrls,
+  stripExternalStyleSheetCss,
  blockExternalResourcesOnNode,
  TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
 } from '../email-sanitization';
@@ -396,6 +397,42 @@ describe('email-sanitization', () => {
    });
  });

+  describe('stripExternalStyleSheetCss (<style> block defence-in-depth, #457)', () => {
+    it('strips external url() inside a style rule', () => {
+      expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("#x{background:url('http://tracker.example/y')}"))
+        .toBe('#x{background:url()}');
+    });
+
+    it('strips the CSS-escaped url() keyword (\\75\\72\\6C()', () => {
+      expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("#x{background:\\75\\72\\6C('http://tracker.example/y')}"))
+        .toBe('#x{background:url()}');
+    });
+
+    it('removes a remote @import (bare-string form)', () => {
+      expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss('@import "http://tracker.example/s.css";\n#x{color:red}'))
+        .toBe('\n#x{color:red}');
+      expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("@import '//tracker.example/s.css';")).toBe('');
+    });
+
+    it('neutralises a remote @import url() form', () => {
+      expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss('@import url(http://tracker.example/s.css);'))
+        .toBe('@import url();');
+    });
+
+    it('leaves a stylesheet with no external refs unchanged (escapes intact)', () => {
+      const css = '#x{content:"\\2014";background:url()}';
+      expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css)).toBe(css);
+    });
+
+    it('blockExternalResourcesOnNode strips a <style> block and reports blocked', () => {
+      const style = parseHtmlSafely(
+        '<body><style>#x{background:url(http://tracker.example/y)}</style></body>',
+      ).body.firstElementChild!;
+      expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(style)).toBe(true);
+      expect(style.textContent).toBe('#x{background:url()}');
+    });
+  });
+
  describe('blockExternalResourcesOnNode (anti-tracking vectors)', () => {
    function el(html: string): Element {
      return parseHtmlSafely(`<body>${html}</body>`).body.firstElementChild!;
@@ -243,6 +243,43 @@ export function stripExternalCssUrls(style: string): string {
  );
 }

+/**
+ * Neutralise external references in a full stylesheet (a kept `<style>` block).
+ * The iframe sanitiser keeps `<style>`, so its CSS can auto-load remote
+ * resources (background `url()`, `@font-face`, `@import`) that the per-node
+ * attribute walk in `blockExternalResourcesOnNode` never sees. The strict
+ * iframe CSP already blocks those fetches at the network level; this strips the
+ * references from the CSS text itself as defence-in-depth.
+ *
+ * Escapes are decoded on the WHOLE block first because the "css escape" tracker
+ * escapes the `url` keyword itself (`\75\72\6C(` -> `url(`) - a literal `url(`
+ * match would miss it. Returns the original (escapes intact) when nothing
+ * external is present, so callers can detect a change by identity. (#457)
+ */
+export function stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css: string): string {
+  if (!css) return css;
+  const decoded = decodeCssEscapes(css);
+  if (!/url\(|@import/i.test(decoded)) return css;
+  let changed = false;
+  // External url(...) anywhere in the sheet (also covers `@import url(...)`).
+  let result = decoded.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner: string) => {
+    if (isExternalResourceUrl(inner)) {
+      changed = true;
+      return 'url()';
+    }
+    return full;
+  });
+  // Bare-string remote import: `@import "http://…"` / `@import '//…'`.
+  result = result.replace(
+    /@import\s+(['"])\s*(?:https?:)?\/\/[^'"]*\1[^;]*;?/gi,
+    () => {
+      changed = true;
+      return '';
+    },
+  );
+  return changed ? result : css;
+}
+
 /** True if a srcset attribute lists at least one external candidate URL. */
 function srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset: string): boolean {
  return srcset
@@ -333,6 +370,19 @@ export function blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node: Element): boolean {
    blocked = true;
  }

+  // <style> block CSS: the iframe sanitiser keeps these, so url()/@font-face/
+  // @import inside them can auto-load remote resources the attribute walk above
+  // never sees. Strip external refs from the stylesheet text (the strict iframe
+  // CSP is the network backstop; this is defence-in-depth). (#457)
+  if (tag === 'STYLE') {
+    const css = node.textContent || '';
+    const cleaned = stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css);
+    if (cleaned !== css) {
+      node.textContent = cleaned;
+      blocked = true;
+    }
+  }
+
  return blocked;
 }