Bernd RodlerandClaude Opus 4.8
f7e487171c
S-01 audited bulwarkmail/plugins/smime @ 91085a3 (2,935 lines). Nine findings, two HIGH. No backdoor and no exfiltration path anywhere in the bundle — the problems are trust-model and input-validation gaps. Full report in vnc/audits/SMIME-PLUGIN-AUDIT-2026-08-04.md. Fork is source-only. The upstream smime.zip is a 1.77 MB prebuilt bundle whose manifest reads 1.0.1 while the source reads 1.0.2, so auditing src/ would not audit what that zip installs. We build from source. Finding 1 (HIGH) — certificate substitution. maybeAutoImportSigner gated on signatureValid alone, but smimeVerify runs checkChain:false, so that only proves "signed by whoever holds this key", not that the claimed identity is real. Self-sign a cert asserting victim@example.com, send one signed message, and it was stored as the encryption target for that address — the user's next Encrypt to the victim went to the attacker. Now requires signerEmailMatch === true and !selfSigned. Both values were already computed and displayed as untrusted in the banner; only the import path ignored them. Tests for `true` explicitly so an undefined match (missing From header) fails closed. Finding 3 (MED-HIGH) — CRLF header injection. Escaping reached only Subject and attachment filename; display names, raw addresses, Message-ID, In-Reply-To, References and attachment Content-Type were emitted verbatim, and formatAddress escapes only backslash and quote. In-Reply-To/References/display names are copied from inbound mail when replying or forwarding, so the value is attacker-supplied. Sanitising inside formatHeader covers all 17 call sites by construction; the three headers assembled directly get stripCrlf explicitly. Also adds auth:observe to the manifest. The plugin registers onAfterLogout/onAccountSwitch — real hooks (lib/plugin-hooks.ts:362-363) — without declaring the permission, so under B-09 the session-key wipe would silently stop running. verify-fixes.mjs carries 19 assertions including source checks that fail if either guard is removed or a new unsanitised interpolated header appears. That last one immediately caught the interpolated smime-type Content-Type header, which manual review had dismissed as static. Finding 2 (unauthenticated CBC accepted on decrypt) is NOT fixed. This is not safe for real mail yet — sandbox accounts only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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VNC-CHANGES — VNCmail+ divergence log
VNCmail+ is a fork of bulwarkmail/webmail (AGPL-3.0). This file records every intentional divergence from upstream so that merging new upstream releases stays a triage exercise, not an archaeology dig.
Rules of the fork
- Keep upstream files unmodified whenever possible. Prefer env vars
(branding), the
vnc/overrides/layer, and additive files over editing files insideapp/,components/,lib/,stores/. - Every edit to an upstream file gets a one-line entry below — path, what, why. No silent edits.
- Branches:
maintracks upstream releases (kept clean);devis the VNC integration + Vercel deploy branch;vnc/*are feature branches. - Syncing upstream:
git fetch upstream && git merge upstream/mainontomain, then mergemainintodev. Resolve using this log.
Divergences
| Date | File / area | Change | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 | vnc/ (new) |
Added VNC customization dir + this log | Fork bootstrap |
| 2026-08-03 | VNCMAIL-SETUP.md (new) |
Vercel deploy runbook | Deploy on Vercel as project "VNCmail+" |
| 2026-08-03 | deploy/k8s/ (new) | k8s manifests + runbook for microk8s deploy | Bulwark is stateful → runs as a container w/ persistent volumes, not Vercel serverless |
| 2026-08-03 | .gitignore | ignore deploy/k8s/secret.yaml | keep the real env secret out of git |
| 2026-08-03 | public/branding/*.svg (new) | VNCmail wordmark (on-dark + on-light) | VNC logo (placeholder — swap official SVG) |
| 2026-08-03 | public/fonts/*.woff2 (new) | DM Sans 400/500/700 + Syne 700/800 (OFL, self-hosted) | VNClagoon typography |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | add builtin-vnclagoon theme (navy+cyan, DM Sans/Syne, @font-face) | VNClagoon brand theme |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/admin/types.ts | DEFAULT_THEME_POLICY.defaultThemeId → builtin-vnclagoon | make VNClagoon the default theme |
| 2026-08-03 | stores/theme-store.ts | default theme/resolvedTheme → dark | dark-first per VNClagoon styleguide |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | add builtin-src theme (Swiss red on white, light-first) | 2nd brand theme (SRC Advisory); VNClagoon stays default |
| 2026-08-03 | public/branding/src-logo.svg (new) | SRC mountain mark | SRC brand (placeholder — swap official) |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/plugin-types.ts | add optional logoLightUrl/logoDarkUrl to InstalledTheme | per-theme brand logos |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/theme-logo.ts (new) | resolveThemeLogo() helper | pick active theme's logo, fall back to global |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | set logos on vnclagoon (wordmark) + src (mark) | logo switches with the brand theme |
| 2026-08-03 | app/(main)/[locale]/login/page.tsx | login logo uses active theme's logo | brand-switch on login |
| 2026-08-03 | components/layout/navigation-rail.tsx | nav-rail logo uses active theme's logo | brand-switch in app |
Note: Vercel was tried and abandoned on 2026-08-03. Bulwark writes to a local
data dir (/app/data/*); Vercel serverless has a read-only filesystem → crash
(ENOENT /var/task/data). VNCmail+ now deploys as a Docker image
(ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-*) on Kubernetes (microk8s) at
vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de, with 4 persistent volumes — see deploy/k8s/. A
microfrontends integration was also added and reverted the same day.
| 2026-08-03 | lib/stalwart/auth-context.ts | give jmap_stalwart_ctx a 6-hour maxAge (was session-cookie → expired on tab close) | session survival across browser restarts |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | add srcSkin (MD3 component overrides: shape scale, filled buttons, text fields, cards, dialogs, state layers, switches, login card); add @font-face + typography to builtin-src; bump to v1.1.0 | SRC theme: keep colors + fonts, apply MD3 design system |
| 2026-08-04 | lib/plugin-sandbox/loader.ts | B-04 security fix — gate hook registration on granted permissions via new HOOK_PERMISSIONS map; refused hooks are skipped, logged and counted | info.hooks is self-reported by the sandbox, so an untrusted plugin could claim onRenderEmailBody and replace any rendered email body without holding email:render-takeover. Consent copy gated what the user was asked, not what the host allowed. |
| 2026-08-04 | lib/plugin-sandbox/host-api.ts | export hasPermission() (was module-private) | one source of truth for the permission rule — the loader gate and the RPC gate must not drift apart |
| 2026-08-04 | app/api/admin/plugins/route.ts | B-01 — scan all .js/.mjs in the bundle (was entrypoint only); return structured findings + canOverride; allow admin overrideWarnings=true with a plugin.install.scan_override audit entry; echo accepted findings on success | hard-reject on eval(/new Function(/innerHTML = made every crypto plugin uninstallable (minified openpgp.js/pkijs trip it), while only scanning the entrypoint left a trivial bypass. Route is already admin-authenticated, so the scan is defence-in-depth, not a trust boundary. |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/audits/SMIME-PLUGIN-AUDIT-2026-08-04.md (new) | S-01 security audit of bulwarkmail/plugins/smime @ 91085a3 — 9 findings (2 HIGH, 1 MED-HIGH), verdict: fork and fix before shipping | privileged same-origin plugin that handles users' private keys; verdict must precede any deploy |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/ (new) | fork of the upstream S/MIME plugin, source only — upstream smime.zip deliberately NOT vendored | shipped zip is a 1.77 MB bundle at manifest 1.0.1 while source is 1.0.2, so auditing src/ would not audit what the zip installs. We build from source via npm run package. |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/src/index.js | audit fix 1 (HIGH) — maybeAutoImportSigner now requires signerEmailMatch === true and !selfSigned before trusting a signer cert | upstream gated on signatureValid alone, but smimeVerify runs checkChain:false, so a self-signed cert asserting any address was silently stored as the ENCRYPTION TARGET for it. Both values were already computed and ignored. |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/src/mime-builder.js | audit fix 3 (MED-HIGH) — stripCrlf() applied inside formatHeader + the 3 directly-assembled headers (att.contentType, att.cid, smimeType) | CRLF escaping reached only Subject and filename; display names, Message-ID, In-Reply-To and References were raw — and those are copied from inbound mail on reply/forward, making it remotely reachable header injection |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/manifest.json | add auth:observe | plugin registers onAfterLogout/onAccountSwitch (real hooks, lib/plugin-hooks.ts:362-363) without declaring the permission; under B-09 the session-key wipe would silently stop running |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/verify-fixes.mjs (new) | 19 regression assertions for both fixes, incl. source checks that fail if a guard is removed | the source assertion caught an interpolated header manual review had wrongly dismissed as static |
| 2026-08-04 | app/(main)/admin/_tabs/plugins.tsx | B-01 (UI) — scanner-findings review panel: holds the rejected file, lists pattern-per-file, offers "Install anyway" / "Cancel"; success message reports how many findings were accepted | without this the override was API-only — an admin uploading a crypto bundle through the web form hit a 400 they could not act on. Also replaces a dead data.warnings read (never returned by the route) with the live findings field. |
(append new rows as you diverge)