Merge remote-tracking branch 'gitlab/claude/electron-userdata-dirs' into dev-merge-batch1

e2e/electron-live-sandbox.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+import { test, expect, _electron as electron } from '@playwright/test';
+import type { ElectronApplication, Page } from '@playwright/test';
+import path from 'node:path';
+
+// Live-sandbox verification run (not part of the regular regression suite).
+//
+// Unlike e2e/electron-smoke.spec.ts (which deliberately uses a fake
+// JMAP_SERVER_URL just to skip the /setup wizard, and never expects a real
+// server on the other end), this spec launches the exact same packaged
+// artifact against the REAL sandbox JMAP backend at
+// https://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de and proves:
+//   1. the login screen renders with no TLS/network errors reaching that host
+//   2. submitting an obviously-fake, nonexistent test credential produces a
+//      structured "invalid credentials" style response from the real server
+//      (not a network failure) - proving the renderer -> Next API route ->
+//      real JMAP server round trip works end-to-end, without ever using or
+//      guessing a real account's credentials.
+const projectRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+const SANDBOX_URL = 'https://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de';
+
+test.describe('Electron desktop shell - live sandbox connectivity', () => {
+  let electronApp: ElectronApplication;
+  let appWindow: Page;
+  const pageErrors: Error[] = [];
+  const networkFailures: string[] = [];
+
+  test.beforeAll(async () => {
+    electronApp = await electron.launch({
+      args: [projectRoot],
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: SANDBOX_URL,
+        SESSION_SECRET: process.env.SESSION_SECRET || 'live-sandbox-verification-run',
+        NODE_ENV: 'production',
+      },
+    });
+
+    appWindow = await electronApp.firstWindow();
+    appWindow.on('pageerror', (error) => {
+      pageErrors.push(error);
+    });
+    appWindow.on('requestfailed', (request) => {
+      networkFailures.push(`${request.method()} ${request.url()} - ${request.failure()?.errorText}`);
+    });
+    await appWindow.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
+  });
+
+  test.afterAll(async () => {
+    await electronApp?.close();
+  });
+
+  test('renders the real login screen (not SETUP REQUIRED) with no network/TLS errors', async () => {
+    const bodyText = await appWindow.locator('body').innerText();
+    expect(bodyText).not.toContain('SETUP REQUIRED');
+    expect(bodyText).not.toContain('Setup Required');
+
+    const emailInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="text"]').first();
+    const passwordInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="password"]').first();
+    await expect(emailInput).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20000 });
+    await expect(passwordInput).toBeVisible();
+
+    await appWindow.screenshot({
+      path: path.join(projectRoot, 'live-sandbox-login-screen.png'),
+      fullPage: true,
+    });
+
+    expect(pageErrors.map((e) => e.message).join('\n')).not.toMatch(/ERR_CERT|ERR_CONNECTION|ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED|ECONNREFUSED/i);
+    expect(networkFailures.join('\n')).not.toMatch(/ERR_CERT|ERR_CONNECTION|ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED|ECONNREFUSED/i);
+  });
+
+  test('submitting a nonexistent test credential reaches the real JMAP server and returns a structured auth error (no real account used/guessed)', async () => {
+    const emailInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="text"]').first();
+    const passwordInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="password"]').first();
+
+    // Deliberately fake, nonexistent address - not a real account, not a
+    // guess against one. This only proves the pipe to the real server works.
+    await emailInput.fill('electron-live-sandbox-verify-8f2c@invalid-test.example');
+    await passwordInput.fill('not-a-real-password-8f2c');
+
+    const allResponses: { url: string; status: number }[] = [];
+    appWindow.on('response', (res) => {
+      allResponses.push({ url: res.url(), status: res.status() });
+    });
+
+    await appWindow.locator('button[type="submit"]').first().click();
+
+    // The important assertion: the app renders a structured "invalid
+    // credentials" style error sourced from the real JMAP server's rejection
+    // (visible in whatever locale the app negotiated), not a network/TLS
+    // failure. A real connectivity break to stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de would
+    // instead surface as a generic network-error message or a stuck spinner.
+    const errorBanner = appWindow.getByText(/invalid|ungültig|incorrect|falsch|unauthorized/i).first();
+    await expect(errorBanner).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15000 });
+    const errorText = await errorBanner.innerText();
+    console.log('[live-sandbox] login error banner text:', errorText);
+    expect(errorText.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(errorText).not.toMatch(/network error|failed to fetch|ERR_CERT|ERR_CONNECTION|ECONNREFUSED/i);
+
+    await appWindow.screenshot({
+      path: path.join(projectRoot, 'live-sandbox-after-failed-login-attempt.png'),
+      fullPage: true,
+    });
+
+    console.log('[live-sandbox] ALL responses observed after click:', JSON.stringify(allResponses, null, 2));
+    const authResponses = allResponses.filter((r) => r.url.includes('/api/auth/'));
+    if (authResponses.length > 0) {
+      for (const r of authResponses) {
+        expect(r.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+        expect(r.status).toBeLessThan(500);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+});

electron-builder.config.js

@@ -15,6 +15,24 @@ module.exports = {
   directories: {
     output: "dist-electron-builds",
   },
+  // The packaged app (`files` below) is plain esbuild-bundled JS - no native
+  // node modules of its own. The one native dependency anywhere in the repo,
+  // @signalapp/sqlcipher (used by lib/mail-index/**), ships its own prebuilt
+  // .node binaries for every platform/arch and is copied in wholesale by
+  // scripts/assemble-standalone.mjs as part of the extraResources standalone
+  // bundle below - it is never rebuilt by electron-builder.
+  //
+  // Without this, electron-builder's default @electron/rebuild pass scans
+  // the ENTIRE node_modules tree (not just what's actually packaged) for
+  // anything with a native binding and tries to recompile it from source
+  // against Electron's ABI via node-gyp. That caught @parcel/watcher - a
+  // transitive devDependency of some dev tool, never shipped in this app -
+  // and hard-failed the whole packaging step on any machine without a full
+  // Xcode Command Line Tools install (`gyp: No Xcode or CLT version
+  // detected!`), even though nothing that rebuild step touches is part of
+  // the artifact. Verified by execution: builds failed with npmRebuild at
+  // its default (true) and succeeded once set to false.
+  npmRebuild: false,
   files: ["dist-electron/**/*", "package.json"],
   extraResources: [
     {
@@ -65,6 +83,7 @@ module.exports = {
     // but left explicit so it's obvious what step 9 needs to flip on.
     hardenedRuntime: false,
   },
+  afterSign: "scripts/after-sign.cjs",
   win: {
     target: [{ target: "nsis", arch: ["x64"] }],
   },

electron/main.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,43 @@ function getIndexStoreDir(): string {
   return path.join(app.getPath("userData"), "offline");
 }
 
+/**
+ * Every writable data dir the standalone server uses, redirected under
+ * `userData`.
+ *
+ * WITHOUT this, all four default to `<cwd>/data/*` (see lib/admin/paths.ts,
+ * lib/settings-sync.ts, lib/telemetry/state.ts, lib/version-check/state.ts),
+ * and in a packaged build cwd is `.../VNCmail+.app/Contents/Resources/standalone`
+ * - i.e. the app writes its own runtime state INSIDE its own bundle. Three
+ * separate failure modes, all observed rather than theorised:
+ *
+ *  1. It INVALIDATES THE CODE SIGNATURE. A signed .app seals its Resources;
+ *     writing there breaks the seal, so `codesign --verify` starts failing
+ *     ("code has no resources but signature indicates they must be present")
+ *     and macOS reports the app as *damaged* on a later launch. Verified on
+ *     an installed copy in /Applications: signature valid at install time,
+ *     exit 1 after the app had run once and written data/admin + data/telemetry.
+ *     Deep-signing the bundle at build time (scripts/after-sign.cjs) is
+ *     necessary but NOT sufficient on its own - the app immediately breaks
+ *     its own signature at runtime unless the writes go elsewhere.
+ *  2. An app update replaces the bundle, silently destroying the user's admin
+ *     config, settings and setup state.
+ *  3. It fails outright wherever the bundle isn't user-writable.
+ *
+ * `userData` is the correct home for per-user mutable state on every platform
+ * and is where the search index already lives, so this keeps one convention.
+ */
+function getServerDataDirs(): Record<string, string> {
+  const root = app.getPath("userData");
+  return {
+    ADMIN_CONFIG_DIR: path.join(root, "admin"),
+    ADMIN_STATE_DIR: path.join(root, "admin-state"),
+    SETTINGS_DATA_DIR: path.join(root, "settings"),
+    TELEMETRY_DATA_DIR: path.join(root, "telemetry"),
+    VERSION_CHECK_DATA_DIR: path.join(root, "version-check"),
+  };
+}
+
 /**
  * Locates the standalone server's entrypoint. Packaged builds ship it as an
  * extraResource (see electron-builder.config.js) because .next/standalone
@@ -124,6 +161,12 @@ async function startStandaloneServer(): Promise<string> {
       PORT: String(port),
       HOSTNAME: "127.0.0.1",
       NODE_ENV: process.env.NODE_ENV || "production",
+      // Keep all mutable state out of the .app bundle - see
+      // getServerDataDirs() for why that matters. Placed after
+      // ...process.env so the desktop shell's paths win over any inherited
+      // value; the same standalone server run outside Electron (the Docker
+      // image) never executes this and keeps its documented env behaviour.
+      ...getServerDataDirs(),
       ...(encryption.ok
         ? { VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR: storeDir, VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_KEY_FD: "3" }
         : {}),

scripts/after-sign.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// electron-builder afterSign hook (mac only - see electron-builder.config.js).
+//
+// Without a real Apple Developer ID, electron-builder's mac target ships
+// with only the auto ad-hoc signature the linker applies to the main
+// executable - the rest of the bundle (Resources, Helper.app children,
+// frameworks) is left unsigned. That inconsistency is what makes macOS
+// report a flat "VNCmail+ is damaged and can't be opened" once the .dmg
+// picks up a quarantine attribute (from a browser download, AirDrop, or
+// any other trust-boundary crossing) - not the more recoverable
+// "unidentified developer, right-click to open anyway" prompt a properly
+// (even if only ad-hoc) signed bundle gets. `codesign --deep` here
+// produces one consistent signature covering everything, verified against
+// the exact failure mode (`codesign --verify --deep --strict` on the
+// unsigned-except-linker bundle failed before this was added).
+//
+// Still not a real Developer ID signature - Gatekeeper will still warn on
+// first launch (`spctl` rejects any non-notarized app outright), but as
+// the recoverable kind, not the "move to Trash" kind.
+const { execFileSync } = require("node:child_process");
+
+module.exports = async function afterSign(context) {
+  if (context.electronPlatformName !== "darwin") return;
+
+  const appPath = `${context.appOutDir}/${context.packager.appInfo.productFilename}.app`;
+  execFileSync("codesign", ["--force", "--deep", "--sign", "-", appPath], {
+    stdio: "inherit",
+  });
+};