diff --git a/lib/plugin-sandbox/host-api.ts b/lib/plugin-sandbox/host-api.ts
index cd082de6..9e9cba21 100644
--- a/lib/plugin-sandbox/host-api.ts
+++ b/lib/plugin-sandbox/host-api.ts
@@ -99,7 +99,12 @@ const PERM_PER_METHOD: Record<string, Permission | null> = {
   'sieve.regenerate': 'filters:write',
 };
 
-function hasPermission(plugin: InstalledPlugin, perm: Permission): boolean {
+/**
+ * Single source of truth for "may this plugin use `perm`?". Exported so the
+ * loader can gate hook registration with the same rule the RPC layer uses -
+ * two copies of this logic would drift.
+ */
+export function hasPermission(plugin: InstalledPlugin, perm: Permission): boolean {
   if ((IMPLICIT_PERMISSIONS as readonly string[]).includes(perm)) return true;
   if (!plugin.permissions.includes(perm)) return false;
   // Defense-in-depth: even if the manifest declares a permission, the host
diff --git a/lib/plugin-sandbox/loader.ts b/lib/plugin-sandbox/loader.ts
index a22d053c..d7826c1c 100644
--- a/lib/plugin-sandbox/loader.ts
+++ b/lib/plugin-sandbox/loader.ts
@@ -18,8 +18,9 @@ import { verifyBundle } from './bundle-integrity';
 import { createBackgroundInstance } from './host-bridge';
 import { resolvePluginTier } from './tier';
 import { register as registerActive, deregister as deregisterActive, all as allActiveEntries } from './registry';
-import { cancelPluginDialogs } from './host-api';
+import { cancelPluginDialogs, hasPermission } from './host-api';
 import { registerShortcuts } from './shortcuts';
+import type { Permission } from '../plugin-types';
 
 // ─── Hook-bus lookup (one flat map for name → bus) ────────────
 
@@ -35,6 +36,38 @@ const HOOK_BUSES: Record<string, AnyBus> = Object.assign({},
   messageListTabHooks,
 ) as Record<string, AnyBus>;
 
+// ─── Permission-gated hooks ───────────────────────────────────
+//
+// `info.hooks` is SELF-REPORTED by the sandboxed bundle, so registration must
+// be checked against granted permissions - otherwise any untrusted plugin could
+// claim a sensitive hook simply by naming it. Consent-dialog copy is not a
+// substitute: it gates what the user was *asked*, not what the host *allows*.
+//
+// Listed here are the hooks that can read message content, alter outgoing mail,
+// or observe key state. Hooks absent from this map are unrestricted (UI
+// observation, navigation, toasts and similar) and register as before.
+const HOOK_PERMISSIONS: Record<string, Permission> = {
+  // Render takeover - replaces the rendered body the user sees.
+  onRenderEmailBody: 'email:render-takeover',
+  onEmailListItemRender: 'email:read',
+  onEmailContentRender: 'email:read',
+  // Outgoing-mail interception: veto, mutate, or take over the send entirely.
+  onComposeSend: 'email:send',
+  onBeforeEmailSend: 'email:send',
+  onTransformOutgoingEmail: 'email:send',
+  // Bulk message content reaching the plugin.
+  onEmailsFetched: 'email:read',
+  onProvideSearchResults: 'email:read',
+  // Attachment bytes on the way up.
+  onBeforeBlobUpload: 'email:blob-write',
+  onBeforeAttachmentUpload: 'email:blob-write',
+  // S/MIME key + certificate state.
+  onSmimeKeyImport: 'smime:read',
+  onSmimeCertImport: 'smime:read',
+  onSmimeKeyStateChange: 'smime:read',
+  onSmimeDefaultsChange: 'smime:read',
+};
+
 // ─── Store accessor (status updates flow through the existing store) ──
 
 type StoreAccessor = { setPluginStatus: (id: string, status: InstalledPlugin['status'], error?: string) => void };
@@ -128,6 +161,7 @@ export async function loadSandboxedPlugin(plugin: InstalledPlugin): Promise<void
     // entry whose handler dispatches into the sandbox. `shortcut:<id>` hooks
     // are dispatched by the keyboard module separately and don't have a bus.
     const hookDisposables: Disposable[] = [];
+    const refusedHooks: string[] = [];
     for (const hookName of info.hooks) {
       if (hookName.startsWith('shortcut:')) continue;
       const bus = HOOK_BUSES[hookName];
@@ -135,6 +169,17 @@ export async function loadSandboxedPlugin(plugin: InstalledPlugin): Promise<void
         console.warn(`[plugin-sandbox] Plugin "${plugin.id}" registered unknown hook "${hookName}"`);
         continue;
       }
+      // Refuse sensitive hooks the plugin has no permission for. Fail closed and
+      // say so loudly - a silently inert hook is far harder to diagnose than a
+      // refused one.
+      const required = HOOK_PERMISSIONS[hookName];
+      if (required && !hasPermission(plugin, required)) {
+        refusedHooks.push(`${hookName} (needs ${required})`);
+        console.error(
+          `[plugin-sandbox] "${plugin.id}" refused hook "${hookName}": missing permission "${required}"`,
+        );
+        continue;
+      }
       const proxy = async (...args: unknown[]) => {
         try {
           return await bg.invokeHook(hookName, args);
@@ -160,7 +205,15 @@ export async function loadSandboxedPlugin(plugin: InstalledPlugin): Promise<void
     });
 
     storeAccessor?.setPluginStatus(plugin.id, 'running');
-    console.info(`[plugin-sandbox] "${plugin.id}" activated (hooks=${info.hooks.length}, slots=${info.slots.length})`);
+    console.info(
+      `[plugin-sandbox] "${plugin.id}" activated (hooks=${info.hooks.length}, slots=${info.slots.length}`
+      + `${refusedHooks.length > 0 ? `, refused=${refusedHooks.length}` : ''})`,
+    );
+    if (refusedHooks.length > 0) {
+      console.warn(
+        `[plugin-sandbox] "${plugin.id}" ran without ${refusedHooks.length} hook(s): ${refusedHooks.join(', ')}`,
+      );
+    }
   } catch (err) {
     const msg = (err as Error).message ?? String(err);
     storeAccessor?.setPluginStatus(plugin.id, 'error', msg);