Bernd Rodler
a622e3755b
CRITICAL fixes: - C1: Error swallowing - throw TransportError on network failure in getEmails/searchEmails - C2: Recurrence expansion ID delimiter changed from ':' to '::occurrence::' - C3: Cross-account calendar event UID dedup after multi-account aggregation - C4: Admin session token revocation via JTI blacklist on logout - C6: FTS5 schema-drop - add warning log for automatic reindex trigger - C7: Settings lock - gate updateSetting() with isSettingLocked() check - C8: Offline push pause - add offline event handler that closes push transports HIGH fixes: - H1: Push handler - add ContactCard and FileNode branches - H2: WS fallback - await state snapshot before reconcileAfterWebSocketFallback - H3: Auth rate limiting - add checkUserAuthRateLimit to session and token routes - H4: OAuth logs - strip access_token from error log context - H7: Template XSS - apply DOMPurify to HTML template body on import - H8: Secure cookie - derive from x-forwarded-proto, not NODE_ENV - H9: bcrypt fix - remove bcrypt prefixes from isHashed() so scrypt-only - H13: calendarTasksEnabled - apply admin gate at runtime in calendar page - H14: Task mutations - add try/catch error handling to update/delete/toggle - H18: autoSelectReplyIdentity default changed from false to true Deferred: P1.3 (C5 auth localStorage encryption) - requires custom Zustand persist adapter.
68 lines
2.0 KiB
TypeScript
68 lines
2.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* In-memory rate limiter for admin login and user authentication.
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* Admin: max 5 attempts per IP per 15 minutes.
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* User auth: max 10 attempts per (IP + username) per 15 minutes.
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*/
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const MAX_ADMIN_ATTEMPTS = 5;
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const MAX_USER_ATTEMPTS = 10;
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const WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000; // 15 minutes
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interface RateLimitEntry {
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count: number;
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resetAt: number;
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}
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const attempts = new Map<string, RateLimitEntry>();
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// Clean up expired entries periodically
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setInterval(() => {
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const now = Date.now();
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for (const [key, entry] of attempts) {
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if (entry.resetAt <= now) {
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attempts.delete(key);
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}
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}
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}, 60_000).unref();
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/**
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* Check if the IP is rate limited. Returns remaining attempts, or 0 if blocked.
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*/
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export function checkRateLimit(ip: string): { allowed: boolean; remaining: number; retryAfterMs: number } {
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const now = Date.now();
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const entry = attempts.get(`admin:${ip}`);
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if (!entry || entry.resetAt <= now) {
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attempts.set(`admin:${ip}`, { count: 1, resetAt: now + WINDOW_MS });
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return { allowed: true, remaining: MAX_ADMIN_ATTEMPTS - 1, retryAfterMs: 0 };
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}
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if (entry.count >= MAX_ADMIN_ATTEMPTS) {
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return { allowed: false, remaining: 0, retryAfterMs: entry.resetAt - now };
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}
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entry.count++;
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return { allowed: true, remaining: MAX_ADMIN_ATTEMPTS - entry.count, retryAfterMs: 0 };
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}
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/**
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* Check rate limit for user authentication, keyed by IP + username.
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*/
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export function checkUserAuthRateLimit(ip: string, username: string): { allowed: boolean; remaining: number; retryAfterMs: number } {
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const now = Date.now();
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const key = `user:${ip}:${username}`;
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const entry = attempts.get(key);
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if (!entry || entry.resetAt <= now) {
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attempts.set(key, { count: 1, resetAt: now + WINDOW_MS });
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return { allowed: true, remaining: MAX_USER_ATTEMPTS - 1, retryAfterMs: 0 };
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}
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if (entry.count >= MAX_USER_ATTEMPTS) {
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return { allowed: false, remaining: 0, retryAfterMs: entry.resetAt - now };
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}
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entry.count++;
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return { allowed: true, remaining: MAX_USER_ATTEMPTS - entry.count, retryAfterMs: 0 };
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}
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