Two product decisions from tonight:
1. Public AI providers can now be published by an admin as named presets
(lib/ai/types.ts's PublicAiPreset: name/baseUrl/model/apiKeyEnvVar).
The admin names an env var, never a secret value - the actual key is
whatever ops has set in the server's real environment, same custody
model as the existing AI_SERVER_BASE_URL var. A new server route
(app/api/ai/public/chat) resolves it and makes the call itself, which
also sidesteps the CORS/wrong-base-URL failure class chatPublic hit
earlier tonight. Users pick a preset from a dropdown in Settings -
Answer with - no key field at all; personal BYOK (paste your own key)
stays available as a secondary "Add your own key" option, not removed.
Admin UI: new "Public - org-managed presets" card in the AI policy tab.
2. AI now defaults ON instead of requiring setup (lib/ai/auto-provision.ts):
on first load, if no provider is chosen yet, probe OpenCode (this app
auto-spawns `opencode serve` itself, so it's the one local option with
zero external install step) then Ollama via the existing auto-discovery,
and adopt whichever answers. Never overrides an explicit choice - only
fires while provider is still null. Wired into both AI entry points
(the Ask button and the Settings pane) so it resolves before either
renders its "not configured" state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New admin tab "AI" (app/(main)/admin/_tabs/ai-policy.tsx): provider-class
toggles, server model allow-list, BYOK provider allow-list, seats/usage
(front-end for the already-real lib/ai/entitlement.ts), retrieval on/off,
consent text + version bump.
Real backend, not cosmetic: AiConsoleConfig persisted via config-manager
(lib/ai/types.ts, ai-policy.json in the CONFIG dir). New GET/PUT
/api/admin/ai/policy. Enforcement wired at every real chokepoint, not just
the picker: /api/ai/server/chat checks classesEnabled.server and the model
allow-list, /api/ai/retrieve checks retrievalEnabled, /api/ai/server/models
filters by allow-list. GET /api/ai/policy folds classesEnabled into the
classes list clients see.
Resolved the spec's 3 open questions as recommended: BYOK allow-list stays
client-side/advisory (wired into ai-assistant-settings.tsx's addProfile),
tier picker stays cosmetic, master aiAssistantEnabled toggle stays in the
existing Policy tab (this tab links to it instead of duplicating it).
Defaults preserve today's behavior exactly (classesEnabled/allowlists all
start empty/null) — turning this on changes nothing until an admin touches it.
Three pieces built together tonight since they're naturally linked (the
server-class proxy is the real entitlement enforcement chokepoint):
1. Multi-key BYOK (public class): several named provider profiles
(name/baseUrl/model), each with its own key in lib/ai/key-store.ts
(keyed by profile id, not a single fixed 'public' slot). The "Try it"
pane lets you pick which saved profile answers each question - not one
fixed default.
2. `server` class, real: app/api/ai/server/{models,chat} proxy through
this app's own backend to AI_SERVER_BASE_URL - same-origin from the
browser, no CORS/OLLAMA_ORIGINS story at all, standing in tonight for
VNC's EU/CH-hosted infra with the real Ollama on this Mac (swapping to
the real instance tomorrow is a config change).
3. Real entitlement enforcement (lib/ai/entitlement.ts), scoped to `server`
only (not local/public, per the 2026-08-05 decisions): checkAndAssignSeat()
re-validates on every /api/ai/server/chat call - first use auto-assigns a
seat if any remain, further calls from an unlicensed user get a 402 with
a specific reason. recordUsage() appends to an append-only metering
ledger (timestamp/user/model/tokens/latency) that IS the billing record.
Admin data endpoints at /api/admin/ai/entitlement (seat total, revoke) -
the visual admin console is a separate, not-yet-built task.
Two real bugs found and fixed during verification, not just claimed fixed:
- /api/ai/policy never actually added 'server' to entitlement.classes even
when AI_SERVER_BASE_URL was set (only the type comment was updated) - the
Server radio option silently never appeared until this was caught live.
- The new routes used readStalwartAuthContext(0) (hardcoded slot, SSO/reauth-
specific) instead of getStalwartCredentials() (the general multi-slot
session resolver every other authenticated route uses) - reachable but
wrong, and would have hidden a real auth gap behind "works on my slot".
Verified end-to-end for real: built + ran the actual server, logged in via
the real (non-demo) auth flow, selected Server, listed the real Ollama
models through the proxy, asked "Reply with exactly the words: SERVER CLASS
WORKS" and got back exactly that - plus confirmed on disk (not just in the
UI) that data/admin-state/ai-entitlement.json recorded the seat assignment
and ai-metering.jsonl recorded real prompt/completion token counts and
latency from the actual model call. Rejection-path logic (seat limit
reached, zero seats configured, revocation) covered by 5 new unit tests
rather than a second live round trip. Full suite: typecheck clean, lint
clean, translations 48/48, production build succeeds.
The overrideWarnings escape hatch added alongside the bundle scan was
API-only: an admin uploading a crypto plugin through the web form hit a
400 with canOverride and had no way to act on it, which left S/MIME and
PGP bundles uninstallable through the UI.
Hold the rejected file client-side and show the findings — pattern per
file — with "Install anyway" and "Cancel". Proceeding re-posts the same
file with overrideWarnings, so the decision stays explicit and lands in
the audit log. The route now echoes accepted findings back on success so
the confirmation says how many were waved through rather than reporting a
bare install.
Also replaces a dead `data.warnings` read with the live `findings` field;
the route never returned `warnings` on success, so that branch never ran.
Completes B-01.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two problems with the upload scanner, pulling in opposite directions.
It only scanned the entrypoint, so a bundle with `eval()` in a second
file passed outright — verified against a synthetic bundle whose
vendor/openpgp.js tripped three patterns while index.js stayed clean.
At the same time, a hard 400 on eval()/new Function()/innerHTML= makes
every crypto plugin uninstallable: minified openpgp.js and pkijs
legitimately contain all three. That blocks S/MIME and PGP entirely.
Scan every .js/.mjs in the bundle and return structured findings
({file, patterns[]}) plus canOverride, so the admin can see exactly what
tripped and where. An explicit overrideWarnings=true proceeds and writes
a plugin.install.scan_override audit entry recording which patterns in
which files were accepted — not merely that an override happened.
This route is already admin-authenticated, so the scan is defence in
depth against an accidental or compromised upload, not a trust boundary.
Treating it as the latter is what made crypto plugins uninstallable.
Also log the B-04 and B-01 divergences in vnc/VNC-CHANGES.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cleans up the lint warnings the pre-commit hook surfaces, without any
behavioral change:
- Remove unused imports/vars/destructured props (parseISO, useEffect,
format, durMin, roles, daysInYear, ALLOWED_PLUGIN_FILES, continuesBefore,
isPushConnected, isSelected) and the now-unused parseDuration import.
- Drop three stale `// eslint-disable-next-line no-undef` directives that
no longer suppress anything (browser-navigation, smime/crypto-engine).
- recurrence-expansion.test.ts: replace 39 `as any` casts with a cast-only
`rule()` helper for partial recurrence-rule fixtures, typed access to
utcStart/utcEnd (now on CalendarEvent), and the source's
`Partial<CalendarEvent> & { excluded?: boolean }` for the excluded
override. No defaults are injected, so the expansion logic sees the same
partial rules as before (35 tests still green).
Remaining: 7 react-hooks/exhaustive-deps warnings are left as-is — adding
the missing deps changes effect/memo timing and needs per-hook review, not
a mechanical fix. tsc --noEmit clean; eslint 0 errors / 7 warnings.
The plugin runtime received the active locale (init payload + 'locale-change')
and plugins could declare a `locales` map, but none of it was usable: the
locales never reached the runtime, and buildPluginApi exposed no i18n. So
plugin code calling pluginApi.i18n.t(...) (as the External Link Warning plugin
does) always got undefined and fell back to English.
Thread plugin locales end to end and surface an i18n API:
- ServerPlugin gains `locales`; the upload route persists manifest.locales
(alongside configSchema/settingsSchema), and /api/plugins surfaces it to the
client so it flows registry -> client -> sandbox host-bridge -> runtime.
- runtime sets __PLUGIN_LOCALE__ at init (not only on later 'locale-change')
and buildPluginApi exposes `i18n.locale` + `i18n.t(key, vars)` resolving
against the plugin's declared locales (manifest.locales) with English/key
fallback and {placeholder} interpolation.
Lets any sandboxed plugin localize its strings from its manifest.
Admins can upload custom mobile/desktop screenshots shown in the browser's
PWA install dialog, replacing the hardcoded Bulwark ones. Two new config keys
(pwaScreenshotMobileUrl/DesktopUrl), upload widgets in the admin Branding tab,
a sharp-based /api/pwa-screenshot/[variant] resize route, and manifest.ts picks
the custom screenshots when configured.
Like the other branding fields, screenshots are per-domain: they are
BRANDING_OVERRIDE_KEYS, the manifest and the /api/pwa-screenshot route resolve
them from the request host (domain override -> global -> Bulwark default), and
the admin Branding tab + upload/delete route handle them in a per-domain scope,
mirroring pwaIconUrl/faviconUrl.
Adds a once-per-day heartbeat that lets the project see how many
instances run Bulwark, on what platforms, with what features enabled,
and roughly how many accounts they have. No email addresses, hostnames,
IPs, or any end-user data are ever sent.
- lib/telemetry: state file, payload builder, jittered scheduler,
instance_id persistence at <data-dir>/.telemetry-id (delete to reset)
- app/api/admin/telemetry: admin API for status / set-consent /
set-endpoint / send-now (all audit-logged)
- app/admin/telemetry: settings page with status, JSON payload preview,
endpoint editor, send-now button, link to the privacy page
- instrumentation.node.ts: starts the scheduler on boot
Default state is enabled. The first heartbeat fires 1 hour after boot
so an admin who installs and immediately disables produces zero pings.
Disable via the settings UI, BULWARK_TELEMETRY=off (or
BULWARK_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1), or by clearing the endpoint.
Account counts are bucketed (1, 2-5, 6-10, 11-50, 51-200, 201+) so a
small instance can't be re-identified by exact size. The /.telemetry-id
file can be deleted to mint a fresh instance_id.
Receiving collector is open source at bulwarkmail/dashboard. Self-host
your own and point at it via BULWARK_TELEMETRY_URL. Full schema,
retention (90d raw → aggregates), and lawful basis are documented at
bulwarkmail.org/docs/legal/privacy/telemetry.
Drops the 0.15 REST management API and routes all account/auth/crypto/
principal operations through Stalwart 0.16's schema-driven JMAP
endpoint via a single passthrough (/api/account/stalwart/jmap).
- New client helper `stalwartJmap` + typed `requireResult`
- account-security-store rewritten against x:AccountPassword, x:AppPassword,
x:AccountSettings, x:Account (with currentSecret for TOTP ops)
- Client-side TOTP setup via `otpauth`; server-generated app password
secrets shown once on create
- Admin check switched to /api/account permissions
(sysAccountQuery/sysTenantQuery/sysSystemSettingsGet)
- Removed sieve vacation-overwrite workaround (fixed upstream #1251)
- Deleted old REST routes, StalwartClient, stale tests; added new
tests for passthrough + store
Bernd Rodler