security(smime): fork upstream plugin and fix two audit findings

S-01 audited bulwarkmail/plugins/smime @ 91085a3 (2,935 lines). Nine
findings, two HIGH. No backdoor and no exfiltration path anywhere in the
bundle — the problems are trust-model and input-validation gaps. Full
report in vnc/audits/SMIME-PLUGIN-AUDIT-2026-08-04.md.

Fork is source-only. The upstream smime.zip is a 1.77 MB prebuilt bundle
whose manifest reads 1.0.1 while the source reads 1.0.2, so auditing
src/ would not audit what that zip installs. We build from source.

Finding 1 (HIGH) — certificate substitution. maybeAutoImportSigner gated
on signatureValid alone, but smimeVerify runs checkChain:false, so that
only proves "signed by whoever holds this key", not that the claimed
identity is real. Self-sign a cert asserting victim@example.com, send one
signed message, and it was stored as the encryption target for that
address — the user's next Encrypt to the victim went to the attacker.
Now requires signerEmailMatch === true and !selfSigned. Both values were
already computed and displayed as untrusted in the banner; only the
import path ignored them. Tests for `true` explicitly so an undefined
match (missing From header) fails closed.

Finding 3 (MED-HIGH) — CRLF header injection. Escaping reached only
Subject and attachment filename; display names, raw addresses,
Message-ID, In-Reply-To, References and attachment Content-Type were
emitted verbatim, and formatAddress escapes only backslash and quote.
In-Reply-To/References/display names are copied from inbound mail when
replying or forwarding, so the value is attacker-supplied. Sanitising
inside formatHeader covers all 17 call sites by construction; the three
headers assembled directly get stripCrlf explicitly.

Also adds auth:observe to the manifest. The plugin registers
onAfterLogout/onAccountSwitch — real hooks (lib/plugin-hooks.ts:362-363)
— without declaring the permission, so under B-09 the session-key wipe
would silently stop running.

verify-fixes.mjs carries 19 assertions including source checks that fail
if either guard is removed or a new unsanitised interpolated header
appears. That last one immediately caught the interpolated smime-type
Content-Type header, which manual review had dismissed as static.

Finding 2 (unauthenticated CBC accepted on decrypt) is NOT fixed. This
is not safe for real mail yet — sandbox accounts only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bernd Rodler
2026-08-04 10:00:11 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent e9746fcf78
commit f7e487171c
23 changed files with 4287 additions and 0 deletions
+121
View File
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/**
* Detect S/MIME content in an email message. Ported from lib/smime/smime-detect.ts.
* Checks Content-Type, JMAP bodyStructure, and attachment metadata.
*/
export function detectSmime(contentType, bodyStructure, attachments) {
const noResult = { type: null, supported: false };
if (contentType) {
const ct = contentType.toLowerCase();
if (ct.includes('application/pkcs7-mime') || ct.includes('application/x-pkcs7-mime')) {
if (ct.includes('smime-type=enveloped-data')) {
const part = findCmsPart(bodyStructure, 'enveloped-data');
return { type: 'enveloped-data', blobId: part?.blobId, partId: part?.partId, supported: true };
}
if (ct.includes('smime-type=signed-data')) {
const part = findCmsPart(bodyStructure, 'signed-data');
return { type: 'signed-data', blobId: part?.blobId, partId: part?.partId, supported: true };
}
const part = findCmsPart(bodyStructure, null);
if (part) {
const partType = inferSmimeTypeFromContentType(part.type || '');
return {
type: partType,
blobId: part.blobId,
partId: part.partId,
supported: partType === 'enveloped-data' || partType === 'signed-data',
};
}
}
if (ct.includes('multipart/signed') && ct.includes('application/pkcs7-signature')) {
return { type: 'detached-sig', supported: false };
}
}
if (bodyStructure) {
const result = walkBodyStructure(bodyStructure);
if (result) return result;
}
if (attachments) {
for (const att of attachments) {
const type = att.type?.toLowerCase() || '';
const name = att.name?.toLowerCase() || '';
if (type.includes('application/pkcs7-mime') || type.includes('application/x-pkcs7-mime')) {
const smimeType = inferSmimeTypeFromContentType(type);
return {
type: smimeType,
blobId: att.blobId,
partId: att.partId,
supported: smimeType === 'enveloped-data' || smimeType === 'signed-data',
};
}
if (name.endsWith('.p7m')) {
return { type: 'enveloped-data', blobId: att.blobId, partId: att.partId, supported: true };
}
if (name.endsWith('.p7s')) {
return { type: 'detached-sig', blobId: att.blobId, partId: att.partId, supported: false };
}
}
}
return noResult;
}
function walkBodyStructure(part) {
const type = part.type?.toLowerCase() || '';
if (type.includes('application/pkcs7-mime') || type.includes('application/x-pkcs7-mime')) {
const smimeType = inferSmimeTypeFromContentType(type);
return {
type: smimeType,
blobId: part.blobId,
partId: part.partId,
supported: smimeType === 'enveloped-data' || smimeType === 'signed-data',
};
}
if (type === 'multipart/signed') {
if (part.subParts?.some((sp) => sp.type?.toLowerCase().includes('application/pkcs7-signature'))) {
return { type: 'detached-sig', supported: false };
}
}
if (part.subParts) {
for (const sub of part.subParts) {
const result = walkBodyStructure(sub);
if (result) return result;
}
}
return null;
}
function findCmsPart(bodyStructure, _smimeType) {
if (!bodyStructure) return null;
const type = bodyStructure.type?.toLowerCase() || '';
if (type.includes('application/pkcs7-mime') || type.includes('application/x-pkcs7-mime')) {
return bodyStructure;
}
if (bodyStructure.subParts) {
for (const sub of bodyStructure.subParts) {
const found = findCmsPart(sub, _smimeType);
if (found) return found;
}
}
return null;
}
function inferSmimeTypeFromContentType(ct) {
const lower = ct.toLowerCase();
if (lower.includes('smime-type=enveloped-data')) return 'enveloped-data';
if (lower.includes('smime-type=signed-data')) return 'signed-data';
if (lower.includes('application/pkcs7-mime') || lower.includes('application/x-pkcs7-mime')) {
return 'enveloped-data';
}
return null;
}