Bernd RodlerandClaude Opus 4.8
d047891ded
Adds roundtrip.mjs, which drives the plugin's own modules directly — no browser, no DOM — and proves the three audit fixes did not break S/MIME. 24 assertions, all passing, against the self-signed spike certificates: PKCS#12 import (both identities, RSA-2048, kdf=600000) key encrypted at rest (32-byte salt, 12-byte IV) unlock yields NON-EXTRACTABLE keys; wrong passphrase rejected sign -> verify: signature valid, signer email matches From encrypt -> decrypt by the intended recipient, plaintext matches sender can read their own Sent copy downgraded message produces no plaintext Two results worth recording. Finding 1 is confirmed against a genuine CMS structure, not just a mock: the spike certs are self-signed, smimeVerify reports signatureValid AND signerEmailMatch true AND selfSigned true, and the gate refuses the auto-import. That is exactly the cert-substitution attack, blocked. The same status with selfSigned:false passes, so the gate is not simply refusing everything. Finding 2 is confirmed end to end: our own encrypt path produces AES-256-GCM, decrypt reports contentAuthenticated:true, so HTML renders without suppression. Only legacy inbound CBC degrades to text. The section-8 assertion is deliberately loose. Swapping the 9-byte AES-GCM OID for the 8-byte 3DES OID also invalidates the enclosing DER lengths, so ASN.1 validation rejects the message before the allowlist is reached — either way no plaintext is produced, and the assertion says which path fired rather than pretending it tested the allowlist. The allowlist itself is asserted precisely in verify-fixes.mjs, which now carries 36 assertions including checks that fail if a legacy CBC OID reappears or the mail path stops using the native engine. Browser-side spike result: the patched plugin installs through the admin channel, resolves to the privileged tier, and activates with "hooks=5, slots=3" and no refusals — so the B-04 gate does not block it. Its S/MIME settings section renders and survives SPA navigation. Key import via the UI could not be automated (native file picker), which is a harness limit rather than a product defect; roundtrip.mjs covers that path directly instead. Findings 4, 5 and 6 remain open. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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VNC-CHANGES — VNCmail+ divergence log
VNCmail+ is a fork of bulwarkmail/webmail (AGPL-3.0). This file records every intentional divergence from upstream so that merging new upstream releases stays a triage exercise, not an archaeology dig.
Rules of the fork
- Keep upstream files unmodified whenever possible. Prefer env vars
(branding), the
vnc/overrides/layer, and additive files over editing files insideapp/,components/,lib/,stores/. - Every edit to an upstream file gets a one-line entry below — path, what, why. No silent edits.
- Branches:
maintracks upstream releases (kept clean);devis the VNC integration + Vercel deploy branch;vnc/*are feature branches. - Syncing upstream:
git fetch upstream && git merge upstream/mainontomain, then mergemainintodev. Resolve using this log.
Divergences
| Date | File / area | Change | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 | vnc/ (new) |
Added VNC customization dir + this log | Fork bootstrap |
| 2026-08-03 | VNCMAIL-SETUP.md (new) |
Vercel deploy runbook | Deploy on Vercel as project "VNCmail+" |
| 2026-08-03 | deploy/k8s/ (new) | k8s manifests + runbook for microk8s deploy | Bulwark is stateful → runs as a container w/ persistent volumes, not Vercel serverless |
| 2026-08-03 | .gitignore | ignore deploy/k8s/secret.yaml | keep the real env secret out of git |
| 2026-08-03 | public/branding/*.svg (new) | VNCmail wordmark (on-dark + on-light) | VNC logo (placeholder — swap official SVG) |
| 2026-08-03 | public/fonts/*.woff2 (new) | DM Sans 400/500/700 + Syne 700/800 (OFL, self-hosted) | VNClagoon typography |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | add builtin-vnclagoon theme (navy+cyan, DM Sans/Syne, @font-face) | VNClagoon brand theme |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/admin/types.ts | DEFAULT_THEME_POLICY.defaultThemeId → builtin-vnclagoon | make VNClagoon the default theme |
| 2026-08-03 | stores/theme-store.ts | default theme/resolvedTheme → dark | dark-first per VNClagoon styleguide |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | add builtin-src theme (Swiss red on white, light-first) | 2nd brand theme (SRC Advisory); VNClagoon stays default |
| 2026-08-03 | public/branding/src-logo.svg (new) | SRC mountain mark | SRC brand (placeholder — swap official) |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/plugin-types.ts | add optional logoLightUrl/logoDarkUrl to InstalledTheme | per-theme brand logos |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/theme-logo.ts (new) | resolveThemeLogo() helper | pick active theme's logo, fall back to global |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | set logos on vnclagoon (wordmark) + src (mark) | logo switches with the brand theme |
| 2026-08-03 | app/(main)/[locale]/login/page.tsx | login logo uses active theme's logo | brand-switch on login |
| 2026-08-03 | components/layout/navigation-rail.tsx | nav-rail logo uses active theme's logo | brand-switch in app |
Note: Vercel was tried and abandoned on 2026-08-03. Bulwark writes to a local
data dir (/app/data/*); Vercel serverless has a read-only filesystem → crash
(ENOENT /var/task/data). VNCmail+ now deploys as a Docker image
(ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-*) on Kubernetes (microk8s) at
vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de, with 4 persistent volumes — see deploy/k8s/. A
microfrontends integration was also added and reverted the same day.
| 2026-08-03 | lib/stalwart/auth-context.ts | give jmap_stalwart_ctx a 6-hour maxAge (was session-cookie → expired on tab close) | session survival across browser restarts |
| 2026-08-03 | lib/builtin-themes.ts | add srcSkin (MD3 component overrides: shape scale, filled buttons, text fields, cards, dialogs, state layers, switches, login card); add @font-face + typography to builtin-src; bump to v1.1.0 | SRC theme: keep colors + fonts, apply MD3 design system |
| 2026-08-04 | lib/plugin-sandbox/loader.ts | B-04 security fix — gate hook registration on granted permissions via new HOOK_PERMISSIONS map; refused hooks are skipped, logged and counted | info.hooks is self-reported by the sandbox, so an untrusted plugin could claim onRenderEmailBody and replace any rendered email body without holding email:render-takeover. Consent copy gated what the user was asked, not what the host allowed. |
| 2026-08-04 | lib/plugin-sandbox/host-api.ts | export hasPermission() (was module-private) | one source of truth for the permission rule — the loader gate and the RPC gate must not drift apart |
| 2026-08-04 | app/api/admin/plugins/route.ts | B-01 — scan all .js/.mjs in the bundle (was entrypoint only); return structured findings + canOverride; allow admin overrideWarnings=true with a plugin.install.scan_override audit entry; echo accepted findings on success | hard-reject on eval(/new Function(/innerHTML = made every crypto plugin uninstallable (minified openpgp.js/pkijs trip it), while only scanning the entrypoint left a trivial bypass. Route is already admin-authenticated, so the scan is defence-in-depth, not a trust boundary. |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/audits/SMIME-PLUGIN-AUDIT-2026-08-04.md (new) | S-01 security audit of bulwarkmail/plugins/smime @ 91085a3 — 9 findings (2 HIGH, 1 MED-HIGH), verdict: fork and fix before shipping | privileged same-origin plugin that handles users' private keys; verdict must precede any deploy |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/ (new) | fork of the upstream S/MIME plugin, source only — upstream smime.zip deliberately NOT vendored | shipped zip is a 1.77 MB bundle at manifest 1.0.1 while source is 1.0.2, so auditing src/ would not audit what the zip installs. We build from source via npm run package. |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/src/index.js | audit fix 1 (HIGH) — maybeAutoImportSigner now requires signerEmailMatch === true and !selfSigned before trusting a signer cert | upstream gated on signatureValid alone, but smimeVerify runs checkChain:false, so a self-signed cert asserting any address was silently stored as the ENCRYPTION TARGET for it. Both values were already computed and ignored. |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/src/mime-builder.js | audit fix 3 (MED-HIGH) — stripCrlf() applied inside formatHeader + the 3 directly-assembled headers (att.contentType, att.cid, smimeType) | CRLF escaping reached only Subject and filename; display names, Message-ID, In-Reply-To and References were raw — and those are copied from inbound mail on reply/forward, making it remotely reachable header injection |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/src/smime-decrypt.js | audit fix 2 (HIGH) — content-encryption allowlist (AES-CBC + AES-GCM only, gate runs before any key use); normal decrypt moved to nativeEngine() so the liner engine is reachable only for a genuine legacy RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 key; return contentAuthenticated | upstream applied NO algorithm check and ran every decrypt through the liner engine, which registers DES-CBC/3DES-CBC/RC2-CBC for PKCS#12 password encryption — the CMS path inherited them. AEAD-only would break interop (RFC 5751 mandates AES-128-CBC), so CBC stays and the weak ciphers go. |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/src/index.js | audit fix 2 (cont.) — suppress HTML when content is unauthenticated (CBC), text-only, behind new renderUnauthenticatedHtml setting (default false) | CMS EnvelopedData has no MAC, so CBC plaintext is malleable and HTML rendering is EFAIL's exfiltration channel. The host blocks remote content by default but that's a setting the plugin can't observe — don't lean on it. Our own encrypt path is always AES-GCM, so outbound mail renders fully. |
| 2026-08-04 | .gitignore | ignore vnc/plugins/smime/{node_modules,dist,smime-vnc.zip} | build output is reproducible from source; never vendor a prebuilt bundle (that was the upstream mistake) |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/manifest.json | add auth:observe | plugin registers onAfterLogout/onAccountSwitch (real hooks, lib/plugin-hooks.ts:362-363) without declaring the permission; under B-09 the session-key wipe would silently stop running |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/verify-fixes.mjs (new) | 36 regression assertions across all three fixes, incl. source checks that fail if a guard is removed, a legacy CBC OID reappears, or the mail path stops using the native engine | the source assertion caught an interpolated header manual review had wrongly dismissed as static |
| 2026-08-04 | vnc/plugins/smime/roundtrip.mjs (new) | real crypto round trip through the plugin's own modules — PKCS#12 import → unlock → sign → verify → encrypt → decrypt, 24 assertions, no browser required | proves the three audit fixes did not break S/MIME. Run: node vnc/plugins/smime/roundtrip.mjs <certdir> |
| 2026-08-04 | app/(main)/admin/_tabs/plugins.tsx | B-01 (UI) — scanner-findings review panel: holds the rejected file, lists pattern-per-file, offers "Install anyway" / "Cancel"; success message reports how many findings were accepted | without this the override was API-only — an admin uploading a crypto bundle through the web form hit a 400 they could not act on. Also replaces a dead data.warnings read (never returned by the route) with the live findings field. |
(append new rows as you diverge)