Files
SRCmail/app/api/auth/sso/start/route.ts
T
Bernd Rodler 13ec05da83 feat: P2.9 VNCtalk + P2.10 Collabora + P2.11 Calendar Enhancements + P2.13 VNCdirectory Admin
- P2.9: VNCtalk video meeting — create/update meeting from event modal,
  'Join Meeting' link in event detail. Admin config vnctalkServerUrl.
- P2.10: Collabora online editing — 'Edit with Collabora' for office files,
  WOPI discovery + edit URL. Admin config collaboraServerUrl.
- P2.11: Calendar enhancements — clickable links in descriptions,
  participant contact popover, Reply/Reply All from event, timezone picker,
  map links for locations.
- P2.13: VNCdirectory IDP admin panel — Connection, SAML/IDP, LDAP,
  Authentication, Federated Apps configuration. Secret masking on display.
2026-08-07 13:38:12 +02:00

152 lines
6.7 KiB
TypeScript

import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import { cookies } from 'next/headers';
import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
import { encryptPayload } from '@/lib/auth/crypto';
import { generateCodeVerifierServer, generateCodeChallengeServer, generateStateServer } from '@/lib/oauth/pkce-server';
import { getRequiredConfig, getDiscoveryValidator } from '@/lib/oauth/token-exchange';
import { discoverOAuth } from '@/lib/oauth/discovery';
import { getOauthScopes } from '@/lib/oauth/tokens';
import { getCookieOptions } from '@/lib/oauth/cookie-config';
import { hasSessionSecret } from '@/lib/auth/session-secret';
import { configManager } from '@/lib/admin/config-manager';
// TODO(P2.13): Wire SAML IDP integration once VNCdirectory is configured.
// When VNCdirectory is enabled and SAML is configured (see
// lib/admin/vncdirectory-config.ts), the SSO start flow should:
// 1. Check isVncDirectoryEnabled() — if false, fall through to existing OAuth flow.
// 2. Read getVncDirectoryConfig() for samlIdpUrl, samlIssuer, samlSpCert.
// 3. Build a SAML AuthnRequest and redirect to the IdP instead of OAuth.
// 4. The /sso/complete handler should process the SAML Response assertion,
// validate the signature against the SP certificate, extract the subject,
// and create a session.
// Reference: docs/admin/VNCDIRECTORY.md in the VNCmail+ plan (P2.13).
const SSO_PENDING_COOKIE = 'sso_pending';
const SSO_PENDING_MAX_AGE = 300; // 5 minutes
// The mobile app's deep-link scheme. Only redirect targets starting with
// this prefix may flow through the mobile handoff path; without the guard
// the SSO complete route would be coerced into returning tokens to whatever
// caller-controlled URL the attacker chose.
const MOBILE_REDIRECT_SCHEME = 'bulwarkmobile://';
export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
try {
if (!hasSessionSecret()) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'SESSION_SECRET is required for SSO' }, { status: 500 });
}
const {
redirect_uri,
locale,
server_id: bodyServerId,
mobile_redirect_uri: rawMobileRedirectUri,
mobile_state: rawMobileState,
purpose: rawPurpose,
} = await request.json();
// `reauth` drives the step-up flow for device pairing: it forces a fresh
// IdP login (prompt=login) and the /reauth/sso/complete handler sets the
// short-lived pairing re-auth proof instead of logging the user in again.
const isReauth = rawPurpose === 'reauth';
if (!redirect_uri || typeof redirect_uri !== 'string') {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing redirect_uri' }, { status: 400 });
}
const mobileRedirectUri =
typeof rawMobileRedirectUri === 'string' && rawMobileRedirectUri
? rawMobileRedirectUri
: null;
const mobileState =
typeof rawMobileState === 'string' && rawMobileState ? rawMobileState : null;
if (mobileRedirectUri && !mobileRedirectUri.startsWith(MOBILE_REDIRECT_SCHEME)) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid mobile_redirect_uri' }, { status: 400 });
}
const serverId = typeof bodyServerId === 'string' && bodyServerId ? bodyServerId : null;
// Validate redirect_uri origin matches the request origin to prevent open redirects
const requestOrigin = request.headers.get('origin') || request.nextUrl.origin;
try {
const redirectOrigin = new URL(redirect_uri).origin;
if (redirectOrigin !== requestOrigin) {
logger.warn('SSO start: redirect_uri origin mismatch', { redirectOrigin, requestOrigin });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid redirect_uri' }, { status: 400 });
}
} catch {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid redirect_uri' }, { status: 400 });
}
const { clientId, discoveryUrl } = getRequiredConfig(serverId);
const metadata = await discoverOAuth(discoveryUrl, { validateEndpoint: getDiscoveryValidator() });
if (!metadata?.authorization_endpoint) {
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'OAuth discovery failed' }, { status: 502 });
}
// Generate PKCE + state server-side
const codeVerifier = generateCodeVerifierServer();
const codeChallenge = generateCodeChallengeServer(codeVerifier);
const state = generateStateServer();
// Encrypt and store in httpOnly cookie. server_id is captured here so the
// /complete handler reaches the same OAuth endpoint we used to authorize.
// Mobile params are captured here so /complete knows to return tokens to
// the caller (in the JSON response) instead of writing the usual server
// cookies - and so the callback page can redirect back to the app.
const pendingData = {
state,
code_verifier: codeVerifier,
redirect_uri,
created_at: Date.now(),
...(serverId ? { server_id: serverId } : {}),
...(mobileRedirectUri ? { mobile_redirect_uri: mobileRedirectUri } : {}),
...(mobileState ? { mobile_state: mobileState } : {}),
...(isReauth ? { purpose: 'reauth' } : {}),
};
const encrypted = encryptPayload(pendingData);
const cookieStore = await cookies();
const baseCookieOpts = getCookieOptions();
cookieStore.set(SSO_PENDING_COOKIE, encrypted, {
...baseCookieOpts,
maxAge: SSO_PENDING_MAX_AGE,
});
// Build authorize URL. OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL, when set, overrides only the
// user-facing authorize endpoint (e.g. a per-brand login host). Discovery,
// token exchange and refresh keep using the canonical discovered endpoints.
const authorizeOverride =
configManager.get<string>('oauthAuthorizeUrl', '') || process.env.OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL;
const authUrl = new URL(authorizeOverride?.trim() || metadata.authorization_endpoint);
authUrl.searchParams.set('response_type', 'code');
authUrl.searchParams.set('client_id', clientId);
authUrl.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', redirect_uri);
authUrl.searchParams.set('scope', getOauthScopes());
authUrl.searchParams.set('state', state);
authUrl.searchParams.set('code_challenge', codeChallenge);
authUrl.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', 'S256');
if (locale) {
authUrl.searchParams.set('ui_locales', locale);
}
// Force a fresh credential entry for step-up re-auth. prompt=login and
// max_age=0 both ask the IdP to re-authenticate even if it has an active
// session; honoring them depends on the IdP supporting these OIDC params.
if (isReauth) {
authUrl.searchParams.set('prompt', 'login');
authUrl.searchParams.set('max_age', '0');
}
return NextResponse.json({
authorize_url: authUrl.toString(),
state,
});
} catch (error) {
logger.error('SSO start error', { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error' });
return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Internal server error' }, { status: 500 });
}
}