261 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
261 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
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import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
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import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
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import { refreshTokenCookieName, refreshTokenServerCookieName } from '@/lib/oauth/tokens';
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import { getCookieOptions } from '@/lib/oauth/cookie-config';
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import { readFileEnv } from '@/lib/read-file-env';
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import { configManager } from '@/lib/admin/config-manager';
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import { isPublicHttpUrl } from '@/lib/security/url-guard';
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import { recordLogin } from '@/lib/telemetry/login-tracker';
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import { parseJmapServers, findServerByUrl, findServerById } from '@/lib/admin/jmap-servers';
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import { MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS } from '@/lib/account-utils';
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import { generateCodeVerifier, generateCodeChallenge } from '@/lib/oauth/pkce';
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/**
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* Exchange a password + (optional) TOTP code for OAuth tokens.
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*
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* Stalwart 0.16+ no longer accepts the legacy `password$totp` convention over
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* HTTP Basic auth: its Basic decoder hardcodes `mfa_token: None` and never
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* splits the secret on `$`, so any TOTP appended to the password is verified
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* verbatim against the password hash and fails. The MFA token must instead be
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* supplied as a distinct field through the structured login endpoint.
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*
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* This route drives that flow server-side (avoiding browser CORS against the
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* mail server, same as OAuth discovery):
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* 1. POST {serverUrl}/api/auth -> authenticate with a separate `mfaToken`,
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* receiving a short-lived authorization `clientCode`.
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* 2. POST {serverUrl}/auth/token (grant_type=authorization_code) -> exchange
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* the code (with PKCE) for access/refresh tokens.
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*
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* Token-based auth also survives TOTP rotation, unlike basic auth which embeds
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* the (≈30s) code in every request.
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*/
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// Fallback OAuth client id used when no client is configured. Stalwart accepts
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// any client id unless `require_client_registration` is enabled (default off);
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// when it is enabled the admin must configure `oauthClientId` with this
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// redirect URI registered.
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const DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID = 'bulwark-webmail';
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interface LoginResult {
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type?: string;
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// The response keeps snake_case: only the LoginResponse variant *tags* are
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// camelCased server-side, not the struct fields (the request fields are).
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client_code?: string;
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}
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function trimUrl(url: string): string {
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return url.replace(/\/+$/, '');
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}
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async function attemptLogin(
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upstreamUrl: string,
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username: string,
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password: string,
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totp: string | undefined,
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redirectUri: string,
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slot: number,
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serverId: string | null,
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): Promise<NextResponse> {
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const base = trimUrl(upstreamUrl);
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// Per-server OAuth credentials override the global ones when the requested
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// server entry has its own oauth block configured.
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const serverList = parseJmapServers(configManager.get<unknown>('jmapServers', []));
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const entry = findServerById(serverList, serverId);
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const clientId = entry?.oauth?.clientId
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|| configManager.get<string>('oauthClientId', '')
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|| process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
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|| DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID;
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const clientSecret = entry?.oauth?.clientSecret
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|| configManager.get<string>('oauthClientSecret', '')
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|| process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
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|| readFileEnv(process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE)
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|| '';
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// PKCE proves the token exchange originates from the same client that
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// initiated the login, so no client secret is required for public clients.
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const verifier = generateCodeVerifier();
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const challenge = await generateCodeChallenge(verifier);
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// Step 1: structured login with a separate MFA token.
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let login: LoginResult;
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try {
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const loginResponse = await fetch(`${base}/api/auth`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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body: JSON.stringify({
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type: 'authCode',
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accountName: username,
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accountSecret: password,
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...(totp ? { mfaToken: totp } : {}),
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clientId,
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redirectUri,
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codeChallenge: challenge,
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codeChallengeMethod: 'S256',
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}),
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});
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if (!loginResponse.ok) {
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const detail = (await loginResponse.text()).substring(0, 500);
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logger.warn('TOTP login: /api/auth rejected request', { status: loginResponse.status });
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// A 404 means the server predates the structured login endpoint; let the
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// caller fall back to the legacy basic-auth path.
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return NextResponse.json(
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{ error: loginResponse.status === 404 ? 'login_endpoint_missing' : 'login_failed', detail },
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{ status: loginResponse.status === 404 ? 404 : 502 },
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);
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}
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login = await loginResponse.json();
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} catch (err) {
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logger.warn('TOTP login: /api/auth request failed', { error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) });
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'login_unreachable' }, { status: 502 });
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}
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switch (login.type) {
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case 'authenticated':
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break;
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case 'mfaRequired':
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'totp_required' }, { status: 401 });
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case 'failure':
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default:
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'invalid_credentials' }, { status: 401 });
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}
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if (!login.client_code) {
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logger.warn('TOTP login: authenticated response missing client_code');
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'login_failed' }, { status: 502 });
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}
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// Step 2: exchange the authorization code for tokens.
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const tokenParams = new URLSearchParams({
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grant_type: 'authorization_code',
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code: login.client_code,
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client_id: clientId,
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redirect_uri: redirectUri,
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code_verifier: verifier,
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});
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// Confidential clients still send their secret; harmless for public clients.
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if (clientSecret) tokenParams.set('client_secret', clientSecret);
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let tokens: { access_token?: string; expires_in?: number; refresh_token?: string };
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try {
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const tokenResponse = await fetch(`${base}/auth/token`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
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body: tokenParams.toString(),
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});
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if (!tokenResponse.ok) {
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const detail = (await tokenResponse.text()).substring(0, 500);
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logger.warn('TOTP login: token exchange failed', { status: tokenResponse.status, detail });
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'token_exchange_failed', detail }, { status: 502 });
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}
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tokens = await tokenResponse.json();
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} catch (err) {
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logger.warn('TOTP login: token endpoint failed', { error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) });
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'token_exchange_failed' }, { status: 502 });
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}
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if (!tokens.access_token) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'token_exchange_failed', detail: 'Response missing access_token' }, { status: 502 });
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}
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logger.info('TOTP login succeeded');
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void recordLogin(username, base);
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return await storeAndRespond(
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{ access_token: tokens.access_token, expires_in: tokens.expires_in, refresh_token: tokens.refresh_token },
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slot,
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serverId,
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);
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}
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export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
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try {
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const { serverUrl, username, password, totp, slot: bodySlot, server_id: bodyServerId, redirectUri: bodyRedirectUri } =
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await request.json();
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if (!serverUrl || !username || !password) {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing required parameters' }, { status: 400 });
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}
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const slot = typeof bodySlot === 'number' && bodySlot >= 0 && bodySlot < MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS ? bodySlot : 0;
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const requestedServerId = typeof bodyServerId === 'string' && bodyServerId ? bodyServerId : null;
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const totpCode = typeof totp === 'string' && totp ? totp : undefined;
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// Pin the upstream URL to a configured JMAP server. The list of allowed
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// servers is `jmapServerUrl` plus any entry from `jmapServers`. Only when
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// no server is configured (and the deployment explicitly allows custom
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// JMAP endpoints) do we fall back to the user-supplied URL - and even then
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// it must resolve to a public address.
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await configManager.ensureLoaded();
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const configuredServerUrl =
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configManager.get<string>('jmapServerUrl', '') ||
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process.env.JMAP_SERVER_URL ||
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process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_JMAP_SERVER_URL ||
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'';
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const allowCustomEndpoint = configManager.get<boolean>('allowCustomJmapEndpoint', false);
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const serverList = parseJmapServers(configManager.get<unknown>('jmapServers', []));
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let upstreamUrl: string;
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let resolvedServerId: string | null = null;
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const requestedEntry = findServerById(serverList, requestedServerId);
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const matchedEntry = requestedEntry || findServerByUrl(serverList, serverUrl);
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if (matchedEntry) {
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upstreamUrl = matchedEntry.url;
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resolvedServerId = matchedEntry.id;
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} else if (configuredServerUrl) {
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upstreamUrl = configuredServerUrl;
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} else if (allowCustomEndpoint) {
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if (!(await isPublicHttpUrl(serverUrl))) {
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logger.warn('TOTP login: rejected non-public server URL');
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'invalid_server_url' }, { status: 400 });
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}
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upstreamUrl = serverUrl;
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} else {
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'jmap_server_not_configured' }, { status: 500 });
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}
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// The redirect URI must be identical in the login and token-exchange steps,
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// and (when require_client_registration is on) registered for the client.
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// Prefer the browser-supplied callback URL the OAuth client already uses;
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// fall back to the upstream URL so the two steps still agree.
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const redirectUri =
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typeof bodyRedirectUri === 'string' && /^https?:\/\//.test(bodyRedirectUri)
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? bodyRedirectUri
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: trimUrl(upstreamUrl);
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return await attemptLogin(upstreamUrl, username, password, totpCode, redirectUri, slot, resolvedServerId);
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} catch (error) {
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logger.error('TOTP login error', { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error' });
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return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Internal server error' }, { status: 500 });
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}
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}
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async function storeAndRespond(
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tokens: { access_token: string; expires_in?: number; refresh_token?: string },
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slot: number,
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serverId: string | null,
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): Promise<NextResponse> {
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const cookieStore = await cookies();
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if (tokens.refresh_token) {
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const cookieName = refreshTokenCookieName(slot);
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cookieStore.set(cookieName, tokens.refresh_token, getCookieOptions());
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}
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const serverCookieName = refreshTokenServerCookieName(slot);
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if (serverId) {
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cookieStore.set(serverCookieName, serverId, getCookieOptions());
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} else {
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cookieStore.delete(serverCookieName);
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}
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return NextResponse.json({
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access_token: tokens.access_token,
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expires_in: tokens.expires_in || 3600,
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has_refresh_token: !!tokens.refresh_token,
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});
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}
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