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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) N. Sakimura, Ed.
Request for Comments: 7636 Nomura Research Institute
Category: Standards Track J. Bradley
ISSN: 2070-1721 Ping Identity
N. Agarwal
Google
September 2015
Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients
Abstract
OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are
susceptible to the authorization code interception attack. This
specification describes the attack as well as a technique to mitigate
against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange
(PKCE, pronounced "pixy").
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Protocol Flow ..............................................5
2. Notational Conventions ..........................................6
3. Terminology .....................................................7
3.1. Abbreviations ..............................................7
4. Protocol ........................................................8
4.1. Client Creates a Code Verifier .............................8
4.2. Client Creates the Code Challenge ..........................8
4.3. Client Sends the Code Challenge with the
Authorization Request ......................................9
4.4. Server Returns the Code ....................................9
4.4.1. Error Response ......................................9
4.5. Client Sends the Authorization Code and the Code
Verifier to the Token Endpoint ............................10
4.6. Server Verifies code_verifier before Returning the
Tokens ....................................................10
5. Compatibility ..................................................11
6. IANA Considerations ............................................11
6.1. OAuth Parameters Registry .................................11
6.2. PKCE Code Challenge Method Registry .......................11
6.2.1. Registration Template ..............................12
6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents ..........................13
7. Security Considerations ........................................13
7.1. Entropy of the code_verifier ..............................13
7.2. Protection against Eavesdroppers ..........................13
7.3. Salting the code_challenge ................................14
7.4. OAuth Security Considerations .............................14
7.5. TLS Security Considerations ...............................15
8. References .....................................................15
8.1. Normative References ......................................15
8.2. Informative References ....................................16
Appendix A. Notes on Implementing Base64url Encoding without
Padding .............................................17
Appendix B. Example for the S256 code_challenge_method ...........17
Acknowledgements ..................................................19
Authors' Addresses ................................................20
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
1. Introduction
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] public clients are susceptible to the
authorization code interception attack.
In this attack, the attacker intercepts the authorization code
returned from the authorization endpoint within a communication path
not protected by Transport Layer Security (TLS), such as inter-
application communication within the client's operating system.
Once the attacker has gained access to the authorization code, it can
use it to obtain the access token.
Figure 1 shows the attack graphically. In step (1), the native
application running on the end device, such as a smartphone, issues
an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request via the browser/operating system.
The Redirection Endpoint URI in this case typically uses a custom URI
scheme. Step (1) happens through a secure API that cannot be
intercepted, though it may potentially be observed in advanced attack
scenarios. The request then gets forwarded to the OAuth 2.0
authorization server in step (2). Because OAuth requires the use of
TLS, this communication is protected by TLS and cannot be
intercepted. The authorization server returns the authorization code
in step (3). In step (4), the Authorization Code is returned to the
requester via the Redirection Endpoint URI that was provided in step
(1).
Note that it is possible for a malicious app to register itself as a
handler for the custom scheme in addition to the legitimate OAuth 2.0
app. Once it does so, the malicious app is now able to intercept the
authorization code in step (4). This allows the attacker to request
and obtain an access token in steps (5) and (6), respectively.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
| End Device (e.g., Smartphone) |
| |
| +-------------+ +----------+ | (6) Access Token +----------+
| |Legitimate | | Malicious|<--------------------| |
| |OAuth 2.0 App| | App |-------------------->| |
| +-------------+ +----------+ | (5) Authorization | |
| | ^ ^ | Grant | |
| | \ | | | |
| | \ (4) | | | |
| (1) | \ Authz| | | |
| Authz| \ Code | | | Authz |
| Request| \ | | | Server |
| | \ | | | |
| | \ | | | |
| v \ | | | |
| +----------------------------+ | | |
| | | | (3) Authz Code | |
| | Operating System/ |<--------------------| |
| | Browser |-------------------->| |
| | | | (2) Authz Request | |
| +----------------------------+ | +----------+
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
Figure 1: Authorization Code Interception Attack
A number of pre-conditions need to hold for this attack to work:
1. The attacker manages to register a malicious application on the
client device and registers a custom URI scheme that is also used
by another application. The operating systems must allow a custom
URI scheme to be registered by multiple applications.
2. The OAuth 2.0 authorization code grant is used.
3. The attacker has access to the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] "client_id" and
"client_secret" (if provisioned). All OAuth 2.0 native app
client-instances use the same "client_id". Secrets provisioned in
client binary applications cannot be considered confidential.
4. Either one of the following condition is met:
4a. The attacker (via the installed application) is able to
observe only the responses from the authorization endpoint.
When "code_challenge_method" value is "plain", only this
attack is mitigated.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
4b. A more sophisticated attack scenario allows the attacker to
observe requests (in addition to responses) to the
authorization endpoint. The attacker is, however, not able to
act as a man in the middle. This was caused by leaking http
log information in the OS. To mitigate this,
"code_challenge_method" value must be set either to "S256" or
a value defined by a cryptographically secure
"code_challenge_method" extension.
While this is a long list of pre-conditions, the described attack has
been observed in the wild and has to be considered in OAuth 2.0
deployments. While the OAuth 2.0 threat model (Section 4.4.1 of
[RFC6819]) describes mitigation techniques, they are, unfortunately,
not applicable since they rely on a per-client instance secret or a
per-client instance redirect URI.
To mitigate this attack, this extension utilizes a dynamically
created cryptographically random key called "code verifier". A
unique code verifier is created for every authorization request, and
its transformed value, called "code challenge", is sent to the
authorization server to obtain the authorization code. The
authorization code obtained is then sent to the token endpoint with
the "code verifier", and the server compares it with the previously
received request code so that it can perform the proof of possession
of the "code verifier" by the client. This works as the mitigation
since the attacker would not know this one-time key, since it is sent
over TLS and cannot be intercepted.
1.1. Protocol Flow
+-------------------+
| Authz Server |
+--------+ | +---------------+ |
| |--(A)- Authorization Request ---->| | |
| | + t(code_verifier), t_m | | Authorization | |
| | | | Endpoint | |
| |<-(B)---- Authorization Code -----| | |
| | | +---------------+ |
| Client | | |
| | | +---------------+ |
| |--(C)-- Access Token Request ---->| | |
| | + code_verifier | | Token | |
| | | | Endpoint | |
| |<-(D)------ Access Token ---------| | |
+--------+ | +---------------+ |
+-------------------+
Figure 2: Abstract Protocol Flow
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
This specification adds additional parameters to the OAuth 2.0
Authorization and Access Token Requests, shown in abstract form in
Figure 2.
A. The client creates and records a secret named the "code_verifier"
and derives a transformed version "t(code_verifier)" (referred to
as the "code_challenge"), which is sent in the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Request along with the transformation method "t_m".
B. The Authorization Endpoint responds as usual but records
"t(code_verifier)" and the transformation method.
C. The client then sends the authorization code in the Access Token
Request as usual but includes the "code_verifier" secret generated
at (A).
D. The authorization server transforms "code_verifier" and compares
it to "t(code_verifier)" from (B). Access is denied if they are
not equal.
An attacker who intercepts the authorization code at (B) is unable to
redeem it for an access token, as they are not in possession of the
"code_verifier" secret.
2. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].
If these words are used without being spelled in uppercase, then they
are to be interpreted with their natural language meanings.
This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
notation of [RFC5234].
STRING denotes a sequence of zero or more ASCII [RFC20] characters.
OCTETS denotes a sequence of zero or more octets.
ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation
of STRING where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII
characters.
BASE64URL-ENCODE(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS,
per Appendix A, producing a STRING.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
BASE64URL-DECODE(STRING) denotes the base64url decoding of STRING,
per Appendix A, producing a sequence of octets.
SHA256(OCTETS) denotes a SHA2 256-bit hash [RFC6234] of OCTETS.
3. Terminology
In addition to the terms defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], this
specification defines the following terms:
code verifier
A cryptographically random string that is used to correlate the
authorization request to the token request.
code challenge
A challenge derived from the code verifier that is sent in the
authorization request, to be verified against later.
code challenge method
A method that was used to derive code challenge.
Base64url Encoding
Base64 encoding using the URL- and filename-safe character set
defined in Section 5 of [RFC4648], with all trailing '='
characters omitted (as permitted by Section 3.2 of [RFC4648]) and
without the inclusion of any line breaks, whitespace, or other
additional characters. (See Appendix A for notes on implementing
base64url encoding without padding.)
3.1. Abbreviations
ABNF Augmented Backus-Naur Form
Authz Authorization
PKCE Proof Key for Code Exchange
MITM Man-in-the-middle
MTI Mandatory To Implement
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
4. Protocol
4.1. Client Creates a Code Verifier
The client first creates a code verifier, "code_verifier", for each
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Authorization Request, in the following manner:
code_verifier = high-entropy cryptographic random STRING using the
unreserved characters [A-Z] / [a-z] / [0-9] / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
from Section 2.3 of [RFC3986], with a minimum length of 43 characters
and a maximum length of 128 characters.
ABNF for "code_verifier" is as follows.
code-verifier = 43*128unreserved
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A
DIGIT = %x30-39
NOTE: The code verifier SHOULD have enough entropy to make it
impractical to guess the value. It is RECOMMENDED that the output of
a suitable random number generator be used to create a 32-octet
sequence. The octet sequence is then base64url-encoded to produce a
43-octet URL safe string to use as the code verifier.
4.2. Client Creates the Code Challenge
The client then creates a code challenge derived from the code
verifier by using one of the following transformations on the code
verifier:
plain
code_challenge = code_verifier
S256
code_challenge = BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier)))
If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as
"S256" is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are
permitted to use "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some
technical reason and know via out-of-band configuration that the
server supports "plain".
The plain transformation is for compatibility with existing
deployments and for constrained environments that can't use the S256
transformation.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
ABNF for "code_challenge" is as follows.
code-challenge = 43*128unreserved
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A
DIGIT = %x30-39
4.3. Client Sends the Code Challenge with the Authorization Request
The client sends the code challenge as part of the OAuth 2.0
Authorization Request (Section 4.1.1 of [RFC6749]) using the
following additional parameters:
code_challenge
REQUIRED. Code challenge.
code_challenge_method
OPTIONAL, defaults to "plain" if not present in the request. Code
verifier transformation method is "S256" or "plain".
4.4. Server Returns the Code
When the server issues the authorization code in the authorization
response, it MUST associate the "code_challenge" and
"code_challenge_method" values with the authorization code so it can
be verified later.
Typically, the "code_challenge" and "code_challenge_method" values
are stored in encrypted form in the "code" itself but could
alternatively be stored on the server associated with the code. The
server MUST NOT include the "code_challenge" value in client requests
in a form that other entities can extract.
The exact method that the server uses to associate the
"code_challenge" with the issued "code" is out of scope for this
specification.
4.4.1. Error Response
If the server requires Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) by OAuth
public clients and the client does not send the "code_challenge" in
the request, the authorization endpoint MUST return the authorization
error response with the "error" value set to "invalid_request". The
"error_description" or the response of "error_uri" SHOULD explain the
nature of error, e.g., code challenge required.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
If the server supporting PKCE does not support the requested
transformation, the authorization endpoint MUST return the
authorization error response with "error" value set to
"invalid_request". The "error_description" or the response of
"error_uri" SHOULD explain the nature of error, e.g., transform
algorithm not supported.
4.5. Client Sends the Authorization Code and the Code Verifier to the
Token Endpoint
Upon receipt of the Authorization Code, the client sends the Access
Token Request to the token endpoint. In addition to the parameters
defined in the OAuth 2.0 Access Token Request (Section 4.1.3 of
[RFC6749]), it sends the following parameter:
code_verifier
REQUIRED. Code verifier
The "code_challenge_method" is bound to the Authorization Code when
the Authorization Code is issued. That is the method that the token
endpoint MUST use to verify the "code_verifier".
4.6. Server Verifies code_verifier before Returning the Tokens
Upon receipt of the request at the token endpoint, the server
verifies it by calculating the code challenge from the received
"code_verifier" and comparing it with the previously associated
"code_challenge", after first transforming it according to the
"code_challenge_method" method specified by the client.
If the "code_challenge_method" from Section 4.3 was "S256", the
received "code_verifier" is hashed by SHA-256, base64url-encoded, and
then compared to the "code_challenge", i.e.:
BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier))) == code_challenge
If the "code_challenge_method" from Section 4.3 was "plain", they are
compared directly, i.e.:
code_verifier == code_challenge.
If the values are equal, the token endpoint MUST continue processing
as normal (as defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]). If the values are not
equal, an error response indicating "invalid_grant" as described in
Section 5.2 of [RFC6749] MUST be returned.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
5. Compatibility
Server implementations of this specification MAY accept OAuth2.0
clients that do not implement this extension. If the "code_verifier"
is not received from the client in the Authorization Request, servers
supporting backwards compatibility revert to the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]
protocol without this extension.
As the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] server responses are unchanged by this
specification, client implementations of this specification do not
need to know if the server has implemented this specification or not
and SHOULD send the additional parameters as defined in Section 4 to
all servers.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA has made the following registrations per this document.
6.1. OAuth Parameters Registry
This specification registers the following parameters in the IANA
"OAuth Parameters" registry defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
o Parameter name: code_verifier
o Parameter usage location: token request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): RFC 7636 (this document)
o Parameter name: code_challenge
o Parameter usage location: authorization request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): RFC 7636 (this document)
o Parameter name: code_challenge_method
o Parameter usage location: authorization request
o Change controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): RFC 7636 (this document)
6.2. PKCE Code Challenge Method Registry
This specification establishes the "PKCE Code Challenge Methods"
registry. The new registry should be a sub-registry of the "OAuth
Parameters" registry.
Additional "code_challenge_method" types for use with the
authorization endpoint are registered using the Specification
Required policy [RFC5226], which includes review of the request by
one or more Designated Experts (DEs). The DEs will ensure that there
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
is at least a two-week review of the request on the oauth-ext-
review@ietf.org mailing list and that any discussion on that list
converges before they respond to the request. To allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s)
may approve registration once they are satisfied that an acceptable
specification will be published.
Registration requests and discussion on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org
mailing list should use an appropriate subject, such as "Request for
PKCE code_challenge_method: example").
The Designated Expert(s) should consider the discussion on the
mailing list, as well as the overall security properties of the
challenge method when evaluating registration requests. New methods
should not disclose the value of the code_verifier in the request to
the Authorization endpoint. Denials should include an explanation
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request
successful.
6.2.1. Registration Template
Code Challenge Method Parameter Name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8
characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is
case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a
case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) states
that there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this
particular case.
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, and home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specifies the parameter,
preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of
the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also
be included but is not required.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
Per this document, IANA has registered the Code Challenge Method
Parameter Names defined in Section 4.2 in this registry.
o Code Challenge Method Parameter Name: plain
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of RFC 7636 (this document)
o Code Challenge Method Parameter Name: S256
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of RFC 7636 (this document)
7. Security Considerations
7.1. Entropy of the code_verifier
The security model relies on the fact that the code verifier is not
learned or guessed by the attacker. It is vitally important to
adhere to this principle. As such, the code verifier has to be
created in such a manner that it is cryptographically random and has
high entropy that it is not practical for the attacker to guess.
The client SHOULD create a "code_verifier" with a minimum of 256 bits
of entropy. This can be done by having a suitable random number
generator create a 32-octet sequence. The octet sequence can then be
base64url-encoded to produce a 43-octet URL safe string to use as a
"code_challenge" that has the required entropy.
7.2. Protection against Eavesdroppers
Clients MUST NOT downgrade to "plain" after trying the "S256" method.
Servers that support PKCE are required to support "S256", and servers
that do not support PKCE will simply ignore the unknown
"code_verifier". Because of this, an error when "S256" is presented
can only mean that the server is faulty or that a MITM attacker is
trying a downgrade attack.
The "S256" method protects against eavesdroppers observing or
intercepting the "code_challenge", because the challenge cannot be
used without the verifier. With the "plain" method, there is a
chance that "code_challenge" will be observed by the attacker on the
device or in the http request. Since the code challenge is the same
as the code verifier in this case, the "plain" method does not
protect against the eavesdropping of the initial request.
The use of "S256" protects against disclosure of the "code_verifier"
value to an attacker.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
Because of this, "plain" SHOULD NOT be used and exists only for
compatibility with deployed implementations where the request path is
already protected. The "plain" method SHOULD NOT be used in new
implementations, unless they cannot support "S256" for some technical
reason.
The "S256" code challenge method or other cryptographically secure
code challenge method extension SHOULD be used. The "plain" code
challenge method relies on the operating system and transport
security not to disclose the request to an attacker.
If the code challenge method is "plain" and the code challenge is to
be returned inside authorization "code" to achieve a stateless
server, it MUST be encrypted in such a manner that only the server
can decrypt and extract it.
7.3. Salting the code_challenge
To reduce implementation complexity, salting is not used in the
production of the code challenge, as the code verifier contains
sufficient entropy to prevent brute-force attacks. Concatenating a
publicly known value to a code verifier (containing 256 bits of
entropy) and then hashing it with SHA256 to produce a code challenge
would not increase the number of attempts necessary to brute force a
valid value for code verifier.
While the "S256" transformation is like hashing a password, there are
important differences. Passwords tend to be relatively low-entropy
words that can be hashed offline and the hash looked up in a
dictionary. By concatenating a unique though public value to each
password prior to hashing, the dictionary space that an attacker
needs to search is greatly expanded.
Modern graphics processors now allow attackers to calculate hashes in
real time faster than they could be looked up from a disk. This
eliminates the value of the salt in increasing the complexity of a
brute-force attack for even low-entropy passwords.
7.4. OAuth Security Considerations
All the OAuth security analysis presented in [RFC6819] applies, so
readers SHOULD carefully follow it.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
7.5. TLS Security Considerations
Current security considerations can be found in "Recommendations for
Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)" [BCP195]. This supersedes the TLS version
recommendations in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
[RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
Appendix A. Notes on Implementing Base64url Encoding without Padding
This appendix describes how to implement a base64url-encoding
function without padding, based upon the standard base64-encoding
function that uses padding.
To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions is shown
below. Similar code could be used in other languages.
static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg)
{
string s = Convert.ToBase64String(arg); // Regular base64 encoder
s = s.Split('=')[0]; // Remove any trailing '='s
s = s.Replace('+', '-'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('/', '_'); // 63rd char of encoding
return s;
}
An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values
follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below,
which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence.
3 236 255 224 193
A-z_4ME
Appendix B. Example for the S256 code_challenge_method
The client uses output of a suitable random number generator to
create a 32-octet sequence. The octets representing the value in
this example (using JSON array notation) are:
[116, 24, 223, 180, 151, 153, 224, 37, 79, 250, 96, 125, 216, 173,
187, 186, 22, 212, 37, 77, 105, 214, 191, 240, 91, 88, 5, 88, 83,
132, 141, 121]
Encoding this octet sequence as base64url provides the value of the
code_verifier:
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
The code_verifier is then hashed via the SHA256 hash function to
produce:
[19, 211, 30, 150, 26, 26, 216, 236, 47, 22, 177, 12, 76, 152, 46,
8, 118, 168, 120, 173, 109, 241, 68, 86, 110, 225, 137, 74, 203,
112, 249, 195]
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
Encoding this octet sequence as base64url provides the value of the
code_challenge:
E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM
The authorization request includes:
code_challenge=E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM
&code_challenge_method=S256
The authorization server then records the code_challenge and
code_challenge_method along with the code that is granted to the
client.
In the request to the token_endpoint, the client includes the code
received in the authorization response as well as the additional
parameter:
code_verifier=dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
The authorization server retrieves the information for the code
grant. Based on the recorded code_challenge_method being S256, it
then hashes and base64url-encodes the value of code_verifier:
BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier)))
The calculated value is then compared with the value of
"code_challenge":
BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier))) == code_challenge
If the two values are equal, then the authorization server can
provide the tokens as long as there are no other errors in the
request. If the values are not equal, then the request must be
rejected, and an error returned.
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
Acknowledgements
The initial draft version of this specification was created by the
OpenID AB/Connect Working Group of the OpenID Foundation.
This specification is the work of the OAuth Working Group, which
includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular,
the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording
that shaped and formed the final specification:
Anthony Nadalin, Microsoft
Axel Nenker, Deutsche Telekom
Breno de Medeiros, Google
Brian Campbell, Ping Identity
Chuck Mortimore, Salesforce
Dirk Balfanz, Google
Eduardo Gueiros, Jive Communications
Hannes Tschonfenig, ARM
James Manger, Telstra
Justin Richer, MIT Kerberos
Josh Mandel, Boston Children's Hospital
Lewis Adam, Motorola Solutions
Madjid Nakhjiri, Samsung
Michael B. Jones, Microsoft
Paul Madsen, Ping Identity
Phil Hunt, Oracle
Prateek Mishra, Oracle
Ryo Ito, mixi
Scott Tomilson, Ping Identity
Sergey Beryozkin
Takamichi Saito
Torsten Lodderstedt, Deutsche Telekom
William Denniss, Google
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]
RFC 7636 OAUTH PKCE September 2015
Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura (editor)
Nomura Research Institute
1-6-5 Marunouchi, Marunouchi Kitaguchi Bldg.
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005
Japan
Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante
Talagante, RM
Chile
Phone: +44 20 8133 3718
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
Naveen Agarwal
Google
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
Mountain View, CA 94043
United States
Phone: +1 650-253-0000
Email: naa@google.com
URI: http://google.com/
Sakimura, et al. Standards Track [Page 20]
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