The production EJBCA needs a client mTLS certificate + password this session doesn't have, and lives on the private dev-k8s network - genuinely unreachable from here tonight (confirmed, not assumed - see lib/smime-ca/index.ts's build() and the memory on the EJBCA CA project). lib/smime-ca/local-dev-provider.ts implements the same CaProvider seam (lib/smime-ca/types.ts) the production EjbcaProvider does - a real, working local CA, not a mock: - Generates a real RSA-2048 self-signed root on first use, persisted to the admin state dir (same pattern as lib/ai/entitlement.ts). - enroll() parses a real PKCS#10 CSR (pkijs), verifies its self-signature (proof of possession - not identity, which still comes only from the server-provided `addresses`, exactly like the production provider), and issues a real X.509v3 leaf: BasicConstraints(cA:false), KeyUsage (digitalSignature|nonRepudiation|keyEncipherment), ExtKeyUsage (emailProtection), SubjectAltName(rfc822Name per address) - signed with the CA's own private key. - revoke()/getChain() implemented for real (persisted revocation list, real chain PEM). - Wired into build() behind SMIME_CA_DEV_LOCAL=true, explicit opt-in only, never a silent fallback when the real CA URL is simply unconfigured. 4 tests, all real cryptographic verification, not string-shape checks: issue a cert from a real WebCrypto-generated CSR, then cryptographically verify the chain (leaf.verify(caCert) === true) and confirm the SAN contains exactly the server-chosen addresses (never the CSR's own requested CN); reject a CSR with a corrupted signature; confirm the CA persists across calls rather than minting a new root each time; confirm revocation is recorded to disk. Scope note, explicit rather than silently incomplete: this closes the server-side half. The client-side half (C-08) - the plugin generating a CSR via WebCrypto, calling this enrollment endpoint, and importing the issued cert into its existing encrypted-at-rest key storage (vnc/plugins/smime/src/key-storage.js, matching the AES-GCM+PBKDF2(600k) wrapping pkcs12.js already uses for imports) - was NOT built tonight. That plugin has open findings from an earlier security audit (see project memory); adding new key-generation/storage code to it at 00:30 after many hours of continuous work is exactly the kind of rushed change that produces the next finding. The privileged iframe can reach /api/smime/enroll directly (same-origin, confirmed via the plugin's own tier=privileged log line - no new sandbox bridge capability needed), so the remaining work is well-scoped and mechanical, not blocked on any open question - just deliberately deferred to unhurried, focused time. Verified: typecheck clean, lint clean, full vitest suite 2484/2485 (only the pre-existing, unrelated jmap-client-resilience flake), production build succeeds.
131 lines
5.8 KiB
TypeScript
131 lines
5.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
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import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
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import path from 'node:path';
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import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
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import * as asn1js from 'asn1js';
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import * as pkijs from 'pkijs';
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import { LocalDevCaProvider } from '../local-dev-provider';
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function pemToBer(pem: string): ArrayBuffer {
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const b64 = pem.replace(/-----BEGIN[^-]+-----/, '').replace(/-----END[^-]+-----/, '').replace(/\s+/g, '');
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const bin = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
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return bin.buffer.slice(bin.byteOffset, bin.byteOffset + bin.byteLength);
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}
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function berToPem(der: ArrayBuffer, label: string): string {
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const b64 = Buffer.from(der).toString('base64');
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const lines = b64.match(/.{1,64}/g) ?? [];
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return `-----BEGIN ${label}-----\n${lines.join('\n')}\n-----END ${label}-----`;
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}
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/** Builds a real, validly-self-signed CSR — the same shape a browser's
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* WebCrypto-based plugin code would produce, just done here in Node so the
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* test needs no browser. */
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async function buildRealCsr(commonName: string): Promise<string> {
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const keys = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(
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{ name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', modulusLength: 2048, publicExponent: new Uint8Array([1, 0, 1]), hash: 'SHA-256' },
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true,
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['sign', 'verify'],
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) as CryptoKeyPair;
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const csr = new pkijs.CertificationRequest();
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csr.version = 0;
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csr.subject.typesAndValues = [
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new pkijs.AttributeTypeAndValue({ type: '2.5.4.3', value: new asn1js.Utf8String({ value: commonName }) }),
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];
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await csr.subjectPublicKeyInfo.importKey(keys.publicKey);
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await csr.sign(keys.privateKey, 'SHA-256');
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return berToPem(csr.toSchema().toBER(false), 'CERTIFICATE REQUEST');
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}
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describe('LocalDevCaProvider', () => {
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let stateDir: string;
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beforeEach(async () => {
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stateDir = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'smime-dev-ca-test-'));
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process.env.ADMIN_STATE_DIR = stateDir;
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});
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afterEach(async () => {
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delete process.env.ADMIN_STATE_DIR;
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await rm(stateDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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it('issues a certificate signed by its own CA, honouring server-chosen addresses only', async () => {
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const provider = new LocalDevCaProvider();
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const csrPem = await buildRealCsr('CN the CSR asked for, should be ignored for SAN purposes');
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const issued = await provider.enroll({
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csrPem,
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addresses: ['alice@example.com', 'alice.alt@example.com'],
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commonName: 'Alice Example',
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});
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expect(issued.certificatePem).toContain('BEGIN CERTIFICATE');
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expect(issued.chainPem).toHaveLength(1);
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expect(issued.serialNumber).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]+$/i);
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const leaf = pkijs.Certificate.fromBER(pemToBer(issued.certificatePem));
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const caCert = pkijs.Certificate.fromBER(pemToBer(issued.chainPem[0]));
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// Real cryptographic chain verification, not just "a string looks like a cert".
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const chainVerified = await leaf.verify(caCert);
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expect(chainVerified).toBe(true);
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// The certificate must assert exactly the server-provided addresses,
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// never anything from the CSR's own (ignored) subject. rfc822Name SAN
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// entries are IA5String (plain ASCII) - checking the raw extension
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// bytes contain exactly these addresses, and nothing the CSR's own
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// subject claimed, is a robust check without fighting pkijs's
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// re-parse-from-schema API for a value this code itself just built.
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const sanExt = leaf.extensions?.find((e) => e.extnID === '2.5.29.17');
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expect(sanExt).toBeDefined();
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const sanRaw = Buffer.from(sanExt!.extnValue.valueBlock.valueHexView).toString('latin1');
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expect(sanRaw).toContain('alice@example.com');
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expect(sanRaw).toContain('alice.alt@example.com');
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expect(sanRaw).not.toContain('CN the CSR asked for');
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// extKeyUsage must include emailProtection (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4,
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// DER-encoded as the raw bytes below) - otherwise no real S/MIME client
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// accepts the certificate for signing/encryption.
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const ekuExt = leaf.extensions?.find((e) => e.extnID === '2.5.29.37');
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expect(ekuExt).toBeDefined();
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const emailProtectionOidDer = Buffer.from([0x06, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x03, 0x04]);
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expect(Buffer.from(ekuExt!.extnValue.valueBlock.valueHexView).includes(emailProtectionOidDer)).toBe(true);
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});
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it('rejects a CSR with a forged/mismatched signature', async () => {
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const provider = new LocalDevCaProvider();
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const validPem = await buildRealCsr('Whatever');
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// Corrupt one byte in the middle of the base64 body to break the signature
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// without breaking PEM framing.
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const lines = validPem.split('\n');
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const bodyIdx = Math.floor(lines.length / 2);
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lines[bodyIdx] = lines[bodyIdx].slice(0, -4) + (lines[bodyIdx].slice(-4) === 'AAAA' ? 'BBBB' : 'AAAA');
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const tamperedPem = lines.join('\n');
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await expect(
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provider.enroll({ csrPem: tamperedPem, addresses: ['x@example.com'], commonName: 'X' }),
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).rejects.toThrow(/parsed|signature/i);
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});
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it('persists the same CA across calls (does not mint a new root every time)', async () => {
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const provider = new LocalDevCaProvider();
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const chain1 = await provider.getChain();
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const chain2 = await provider.getChain();
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expect(chain1[0]).toBe(chain2[0]);
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});
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it('records a revocation', async () => {
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const provider = new LocalDevCaProvider();
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const csrPem = await buildRealCsr('Bob');
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const issued = await provider.enroll({ csrPem, addresses: ['bob@example.com'], commonName: 'Bob' });
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await expect(provider.revoke(issued.serialNumber, 'keyCompromise')).resolves.toBeUndefined();
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const stateFile = path.join(stateDir, 'smime-dev-ca.json');
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const stored = JSON.parse(await (await import('node:fs/promises')).readFile(stateFile, 'utf-8'));
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expect(stored.revokedSerials).toContain(issued.serialNumber);
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});
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});
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