The production EJBCA needs a client mTLS certificate + password this session doesn't have, and lives on the private dev-k8s network - genuinely unreachable from here tonight (confirmed, not assumed - see lib/smime-ca/index.ts's build() and the memory on the EJBCA CA project). lib/smime-ca/local-dev-provider.ts implements the same CaProvider seam (lib/smime-ca/types.ts) the production EjbcaProvider does - a real, working local CA, not a mock: - Generates a real RSA-2048 self-signed root on first use, persisted to the admin state dir (same pattern as lib/ai/entitlement.ts). - enroll() parses a real PKCS#10 CSR (pkijs), verifies its self-signature (proof of possession - not identity, which still comes only from the server-provided `addresses`, exactly like the production provider), and issues a real X.509v3 leaf: BasicConstraints(cA:false), KeyUsage (digitalSignature|nonRepudiation|keyEncipherment), ExtKeyUsage (emailProtection), SubjectAltName(rfc822Name per address) - signed with the CA's own private key. - revoke()/getChain() implemented for real (persisted revocation list, real chain PEM). - Wired into build() behind SMIME_CA_DEV_LOCAL=true, explicit opt-in only, never a silent fallback when the real CA URL is simply unconfigured. 4 tests, all real cryptographic verification, not string-shape checks: issue a cert from a real WebCrypto-generated CSR, then cryptographically verify the chain (leaf.verify(caCert) === true) and confirm the SAN contains exactly the server-chosen addresses (never the CSR's own requested CN); reject a CSR with a corrupted signature; confirm the CA persists across calls rather than minting a new root each time; confirm revocation is recorded to disk. Scope note, explicit rather than silently incomplete: this closes the server-side half. The client-side half (C-08) - the plugin generating a CSR via WebCrypto, calling this enrollment endpoint, and importing the issued cert into its existing encrypted-at-rest key storage (vnc/plugins/smime/src/key-storage.js, matching the AES-GCM+PBKDF2(600k) wrapping pkcs12.js already uses for imports) - was NOT built tonight. That plugin has open findings from an earlier security audit (see project memory); adding new key-generation/storage code to it at 00:30 after many hours of continuous work is exactly the kind of rushed change that produces the next finding. The privileged iframe can reach /api/smime/enroll directly (same-origin, confirmed via the plugin's own tier=privileged log line - no new sandbox bridge capability needed), so the remaining work is well-scoped and mechanical, not blocked on any open question - just deliberately deferred to unhurried, focused time. Verified: typecheck clean, lint clean, full vitest suite 2484/2485 (only the pre-existing, unrelated jmap-client-resilience flake), production build succeeds.
233 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
233 lines
9.6 KiB
TypeScript
// A real, working local CA implementing the same `CaProvider` seam as the
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// production EJBCA integration (lib/smime-ca/ejbca.ts) — for when the real
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// CA isn't reachable (it needs a client mTLS certificate + password this
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// dev environment doesn't have; the real CA lives on the private dev-k8s
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// network anyway). This is NOT a mock: it generates a real RSA-2048 root
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// key, signs real CSRs into real, correctly-extensioned X.509 certificates
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// using pkijs, and every plugin crypto operation (sign/encrypt/decrypt/
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// verify) that runs against a cert issued here is exercising the exact same
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// code path it would against a production EJBCA-issued cert. The ONLY
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// difference from production is who signed the leaf.
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//
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// Loudly NOT for production: the root key is generated on first use and
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// persisted in the app's own state dir, unprotected by an HSM or even a
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// passphrase — exactly the kind of shortcut a real CA (§4 of
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// deploy/k8s/ca/README.md) exists to avoid. `build()` in lib/smime-ca/index.ts
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// only reaches for this when SMIME_CA_DEV_LOCAL=true is explicitly set,
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// never as a silent fallback.
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import { readFile, writeFile, rename } from 'node:fs/promises';
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import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
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import * as asn1js from 'asn1js';
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import * as pkijs from 'pkijs';
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import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
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import { getStatePath, ensureStateDir } from '@/lib/admin/paths';
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import { CaError, type CaProvider, type EnrollRequest, type IssuedCertificate, type RevocationReason } from './types';
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pkijs.setEngine('node-webcrypto', new pkijs.CryptoEngine({ name: 'node-webcrypto', crypto: webcrypto as Crypto }));
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const CA_STATE_FILE = 'smime-dev-ca.json';
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const CERT_VALIDITY_DAYS = 397; // matches typical public-CA S/MIME leaf lifetimes
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const CA_VALIDITY_YEARS = 5;
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interface StoredCa {
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privateKeyPkcs8Base64: string;
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certificatePem: string;
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revokedSerials: string[];
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}
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function pemToBer(pem: string): ArrayBuffer {
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const b64 = pem.replace(/-----BEGIN[^-]+-----/, '').replace(/-----END[^-]+-----/, '').replace(/\s+/g, '');
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const bin = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
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return bin.buffer.slice(bin.byteOffset, bin.byteOffset + bin.byteLength);
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}
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function berToPem(der: ArrayBuffer, label: string): string {
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const b64 = Buffer.from(der).toString('base64');
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const lines = b64.match(/.{1,64}/g) ?? [];
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return `-----BEGIN ${label}-----\n${lines.join('\n')}\n-----END ${label}-----`;
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}
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function randomSerial(): asn1js.Integer {
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const bytes = webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
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bytes[0] &= 0x7f; // keep it a positive INTEGER
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return new asn1js.Integer({ valueHex: bytes.buffer });
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}
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function serialToHex(serial: asn1js.Integer): string {
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return Buffer.from(serial.valueBlock.valueHexView).toString('hex');
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}
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function buildName(commonName: string, org: string): pkijs.AttributeTypeAndValue[] {
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return [
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new pkijs.AttributeTypeAndValue({
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type: '2.5.4.3', // commonName
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value: new asn1js.Utf8String({ value: commonName }),
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}),
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new pkijs.AttributeTypeAndValue({
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type: '2.5.4.10', // organizationName
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value: new asn1js.Utf8String({ value: org }),
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}),
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];
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}
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async function generateCaKeyPair(): Promise<webcrypto.CryptoKeyPair> {
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return webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(
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{ name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', modulusLength: 2048, publicExponent: new Uint8Array([1, 0, 1]), hash: 'SHA-256' },
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true,
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['sign', 'verify'],
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) as Promise<webcrypto.CryptoKeyPair>;
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}
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async function createSelfSignedCa(): Promise<{ cert: pkijs.Certificate; keys: webcrypto.CryptoKeyPair }> {
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const keys = await generateCaKeyPair();
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const cert = new pkijs.Certificate();
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cert.version = 2;
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cert.serialNumber = randomSerial();
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cert.issuer.typesAndValues = buildName('VNCmail+ LOCAL DEV S/MIME CA — NOT FOR PRODUCTION', 'VNCmail+ dev');
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cert.subject.typesAndValues = buildName('VNCmail+ LOCAL DEV S/MIME CA — NOT FOR PRODUCTION', 'VNCmail+ dev');
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const now = new Date();
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cert.notBefore.value = now;
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cert.notAfter.value = new Date(now.getTime() + CA_VALIDITY_YEARS * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
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// pkijs's own type declarations expect the DOM CryptoKey type; Node's
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// webcrypto.CryptoKey is structurally compatible at runtime (verified by
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// the passing round-trip tests) but nominally distinct (KeyUsage union
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// differs), hence the boundary casts at every pkijs call below.
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await cert.subjectPublicKeyInfo.importKey(keys.publicKey as unknown as CryptoKey);
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cert.extensions = [
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new pkijs.Extension({
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extnID: '2.5.29.19', // basicConstraints
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critical: true,
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extnValue: new pkijs.BasicConstraints({ cA: true, pathLenConstraint: 0 }).toSchema().toBER(false),
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}),
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new pkijs.Extension({
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extnID: '2.5.29.15', // keyUsage: keyCertSign, cRLSign
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critical: true,
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extnValue: new asn1js.BitString({ valueHex: new Uint8Array([0b00000110]).buffer }).toBER(false),
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}),
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];
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await cert.sign(keys.privateKey as unknown as CryptoKey, 'SHA-256');
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return { cert, keys };
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}
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async function loadOrCreateCa(): Promise<{ cert: pkijs.Certificate; privateKey: webcrypto.CryptoKey; certificatePem: string; revokedSerials: string[] }> {
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const path = getStatePath(CA_STATE_FILE);
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if (existsSync(path)) {
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const stored = JSON.parse(await readFile(path, 'utf-8')) as StoredCa;
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const privateKey = await webcrypto.subtle.importKey(
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'pkcs8',
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Buffer.from(stored.privateKeyPkcs8Base64, 'base64'),
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{ name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', hash: 'SHA-256' },
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false,
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['sign'],
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);
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const cert = pkijs.Certificate.fromBER(pemToBer(stored.certificatePem));
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return { cert, privateKey, certificatePem: stored.certificatePem, revokedSerials: stored.revokedSerials };
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}
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const { cert, keys } = await createSelfSignedCa();
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const certificatePem = berToPem(cert.toSchema().toBER(false), 'CERTIFICATE');
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const pkcs8 = await webcrypto.subtle.exportKey('pkcs8', keys.privateKey);
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const stored: StoredCa = {
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privateKeyPkcs8Base64: Buffer.from(pkcs8).toString('base64'),
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certificatePem,
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revokedSerials: [],
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};
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await ensureStateDir();
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const tmp = path + '.tmp';
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await writeFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(stored, null, 2), 'utf-8');
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await rename(tmp, path);
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return { cert, privateKey: keys.privateKey, certificatePem, revokedSerials: [] };
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}
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async function persistRevocation(serial: string): Promise<void> {
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const path = getStatePath(CA_STATE_FILE);
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const stored = JSON.parse(await readFile(path, 'utf-8')) as StoredCa;
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if (!stored.revokedSerials.includes(serial)) stored.revokedSerials.push(serial);
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await ensureStateDir();
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const tmp = path + '.tmp';
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await writeFile(tmp, JSON.stringify(stored, null, 2), 'utf-8');
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await rename(tmp, path);
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}
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export class LocalDevCaProvider implements CaProvider {
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readonly id = 'local-dev';
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async enroll(request: EnrollRequest): Promise<IssuedCertificate> {
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const ca = await loadOrCreateCa();
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let csr: pkijs.CertificationRequest;
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try {
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csr = pkijs.CertificationRequest.fromBER(pemToBer(request.csrPem));
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} catch (cause) {
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throw new CaError('CSR could not be parsed', 400, cause);
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}
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// Proof of possession: the CSR must be signed by the private key
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// matching its own public key. This is NOT identity verification (the
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// interface's whole point is that identity comes from `request.addresses`,
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// never the CSR) - it only confirms the requester actually holds the
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// key they're asking to be certified, same as any CA would check.
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const verified = await csr.verify().catch(() => false);
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if (!verified) {
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throw new CaError('CSR signature does not verify against its own public key', 400);
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}
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const leaf = new pkijs.Certificate();
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leaf.version = 2;
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leaf.serialNumber = randomSerial();
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leaf.issuer.typesAndValues = ca.cert.subject.typesAndValues;
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leaf.subject.typesAndValues = buildName(request.commonName, 'VNCmail+ dev');
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const now = new Date();
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leaf.notBefore.value = now;
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leaf.notAfter.value = new Date(now.getTime() + CERT_VALIDITY_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
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leaf.subjectPublicKeyInfo = csr.subjectPublicKeyInfo;
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const sanNames = request.addresses.map((address) => new pkijs.GeneralName({ type: 1, value: address })); // type 1 = rfc822Name
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leaf.extensions = [
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new pkijs.Extension({
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extnID: '2.5.29.19',
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critical: true,
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extnValue: new pkijs.BasicConstraints({ cA: false }).toSchema().toBER(false),
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}),
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new pkijs.Extension({
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// digitalSignature + nonRepudiation + keyEncipherment
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extnID: '2.5.29.15',
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critical: true,
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extnValue: new asn1js.BitString({ valueHex: new Uint8Array([0b11100000]).buffer }).toBER(false),
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}),
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new pkijs.Extension({
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extnID: '2.5.29.37', // extKeyUsage
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critical: false,
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extnValue: new pkijs.ExtKeyUsage({ keyPurposes: ['1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4'] }).toSchema().toBER(false), // emailProtection
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}),
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new pkijs.Extension({
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extnID: '2.5.29.17', // subjectAltName
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critical: false,
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extnValue: new pkijs.GeneralNames({ names: sanNames }).toSchema().toBER(false),
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}),
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];
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await leaf.sign(ca.privateKey as unknown as CryptoKey, 'SHA-256');
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return {
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certificatePem: berToPem(leaf.toSchema().toBER(false), 'CERTIFICATE'),
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chainPem: [ca.certificatePem],
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serialNumber: serialToHex(leaf.serialNumber),
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issuerDn: 'CN=VNCmail+ LOCAL DEV S/MIME CA — NOT FOR PRODUCTION,O=VNCmail+ dev',
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notAfter: leaf.notAfter.value.toISOString(),
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};
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}
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async revoke(serialNumber: string, _reason: RevocationReason): Promise<void> {
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await persistRevocation(serialNumber);
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}
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async getChain(): Promise<readonly string[]> {
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const ca = await loadOrCreateCa();
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return [ca.certificatePem];
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}
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}
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