Defence-in-depth on top of the strict iframe img-src/media-src/font-src CSP that already blocks <style>-tag fetches at the network level. The per-node DOM walk in blockExternalResourcesOnNode only sees element attributes, so a tracker hidden in a kept <style> block (background url(), @font-face, @import) never passed through it. Adds stripExternalStyleSheetCss(), wired into blockExternalResourcesOnNode for STYLE nodes (so it's gated on shouldBlockExternal and drives the blocked-content banner like every other vector). Decodes CSS escapes over the whole block first so the escaped-keyword form \75\72\6C( -> url( is caught - a literal `url(` match would miss it. Removes remote @import in both url() and bare-string forms.
680 lines
29 KiB
TypeScript
680 lines
29 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
|
|
import DOMPurify from 'dompurify';
|
|
import {
|
|
sanitizeEmailHtml,
|
|
sanitizeSignatureHtml,
|
|
sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay,
|
|
parseHtmlSafely,
|
|
hasRichFormatting,
|
|
plainTextToSafeHtml,
|
|
sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml,
|
|
EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
|
|
EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
|
|
isExternalResourceUrl,
|
|
decodeCssEscapes,
|
|
styleHasExternalUrl,
|
|
stripExternalCssUrls,
|
|
stripExternalStyleSheetCss,
|
|
blockExternalResourcesOnNode,
|
|
TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
|
|
} from '../email-sanitization';
|
|
|
|
describe('email-sanitization', () => {
|
|
describe('sanitizeEmailHtml', () => {
|
|
it('should remove script tags', () => {
|
|
const malicious = '<p>Hello</p><script>alert("XSS")</script>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<script>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('Hello');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should remove event handlers', () => {
|
|
const malicious = '<img src="x" onerror="alert(\'XSS\')">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('onerror');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should remove iframe, object, embed tags', () => {
|
|
const malicious = '<div>Content</div><iframe src="evil.com"></iframe><object></object>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<iframe');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<object');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('Content');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should remove meta, link, base tags', () => {
|
|
const malicious = '<p>Text</p><meta charset="utf-8"><link rel="stylesheet" href="evil.css">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malicious);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<meta');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<link');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('Text');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should preserve safe HTML structure', () => {
|
|
const safe = '<p>Paragraph</p><div><span>Nested</span></div><table><tr><td>Cell</td></tr></table>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(safe);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<p>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<div>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<table>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('Cell');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should preserve safe attributes', () => {
|
|
const withAttrs = '<p style="color: red;" class="text">Styled</p>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(withAttrs);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('style');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('class');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should handle empty input', () => {
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtml('')).toBe('');
|
|
expect(sanitizeEmailHtml(' ')).toBeTruthy();
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should handle malformed HTML', () => {
|
|
const malformed = '<p>Unclosed<div>Tags';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(malformed);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('Unclosed');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('Tags');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('sanitizeSignatureHtml', () => {
|
|
it('should allow basic formatting tags', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<p><strong>John Doe</strong><br><em>Software Engineer</em></p>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<strong>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<em>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('John Doe');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should allow img with https src', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<p>John</p><img src="https://cdn.example.com/logo.png" alt="Logo" width="120" height="40">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<img');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('src="https://cdn.example.com/logo.png"');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('alt="Logo"');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('width="120"');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('height="40"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should allow img with data:image/png;base64 src', () => {
|
|
const dataUri = '';
|
|
const signature = `<img src="${dataUri}" alt="Logo">`;
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<img');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data:image/png;base64,');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should allow img with ', '', '', ''];
|
|
for (const src of cases) {
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(`<img src="${src}" alt="x">`);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<img');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain(src);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should strip img with http: src (https only)', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<img src="http://insecure.example.com/logo.png" alt="Logo">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('http://insecure.example.com');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should strip img with javascript: src', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<img src="javascript:alert(1)" alt="x">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should strip img with " alt="x">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('data:image/svg');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should strip img with non-image data: URI', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<img src="data:text/html;base64,PHA+aGk8L3A+" alt="x">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('data:text/html');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<img');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should strip event handlers on img', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<img src="https://cdn.example.com/logo.png" alt="x" onerror="alert(1)" onload="alert(2)">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('onerror');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('onload');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('https://cdn.example.com/logo.png');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should remove video and audio tags', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<p>John</p><video src="vid.mp4"></video><audio src="sound.mp3"></audio>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<video');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<audio');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should preserve links with safe attributes', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<p><a href="https://example.com" style="color: blue;">Website</a></p>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('<a');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('href');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('example.com');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should remove script tags', () => {
|
|
const malicious = '<p>Signature</p><script>alert("XSS")</script>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(malicious);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('<script>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('Signature');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should handle empty signatures', () => {
|
|
expect(sanitizeSignatureHtml('')).toBe('');
|
|
expect(sanitizeSignatureHtml(' ')).toBe('');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should be stricter than email sanitization for script-bearing tags', () => {
|
|
const html = '<p>Text</p><table><tr><td>Data</td></tr></table><video src="v.mp4"></video><iframe src="x"></iframe>';
|
|
const emailClean = sanitizeEmailHtml(html);
|
|
const signatureClean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(html);
|
|
|
|
// Both preserve tables (signatures are universally table-based)
|
|
expect(emailClean).toContain('<table>');
|
|
expect(signatureClean).toContain('<table');
|
|
expect(signatureClean).toContain('Data');
|
|
|
|
// Signature still blocks media and frames
|
|
expect(signatureClean).not.toContain('<video');
|
|
expect(signatureClean).not.toContain('<iframe');
|
|
expect(signatureClean).toContain('Text');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should preserve table layout attributes used by email signatures', () => {
|
|
const signature = '<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0"><tr><td valign="top" align="left" bgcolor="#fafafa" colspan="2">Name</td></tr></table>';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtml(signature);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('cellpadding');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('cellspacing');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('valign');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('align');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('bgcolor');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('colspan');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('parseHtmlSafely', () => {
|
|
it('should return a valid Document', () => {
|
|
const html = '<p>Test</p>';
|
|
const doc = parseHtmlSafely(html);
|
|
expect(doc).toBeInstanceOf(Document);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should not execute scripts', () => {
|
|
let executed = false;
|
|
const html = '<script>executed = true;</script>';
|
|
parseHtmlSafely(html);
|
|
expect(executed).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should handle malformed HTML gracefully', () => {
|
|
const malformed = '<p>Unclosed<div>Tags';
|
|
const doc = parseHtmlSafely(malformed);
|
|
expect(doc).toBeInstanceOf(Document);
|
|
expect(doc.body.textContent).toContain('Unclosed');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('hasRichFormatting', () => {
|
|
it('should detect tables', () => {
|
|
const html = '<table><tr><td>Data</td></tr></table>';
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting(html)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should detect images', () => {
|
|
const html = '<img src="pic.jpg">';
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting(html)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should detect inline styles', () => {
|
|
const html = '<div style="color: red;">Styled</div>';
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting(html)).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should detect formatting tags', () => {
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('<b>Bold</b>')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('<strong>Strong</strong>')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('<em>Emphasized</em>')).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should detect headings', () => {
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('<h1>Title</h1>')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('<h3>Subtitle</h3>')).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should detect lists', () => {
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('<ul><li>Item</li></ul>')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('<ol><li>Item</li></ol>')).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should return false for plain text', () => {
|
|
const plain = '<p>Just plain text</p>';
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting(plain)).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should return false for simple paragraphs', () => {
|
|
const simple = '<p>Line 1</p><p>Line 2</p>';
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting(simple)).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should handle empty HTML', () => {
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting('')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(hasRichFormatting(' ')).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('inline CID image handling', () => {
|
|
it('should preserve blob: URLs for CID-replaced images (not treated as external)', () => {
|
|
// Simulate what the component does: replace cid: with blob: object URLs
|
|
const html = '<p>See image:</p><img src="blob:http://localhost/abc-123">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(html);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('blob:');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should preserve data: URLs for CID placeholder images', () => {
|
|
const html = '<img src="">';
|
|
const clean = sanitizeEmailHtml(html);
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data:image/gif');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should not leave raw JMAP download URLs after CID replacement pattern', () => {
|
|
// This tests the regex pattern used for CID replacement
|
|
const htmlWithCid = '<img src="cid:image001@example.com">';
|
|
// Simulate the component's replacement: all cid: refs should become blob: or data: URLs
|
|
const replaced = htmlWithCid.replace(
|
|
/\bcid:([^"'\s)]+)/gi,
|
|
() => 'blob:http://localhost/safe-object-url'
|
|
);
|
|
expect(replaced).not.toContain('cid:');
|
|
expect(replaced).toContain('blob:');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('should block external http(s) images but not blob/data URLs via DOMPurify hook', () => {
|
|
const html = `
|
|
<img src="blob:http://localhost/inline-ok">
|
|
<img src="https://tracker.evil.com/pixel.png">
|
|
<img src="">
|
|
`;
|
|
|
|
const config = { ...EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG };
|
|
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
|
|
if (node.tagName === 'IMG') {
|
|
const src = node.getAttribute('src');
|
|
if (src && (src.startsWith('http://') || src.startsWith('https://') || src.startsWith('//'))) {
|
|
node.setAttribute('data-blocked-src', src);
|
|
node.removeAttribute('src');
|
|
node.setAttribute('alt', '[Image blocked]');
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, config);
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
|
|
|
|
// External https image should be blocked
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-src');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('tracker.evil.com');
|
|
// blob: and data: URLs should NOT be blocked (they don't start with http/https)
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('blob:');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data:image/gif');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('isExternalResourceUrl', () => {
|
|
it('detects http(s) and protocol-relative URLs', () => {
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('http://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('//tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('sees through leading whitespace/newlines (imgNewlineSrc bypass)', () => {
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('\n\nhttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl(' \t https://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
|
|
// Tab/newline removed anywhere in the URL by the parser.
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('h\nttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('ht\ttps://tracker.example/p.png')).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('treats inline/local schemes as not external', () => {
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('blob:http://localhost/abc')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('cid:image001@example.com')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('/relative/path.png')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl('')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl(null)).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(isExternalResourceUrl(undefined)).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('decodeCssEscapes', () => {
|
|
it('decodes hex escapes (cssEscape bypass)', () => {
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68ttp://x')).toBe('http://x');
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\000068ttps://x')).toBe('https://x');
|
|
// Hex escape consumes one trailing whitespace separator.
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\68 ttp')).toBe('http');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('decodes single-character escapes', () => {
|
|
expect(decodeCssEscapes('\\h\\t\\t\\p')).toBe('http');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('styleHasExternalUrl / stripExternalCssUrls', () => {
|
|
it('detects and strips plain external url()', () => {
|
|
const style = 'background:url(https://tracker.example/p.png)';
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('detects and strips CSS-escaped external url()', () => {
|
|
const style = 'background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)';
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe('background:url()');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('detects url() with whitespace/quotes', () => {
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl("background: url( '\n https://t/p.png' )")).toBe(true);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('leaves data: and relative url() untouched', () => {
|
|
const style = "background:url('')";
|
|
expect(styleHasExternalUrl(style)).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(stripExternalCssUrls(style)).toBe(style);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('stripExternalStyleSheetCss (<style> block defence-in-depth, #457)', () => {
|
|
it('strips external url() inside a style rule', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("#x{background:url('http://tracker.example/y')}"))
|
|
.toBe('#x{background:url()}');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('strips the CSS-escaped url() keyword (\\75\\72\\6C()', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("#x{background:\\75\\72\\6C('http://tracker.example/y')}"))
|
|
.toBe('#x{background:url()}');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('removes a remote @import (bare-string form)', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss('@import "http://tracker.example/s.css";\n#x{color:red}'))
|
|
.toBe('\n#x{color:red}');
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss("@import '//tracker.example/s.css';")).toBe('');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('neutralises a remote @import url() form', () => {
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss('@import url(http://tracker.example/s.css);'))
|
|
.toBe('@import url();');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('leaves a stylesheet with no external refs unchanged (escapes intact)', () => {
|
|
const css = '#x{content:"\\2014";background:url()}';
|
|
expect(stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css)).toBe(css);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blockExternalResourcesOnNode strips a <style> block and reports blocked', () => {
|
|
const style = parseHtmlSafely(
|
|
'<body><style>#x{background:url(http://tracker.example/y)}</style></body>',
|
|
).body.firstElementChild!;
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(style)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(style.textContent).toBe('#x{background:url()}');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('blockExternalResourcesOnNode (anti-tracking vectors)', () => {
|
|
function el(html: string): Element {
|
|
return parseHtmlSafely(`<body>${html}</body>`).body.firstElementChild!;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it('blocks an img whose src is hidden behind a leading newline', () => {
|
|
const img = el('<img src="">');
|
|
img.setAttribute('src', '\n\nhttps://tracker.example/pixel.png');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toBe('https://tracker.example/pixel.png');
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks img srcset', () => {
|
|
const img = el('<img srcset="https://tracker.example/1x.png 1x, https://tracker.example/2x.png 2x">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(img.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks <picture><source srcset> (pictureSource)', () => {
|
|
const source = el('<source srcset="https://tracker.example/pic.webp" type="image/webp">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks <source src> for media', () => {
|
|
const source = el('<source src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(source)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(source.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks <video poster> (videoPoster)', () => {
|
|
const video = el('<video poster="https://tracker.example/poster.jpg"></video>');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks video src', () => {
|
|
const video = el('<video src="https://tracker.example/v.mp4"></video>');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(video)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('blocks the legacy background attribute', () => {
|
|
// <td> is foster-parented out of <body>, so build it directly.
|
|
const td = document.createElement('td');
|
|
td.setAttribute('background', 'https://tracker.example/bg.png');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(td)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(td.hasAttribute('background')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(td.getAttribute('data-blocked-background')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('strips external inline style url() including CSS escapes (cssEscape)', () => {
|
|
const div = el('<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/p.png)">x</div>');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(div)).toBe(true);
|
|
expect(div.getAttribute('style')).not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
expect(div.getAttribute('data-blocked-style')).toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not block inline/local resources', () => {
|
|
const img = el('<img src="blob:http://localhost/inline">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(img)).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe('blob:http://localhost/inline');
|
|
|
|
const dataImg = el('<img src="">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(dataImg)).toBe(false);
|
|
|
|
const cidImg = el('<img src="cid:logo@example.com">');
|
|
expect(blockExternalResourcesOnNode(cidImg)).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('works as a DOMPurify afterSanitizeAttributes hook across all vectors', () => {
|
|
const html = `
|
|
<img src=" https://tracker.example/a.png">
|
|
<picture><source srcset="https://tracker.example/b.webp"><img src="https://tracker.example/c.png"></picture>
|
|
<div style="background:url(\\68ttps://tracker.example/d.png)">bg</div>
|
|
`;
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
|
|
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element);
|
|
});
|
|
const clean = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
|
|
|
|
const doc = parseHtmlSafely(clean);
|
|
// No live src/srcset/style references the tracker anymore.
|
|
doc.querySelectorAll('img, source').forEach((node) => {
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('src') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
expect(node.getAttribute('srcset') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
});
|
|
expect(doc.querySelector('div')?.getAttribute('style') ?? '').not.toContain('tracker.example');
|
|
// The originals are stashed for the banner/affordance.
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-src');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-srcset');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('data-blocked-style');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('Email Privacy Tester exact payloads (iframe render path)', () => {
|
|
function render(html: string): string {
|
|
DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) =>
|
|
blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node as Element)
|
|
);
|
|
const out = DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
|
|
DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
|
|
return out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it('pictureSource: <picture><source srcset> does not keep a live external ref', () => {
|
|
const source = parseHtmlSafely(render('<picture><source srcset="http://TRACK/"><img src="#"></picture>')).querySelector('source')!;
|
|
expect(source.hasAttribute('srcset')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(source.getAttribute('data-blocked-srcset')).toContain('TRACK');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('imgNewlineSrc: newline after the first slash (protocol-relative) is blocked', () => {
|
|
const img = parseHtmlSafely(render('<img src="/\n/TRACK_HOST/PATH">')).querySelector('img')!;
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
|
|
expect(img.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('TRACK_HOST');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('videoPoster: poster and src are both stripped', () => {
|
|
const video = parseHtmlSafely(render('<video poster="http://TRACK/" autoplay="true" src="http://OTHER/"></video>')).querySelector('video')!;
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('poster')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(video.hasAttribute('src')).toBe(false);
|
|
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-poster')).toContain('TRACK');
|
|
expect(video.getAttribute('data-blocked-src')).toContain('OTHER');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('anchor href is preserved (links stay clickable; DNS prefetch is disabled via iframe meta)', () => {
|
|
const out = render('<a href="http://TRACK/">link</a>');
|
|
expect(out).toContain('href="http://TRACK/"');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('plainTextToSafeHtml', () => {
|
|
it('escapes HTML-special characters in surrounding text', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('<script>alert(1)</script> & "q" \'q\'');
|
|
expect(result).not.toContain('<script>');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('<script>');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('&');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain(''');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('linkifies http(s) URLs', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('visit http://example.com/path now');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('<a href="http://example.com/path"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('prevents attribute breakout via quote in URL (CVE regression)', () => {
|
|
const payload = 'http://evil.tld/"onmouseover="alert(1)"x="';
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml(payload);
|
|
// The anchor tag must not contain any unescaped attribute beyond href/target/rel.
|
|
expect(result).not.toMatch(/<a [^>]*onmouseover/i);
|
|
expect(result).not.toMatch(/<a [^>]*style=/i);
|
|
// Quotes from the payload must be entity-encoded wherever they land.
|
|
expect(result).toContain('"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('prevents attribute breakout via style injection', () => {
|
|
const payload = 'http://evil.tld/"style="background:red"x="';
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml(payload);
|
|
expect(result).not.toMatch(/href="[^"]*"[^>]*style=/);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('terminates URL at quote, keeping rest as escaped text', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('http://evil.tld/"injected');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('<a href="http://evil.tld/"');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('"injected');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('applies linkClass when provided and escapes it', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('http://x.com', 'text-primary hover:underline');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('class="text-primary hover:underline"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not linkify non-http schemes', () => {
|
|
const result = plainTextToSafeHtml('try javascript:alert(1) or file:///etc/passwd');
|
|
expect(result).not.toContain('<a ');
|
|
expect(result).toContain('javascript:alert(1)');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay', () => {
|
|
// Signatures render into the main document (identity-form preview, composer
|
|
// block), not the sandboxed iframe, so a target-less anchor navigates the
|
|
// whole app away and takes the unsaved draft/signature with it.
|
|
it('forces target=_blank and rel on signature links', () => {
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay('<p><a href="https://example.com">Site</a></p>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('overrides a target the user supplied themselves', () => {
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay('<a href="https://example.com" target="_top">x</a>');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('_top');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('keeps the image restrictions of the storage sanitizer', () => {
|
|
const clean = sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay(
|
|
'<img src="http://insecure.example.com/l.png"><img src="https://cdn.example.com/l.png">',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(clean).not.toContain('insecure.example.com');
|
|
expect(clean).toContain('https://cdn.example.com/l.png');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('does not leak target into the stored or sent signature', () => {
|
|
// sanitizeSignatureHtml feeds both storage and the outgoing message body.
|
|
const stored = sanitizeSignatureHtml('<p><a href="https://example.com">Site</a></p>');
|
|
expect(stored).toContain('href="https://example.com"');
|
|
expect(stored).not.toContain('target=');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('handles empty input', () => {
|
|
expect(sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay('')).toBe('');
|
|
expect(sanitizeSignatureHtmlForDisplay(' ')).toBe('');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe('sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml', () => {
|
|
// This branch renders into the main document, not the sandboxed iframe, so
|
|
// an anchor that loses target="_blank" navigates the whole app away.
|
|
it('preserves target and rel on links emitted by plainTextToSafeHtml', () => {
|
|
const rendered = sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(
|
|
plainTextToSafeHtml('see https://github.com/honzup/webmail/pull/560'),
|
|
);
|
|
expect(rendered).toContain('target="_blank"');
|
|
expect(rendered).toContain('rel="noopener noreferrer"');
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it('still strips dangerous schemes and tags', () => {
|
|
const rendered = sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(
|
|
'<a href="javascript:alert(1)" target="_blank">x</a><script>alert(1)</script>',
|
|
);
|
|
expect(rendered).not.toContain('javascript:');
|
|
expect(rendered).not.toContain('<script');
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|