Files
SRCmail/app/api/auth/totp-token-exchange/route.ts
T

261 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { refreshTokenCookieName, refreshTokenServerCookieName } from '@/lib/oauth/tokens';
import { getCookieOptions } from '@/lib/oauth/cookie-config';
import { readFileEnv } from '@/lib/read-file-env';
import { configManager } from '@/lib/admin/config-manager';
import { isPublicHttpUrl } from '@/lib/security/url-guard';
import { recordLogin } from '@/lib/telemetry/login-tracker';
import { parseJmapServers, findServerByUrl, findServerById } from '@/lib/admin/jmap-servers';
import { MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS } from '@/lib/account-utils';
import { generateCodeVerifier, generateCodeChallenge } from '@/lib/oauth/pkce';
/**
* Exchange a password + (optional) TOTP code for OAuth tokens.
*
* Stalwart 0.16+ no longer accepts the legacy `password$totp` convention over
* HTTP Basic auth: its Basic decoder hardcodes `mfa_token: None` and never
* splits the secret on `$`, so any TOTP appended to the password is verified
* verbatim against the password hash and fails. The MFA token must instead be
* supplied as a distinct field through the structured login endpoint.
*
* This route drives that flow server-side (avoiding browser CORS against the
* mail server, same as OAuth discovery):
* 1. POST {serverUrl}/api/auth -> authenticate with a separate `mfaToken`,
* receiving a short-lived authorization `clientCode`.
* 2. POST {serverUrl}/auth/token (grant_type=authorization_code) -> exchange
* the code (with PKCE) for access/refresh tokens.
*
* Token-based auth also survives TOTP rotation, unlike basic auth which embeds
* the (≈30s) code in every request.
*/
// Fallback OAuth client id used when no client is configured. Stalwart accepts
// any client id unless `require_client_registration` is enabled (default off);
// when it is enabled the admin must configure `oauthClientId` with this
// redirect URI registered.
const DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID = 'bulwark-webmail';
interface LoginResult {
type?: string;
// The response keeps snake_case: only the LoginResponse variant *tags* are
// camelCased server-side, not the struct fields (the request fields are).
client_code?: string;
}
function trimUrl(url: string): string {
return url.replace(/\/+$/, '');
}
async function attemptLogin(
upstreamUrl: string,
username: string,
password: string,
totp: string | undefined,
redirectUri: string,
slot: number,
serverId: string | null,
): Promise<NextResponse> {
const base = trimUrl(upstreamUrl);
// Per-server OAuth credentials override the global ones when the requested
// server entry has its own oauth block configured.
const serverList = parseJmapServers(configManager.get<unknown>('jmapServers', []));
const entry = findServerById(serverList, serverId);
const clientId = entry?.oauth?.clientId
|| configManager.get<string>('oauthClientId', '')
|| process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
|| DEFAULT_CLIENT_ID;
const clientSecret = entry?.oauth?.clientSecret
|| configManager.get<string>('oauthClientSecret', '')
|| process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
|| readFileEnv(process.env.OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE)
|| '';
// PKCE proves the token exchange originates from the same client that
// initiated the login, so no client secret is required for public clients.
const verifier = generateCodeVerifier();
const challenge = await generateCodeChallenge(verifier);
// Step 1: structured login with a separate MFA token.
let login: LoginResult;
try {
const loginResponse = await fetch(`${base}/api/auth`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
type: 'authCode',
accountName: username,
accountSecret: password,
...(totp ? { mfaToken: totp } : {}),
clientId,
redirectUri,
codeChallenge: challenge,
codeChallengeMethod: 'S256',
}),
});
if (!loginResponse.ok) {
const detail = (await loginResponse.text()).substring(0, 500);
logger.warn('TOTP login: /api/auth rejected request', { status: loginResponse.status });
// A 404 means the server predates the structured login endpoint; let the
// caller fall back to the legacy basic-auth path.
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: loginResponse.status === 404 ? 'login_endpoint_missing' : 'login_failed', detail },
{ status: loginResponse.status === 404 ? 404 : 502 },
);
}
login = await loginResponse.json();
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('TOTP login: /api/auth request failed', { error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'login_unreachable' }, { status: 502 });
}
switch (login.type) {
case 'authenticated':
break;
case 'mfaRequired':
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'totp_required' }, { status: 401 });
case 'failure':
default:
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'invalid_credentials' }, { status: 401 });
}
if (!login.client_code) {
logger.warn('TOTP login: authenticated response missing client_code');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'login_failed' }, { status: 502 });
}
// Step 2: exchange the authorization code for tokens.
const tokenParams = new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: 'authorization_code',
code: login.client_code,
client_id: clientId,
redirect_uri: redirectUri,
code_verifier: verifier,
});
// Confidential clients still send their secret; harmless for public clients.
if (clientSecret) tokenParams.set('client_secret', clientSecret);
let tokens: { access_token?: string; expires_in?: number; refresh_token?: string };
try {
const tokenResponse = await fetch(`${base}/auth/token`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
body: tokenParams.toString(),
});
if (!tokenResponse.ok) {
const detail = (await tokenResponse.text()).substring(0, 500);
logger.warn('TOTP login: token exchange failed', { status: tokenResponse.status, detail });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'token_exchange_failed', detail }, { status: 502 });
}
tokens = await tokenResponse.json();
} catch (err) {
logger.warn('TOTP login: token endpoint failed', { error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err) });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'token_exchange_failed' }, { status: 502 });
}
if (!tokens.access_token) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'token_exchange_failed', detail: 'Response missing access_token' }, { status: 502 });
}
logger.info('TOTP login succeeded');
void recordLogin(username, base);
return await storeAndRespond(
{ access_token: tokens.access_token, expires_in: tokens.expires_in, refresh_token: tokens.refresh_token },
slot,
serverId,
);
}
export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
try {
const { serverUrl, username, password, totp, slot: bodySlot, server_id: bodyServerId, redirectUri: bodyRedirectUri } =
await request.json();
if (!serverUrl || !username || !password) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing required parameters' }, { status: 400 });
}
const slot = typeof bodySlot === 'number' && bodySlot >= 0 && bodySlot < MAX_ACCOUNT_SLOTS ? bodySlot : 0;
const requestedServerId = typeof bodyServerId === 'string' && bodyServerId ? bodyServerId : null;
const totpCode = typeof totp === 'string' && totp ? totp : undefined;
// Pin the upstream URL to a configured JMAP server. The list of allowed
// servers is `jmapServerUrl` plus any entry from `jmapServers`. Only when
// no server is configured (and the deployment explicitly allows custom
// JMAP endpoints) do we fall back to the user-supplied URL - and even then
// it must resolve to a public address.
await configManager.ensureLoaded();
const configuredServerUrl =
configManager.get<string>('jmapServerUrl', '') ||
process.env.JMAP_SERVER_URL ||
process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_JMAP_SERVER_URL ||
'';
const allowCustomEndpoint = configManager.get<boolean>('allowCustomJmapEndpoint', false);
const serverList = parseJmapServers(configManager.get<unknown>('jmapServers', []));
let upstreamUrl: string;
let resolvedServerId: string | null = null;
const requestedEntry = findServerById(serverList, requestedServerId);
const matchedEntry = requestedEntry || findServerByUrl(serverList, serverUrl);
if (matchedEntry) {
upstreamUrl = matchedEntry.url;
resolvedServerId = matchedEntry.id;
} else if (configuredServerUrl) {
upstreamUrl = configuredServerUrl;
} else if (allowCustomEndpoint) {
if (!(await isPublicHttpUrl(serverUrl))) {
logger.warn('TOTP login: rejected non-public server URL');
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'invalid_server_url' }, { status: 400 });
}
upstreamUrl = serverUrl;
} else {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'jmap_server_not_configured' }, { status: 500 });
}
// The redirect URI must be identical in the login and token-exchange steps,
// and (when require_client_registration is on) registered for the client.
// Prefer the browser-supplied callback URL the OAuth client already uses;
// fall back to the upstream URL so the two steps still agree.
const redirectUri =
typeof bodyRedirectUri === 'string' && /^https?:\/\//.test(bodyRedirectUri)
? bodyRedirectUri
: trimUrl(upstreamUrl);
return await attemptLogin(upstreamUrl, username, password, totpCode, redirectUri, slot, resolvedServerId);
} catch (error) {
logger.error('TOTP login error', { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error' });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Internal server error' }, { status: 500 });
}
}
async function storeAndRespond(
tokens: { access_token: string; expires_in?: number; refresh_token?: string },
slot: number,
serverId: string | null,
): Promise<NextResponse> {
const cookieStore = await cookies();
if (tokens.refresh_token) {
const cookieName = refreshTokenCookieName(slot);
cookieStore.set(cookieName, tokens.refresh_token, getCookieOptions());
}
const serverCookieName = refreshTokenServerCookieName(slot);
if (serverId) {
cookieStore.set(serverCookieName, serverId, getCookieOptions());
} else {
cookieStore.delete(serverCookieName);
}
return NextResponse.json({
access_token: tokens.access_token,
expires_in: tokens.expires_in || 3600,
has_refresh_token: !!tokens.refresh_token,
});
}