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+# VNCmail+ — known issues (host app, not the S/MIME plugin)
+
+Filed during the S/MIME spike, 2026-08-04. Neither blocks P1.
+
+## 1. A 401 from any login step is reported as "wrong password"
+
+`stores/auth-store.ts:61`
+
+```ts
+{ key: 'invalid_credentials', matches: ['Invalid username or password', '401', 'Unauthorized'] },
+```
+
+`classifyLoginError` is fed by a catch-all wrapped around the *entire* login
+sequence (`auth-store.ts:767`), so any error whose message merely *contains*
+`401` becomes "Invalid username or password" — including a 401 raised well
+after the credential check already succeeded.
+
+**Reproduced:** `admin@sandbox.vnc.de` is a Stalwart *administrative principal*
+with no mailbox. `POST /api/auth/session` returns `200 {"ok":true}` — the
+password is genuinely correct — but the follow-up JMAP session fetch returns
+`401 Unauthorized` ("You have to authenticate first."), and the UI reports a
+wrong password. Verified side by side against `GET /.well-known/jmap` with
+Basic auth:
+
+| Account | Result |
+|---|---|
+| `bernd.rodler@sandbox.vnc.de` | `200` · 1 account · mail capability present |
+| `admin@sandbox.vnc.de` | `401 Unauthorized` |
+
+**Cost observed:** several minutes lost re-typing a password that was never wrong.
+
+**Impact:** an admin-only principal, a disabled mailbox, and a revoked mail
+permission are all indistinguishable from a typo. Users retry credentials
+indefinitely and support chases the wrong cause.
+
+**Fix direction:** distinguish a 401 from the credential check from a 401 raised
+by a later step, and give the latter its own message (e.g. "This account has no
+mailbox"). Matching on the bare substring `401` anywhere in an error message is
+too broad regardless — it will also catch a 401 from an unrelated downstream
+call, and any error text that happens to contain those digits.
+
+## 2. Page reload signs you out unless "stay signed in" is ticked
+
+Reloading `localhost:3100` without `rememberMe` produces *"Ihre Sitzung ist
+abgelaufen"*. During the spike this also silently prevented plugin activation
+(the sandbox loader only runs after a successful boot), which presented as a
+plugin fault rather than a session fault — it cost two debugging cycles before
+the real cause was clear.
+
+`.env.local` `SESSION_SECRET` is intact, so this is not a signing-key rotation.
+This may be the same complaint raised earlier about sessions expiring too
+quickly — if so, the 6-hour `jmap_stalwart_ctx` `maxAge` added in
+`lib/stalwart/auth-context.ts` did not address the real cause.
+
+Unknown size until diagnosed. Deliberately not chased during the spike.