Merge pull request #1 from brvncde-dotcom/dev

Dev

.dockerignore

@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ node_modules
 !.env.example
 !.env.dev.example
 scripts/
+# ...except the first-party plugin builder, which the image build runs
+# (see Dockerfile). Without this the whole scripts/ dir is absent from the
+# build context and the RUN step fails with "Cannot find module".
+!scripts/build-plugins.mjs
 TODO.md
 *.md
 !README.md

.github/workflows/electron-build.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+name: Build Electron Desktop App
+
+# Phase 1 of the VNCprodbuild rollout (~/.claude/skills/VNCprodbuild/SKILL.md
+# on the machine that authored this - Phase 1 step 8). Builds the desktop
+# shell (electron/) for macOS, Windows, and Linux on every release, or
+# on-demand via workflow_dispatch for a one-off test build.
+#
+# Ships UNSIGNED. There's no Apple Developer ID or Windows code-signing cert
+# yet (VNCprodbuild Phase 1 step 9 - both are human-owned purchases, not
+# something CI can provide). CSC_IDENTITY_AUTO_DISCOVERY: "false" below stops
+# electron-builder from probing for a macOS signing identity it won't find.
+# Adding real certs later needs no rewrite here - just add CSC_LINK/
+# CSC_KEY_PASSWORD (macOS) and/or WIN_CSC_LINK/WIN_CSC_KEY_PASSWORD (Windows)
+# as repo secrets and electron-builder picks them up automatically.
+
+on:
+  release:
+    types: [published]
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+permissions:
+  contents: write
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        os: [macos-latest, windows-latest, ubuntu-latest]
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Setup Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: 22
+          cache: npm
+
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: npm ci
+
+      - name: Build standalone Next.js server
+        run: npm run build:standalone
+
+      - name: Bundle Electron main/preload
+        run: npm run build:electron
+
+      # Only Linux runners lack a display server by default - macOS/Windows
+      # GitHub-hosted runners can launch a real (if headless) GUI session
+      # without one.
+      - name: Install Xvfb (Linux)
+        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y xvfb
+
+      # Required gate (VNCprodbuild Phase 1 step 2) before any packaging or
+      # artifact-upload step below, on every OS in the matrix - a
+      # platform-specific regression in electron/main.ts (path handling,
+      # spawn behavior, etc.) should fail exactly the leg it breaks, not
+      # slip through because only one OS was ever smoke-tested.
+      - name: Run Electron smoke test (Linux, via Xvfb)
+        if: runner.os == 'Linux'
+        run: xvfb-run --auto-servernum npm run test:electron
+
+      - name: Run Electron smoke test
+        if: runner.os != 'Linux'
+        run: npm run test:electron
+
+      - name: Package
+        env:
+          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          CSC_IDENTITY_AUTO_DISCOVERY: "false"
+        run: npx electron-builder --config electron-builder.config.js --publish ${{ github.event_name == 'release' && 'always' || 'never' }}
+
+      - name: Upload artifact (workflow_dispatch)
+        if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: vncmail-plus-desktop-${{ matrix.os }}
+          path: |
+            dist-electron-builds/*.dmg
+            dist-electron-builds/*.zip
+            dist-electron-builds/*.exe
+            dist-electron-builds/*.AppImage
+            dist-electron-builds/*.deb
+          retention-days: 7
+          if-no-files-found: ignore

.github/workflows/pr-verify.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+name: PR Verify
+
+# Required status check on `main` (Settings -> Branches). Mirrors the GitLab
+# CI `verify` stage (.gitlab-ci.yml) so both remotes gate merges the same
+# way: typecheck, lint, translations, and a real production build — no
+# registry, no cluster, nothing that can be blocked by infra that's down.
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches:
+      - main
+      - dev
+
+jobs:
+  verify:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: 24
+          cache: npm
+      - run: npm ci
+      - run: npm run typecheck
+      - run: npm run lint
+      - run: npm run test:translations
+      - run: npm run build
+        env:
+          GIT_COMMIT: ${{ github.sha }}

.gitignore

@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@ yarn-error.log*
 # vercel
 .vercel
 
+# electron (see electron/, scripts/build-electron.mjs, electron-builder.config.js)
+/dist-electron/
+/dist-electron-builds/
+
+# playwright output
+/test-results/
+/playwright-report/
+
 # typescript
 *.tsbuildinfo
 next-env.d.ts
@@ -51,5 +59,17 @@ next-env.d.ts
 # Sibling repos
 /repos/
 
-# k8s deploy secret (create from deploy/k8s/secret.example.yaml)
+# k8s deploy secrets (create from the matching overlay's secret.example.yaml)
-/deploy/k8s/secret.yaml
+/deploy/k8s/overlays/*/secret.yaml
+
+# First-party plugin build output (rebuild with: npm run build:plugins).
+# vnc/plugins/build/ is the staging dir the server installs from at startup
+# (see lib/admin/bundled-plugins.ts) - built, never committed.
+vnc/plugins/build/
+vnc/plugins/*/node_modules/
+vnc/plugins/*/dist/
+vnc/plugins/smime/smime-vnc.zip
+vnc/plugins/smime/smime.zip
+
+# macOS
+.DS_Store

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+# GitLab-CI dev→prod pipeline for VNCmail+ — GitOps via ArgoCD.
+#
+# Revised after direct inspection of the real infrastructure found ArgoCD
+# already installed (idle, zero Applications) on the dev-k8s-1/2/3 cluster.
+# That's more idiomatic than a runner-executes-kubectl design, and it means
+# this pipeline needs ZERO cluster credentials — CI only ever talks to the
+# container registry and to this git repo. ArgoCD (which already has
+# whatever cluster access it needs, set up once when its Applications were
+# registered — see deploy/argocd/) is what actually applies anything.
+#
+# Design:
+#   - One image name, environment lives only in the tag. No more -dev/-beta
+#     name confusion from the old GitHub Actions workflow.
+#   - MR into `dev`: verify only (typecheck/lint/unit test/build check). No
+#     push, no deploy — this is the multi-developer merge gate.
+#   - Push to `dev`: build+push an immutable `sha-<sha>` tag, then commit a
+#     one-line tag-bump into overlays/dev/image-tag/kustomization.yaml
+#     (`[skip ci]`, so this doesn't retrigger itself). ArgoCD's `vncmail-dev`
+#     Application has automated sync — it notices the git change and applies
+#     it. No approval needed, dev always deploys, and this job never touches
+#     the cluster directly.
+#   - Push to `main`: NEVER rebuilds. `main` only ever advances via
+#     `git merge --ff-only dev`, so main's HEAD commit already has a built
+#     image (the same sha- tag dev already deployed). This job just bumps
+#     overlays/prod/image-tag/kustomization.yaml to point at that same tag.
+#     The actual promotion gate is a HUMAN clicking Sync on the `vncmail-prod` ArgoCD
+#     Application (deliberately NOT automated sync) — not a GitLab manual
+#     job, since ArgoCD already provides that exact gate more directly.
+#     Until prod Stalwart/hostname/secrets are real (see VNCMAIL-SETUP.md),
+#     nobody should click that Sync button — but nothing here does it for
+#     you either way.
+#
+# Deliberately single-platform (linux/amd64) — this pipeline serves two
+# known amd64 microk8s clusters, not public multi-arch distribution (that's
+# what the GHCR release workflows are for, untouched by this file).
+#
+# Registry history (so nobody re-litigates this from scratch). GitLab's own
+# Container Registry was tried twice and does not work on this server:
+#
+#   Round 1: registry_external_url was unset, so $CI_REGISTRY was empty and
+#            docker login silently fell through to Docker Hub.
+#   Round 2: after the server-side config, the project's sidebar DID show
+#            "Container Registry" and docker login DID succeed - but the push
+#            failed 403. Diagnosed 2026-08-05 by curling the vhost directly:
+#
+#              $ curl -i https://registry.gitlab.vnc.biz/v2/
+#              www-authenticate: Bearer realm="http://gitlab.vnc.biz/jwt/auth",
+#                                       service="dependency_proxy"
+#              x-runtime: 0.020470
+#              x-gitlab-meta: {"correlation_id":...}
+#
+#            x-runtime/x-gitlab-meta are RAILS headers, and the service is
+#            "dependency_proxy" - so nginx routes that hostname to the GitLab
+#            Rails app, which reads /v2/ as the dependency proxy (a Docker Hub
+#            pull-through cache), NOT to the registry container. The registry
+#            service was never actually wired behind that vhost. That is why
+#            login worked (Rails issues an unscoped dependency-proxy token)
+#            while a scoped :push request 403'd - the dependency proxy has no
+#            push concept at all.
+#
+# Fixing that is an nginx/omnibus change on the GitLab server (registry
+# service must actually listen behind registry.gitlab.vnc.biz), not something
+# any .gitlab-ci.yml can reach. Until someone does that, GHCR it is - the
+# same image the sandbox already pulls, and confirmed public so the cluster
+# needs no imagePullSecrets (see deploy/k8s/base/deployment.yaml).
+#
+# Prerequisite this file assumes (documented in VNCMAIL-SETUP.md, not
+# something this file can set up itself):
+#   - A GitHub PAT with `write:packages` for ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom as
+#     $GITLAB_CI_GHCR_TOKEN, plus the matching GitHub username as
+#     $GITLAB_CI_GHCR_USER — both masked+protected CI/CD variables. A GitHub
+#     credential can only come from GitHub; nothing GitLab-native substitutes.
+#   - A GitLab Runner (any kind — no cluster access needed at all now).
+#   - Either "allow this job token to push to this project" enabled
+#     (Settings → CI/CD → Job token permissions), OR a project access token
+#     with `write_repository` scope in $GITLAB_PUSH_TOKEN. The job below
+#     tries CI_JOB_TOKEN first (see the script).
+#
+# deploy/k8s/ca/ (the EJBCA internal CA) is never referenced anywhere below,
+# and neither ArgoCD Application in deploy/argocd/ points at it — that stays
+# a fully manual, human-only runbook (see deploy/k8s/ca/README.md).
+
+stages:
+  - verify
+  - build
+  - bump-dev
+  - bump-prod
+
+variables:
+  # GHCR, not GitLab's own registry - see the "Registry history" note in the
+  # header for the curl output proving why. Same image the sandbox already
+  # pulls today.
+  IMAGE: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev
+  GIT_STRATEGY: clone
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# verify — required check on every MR into dev. No registry, no cluster.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+verify:
+  stage: verify
+  image: node:24-alpine
+  rules:
+    - if: '$CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "merge_request_event"'
+  script:
+    - npm ci
+    - npm run typecheck
+    - npm run lint
+    - npm run test:translations
+    - npm run build
+  # test:integration is deliberately NOT here — it spins up a real Stalwart
+  # fixture via docker-compose, which needs an actual Docker daemon this
+  # runner's Kubernetes executor doesn't provide without privileged mode
+  # (see the build job below). Candidate for a separate scheduled job on a
+  # differently-configured runner, not a blocker on every MR.
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# build — push to dev only. Builds once; main never rebuilds (see header).
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+build:
+  stage: build
+  # Kaniko builds OCI images without a Docker daemon, so it needs neither a
+  # dind service nor a privileged pod — GitLab's own recommended approach
+  # for the Kubernetes executor specifically. The docker:27-cli + dind
+  # combination that was here before this got as far as a successful
+  # $CI_REGISTRY login, then failed every way it was pointed
+  # (unix:///var/run/docker.sock, tcp://docker:2375, tcp://localhost:2375):
+  # the dind container itself was never actually listening, which on this
+  # executor means it needs `privileged: true` in the runner's own
+  # config.toml — a cluster/GitLab-admin setting outside this file's
+  # control. Kaniko sidesteps that requirement entirely rather than chasing
+  # runner permissions further, and is also the safer default on a shared
+  # cluster (no privileged containers at all).
+  image:
+    name: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.23.2-debug
+    entrypoint: [""]
+  rules:
+    - if: '$CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "push" && $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "dev"'
+  script:
+    # Fail loudly and immediately if the GHCR credentials aren't configured,
+    # rather than letting kaniko get all the way through a full Next.js build
+    # and only then 403 on push (which is exactly how the GitLab-registry
+    # attempt burned several pipeline runs).
+    - |
+      if [ -z "$GITLAB_CI_GHCR_TOKEN" ] || [ -z "$GITLAB_CI_GHCR_USER" ]; then
+        echo "ERROR: \$GITLAB_CI_GHCR_TOKEN and/or \$GITLAB_CI_GHCR_USER are not set."
+        echo "Add both under Settings -> CI/CD -> Variables (masked + protected)."
+        echo "The token is a GitHub PAT with the write:packages scope."
+        exit 1
+      fi
+    - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
+    - |
+      echo "{\"auths\":{\"ghcr.io\":{\"auth\":\"$(printf '%s:%s' "$GITLAB_CI_GHCR_USER" "$GITLAB_CI_GHCR_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
+    - >
+      /kaniko/executor
+      --context "$CI_PROJECT_DIR"
+      --dockerfile "$CI_PROJECT_DIR/Dockerfile"
+      --build-arg GIT_COMMIT=$CI_COMMIT_SHA
+      --destination "$IMAGE:sha-$CI_COMMIT_SHORT_SHA"
+      --destination "$IMAGE:dev-latest"
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# bump-dev — no cluster access. Commits the just-built tag into the overlay
+# ArgoCD watches; ArgoCD's automated sync does the actual apply.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+bump-dev:
+  stage: bump-dev
+  image: alpine/git:2.47.0
+  rules:
+    - if: '$CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "push" && $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "dev"'
+  script:
+    - TAG="sha-$CI_COMMIT_SHORT_SHA"
+    - |
+      cat > deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/image-tag/kustomization.yaml <<EOF
+      # Owned by CI (bump-dev job in .gitlab-ci.yml) - regenerated every
+      # push to dev. Do not hand-edit; edits here get overwritten.
+      apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1alpha1
+      kind: Component
+      images:
+        - name: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev
+          newName: $IMAGE
+          newTag: $TAG
+      EOF
+    - git config user.name "vncmail-ci"
+    - git config user.email "ci@vnc.biz"
+    - git add deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/image-tag/kustomization.yaml
+    - |
+      if git diff --cached --quiet; then
+        echo "No change (tag already pinned) - nothing to commit"
+      else
+        git commit -m "chore(deploy): pin dev to $TAG [skip ci]"
+        git push "https://gitlab-ci-token:${GITLAB_PUSH_TOKEN:-$CI_JOB_TOKEN}@${CI_SERVER_HOST}/${CI_PROJECT_PATH}.git" HEAD:dev
+      fi
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# bump-prod — no cluster access, no rebuild. Points overlays/prod at the
+# exact tag already running on dev. Does NOT deploy anything: vncmail-prod's
+# ArgoCD Application has manual sync, so this only prepares what a human
+# would be syncing, it doesn't sync it.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+bump-prod:
+  stage: bump-prod
+  image: alpine/git:2.47.0
+  rules:
+    - if: '$CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE == "push" && $CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "main"'
+  script:
+    - TAG="sha-$CI_COMMIT_SHORT_SHA"
+    - echo "main advanced to $CI_COMMIT_SHA (must be a dev commit, ff-only) - that image already exists as $IMAGE:$TAG"
+    - |
+      cat > deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/image-tag/kustomization.yaml <<EOF
+      # Owned by CI (bump-prod job in .gitlab-ci.yml) - regenerated every
+      # push to main. Do not hand-edit; edits here get overwritten. Bumping
+      # this is NOT the same as deploying it - vncmail-prod's ArgoCD
+      # Application has manual sync, see the note in the parent
+      # kustomization.yaml.
+      apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1alpha1
+      kind: Component
+      images:
+        - name: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev
+          newName: $IMAGE
+          newTag: $TAG
+      EOF
+    - git config user.name "vncmail-ci"
+    - git config user.email "ci@vnc.biz"
+    - git add deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/image-tag/kustomization.yaml
+    - |
+      if git diff --cached --quiet; then
+        echo "No change (tag already pinned) - nothing to commit"
+      else
+        git commit -m "chore(deploy): point prod overlay at $TAG (not synced - manual gate in ArgoCD) [skip ci]"
+        git push "https://gitlab-ci-token:${GITLAB_PUSH_TOKEN:-$CI_JOB_TOKEN}@${CI_SERVER_HOST}/${CI_PROJECT_PATH}.git" HEAD:main
+      fi

Dockerfile

@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ ENV NEXT_PUBLIC_DEFAULT_LOCALE=$NEXT_PUBLIC_DEFAULT_LOCALE
 # `git rev-parse` inside the build can't find it - CI must pass it in.
 ARG GIT_COMMIT=unknown
 ENV GIT_COMMIT=$GIT_COMMIT
+# Build the first-party plugins (vnc/plugins/*) that ship with this fork -
+# currently the audited S/MIME plugin, which the server installs into its
+# plugin registry at startup (lib/admin/bundled-plugins.ts). Each plugin has
+# its own package.json + lockfile, so this does its own npm ci.
+# Runs BEFORE next build so a broken plugin fails the image build.
+RUN node scripts/build-plugins.mjs
 RUN npx next build --webpack
 
 FROM node:24-alpine AS runner
@@ -43,6 +49,10 @@ RUN apk upgrade --no-cache && \
 COPY --from=builder /app/public ./public
 COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/standalone ./
 COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/.next/static ./.next/static
+# Staged first-party plugin bundles. Read by path at runtime, so Next's output
+# file tracing does not carry them into .next/standalone - copy explicitly or
+# the image boots with the S/MIME policy toggle on and no plugin installed.
+COPY --from=builder --chown=nextjs:nodejs /app/vnc/plugins/build ./vnc/plugins/build
 RUN mkdir -p /app/data/settings /app/data/admin /app/data/admin-state /app/data/telemetry && chown -R nextjs:nodejs /app/data
 USER nextjs
 EXPOSE 3000

VNCMAIL-SETUP.md

@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@ of truth; VNCmail+ is the UI. It deploys as a **container on Kubernetes
   except `/tmp`, so Bulwark's `mkdir ./data` crashes (`ENOENT /var/task/data`).
   You cannot point its data dirs at a remote host either (they're POSIX paths,
   not URLs). Bulwark's native model is a container + persistent volumes.
-- So VNCmail+ runs as a Docker image (`ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-*`)
+- So VNCmail+ runs as a Docker image with **4 persistent volumes**, exactly
-  with **4 persistent volumes**, exactly like the existing `bulwark.sandbox.vnc.de`.
+  like the existing `bulwark.sandbox.vnc.de`.
 - JMAP calls go through **server-side `/api/*` routes** (`proxy.ts`) → server-to-
   server to Stalwart, **no browser CORS**. Config is **runtime-read**.
 
@@ -27,37 +27,130 @@ of truth; VNCmail+ is the UI. It deploys as a **container on Kubernetes
 
 | Branch | Role |
 |--------|------|
-| `main` | **Production** — CI builds `…/vncmail-plus-beta`. Only updated by an explicit promote. |
+| `main` | **Production.** Only updated by `git merge --ff-only dev`, then an explicit manual promote in CI. No prod environment exists yet — see "CI/CD" below. |
-| `dev`  | Integration + QA — CI builds `…/vncmail-plus-dev` on push. Default working branch. |
+| `dev`  | Integration + QA — default working branch. Every push auto-builds and auto-deploys to the sandbox (`vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de`). |
-| `vnc/*`| Feature branches for UI work (branch off `dev`, PR into `dev`). |
+| `vnc/*`| Feature branches for UI work (branch off `dev`, MR into `dev` — required, gated by CI). |
 
 All VNC customization lives under `vnc/` (see `vnc/VNC-CHANGES.md`).
 
+## CI/CD — GitLab (canonical) + ArgoCD GitOps, Vercel-style dev→prod
+
+Multiple developers work on this repo now. `.gitlab-ci.yml` on
+[gitlab.vnc.biz](https://gitlab.vnc.biz/gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus)
+(the canonical remote — GitHub `origin` is a passive mirror, not where CI or
+deploys happen) builds images and bumps a tag in git; **ArgoCD does the
+actual deploying** — already installed and idle on the `dev-k8s-1/2/3`
+cluster, discovered when standing this up. GitLab CI needs zero cluster
+credentials as a result.
+
+Two real clusters, confirmed by direct inspection:
+
+| Cluster | Role | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `dev-k8s-1/2/3` | dev/sandbox | ~hours old when set up here. Traefik, metallb, cert-manager (`letsencrypt-staging` issuer only), **ArgoCD already running**. |
+| `node1/node2/node3` | prod (HA) | Older, rook-ceph+traefik+metallb+cert-manager, but **zero apps and zero ClusterIssuers** — genuinely a clean slate. |
+
+Neither cluster had a `vncmail` namespace, `vnc-ca` namespace, or `bulwark`
+ingress — the "live sandbox at vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de" referenced earlier in
+this doc's history was aspirational (manifests + docs existed, nothing was
+ever actually applied). The ingress manifests also assumed nginx (`class:
+public`, an nginx body-size annotation) — fixed to Traefik's real
+`ingressClassName: traefik` (Traefik has no default body-size cap, so no
+replacement annotation is needed).
+
+Flow:
+
+1. **MR into `dev`** → `verify` stage (typecheck/lint/unit test/build).
+   Required check — no push, no deploy.
+2. **Merge to `dev`** → `build` pushes one image,
+   `registry.gitlab.vnc.biz/.../vncmail-plus:sha-<sha>`, then `bump-dev`
+   commits that tag into `deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/image-tag/kustomization.yaml`
+   (`[skip ci]`). ArgoCD's `vncmail-dev` Application picks up the git change.
+3. **Merge to `main`** (fast-forward only, see below) → `bump-prod` points
+   `overlays/prod/image-tag/` at that same tag — **no rebuild**. The actual
+   promotion gate is a **human clicking Sync** on the `vncmail-prod` ArgoCD
+   Application, which is permanently manual-sync (never automated) — that's
+   the Vercel-style "Promote to Production" button, just living in ArgoCD's
+   UI instead of GitLab's.
+
+### What's left to wire up (one-time, human steps)
+
+1. **Add the ArgoCD deploy key to GitLab** — Project → Settings → Repository
+   → Deploy keys → add (read-only is enough):
+   ```
+   ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOURjX/Y9zfB785DyLEF1GUq4HhWujrqeXag8oxdMciq argocd@dev-k8s (vncmail-plus read-only)
+   ```
+   Until this is added, `vncmail-dev`'s ArgoCD Application (already created,
+   `kubectl -n argocd get application vncmail-dev`) shows a benign
+   `ComparisonError` (SSH handshake failing) — expected, not a bug.
+2. **Let CI push tag-bumps back to this repo** — either enable "this project
+   can be accessed by CI/CD job tokens from other projects" → actually
+   simpler: Settings → CI/CD → Job token permissions → allow this project's
+   own job token to push to itself, OR create a Project Access Token
+   (`write_repository` scope) and add it as a masked CI/CD variable
+   `GITLAB_PUSH_TOKEN` (the pipeline tries that first, falls back to
+   `CI_JOB_TOKEN`).
+3. **One-time namespace bootstrap** (CI/ArgoCD deliberately never manage
+   secret contents — see `deploy/k8s/README.md` §3):
+   ```bash
+   # against dev-k8s (ArgoCD's CreateNamespace=true will make `vncmail` on
+   # first sync, or create it yourself first — either order works)
+   kubectl create secret docker-registry ghcr-pull -n vncmail ...   # or make the GHCR package public
+   cp deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/secret.example.yaml secret.yaml   # edit SESSION_SECRET
+   kubectl apply -f secret.yaml
+   ```
+4. **First sync** — ArgoCD UI at `https://argo.devcluster.vnc.de`
+   (username `admin`, password: `kubectl -n argocd get secret
+   argocd-initial-admin-secret -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d`
+   — rotate it after logging in once) → `vncmail-dev` → Sync. Once that's
+   clean, flip `deploy/argocd/vncmail-dev-app.yaml`'s commented-out
+   `automated:` block on and re-apply, so dev auto-syncs on every push from
+   then on.
+5. **Production** (later, deliberately not wired yet): decide a real
+   hostname, stand up prod Stalwart, register `node1-3` as an ArgoCD-managed
+   cluster, apply `deploy/argocd/vncmail-prod-app.yaml`, fill in real
+   `overlays/prod` values, create a real ClusterIssuer on `node1-3` (there
+   isn't one today), then click Sync once — deliberately not before.
+
+Historical note: the old `-dev`/`-beta` GHCR image-name split
+(`.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml`) is retired by this — one image name
+now, environment lives only in the tag.
+
 ## Deploy (Kubernetes / microk8s)
 
 Full runbook: **[deploy/k8s/README.md](deploy/k8s/README.md)**. In short:
 
-1. CI builds the image on push to `dev`/`main` → `ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev` (`.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml`).
+1. CI (above) builds and pushes the image, one name/many tags, to GitLab's
-2. `kubectl apply` the manifests in `deploy/k8s/` (namespace, 4 PVCs, deployment, service, ingress) + a `secret.yaml` (from `secret.example.yaml`) + a `ghcr-pull` image-pull secret.
+   registry.
-3. Point `vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de` DNS at the ingress; cert-manager issues TLS.
+2. `kubectl apply -k deploy/k8s/overlays/dev` (or `overlays/prod`, once real)
+   — base manifests (namespace, 4 PVCs, deployment, service, ingress) live in
+   `deploy/k8s/base/`, environment differences (namespace, hostname, replica
+   count) are overlay patches.
+3. DNS + a `secret.yaml` (from the overlay's `secret.example.yaml`, gitignored,
+   created once by hand — CI never manages secret contents) + an image-pull
+   secret are the remaining manual, human, one-time steps per environment.
 
 Runs alongside the existing `bulwark.sandbox.vnc.de`. Match your cluster's
 StorageClass / IngressClass / cert issuer to bulwark's (see the runbook).
 
 ## Deploy workflow (dev-first — ALWAYS)
 
-Same flow as every other VNC/SRC repo:
+Same flow as every other VNC/SRC repo, now enforced structurally by CI rather
+than by convention:
 
-1. Work on `dev` (or `vnc/*` → PR into `dev`). Push to `dev` → CI builds the `-dev` image → `kubectl -n vncmail rollout restart deploy/vncmail-plus` to pull it. QA at `vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de`.
+1. Work on `dev` (or `vnc/*` → MR into `dev`, CI-gated). Merge → auto-builds
+   and auto-deploys to `vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de`. QA there.
 2. **Promote to production only on explicit go-live** — merge `dev` → `main`:
    ```bash
    git log dev..main            # MUST be empty — main must have nothing dev lacks (else prod would revert)
    git checkout main && git merge --ff-only dev
-   git push origin main         # CI builds the production image
+   git push gitlab main         # never GitHub — opens the manual `promote` job, does not run it
    git checkout dev
    ```
-   Then roll the production deployment to the new image (pin its digest — see deploy/k8s/README.md).
+   Then click `promote` in the GitLab pipeline UI (protected `production`
-   Never push straight to `main`. Never let a dev→main merge silently revert prod.
+   environment — requires the right role) once prod actually exists (see
+   "CI/CD" above). Never push straight to `main`. Never let a dev→main merge
+   silently revert prod.
 
 ## Syncing upstream (Bulwark releases)
 

app/(main)/[locale]/login/page.tsx

@@ -134,12 +134,20 @@ export default function LoginPage() {
   const isMobileHandoff = Boolean(mobileRedirectUri);
   const { login, loginDemo, isLoading, error, clearError, isAuthenticated } = useAuthStore();
   const { theme, setTheme, initializeTheme } = useThemeStore(useShallow((s) => ({ theme: s.theme, setTheme: s.setTheme, initializeTheme: s.initializeTheme })));
-  const { appName, jmapServerUrl: configuredServerUrl, oauthEnabled, oauthOnly, oauthClientId: globalOauthClientId, oauthIssuerUrl: globalOauthIssuerUrl, oauthScopes, rememberMeEnabled, devMode, demoMode, loginLogoLightUrl, loginLogoDarkUrl, loginCompanyName, loginImprintUrl, loginPrivacyPolicyUrl, loginWebsiteUrl, loginLogoMaxHeight, loginLogoMaxWidth, loginShowHeading, loginShowSubtitle, loginShowTotp, loginShowVersion, isLoading: configLoading, error: configError, autoSsoEnabled, embeddedMode: _embeddedMode, allowCustomJmapEndpoint, jmapServers, jmapServerAutoPickByDomain } = useConfig();
+  const { appName, jmapServerUrl: configuredServerUrl, oauthEnabled, oauthOnly, oauthClientId: globalOauthClientId, oauthIssuerUrl: globalOauthIssuerUrl, oauthScopes, rememberMeEnabled, devMode, demoMode, loginLogoLightUrl, loginLogoDarkUrl, loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom, loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom, loginCompanyName, loginImprintUrl, loginPrivacyPolicyUrl, loginWebsiteUrl, loginLogoMaxHeight, loginLogoMaxWidth, loginShowHeading, loginShowSubtitle, loginShowTotp, loginShowVersion, isLoading: configLoading, error: configError, autoSsoEnabled, embeddedMode: _embeddedMode, allowCustomJmapEndpoint, jmapServers, jmapServerAutoPickByDomain } = useConfig();
   const resolvedTheme = useThemeStore((s) => s.resolvedTheme);
   const { activeThemeId, installedThemes } = useThemeStore(useShallow((s) => ({ activeThemeId: s.activeThemeId, installedThemes: s.installedThemes })));
   // Active theme may carry its own brand logo (VNClagoon wordmark, SRC mark);
-  // fall back to the globally configured login logo.
+  // an explicitly-configured logo (Branding tab / LOGIN_LOGO_*_URL) wins
-  const effLoginLogo = resolveThemeLogo(installedThemes, activeThemeId, resolvedTheme === 'dark', loginLogoLightUrl, loginLogoDarkUrl);
+  // over that, falling back to the theme's logo only when nothing was set.
+  const effLoginLogo = resolveThemeLogo(
+    installedThemes,
+    activeThemeId,
+    resolvedTheme === 'dark',
+    loginLogoLightUrl,
+    loginLogoDarkUrl,
+    loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom || loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom,
+  );
 
   // Login logo sizing: when a max height/width is configured, drop the fixed
   // 64×64 box so the logo (e.g. a wide wordmark) can render at its true size.

app/(main)/[locale]/page.tsx

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ import { usePromptDialog } from "@/hooks/use-prompt-dialog";
 import { useBrowserNavigation, type NavSnapshot } from "@/hooks/use-browser-navigation";
 import { debug } from "@/lib/debug";
 import { playNotificationSound } from "@/lib/notification-sound";
+import { isElectronShell, showElectronNotification } from "@/lib/electron-bridge";
 import { cn } from "@/lib/utils";
 import { localizeMailboxName } from "@/lib/mailbox-label";
 import { KEYWORD_PREFIX, KEYWORD_PREFIX_LEGACY } from "@/lib/thread-utils";
@@ -1062,7 +1063,45 @@ export default function Home() {
       debug.log('push', `[Push] Push notifications enabled for ${cleanups.length} account(s)`);
     }
 
+    // CATCH-UP for the desktop shell's local search index. The index's normal
+    // trigger is a push StateChange (stores/email-store.ts's handleStateChange),
+    // but nothing was pushed while the app was closed - and the polling
+    // transport has no signal for contacts or files at all (client.ts's
+    // buildStatePollingRequest covers Mailbox/Email/Calendar/CalendarEvent/
+    // SieveScript only). So backfill a bounded recent window once per session,
+    // after push is wired. Fire-and-forget; a no-op outside Electron.
+    const catchUpTimer = setTimeout(() => {
+      void (async () => {
+        try {
+          const { catchUpIndex } = await import('@/lib/mail-index-client');
+          await catchUpIndex(
+            useAccountStore.getState().getActiveAccount()?.cookieSlot,
+          );
+        } catch {
+          /* the index is optional */
+        }
+        // The offline REPLICA's launch catch-up. Same reasoning as the index's,
+        // plus one of its own: a `/changes` cursor cannot tell us about anything
+        // that happened while the process was dead, so a cycle at launch is what
+        // drains the backlog. One cycle is bounded, so a first sync of a large
+        // mailbox needs several - `chainSync` runs them with a hard cap.
+        //
+        // Sequenced AFTER the index rather than in parallel: both write the same
+        // SQLite file, and although `busy_timeout` makes concurrent writers safe,
+        // there is no reason to spend the contention during first paint.
+        try {
+          const { chainSync } = await import('@/lib/offline-replica-client');
+          await chainSync({ slot: useAccountStore.getState().getActiveAccount()?.cookieSlot });
+        } catch {
+          /* the replica is optional */
+        }
+      })();
+      // Deliberately after the initial mailbox fetch settles: the catch-up is a
+      // background nicety and must not compete with first paint.
+    }, 4000);
+
     return () => {
+      clearTimeout(catchUpTimer);
       cleanups.forEach((fn) => fn());
     };
   }, [isAuthenticated, client, activeAccountId, connectedAccountsSignature, handleStateChange, setPushConnected, buildPopulatedUnifiedAccounts, refreshCrossCounts, refreshUnifiedCounts]);
@@ -1186,13 +1225,34 @@ export default function Home() {
     // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
   }, [selectedEmail?.id, isScheduledView]);
 
-  // Handle new email notifications - play sound
+  // Handle new email notifications - play sound, and (in the Electron shell)
+  // fire a native OS notification. This effect is the transport-agnostic
+  // "genuinely new unread mail arrived" signal - stores/email-store.ts's
+  // refreshCurrentMailbox() already filters out sends/moves/drafts and only
+  // sets newEmailNotification for a real new top-of-inbox message, and it
+  // fires identically whether the underlying JMAP StateChange arrived over
+  // the WebSocket push connection (lib/jmap/client.ts's connectWebSocket),
+  // SSE, or the polling fallback - no need to duplicate this per transport.
   useEffect(() => {
     if (newEmailNotification) {
       const { emailNotificationsEnabled, emailNotificationSound, notificationSoundChoice } = useSettingsStore.getState();
       if (emailNotificationsEnabled && emailNotificationSound) {
         playNotificationSound(notificationSoundChoice);
       }
+      if (emailNotificationsEnabled && isElectronShell()) {
+        // Same fallback text public/sw.js's push handler already uses for
+        // its (also un-translated) system notifications - a native OS
+        // notification body isn't run through next-intl either way, so
+        // matching that existing precedent instead of introducing new
+        // translation keys for a rarely-hit fallback.
+        const sender = newEmailNotification.from?.[0];
+        const senderName = sender?.name || sender?.email || 'New mail';
+        const body = newEmailNotification.subject || newEmailNotification.preview || '(no subject)';
+        void showElectronNotification(senderName, {
+          body,
+          tag: `bulwark-mail:${newEmailNotification.id}`,
+        });
+      }
       debug.log('email', 'New email received:', newEmailNotification.subject);
       clearNewEmailNotification();
     }

app/(main)/admin/_tabs/plugins.tsx

@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ export function PluginsTab() {
   const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
   const [uploading, setUploading] = useState(false);
   const [message, setMessage] = useState<{ type: 'success' | 'error'; text: string } | null>(null);
+  // Bundle held back by the pattern scanner, awaiting an explicit admin decision.
+  const [pendingScan, setPendingScan] = useState<
+    { file: File; findings: Array<{ file: string; patterns: string[] }> } | null
+  >(null);
   const fileInputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
   const [policy, setPolicy] = useState<SettingsPolicy>({ ...DEFAULT_POLICY });
   const [policyDirty, setPolicyDirty] = useState(false);
@@ -104,15 +108,17 @@ export function PluginsTab() {
     }
   }
 
-  async function handleUpload(e: React.ChangeEvent<HTMLInputElement>) {
+  // Upload a bundle. The scanner may refuse it for containing patterns that are
-    const file = e.target.files?.[0];
+  // expected in a vendored crypto library (openpgp.js, pkijs); in that case the
-    if (!file) return;
+  // server returns `canOverride` and we hold the file so the admin can review
-
+  // the findings and decide. `override` re-posts the same file with consent.
+  async function uploadPlugin(file: File, override: boolean) {
     setUploading(true);
     setMessage(null);
 
     const formData = new FormData();
     formData.append('file', file);
+    if (override) formData.append('overrideWarnings', 'true');
 
     try {
       const res = await apiFetch('/api/admin/plugins', {
@@ -122,13 +128,22 @@ export function PluginsTab() {
 
       const data = await res.json();
       if (res.ok) {
-        const warnings = data.warnings?.length ? ` (${data.warnings.length} warning(s))` : '';
+        setPendingScan(null);
-        setMessage({ type: 'success', text: `Plugin "${data.plugin.name}" installed${warnings}` });
+        const accepted = data.findings?.length
+          ? ` — ${data.findings.length} scanner finding(s) accepted and logged`
+          : '';
+        setMessage({ type: 'success', text: `Plugin "${data.plugin.name}" installed${accepted}` });
         await fetchPlugins();
+      } else if (data.canOverride && Array.isArray(data.findings) && !override) {
+        // Hold the file rather than the error: the admin needs to see WHAT
+        // tripped, in WHICH file, before deciding.
+        setPendingScan({ file, findings: data.findings });
       } else {
+        setPendingScan(null);
         setMessage({ type: 'error', text: data.error || 'Upload failed' });
       }
     } catch {
+      setPendingScan(null);
       setMessage({ type: 'error', text: 'Upload failed' });
     } finally {
       setUploading(false);
@@ -136,6 +151,13 @@ export function PluginsTab() {
     }
   }
 
+  async function handleUpload(e: React.ChangeEvent<HTMLInputElement>) {
+    const file = e.target.files?.[0];
+    if (!file) return;
+    setPendingScan(null);
+    await uploadPlugin(file, false);
+  }
+
   async function togglePlugin(id: string, enabled: boolean) {
     setMessage(null);
     const res = await apiFetch('/api/admin/plugins', {
@@ -302,6 +324,51 @@ export function PluginsTab() {
         </div>
       )}
 
+      {pendingScan && (
+        <div className="border border-warning/40 bg-warning/5 rounded-lg p-4 space-y-3">
+          <div className="flex items-start gap-2">
+            <AlertTriangle className="w-4 h-4 text-warning mt-0.5 flex-shrink-0" />
+            <div className="space-y-1">
+              <p className="text-sm font-medium text-foreground">
+                Scanner flagged <span className="font-mono">{pendingScan.file.name}</span>
+              </p>
+              <p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+                These patterns can indicate malicious code, but they also appear in legitimate
+                minified crypto libraries such as openpgp.js and pkijs. Review the findings before
+                proceeding — installing anyway is recorded in the audit log.
+              </p>
+            </div>
+          </div>
+
+          <ul className="space-y-1">
+            {pendingScan.findings.map(f => (
+              <li key={f.file} className="text-xs font-mono bg-background/60 border border-border rounded px-2 py-1">
+                <span className="text-foreground">{f.file}</span>
+                <span className="text-muted-foreground"> — {f.patterns.join(', ')}</span>
+              </li>
+            ))}
+          </ul>
+
+          <div className="flex items-center gap-2">
+            <button
+              onClick={() => uploadPlugin(pendingScan.file, true)}
+              disabled={uploading}
+              className="inline-flex items-center gap-2 h-8 px-3 rounded-md bg-destructive text-destructive-foreground text-xs font-medium hover:bg-destructive/90 disabled:opacity-50 transition-all"
+            >
+              {uploading ? <Loader2 className="w-3.5 h-3.5 animate-spin" /> : <AlertTriangle className="w-3.5 h-3.5" />}
+              Install anyway
+            </button>
+            <button
+              onClick={() => { setPendingScan(null); setMessage(null); }}
+              disabled={uploading}
+              className="inline-flex items-center h-8 px-3 rounded-md border border-border text-xs font-medium text-foreground hover:bg-muted disabled:opacity-50 transition-all"
+            >
+              Cancel
+            </button>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+      )}
+
       <div className="border border-border rounded-lg">
         <div className="px-4 py-3 border-b border-border bg-muted/30">
           <div className="flex items-center gap-2">

app/api/admin/plugins/route.ts

@@ -158,15 +158,47 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
     }
     const code = await entryFile.async('string');
 
-    // Security: block plugins containing dangerous JS patterns
+    // Security: scan for dangerous JS patterns across EVERY script in the
-    const warnings: string[] = [];
+    // bundle, not just the entrypoint - a second .js file was previously never
-    for (const { pattern, label } of SUSPICIOUS_JS_PATTERNS) {
+    // looked at.
-      if (pattern.test(code)) warnings.push(`Contains ${label}`);
+    //
-      pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+    // The result is a reviewable finding rather than an unconditional reject.
+    // Minified crypto libraries (openpgp.js, pkijs) legitimately contain these
+    // patterns, so a hard block makes S/MIME and PGP plugins uninstallable.
+    // This route is already admin-authenticated, so the scan is defence in
+    // depth against an accidental or compromised upload, not a trust boundary:
+    // an admin may proceed with `overrideWarnings`, and the override is
+    // recorded in the audit log with the exact findings.
+    const findings: Array<{ file: string; patterns: string[] }> = [];
+    for (const [filePath, entry] of Object.entries(zip.files)) {
+      if (entry.dir) continue;
+      const ext = filePath.slice(filePath.lastIndexOf('.')).toLowerCase();
+      if (ext !== '.js' && ext !== '.mjs') continue;
+      const source = filePath === root + (manifest.entrypoint as string)
+        ? code
+        : await entry.async('string');
+      const hits: string[] = [];
+      for (const { pattern, label } of SUSPICIOUS_JS_PATTERNS) {
+        if (pattern.test(source)) hits.push(label);
+        pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+      }
+      if (hits.length > 0) {
+        findings.push({ file: filePath.slice(root.length), patterns: hits });
+      }
     }
-    if (warnings.length > 0) {
+
+    const overrideWarnings = formData.get('overrideWarnings') === 'true';
+    if (findings.length > 0 && !overrideWarnings) {
+      const summary = findings
+        .map(f => `${f.file}: ${f.patterns.join(', ')}`)
+        .join('; ');
       return NextResponse.json(
-        { error: `Plugin rejected: ${warnings.join(', ')}. These patterns are not allowed for security reasons.` },
+        {
+          error: `Plugin rejected: ${summary}. Review the bundle; if these are expected `
+            + `(e.g. a vendored crypto library), re-upload with "overrideWarnings" to proceed.`,
+          findings,
+          canOverride: true,
+        },
         { status: 400 },
       );
     }
@@ -212,8 +244,20 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
     await savePlugin(plugin, code);
     invalidateFrameOriginsCache();
     await auditLog('plugin.install', { id: plugin.id, name: plugin.name, version: plugin.version, frameOrigins: declaredFrameOrigins, httpOrigins: declaredHttpOrigins, apiPostPaths: declaredApiPostPaths }, ip);
+    if (findings.length > 0) {
+      // Record WHAT was waved through, not merely that an override happened -
+      // otherwise the audit trail can't answer "which patterns did we accept?".
+      await auditLog(
+        'plugin.install.scan_override',
+        { id: plugin.id, version: plugin.version, findings },
+        ip,
+      );
+      logger.warn('Plugin installed with scanner override', { id: plugin.id, findings });
+    }
 
-    return NextResponse.json({ plugin });
+    // Echo accepted findings back so the admin UI can confirm exactly what was
+    // waved through, rather than reporting a bare success.
+    return NextResponse.json(findings.length > 0 ? { plugin, findings } : { plugin });
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Plugin install error', { error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error' });
     return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Internal server error' }, { status: 500 });

app/api/config/route.ts

@@ -44,6 +44,17 @@ export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
     return configManager.get<T>(key, fallback);
   };
 
+  // Whether a logo field was actually set by an operator (Branding tab,
+  // an env var, or a per-domain override) rather than left at its default -
+  // consumed by resolveThemeLogo() so an explicit choice here wins over the
+  // active theme's own built-in logo, instead of being silently shadowed by
+  // it. See lib/theme-logo.ts.
+  const configSources = configManager.getAllWithSources();
+  const isLogoOverridden = (key: BrandingOverrideKey): boolean =>
+    typeof domainOverrides[key] === 'string' && domainOverrides[key]!.length > 0
+      ? true
+      : configSources[key]?.source !== 'default';
+
   const appName =
     branded<string>('appName', '') || process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_NAME || 'Webmail';
   const jmapServerUrl = configManager.get<string>('jmapServerUrl') || process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_JMAP_SERVER_URL || '';
@@ -68,8 +79,12 @@ export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
       faviconUrl: branded<string>('faviconUrl', '/branding/Bulwark_Favicon.svg'),
       appLogoLightUrl: branded<string>('appLogoLightUrl', ''),
       appLogoDarkUrl: branded<string>('appLogoDarkUrl', ''),
+      appLogoLightUrlIsCustom: isLogoOverridden('appLogoLightUrl'),
+      appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: isLogoOverridden('appLogoDarkUrl'),
       loginLogoLightUrl: branded<string>('loginLogoLightUrl', '/branding/Bulwark_Logo_Color.svg'),
       loginLogoDarkUrl: branded<string>('loginLogoDarkUrl', '/branding/Bulwark_Logo_White.svg'),
+      loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom: isLogoOverridden('loginLogoLightUrl'),
+      loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: isLogoOverridden('loginLogoDarkUrl'),
       loginCompanyName: branded<string>('loginCompanyName', ''),
       loginImprintUrl: branded<string>('loginImprintUrl', ''),
       loginPrivacyPolicyUrl: branded<string>('loginPrivacyPolicyUrl', ''),

app/api/offline/mail/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// GET /api/offline/mail?kind=mailboxes|list|message - the OFFLINE READ SURFACE.
+//
+// THIS ROUTE MUST NEVER MAKE A NETWORK CALL. That is the whole feature: it is
+// consulted precisely when the backend is unreachable, so a JMAP session fetch to
+// learn the account id would fail for the exact reason the route was called. The
+// account is resolved from the request's own encrypted `jmap_stalwart_ctx` cookie
+// (a local decrypt) and from the account ids the store already holds rows for.
+//
+// It is a FALLBACK, not a cache in front of the server - see `read.ts`'s header
+// for the coherence rules that depend on that, and `lib/offline-fallback-client.ts`
+// for the one place that decides a read has genuinely failed.
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import {
+  readEnvelopePage, readMailboxes, readMessage,
+} from '@/lib/offline-replica/read';
+import {
+  resolveIndexSession, resolveReadAccountId, withReplica,
+} from '@/lib/offline-replica/engine';
+import { gateReplicaRoute, NO_STORE, replicaErrorResponse } from '@/lib/offline-replica/route-gate';
+
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
+
+const MAX_LIMIT = 200;
+
+export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
+  const gated = gateReplicaRoute();
+  if (gated) return gated;
+
+  const params = request.nextUrl.searchParams;
+  const kind = params.get('kind') ?? 'mailboxes';
+  if (kind !== 'mailboxes' && kind !== 'list' && kind !== 'message') {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'kind must be mailboxes, list or message' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const session = await resolveIndexSession(request);
+    const payload = await withReplica(session.accountId, (store) => {
+      const jmapAccountId = resolveReadAccountId(store, params.get('jmapAccountId'));
+      if (!jmapAccountId) {
+        // Nothing synced yet for this account. Not an error - the caller falls
+        // back to whatever it would have shown without a replica.
+        return { empty: true as const };
+      }
+
+      if (kind === 'mailboxes') {
+        return { empty: false as const, jmapAccountId, mailboxes: readMailboxes(store, jmapAccountId) };
+      }
+
+      if (kind === 'list') {
+        const rawLimit = Number(params.get('limit') ?? '50');
+        const limit = Number.isFinite(rawLimit)
+          ? Math.min(Math.max(Math.trunc(rawLimit), 1), MAX_LIMIT)
+          : 50;
+        const rawOffset = Number(params.get('offset') ?? '0');
+        const offset = Number.isFinite(rawOffset) ? Math.max(Math.trunc(rawOffset), 0) : 0;
+        // An absent mailboxId means "everything", which is what the unified views
+        // ask for; an empty string is a caller bug and must not silently widen.
+        const mailboxParam = params.get('mailboxId');
+        const mailboxId = mailboxParam === null ? null : mailboxParam;
+        if (mailboxId === '') {
+          return { empty: true as const };
+        }
+        const page = readEnvelopePage(store, jmapAccountId, mailboxId, limit, offset);
+        return { empty: false as const, jmapAccountId, ...page };
+      }
+
+      const id = params.get('id');
+      if (!id || id.length > 256) return { empty: true as const };
+      const message = readMessage(store, jmapAccountId, id);
+      if (!message) return { empty: false as const, jmapAccountId, email: null, hasBody: false };
+      return {
+        empty: false as const,
+        jmapAccountId,
+        email: message.email,
+        hasBody: message.hasBody,
+      };
+    });
+
+    if (payload.empty) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, available: false }, { headers: NO_STORE });
+    }
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, available: true, ...payload }, { headers: NO_STORE });
+  } catch (error) {
+    return replicaErrorResponse(error, 'offline read');
+  }
+}

app/api/offline/reindex/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+// POST /api/offline/reindex - write mail/calendar/contacts/files into the
+// encrypted local search index for the calling session's account.
+//
+// The PRIMARY caller is the renderer's live JMAP push handler: when a
+// StateChange arrives it posts the ids that changed, so indexing is reactive to
+// each delivery rather than periodic. `{ catchUp: true }` (no ids) is the
+// fallback used at app launch to backfill whatever changed while the app was
+// closed.
+//
+// GATED: returns 404 unless VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR is set, which only
+// electron/main.ts does. The same standalone server artifact runs in the
+// multi-tenant production Docker image, where this feature must not exist at
+// all - 404 rather than 403 so nothing learns the route is there.
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
+import { isSqlcipherAvailable } from '@/lib/mail-index/binding';
+import { hasKeyChannel, IndexKeyError } from '@/lib/mail-index/key';
+import { getStoreDir } from '@/lib/mail-index/paths';
+import {
+  IndexSessionError, MAX_IDS_PER_CALL, resolveIndexSession, runIndex,
+  type IndexRequest,
+} from '@/lib/mail-index/reindex';
+import { CONTENT_TYPES, isContentType, type ContentType } from '@/lib/mail-index/store';
+import { JmapIndexError } from '@/lib/mail-index/jmap';
+
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
+
+function parseIdMap(raw: unknown): Partial<Record<ContentType, string[]>> | undefined {
+  if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'object' || Array.isArray(raw)) return undefined;
+  const out: Partial<Record<ContentType, string[]>> = {};
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(raw as Record<string, unknown>)) {
+    if (!isContentType(key) || !Array.isArray(value)) continue;
+    const ids = value
+      .filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string' && v.length > 0 && v.length <= 256)
+      .slice(0, MAX_IDS_PER_CALL);
+    if (ids.length > 0) out[key] = ids;
+  }
+  return Object.keys(out).length > 0 ? out : undefined;
+}
+
+export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
+  if (!getStoreDir()) {
+    return new NextResponse(null, { status: 404 });
+  }
+  if (!hasKeyChannel()) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'The local index has no key channel in this process.', code: 'no-key-channel' },
+      { status: 503 },
+    );
+  }
+  if (!isSqlcipherAvailable()) {
+    // The native binding is an optionalDependency, so "not installed" is a
+    // normal state on platforms without a prebuild - not an error to log loudly.
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Encrypted local index is unavailable on this platform.', code: 'no-binding' },
+      { status: 503 },
+    );
+  }
+
+  let body: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+  try {
+    const text = await request.text();
+    if (text.trim()) body = JSON.parse(text) as Record<string, unknown>;
+  } catch {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Malformed JSON body' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const rawTypes = Array.isArray(body.types) ? body.types.filter(isContentType) : [];
+  const req: IndexRequest = {
+    types: rawTypes.length > 0 ? rawTypes : undefined,
+    ids: parseIdMap(body.ids),
+    removed: parseIdMap(body.removed),
+    // Pruning is a catch-up concern; a single-delivery call shouldn't scan.
+    prune: body.catchUp === true,
+  };
+
+  try {
+    const session = await resolveIndexSession(request);
+    const result = await runIndex(session, req);
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      {
+        ok: true,
+        written: result.written,
+        skipped: result.skipped,
+        errors: result.errors,
+        durationMs: result.durationMs,
+        types: CONTENT_TYPES,
+      },
+      { headers: { 'Cache-Control': 'no-store' } },
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof IndexSessionError) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message }, { status: error.status });
+    }
+    if (error instanceof JmapIndexError) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message }, { status: error.status });
+    }
+    if (error instanceof IndexKeyError) {
+      // no-secure-storage is the Linux-without-a-keyring refusal: a real,
+      // expected outcome with a user-facing explanation, not a server fault.
+      const status = error.code === 'no-secure-storage' ? 503 : 500;
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message, code: error.code }, { status });
+    }
+    logger.error('mail-index reindex failed', {
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+    });
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Reindex failed' }, { status: 500 });
+  }
+}

app/api/offline/search/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+// GET /api/offline/search?q=...&types=mail,calendar&limit=20
+//
+// THE RETRIEVAL SURFACE. This is what an AI/RAG feature calls to gather
+// relevant context from the user's own mail, calendar, contacts and files
+// before prompting a model - hence the `snippet` on every hit and the
+// `contextBlock` convenience field, which is the same information already
+// flattened into text a prompt can carry directly.
+//
+// Read-only: it never touches the network and never writes. Gated identically
+// to the reindex route.
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
+import { isSqlcipherAvailable } from '@/lib/mail-index/binding';
+import { hasKeyChannel, IndexKeyError, withIndexKey } from '@/lib/mail-index/key';
+import { getStoreDir } from '@/lib/mail-index/paths';
+import { IndexSessionError, resolveIndexSession } from '@/lib/mail-index/reindex';
+import {
+  isContentType, MailIndex, MailIndexUnavailableError, type ContentType, type SearchHit,
+} from '@/lib/mail-index/store';
+
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
+
+/**
+ * One hit as a plain text block, ready to be concatenated into a prompt.
+ * Kept server-side so every caller (a chat feature, a future agent, a test)
+ * formats context the same way rather than each inventing its own.
+ */
+function toContextBlock(hit: SearchHit): string {
+  const label: Record<ContentType, string> = {
+    mail: 'EMAIL', calendar: 'CALENDAR EVENT', contact: 'CONTACT', file: 'FILE',
+  };
+  const lines = [`[${label[hit.contentType]}] ${hit.title}`];
+  if (hit.occurredAt) lines.push(`Date: ${hit.occurredAt}`);
+  if (hit.people) lines.push(`People: ${hit.people}`);
+  const path = hit.metadata?.path;
+  if (typeof path === 'string' && path) lines.push(`Path: ${path}`);
+  if (hit.snippet) lines.push(`Excerpt: ${hit.snippet}`);
+  return lines.join('\n');
+}
+
+export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
+  if (!getStoreDir()) {
+    return new NextResponse(null, { status: 404 });
+  }
+  if (!hasKeyChannel() || !isSqlcipherAvailable()) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'Encrypted local index is unavailable in this process.', code: 'unavailable' },
+      { status: 503 },
+    );
+  }
+
+  const params = request.nextUrl.searchParams;
+  const query = (params.get('q') ?? '').trim();
+  const wantStats = params.get('stats') === 'true';
+
+  if (!query && !wantStats) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Missing q parameter' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+  if (query.length > 512) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Query too long' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const types = (params.get('types') ?? '')
+    .split(',')
+    .map((t) => t.trim())
+    .filter(isContentType);
+
+  const limitRaw = Number(params.get('limit') ?? '20');
+  const limit = Number.isFinite(limitRaw) ? Math.min(Math.max(Math.trunc(limitRaw), 1), 100) : 20;
+
+  try {
+    const session = await resolveIndexSession(request);
+    const storeDir = getStoreDir();
+    if (!storeDir) return new NextResponse(null, { status: 404 });
+
+    const payload = await withIndexKey(session.accountId, (key) => {
+      const index = MailIndex.open({ storeDir, accountId: session.accountId, key });
+      try {
+        const stats = index.stats();
+        if (!query) return { hits: [] as SearchHit[], stats };
+        return { hits: index.search({ query, types, limit }), stats: wantStats ? stats : undefined };
+      } finally {
+        index.close();
+      }
+    });
+
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      {
+        ok: true,
+        query,
+        types: types.length > 0 ? types : 'all',
+        count: payload.hits.length,
+        hits: payload.hits,
+        // Everything a prompt needs, pre-joined in rank order.
+        contextBlock: payload.hits.map(toContextBlock).join('\n\n---\n\n'),
+        ...(payload.stats ? { stats: payload.stats } : {}),
+      },
+      { headers: { 'Cache-Control': 'no-store' } },
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof IndexSessionError) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message }, { status: error.status });
+    }
+    if (error instanceof IndexKeyError) {
+      const status = error.code === 'no-secure-storage' ? 503 : 500;
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message, code: error.code }, { status });
+    }
+    if (error instanceof MailIndexUnavailableError) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message, code: 'unavailable' }, { status: 503 });
+    }
+    logger.error('mail-index search failed', {
+      error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
+    });
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Search failed' }, { status: 500 });
+  }
+}

app/api/offline/status/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+// GET    /api/offline/status - size, freshness and retention policy, for Settings.
+// PUT    /api/offline/status - update the retention policy.
+// DELETE /api/offline/status - purge the replica.
+//
+// The POLICY LIVES IN THE ENCRYPTED STORE, not in renderer localStorage. The
+// design review's H1 was that a server-side engine cannot read a renderer-only
+// setting; keeping the policy server-side means the retention pass always has the
+// value it needs, while the DECISION TO SYNC AT ALL stays with the renderer, so
+// nothing is ever materialised for an account that never opted in.
+//
+// Like every read here, GET makes no network call: an offline user must still be
+// able to see what they have and free the space.
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { clampPolicy, POLICY_LIMITS, type RetentionPolicy } from '@/lib/offline-replica/store';
+import { resolveIndexSession, resolveReadAccountId, withReplica } from '@/lib/offline-replica/engine';
+import { gateReplicaRoute, NO_STORE, replicaErrorResponse } from '@/lib/offline-replica/route-gate';
+
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
+
+export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
+  const gated = gateReplicaRoute();
+  if (gated) return gated;
+  try {
+    const session = await resolveIndexSession(request);
+    const payload = await withReplica(session.accountId, (store) => {
+      const jmapAccountId = resolveReadAccountId(store, null);
+      const policy = store.getPolicy();
+      const flags = store.getFlags(Date.now());
+      if (!jmapAccountId) {
+        return {
+          policy,
+          limits: POLICY_LIMITS,
+          synced: false,
+          stats: null,
+          coveragePhase: 'never-run',
+          resyncRequired: flags.resyncRequired,
+          lastCycleAt: flags.lastCycleAt ?? null,
+          lastCycleOk: flags.lastCycleOk ?? null,
+        };
+      }
+      return {
+        policy,
+        limits: POLICY_LIMITS,
+        synced: true,
+        stats: store.stats(jmapAccountId),
+        coveragePhase: store.getCoverage(jmapAccountId)?.phase ?? 'never-run',
+        coveredFrom: store.getCoverage(jmapAccountId)?.coveredFrom ?? null,
+        resyncRequired: flags.resyncRequired,
+        lastCycleAt: flags.lastCycleAt ?? null,
+        lastCycleOk: flags.lastCycleOk ?? null,
+        lastCycleError: flags.lastCycleError ?? null,
+      };
+    });
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, ...payload }, { headers: NO_STORE });
+  } catch (error) {
+    return replicaErrorResponse(error, 'offline status');
+  }
+}
+
+export async function PUT(request: NextRequest) {
+  const gated = gateReplicaRoute();
+  if (gated) return gated;
+
+  let body: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+  try {
+    const text = await request.text();
+    if (text.trim()) body = JSON.parse(text) as Record<string, unknown>;
+  } catch {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Malformed JSON body' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const policy = clampPolicy(body as Partial<RetentionPolicy>);
+  try {
+    const session = await resolveIndexSession(request);
+    await withReplica(session.accountId, (store) => {
+      store.transaction(() => { store.setPolicy(policy); });
+    });
+    // The cycle applies it: a widen re-enters coverage scanning, a narrow evicts,
+    // and the clock guard is told this was INTENT rather than a glitch by the
+    // `lastEnvelopeDays` it compares against.
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, policy }, { headers: NO_STORE });
+  } catch (error) {
+    return replicaErrorResponse(error, 'offline policy update');
+  }
+}
+
+export async function DELETE(request: NextRequest) {
+  const gated = gateReplicaRoute();
+  if (gated) return gated;
+  try {
+    const session = await resolveIndexSession(request);
+    await withReplica(session.accountId, (store) => {
+      // ALL OF IT, cursors included. A record wipe that leaves cursors behind is
+      // the one state no amount of syncing repairs: `/changes` structurally cannot
+      // re-deliver mail that already existed when the cursor was captured, so the
+      // next cycle would advance a live cursor over an empty store forever.
+      store.transaction(() => { store.purgeAll(); });
+    });
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, purged: true }, { headers: NO_STORE });
+  } catch (error) {
+    return replicaErrorResponse(error, 'offline purge');
+  }
+}

app/api/offline/sync/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// POST /api/offline/sync - run ONE bounded delta-sync cycle for the calling
+// session's account.
+//
+// The renderer drives this: once at launch (catch-up for whatever changed while
+// the app was closed, for which no push event was ever delivered) and on each
+// JMAP `StateChange` from the live push connection. There is no background worker
+// and no resident credential - see `lib/offline-replica/sync.ts`'s header for why
+// that architecture choice keeps most of the original design review's critical
+// findings out of scope entirely.
+//
+// A cycle is BOUNDED. `unfinishedWork: true` means "call again", and the renderer
+// chains with a cap; it never means an error.
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { clampPolicy, type RetentionPolicy } from '@/lib/offline-replica/store';
+import { resolveIndexSession, syncAccount } from '@/lib/offline-replica/engine';
+import { gateReplicaRoute, NO_STORE, replicaErrorResponse } from '@/lib/offline-replica/route-gate';
+
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic';
+
+export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
+  const gated = gateReplicaRoute();
+  if (gated) return gated;
+
+  let body: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+  try {
+    const text = await request.text();
+    if (text.trim()) body = JSON.parse(text) as Record<string, unknown>;
+  } catch {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Malformed JSON body' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const rawPolicy = body.policy;
+  const policy: RetentionPolicy | undefined =
+    rawPolicy && typeof rawPolicy === 'object' && !Array.isArray(rawPolicy)
+      ? clampPolicy(rawPolicy as Partial<RetentionPolicy>)
+      : undefined;
+
+  try {
+    const session = await resolveIndexSession(request);
+    const report = await syncAccount(session, {
+      policy,
+      forceResync: body.forceResync === true,
+    });
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: report.ok, report }, { headers: NO_STORE });
+  } catch (error) {
+    return replicaErrorResponse(error, 'sync');
+  }
+}

app/api/smime/enroll/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/**
+ * S/MIME certificate enrolment (`C-08`, server half).
+ *
+ * The plugin generates a keypair in the browser and sends only a CSR here. The
+ * private key never leaves the device — this route never sees it and has no way
+ * to ask for it.
+ *
+ * What this route exists to decide: **which addresses the issued certificate is
+ * allowed to assert.** That question cannot be answered in the browser, and it
+ * must not be answered by the CSR — a CSR is a self-assertion, and honouring its
+ * `subjectAltName` would let anyone mint a certificate for any address, which is
+ * indistinguishable from having no CA at all.
+ */
+import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { readStalwartAuthContext } from '@/lib/stalwart/auth-context';
+import { fetchJmapSession, postJmap, rebaseApiUrl } from '@/lib/stalwart/jmap-api';
+import { CaError, getCaProvider } from '@/lib/smime-ca';
+
+export const runtime = 'nodejs';
+
+const MAX_CSR_BYTES = 8 * 1024;
+
+export async function POST(request: Request) {
+  const provider = getCaProvider();
+  if (!provider) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'S/MIME enrolment is not configured on this server' },
+      { status: 503 },
+    );
+  }
+
+  let body: { csrPem?: unknown; slot?: unknown };
+  try {
+    body = await request.json();
+  } catch {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'invalid JSON body' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const csrPem = typeof body.csrPem === 'string' ? body.csrPem.trim() : '';
+  if (!csrPem) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'csrPem is required' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+  if (csrPem.length > MAX_CSR_BYTES) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'csrPem too large' }, { status: 413 });
+  }
+  // Shape check only. This is not a security control — see the module comment on
+  // why the CSR's contents are not trusted regardless of what they contain.
+  if (!/^-----BEGIN (NEW )?CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----[\s\S]+-----END (NEW )?CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----$/
+    .test(csrPem)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'csrPem is not a PEM PKCS#10 request' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const slot = Number.isInteger(body.slot) ? (body.slot as number) : 0;
+  if (slot < 0 || slot > 9) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'invalid slot' }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  // The auth context is an encrypted, server-minted cookie, so `username` cannot
+  // be forged by the client. It still isn't sufficient on its own — see below.
+  const auth = await readStalwartAuthContext(slot);
+  if (!auth) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'not authenticated' }, { status: 401 });
+  }
+
+  let identity: { addresses: string[]; displayName?: string };
+  try {
+    identity = await resolveIdentity(auth.serverUrl, auth.authHeader);
+  } catch (cause) {
+    console.error('[smime-enroll] identity resolution failed:', cause);
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'could not confirm your sending addresses with the mail server' },
+      { status: 502 },
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (identity.addresses.length === 0) {
+    // An authenticated principal with no sending identity — an admin-only
+    // account, or a mailbox with submission disabled. Refuse rather than falling
+    // back to the cookie's username, which would issue a certificate for an
+    // address the mail server will not actually let this account send from.
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      { error: 'this account has no sending address, so no certificate can be issued for it' },
+      { status: 403 },
+    );
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const issued = await provider.enroll({
+      csrPem,
+      addresses: identity.addresses,
+      commonName: identity.displayName || identity.addresses[0],
+    });
+
+    // Audit before returning. A certificate that exists with no record of who
+    // asked for it is the thing you most want during an incident.
+    console.info(
+      `[smime-enroll] issued serial=${issued.serialNumber} ca=${provider.id} `
+      + `account=${auth.username} addresses=${identity.addresses.join(',')}`,
+    );
+
+    return NextResponse.json({
+      certificatePem: issued.certificatePem,
+      chainPem: issued.chainPem,
+      serialNumber: issued.serialNumber,
+      issuerDn: issued.issuerDn,
+      notAfter: issued.notAfter,
+      addresses: identity.addresses,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof CaError) {
+      console.error(`[smime-enroll] CA error for ${auth.username}:`, error.message, error.cause);
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message }, { status: error.status });
+    }
+    console.error('[smime-enroll] unexpected error:', error);
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'enrolment failed' }, { status: 500 });
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Ask Stalwart which addresses this session may send from, via `Identity/get`.
+ *
+ * This is deliberately not derived from the auth cookie's `username`. The right
+ * authority for "may this person have a signing certificate for this address" is
+ * the mail server that already decides "may this person send from this address" —
+ * anything else invents a second, weaker answer to a question already settled.
+ *
+ * It also handles the cases the cookie cannot: an alias the account legitimately
+ * sends as (which should be on the certificate) and an administrative principal
+ * with no mailbox at all (which should get no certificate). The latter is not
+ * hypothetical here — `admin@sandbox.vnc.de` authenticates successfully and has
+ * no mail session, and trusting the cookie would have issued it a certificate.
+ */
+async function resolveIdentity(
+  serverUrl: string,
+  authHeader: string,
+): Promise<{ addresses: string[]; displayName?: string }> {
+  const session = await fetchJmapSession(serverUrl, authHeader);
+  if (!session) throw new Error('no JMAP session');
+
+  const accountId = session.primaryAccounts?.['urn:ietf:params:jmap:mail'];
+  if (!accountId) throw new Error('no primary mail account');
+
+  const apiUrl = rebaseApiUrl(session, serverUrl);
+  if (!apiUrl) throw new Error('session advertises no usable apiUrl');
+
+  const res = await postJmap(apiUrl, authHeader, JSON.stringify({
+    using: ['urn:ietf:params:jmap:core', 'urn:ietf:params:jmap:submission'],
+    methodCalls: [['Identity/get', { accountId }, '0']],
+  }));
+  if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Identity/get returned ${res.status}`);
+
+  const payload = await res.json() as {
+    methodResponses?: [string, { list?: { email?: string; name?: string }[] }, string][];
+  };
+  const first = payload.methodResponses?.[0];
+  if (!first || first[0] !== 'Identity/get') {
+    throw new Error('Identity/get failed');
+  }
+
+  const seen = new Set<string>();
+  const addresses: string[] = [];
+  let displayName: string | undefined;
+
+  for (const entry of first[1]?.list ?? []) {
+    const email = typeof entry.email === 'string' ? entry.email.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
+    // Stalwart can report a wildcard identity (`*@domain`) for accounts allowed
+    // to send as anything in a domain. That is a real capability, but it is not
+    // an address and must never reach a certificate — a `rfc822Name` SAN of
+    // `*@vnc.de` is either rejected by clients or, worse, honoured.
+    if (!email || email.includes('*') || !email.includes('@')) continue;
+    if (seen.has(email)) continue;
+    seen.add(email);
+    addresses.push(email);
+    if (!displayName && typeof entry.name === 'string' && entry.name.trim()) {
+      displayName = entry.name.trim();
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { addresses, displayName };
+}

components/layout/navigation-rail.tsx

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ export function NavigationRail({
   const t = useTranslations("sidebar");
   const pathname = usePathname();
   const router = useRouter();
-  const { appLogoLightUrl, appLogoDarkUrl } = useConfig();
+  const { appLogoLightUrl, appLogoDarkUrl, appLogoLightUrlIsCustom, appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom } = useConfig();
   const resolvedTheme = useThemeStore((s) => s.resolvedTheme);
   const activeThemeId = useThemeStore((s) => s.activeThemeId);
   const installedThemes = useThemeStore((s) => s.installedThemes);
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ export function NavigationRail({
       )}
     >
       {(() => {
-        const logoUrl = withBasePath(resolveThemeLogo(installedThemes, activeThemeId, resolvedTheme === 'dark', appLogoLightUrl, appLogoDarkUrl));
+        const logoUrl = withBasePath(resolveThemeLogo(installedThemes, activeThemeId, resolvedTheme === 'dark', appLogoLightUrl, appLogoDarkUrl, appLogoLightUrlIsCustom || appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom));
         return logoUrl ? (
           <div className="flex items-center justify-center py-3 px-1">
             <img

components/settings/about-data-settings.tsx

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { cn } from '@/lib/utils';
 import { getPathPrefix } from '@/lib/browser-navigation';
 import { clearCachedData } from '@/lib/clear-cached-data';
 import { SpamSiegeGame } from './spam-siege-game';
+import { LocalIndexSettings } from './local-index-settings';
 
 const APP_VERSION = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_VERSION || "0.0.0";
 const GIT_COMMIT = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_GIT_COMMIT || "unknown";
@@ -218,6 +219,9 @@ export function AboutDataSettings() {
           </Button>
         </SettingItem>
       </SettingsSection>
+
+      {/* Desktop shell only - renders nothing in the browser/PWA build. */}
+      <LocalIndexSettings />
     </>
   );
 }

components/settings/local-index-settings.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+"use client";
+
+// Settings panel for the desktop shell's encrypted local search index.
+//
+// Deliberately small: the index's PRIMARY trigger is the live push connection
+// (see lib/mail-index-client.ts's indexOnStateChange, wired into
+// stores/email-store.ts's handleStateChange), so this panel is a status readout
+// plus a manual catch-up button - not the mechanism.
+//
+// Renders nothing at all outside the Electron shell, where the routes 404.
+
+import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from 'react';
+import { Button } from '@/components/ui/button';
+import { SettingsSection, SettingItem } from './settings-section';
+import { isElectronShell } from '@/lib/electron-bridge';
+import { useAccountStore } from '@/stores/account-store';
+import { catchUpIndex, fetchIndexStats, type IndexStats } from '@/lib/mail-index-client';
+import {
+  chainSync, fetchReplicaStatus, purgeReplica, updateRetentionPolicy,
+  type ReplicaStatus, type RetentionPolicy,
+} from '@/lib/offline-replica-client';
+
+const TYPE_LABELS: Record<string, string> = {
+  mail: 'Mail',
+  calendar: 'Calendar',
+  contact: 'Contacts',
+  file: 'Files',
+};
+
+export function LocalIndexSettings() {
+  const slot = useAccountStore((s) => s.accounts.find((a) => a.id === s.activeAccountId)?.cookieSlot);
+  const [stats, setStats] = useState<IndexStats[] | null>(null);
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
+  const [message, setMessage] = useState<string | null>(null);
+  // `null` until the first probe resolves, so we don't flash a panel that then
+  // vanishes on a non-desktop build.
+  const [available, setAvailable] = useState<boolean | null>(null);
+
+  const refreshStats = useCallback(async () => {
+    const next = await fetchIndexStats(slot);
+    setStats(next);
+    setAvailable(next !== null);
+  }, [slot]);
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (!isElectronShell()) {
+      setAvailable(false);
+      return;
+    }
+    void refreshStats();
+  }, [refreshStats]);
+
+  const handleRebuild = async () => {
+    setBusy(true);
+    setMessage(null);
+    try {
+      const result = await catchUpIndex(slot);
+      if (result.unavailable) {
+        setAvailable(false);
+        setMessage(result.error ?? 'The encrypted index is unavailable on this system.');
+        return;
+      }
+      if (!result.ok) {
+        setMessage(result.error ?? 'Indexing failed.');
+        return;
+      }
+      const written = Object.entries(result.written ?? {})
+        .map(([type, n]) => `${TYPE_LABELS[type] ?? type}: ${n}`)
+        .join(', ');
+      const failed = (result.errors ?? []).map((e) => `${e.contentType} (${e.message})`).join('; ');
+      setMessage(
+        [
+          written ? `Indexed ${written}.` : 'Nothing to index.',
+          result.skipped?.length ? `Not supported: ${result.skipped.join(', ')}.` : '',
+          failed ? `Problems: ${failed}` : '',
+        ]
+          .filter(Boolean)
+          .join(' '),
+      );
+      await refreshStats();
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(false);
+    }
+  };
+
+  if (available === false || available === null) return null;
+
+  const total = (stats ?? []).reduce((sum, s) => sum + s.count, 0);
+
+  return (
+    <SettingsSection
+      title="Local search index"
+      description={
+        'An encrypted index of your recent mail, calendar events, contacts and file names, ' +
+        'stored on this device only. It updates automatically as items arrive, and powers ' +
+        'local search and AI answers about your own data. Files are indexed by name and ' +
+        'location, not by their contents.'
+      }
+    >
+      <SettingItem
+        label="Indexed items"
+        description={
+          total > 0
+            ? (stats ?? [])
+                .map((s) => `${TYPE_LABELS[s.contentType] ?? s.contentType}: ${s.count}`)
+                .join(' · ')
+            : 'Nothing indexed yet.'
+        }
+      >
+        <span className="text-sm text-muted-foreground tabular-nums">{total}</span>
+      </SettingItem>
+
+      <SettingItem
+        label="Update now"
+        description={
+          message ??
+          'Catches up on anything that changed while the app was closed. Normally not needed - ' +
+            'the index updates itself when mail, events, contacts or files change.'
+        }
+      >
+        <Button variant="outline" size="sm" onClick={handleRebuild} disabled={busy}>
+          {busy ? 'Indexing…' : 'Update index'}
+        </Button>
+      </SettingItem>
+
+      <OfflineMailSettings slot={slot} />
+    </SettingsSection>
+  );
+}
+
+function formatBytes(bytes: number): string {
+  if (bytes < 1024) return `${bytes} B`;
+  const units = ['KB', 'MB', 'GB'];
+  let value = bytes / 1024;
+  let unit = 0;
+  while (value >= 1024 && unit < units.length - 1) { value /= 1024; unit++; }
+  return `${value.toFixed(value >= 10 ? 0 : 1)} ${units[unit]}`;
+}
+
+const PHASE_LABELS: Record<string, string> = {
+  'never-run': 'not started',
+  scanning: 'downloading history',
+  reconciling: 'rebuilding',
+  complete: 'up to date',
+};
+
+/**
+ * Controls for the offline mail replica (lib/offline-replica/**).
+ *
+ * Lives inside the same panel as the search index because they share one
+ * encrypted file, one key and one purge - presenting them as two unrelated
+ * features would misrepresent what "delete" deletes.
+ */
+function OfflineMailSettings({ slot }: { slot: number | undefined }) {
+  const [status, setStatus] = useState<ReplicaStatus | null>(null);
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState<null | 'sync' | 'purge' | 'policy'>(null);
+  const [message, setMessage] = useState<string | null>(null);
+
+  const refresh = useCallback(async () => {
+    setStatus(await fetchReplicaStatus(slot));
+  }, [slot]);
+
+  useEffect(() => { void refresh(); }, [refresh]);
+
+  const savePolicy = async (patch: Partial<RetentionPolicy>) => {
+    if (!status) return;
+    const next: RetentionPolicy = { ...status.policy, ...patch };
+    setBusy('policy');
+    setMessage(null);
+    try {
+      const ok = await updateRetentionPolicy(next, slot);
+      if (!ok) { setMessage('Could not save the retention setting.'); return; }
+      // The change is applied by the next cycle - a widen re-scans, a narrow
+      // evicts - so run one now rather than leaving the number looking wrong.
+      await chainSync({ slot, max: 2 });
+      await refresh();
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(null);
+    }
+  };
+
+  const handleSync = async () => {
+    setBusy('sync');
+    setMessage(null);
+    try {
+      const report = await chainSync({ slot });
+      if (!report) { setMessage('Offline mail is unavailable on this system.'); return; }
+      setMessage(
+        report.ok
+          ? `Synced ${report.envelopesWritten} messages and ${report.bodiesWritten} bodies.` +
+            (report.unfinishedWork ? ' More will download in the background.' : '') +
+            (report.warnings.length > 0 ? ` Notes: ${report.warnings.join('; ')}` : '')
+          : `Sync failed: ${report.error ?? 'unknown error'}`,
+      );
+      await refresh();
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(null);
+    }
+  };
+
+  const handlePurge = async () => {
+    setBusy('purge');
+    setMessage(null);
+    try {
+      const ok = await purgeReplica(slot);
+      setMessage(ok ? 'Offline mail deleted from this device.' : 'Could not delete offline mail.');
+      await refresh();
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(null);
+    }
+  };
+
+  if (!status) return null;
+
+  const stats = status.stats;
+  const total = stats ? stats.fileBytes : 0;
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      <SettingItem
+        label="Offline mail"
+        description={
+          stats
+            ? `${stats.envelopes} messages listed, ${stats.bodies} readable offline · ` +
+              `${formatBytes(stats.bodyBytes)} of message content · ` +
+              `status: ${PHASE_LABELS[status.coveragePhase] ?? status.coveragePhase}` +
+              (status.resyncRequired ? ' (a rebuild is queued)' : '') +
+              (stats.wantedBodies > 0 ? ` · ${stats.wantedBodies} still downloading` : '')
+            : 'Nothing stored yet. Mail downloads automatically as it arrives.'
+        }
+      >
+        <span className="text-sm text-muted-foreground tabular-nums">{formatBytes(total)}</span>
+      </SettingItem>
+
+      <SettingItem
+        label="Keep message list for"
+        description={
+          'How far back the offline message list goes. Listed messages are tiny (about a ' +
+          'kilobyte each), so a wide window here costs very little and means a message never ' +
+          'disappears from the offline list just because its content was removed to save space.'
+        }
+      >
+        <select
+          className="h-9 rounded-md border border-border bg-background px-2 text-sm"
+          value={status.policy.envelopeDays}
+          disabled={busy !== null}
+          onChange={(e) => void savePolicy({ envelopeDays: Number(e.target.value) })}
+        >
+          {[30, 90, 180, 365, 730, 1825].map((d) => (
+            <option key={d} value={d}>
+              {d >= 365 ? `${Math.round(d / 365)} year${d >= 730 ? 's' : ''}` : `${d} days`}
+            </option>
+          ))}
+        </select>
+      </SettingItem>
+
+      <SettingItem
+        label="Keep full messages for"
+        description={
+          'How far back complete messages - including formatted content - are stored so they ' +
+          'can be read with no network. Attachments are not downloaded; they still need a ' +
+          'connection.'
+        }
+      >
+        <select
+          className="h-9 rounded-md border border-border bg-background px-2 text-sm"
+          value={status.policy.bodyDays}
+          disabled={busy !== null}
+          onChange={(e) => void savePolicy({ bodyDays: Number(e.target.value) })}
+        >
+          {[7, 14, 30, 90, 180, 365].map((d) => (
+            <option key={d} value={d}>{d >= 365 ? '1 year' : `${d} days`}</option>
+          ))}
+        </select>
+      </SettingItem>
+
+      <SettingItem
+        label="Storage limit for message content"
+        description={
+          'The oldest stored content is removed first when this is reached. Messages stay in ' +
+          'the offline list either way - only their content is removed.'
+        }
+      >
+        <select
+          className="h-9 rounded-md border border-border bg-background px-2 text-sm"
+          value={status.policy.maxBodyMB}
+          disabled={busy !== null}
+          onChange={(e) => void savePolicy({ maxBodyMB: Number(e.target.value) })}
+        >
+          {[100, 250, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000].map((mb) => (
+            <option key={mb} value={mb}>{mb >= 1000 ? `${mb / 1000} GB` : `${mb} MB`}</option>
+          ))}
+        </select>
+      </SettingItem>
+
+      <SettingItem
+        label="Offline mail actions"
+        description={message ?? 'Download now, or delete everything stored offline on this device.'}
+      >
+        <div className="flex gap-2">
+          <Button variant="outline" size="sm" onClick={handleSync} disabled={busy !== null}>
+            {busy === 'sync' ? 'Downloading…' : 'Download now'}
+          </Button>
+          <Button variant="outline" size="sm" onClick={handlePurge} disabled={busy !== null}>
+            {busy === 'purge' ? 'Deleting…' : 'Delete offline mail'}
+          </Button>
+        </div>
+      </SettingItem>
+    </>
+  );
+}

deploy/argocd/vncmail-dev-app.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Registered on the dev-k8s-1/2/3 cluster (where ArgoCD already lives) via
+# `kubectl apply` directly to the argocd namespace — this file is the
+# version-controlled record of that, not something ArgoCD itself syncs
+# (no app-of-apps here, deliberately kept simple for two Applications).
+#
+# syncPolicy starts WITHOUT automated — manual sync until the one-time
+# per-namespace bootstrap (vncmail-env secret, image-pull secret — see
+# deploy/k8s/README.md §3) is done by hand once. Flip to automated (see
+# commented block below) only after a first manual sync succeeds cleanly.
+apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Application
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-dev
+  namespace: argocd
+spec:
+  project: default
+  source:
+    repoURL: git@gitlab.vnc.biz:gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus.git
+    targetRevision: dev
+    path: deploy/k8s/overlays/dev
+  destination:
+    server: https://kubernetes.default.svc # in-cluster — ArgoCD and vncmail-dev share this cluster
+    namespace: vncmail
+  syncPolicy:
+    syncOptions:
+      - CreateNamespace=true
+    # automated:
+    #   prune: true
+    #   selfHeal: true

deploy/argocd/vncmail-prod-app.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# NOT YET APPLIED to any cluster. Scaffolding only, matching
+# deploy/k8s/overlays/prod's own "inert until Phase D" status.
+#
+# Unlike vncmail-dev-app.yaml, this targets a DIFFERENT cluster (node1-3,
+# the HA "prod" cluster) than the one ArgoCD itself runs on (dev-k8s).
+# That means before this can be applied, node1-3 needs to be registered as
+# an ArgoCD-managed cluster (`argocd cluster add`, or an equivalent
+# ServiceAccount+kubeconfig secret) — deliberately not done yet: there's no
+# reason to wire cross-cluster RBAC into the prod HA cluster before prod
+# hostname/Stalwart/secrets are real and someone's actually promoting.
+#
+# syncPolicy has no automated block at all, and won't get one even later —
+# prod stays manual-sync-only permanently. That's the promotion gate.
+apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Application
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-prod
+  namespace: argocd
+spec:
+  project: default
+  source:
+    repoURL: git@gitlab.vnc.biz:gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus.git
+    targetRevision: main
+    path: deploy/k8s/overlays/prod
+  destination:
+    server: CHANGEME # the node1-3 cluster's registered ArgoCD server URL, once added
+    namespace: vncmail-prod
+  syncPolicy:
+    syncOptions:
+      - CreateNamespace=true

deploy/k8s/README.md

@@ -1,29 +1,68 @@
 # VNCmail+ — Admin Deployment Guide (microk8s)
 
 Deploy VNCmail+ (VNC's Bulwark fork) as a container at **`vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de`**,
-**alongside** the existing `bulwark.sandbox.vnc.de`. Plain `kubectl apply` — no
+**alongside** the existing `bulwark.sandbox.vnc.de`.
-GitOps needed.
 
 > Why a container (not Vercel): Bulwark is stateful — it writes settings/admin/
 > telemetry to `/app/data`, which needs persistent volumes.
 
+## Structure — base + overlays
+
+```
+deploy/k8s/
+  base/               # shared manifest shapes (namespace-agnostic)
+  overlays/
+    dev/              # the live sandbox — vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de, namespace vncmail
+    prod/             # scaffolded, NOT YET LIVE — see "Production status" below
+  ca/                 # separate, isolated EJBCA internal CA — see ca/README.md.
+                       # Never composed with base/ or either overlay above.
+```
+
+`kubectl apply -k overlays/dev` (or `overlays/prod`, once real) instead of
+applying `base/` directly — `base/` alone has no namespace and won't apply
+meaningfully on its own.
+
+## Routine deploys go through CI + ArgoCD now
+
+As of the GitLab CI/CD pipeline (`.gitlab-ci.yml`, see `../../VNCMAIL-SETUP.md`
+§ CI/CD), **pushing to `dev` auto-builds and bumps the deploy tag; ArgoCD's
+`vncmail-dev` Application applies it** — you should not normally need to run
+`kubectl apply` for the sandbox by hand anymore, and CI never touches the
+cluster directly (it only ever talks to the registry and to this git repo).
+This guide's manual steps below are for first-time setup, the one-time
+secret creation CI/ArgoCD deliberately never automate, and troubleshooting.
+
+## Production status
+
+**There is no production VNCmail+ deployment yet.** `overlays/prod/` exists
+in the repo but is inert: its ingress hostname and its secret's
+`JMAP_SERVER_URL` are both obvious placeholders (`vncmail.CHANGEME.invalid` /
+`https://REPLACE-ME-prod-stalwart-not-yet-deployed.invalid`) that will fail
+loudly rather than silently deploy against the wrong backend. Applying it
+requires, in order: a real prod Stalwart instance to exist, a real hostname
+decision, DNS, a real `secret.yaml`, and the `.gitlab-ci.yml` `promote` job's
+`kubectl apply` step (currently a TODO placeholder) filled in. None of that
+is CI's job to decide — it's an explicit, human-triggered event.
+
 ---
 
-## 1. What you are deploying
+## 1. What you are deploying (per overlay)
 
 | # | Object | File | Purpose |
 |---|--------|------|---------|
-| 1 | Namespace `vncmail` | `namespace.yaml` | Isolates the app |
+| 1 | Namespace | `overlays/<env>/namespace.yaml` | Isolates the app (`vncmail` for dev, `vncmail-prod` for prod) |
-| 2 | 4× PersistentVolumeClaim | `pvc.yaml` | `/app/data/{settings,admin,admin-state,telemetry}` |
+| 2 | 4× PersistentVolumeClaim | `base/pvc.yaml` | `/app/data/{settings,admin,admin-state,telemetry}` |
-| 3 | Secret `vncmail-env` | `secret.yaml` *(you create it)* | App config (JMAP URL, session secret, branding) |
+| 3 | Secret `vncmail-env` | `overlays/<env>/secret.yaml` *(you create it)* | App config (JMAP URL, session secret, branding) |
-| 4 | Secret `ghcr-pull` | *(you create it — command below)* | Pull the private image from GHCR |
+| 4 | Image-pull secret | *(you create it — command below)* | Pull the (currently private) image |
-| 5 | Deployment `vncmail-plus` | `deployment.yaml` | The app pod |
+| 5 | Deployment `vncmail-plus` | `base/deployment.yaml` (+ overlay patches) | The app pod |
-| 6 | Service `vncmail-plus` | `service.yaml` | ClusterIP :80 → pod :3000 |
+| 6 | Service `vncmail-plus` | `base/service.yaml` | ClusterIP :80 → pod :3000 |
-| 7 | Ingress `vncmail-plus` | `ingress.yaml` | TLS host `vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de` |
+| 7 | Ingress `vncmail-plus` | `base/ingress.yaml` (+ overlay patches for prod) | TLS host |
 
-**Image:** `ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev:latest`
+**Image:** CI builds and pushes to `registry.gitlab.vnc.biz/gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus`
-(built automatically by CI from the `dev` branch). For anything beyond the
+(tag `sha-<sha>` per deploy, moving pointers `dev-latest`/`prod-latest`). The
-sandbox, pin a digest — see §5.
+`ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev` image referenced in `base/deployment.yaml`
+is a legacy default only — CI overrides it per-deploy via `kubectl set image`,
+so what's committed there never needs to track what's actually running.
 
 ---
 
@@ -43,45 +82,48 @@ kubectl get ingressclass
 kubectl get clusterissuer      # cert-manager issuers (if used)
 ```
 
-Then edit if they differ from the defaults below:
+Then edit if they differ from the defaults below (in `base/`, so both overlays
+pick up the fix):
 
 | Value | Default in manifests | File to edit |
 |-------|----------------------|--------------|
-| StorageClass | `microk8s-hostpath` | `pvc.yaml` (all 4) |
+| StorageClass | `microk8s-hostpath` | `base/pvc.yaml` (all 4) |
-| IngressClass | `public` | `ingress.yaml` |
+| IngressClass | `public` | `base/ingress.yaml` |
-| cert-manager issuer | `letsencrypt-prod` | `ingress.yaml` |
+| cert-manager issuer | `letsencrypt-prod` | `base/ingress.yaml` |
 
 ---
 
-## 3. Deploy (copy-paste, in order)
+## 3. First-time setup (one-time, per environment — CI never does this)
 
 ```bash
-cd deploy/k8s
+cd deploy/k8s/overlays/dev     # or overlays/prod, once real
 
-# a) Namespace
+# a) Image-pull secret — the registry package is private.
-kubectl apply -f namespace.yaml
-
-# b) Image-pull secret — the GHCR package is private.
-#    Use a GitHub PAT (classic) with the read:packages scope.
 kubectl create secret docker-registry ghcr-pull \
   --namespace vncmail \
   --docker-server=ghcr.io \
   --docker-username=brvncde-dotcom \
   --docker-password='<GITHUB_PAT_read:packages>' \
   --docker-email=br@vnc.biz
+#    Once CI has cut over to registry.gitlab.vnc.biz, this becomes a
+#    docker-registry secret for that registry instead — see VNCMAIL-SETUP.md.
 
-# c) App config secret — copy the template, set a real SESSION_SECRET, apply.
+# b) App config secret — copy the template, set a real SESSION_SECRET, apply.
 cp secret.example.yaml secret.yaml
 #    edit secret.yaml:  SESSION_SECRET: "$(openssl rand -base64 32)"
 kubectl apply -f secret.yaml
 
-# d) Everything else (PVCs, Deployment, Service, Ingress)
+# c) Everything else (namespace, PVCs, Deployment, Service, Ingress)
 kubectl apply -k .
 ```
 
-> Alternative to (b): make the GHCR package public
+> Alternative to (a): make the registry package public, then delete the
-> (GitHub → Packages → vncmail-plus-dev → Package settings → Change visibility),
+> `imagePullSecrets:` block from `base/deployment.yaml`.
-> then delete the `imagePullSecrets:` block from `deployment.yaml`.
+
+After this one-time setup, routine deploys to `dev` happen automatically via
+CI on every push — see "Routine deploys go through CI now" above. This
+section is for first-time bring-up (or `overlays/prod`, once it's real) and
+troubleshooting, not the everyday path.
 
 ---
 
@@ -104,16 +146,23 @@ a bare username.
 
 ## 5. Update to a new build
 
-```bash
+Normally you don't — CI's `bump-dev` job + ArgoCD's automated sync do this
-# CI rebuilds ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev on every push to `dev`.
+on every push to `dev`. To do it by hand (e.g. troubleshooting, before
-kubectl -n vncmail rollout restart deploy/vncmail-plus     # pulls :latest (imagePullPolicy: Always)
+automated sync is turned on):
 
-# Production: pin a digest instead of :latest so rollouts are deterministic.
+```bash
 kubectl -n vncmail set image deploy/vncmail-plus \
-  vncmail-plus=ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev@sha256:<digest>
+  vncmail-plus=registry.gitlab.vnc.biz/gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus:sha-<sha>
 ```
 
-Rollback: `kubectl -n vncmail rollout undo deploy/vncmail-plus`
+ArgoCD will overwrite this on its next sync unless you also update
+`deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/image-tag/kustomization.yaml` to match — that file
+is CI-owned (see its header comment), so a by-hand `set image` is only ever
+a temporary override, not a real fix.
+
+Rollback (bypassing ArgoCD temporarily): `kubectl -n vncmail rollout undo deploy/vncmail-plus`.
+The real rollback is reverting the commit that bumped the tag and letting
+ArgoCD re-sync.
 
 ---
 
@@ -121,9 +170,9 @@ Rollback: `kubectl -n vncmail rollout undo deploy/vncmail-plus`
 
 | Symptom | Cause / fix |
 |---------|-------------|
-| Pod `ImagePullBackOff` | `ghcr-pull` secret missing/expired, or package still private. Recreate the secret (§3b) or make the package public. |
+| Pod `ImagePullBackOff` | `ghcr-pull` secret missing/expired, or package still private. Recreate the secret (§3a) or make the package public. |
-| Pod `CrashLoopBackOff`, logs show `EACCES`/permission on `/app/data` | Volume not writable by uid 1001. `securityContext.fsGroup: 1001` is set in `deployment.yaml` — keep it; some storage drivers also need it on the PVC. |
+| Pod `CrashLoopBackOff`, logs show `EACCES`/permission on `/app/data` | Volume not writable by uid 1001. `securityContext.fsGroup: 1001` is set in `base/deployment.yaml` — keep it; some storage drivers also need it on the PVC. |
-| PVC stuck `Pending` | Wrong `storageClassName` in `pvc.yaml`. Set it to one from `kubectl get sc`. |
+| PVC stuck `Pending` | Wrong `storageClassName` in `base/pvc.yaml`. Set it to one from `kubectl get sc`. |
 | Ingress has no address / no cert | Wrong `ingressClassName` or cert issuer. Match bulwark's (§2). Check `kubectl -n vncmail describe ingress vncmail-plus`. |
 | Login shows "Ein Fehler ist aufgetreten" | Use the **full** email (`user@sandbox.vnc.de`), not a bare username. |
 | Can't reach Stalwart | Check `JMAP_SERVER_URL` in the secret = `https://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de`. |

deploy/k8s/base/deployment.yaml

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ apiVersion: apps/v1
 kind: Deployment
 metadata:
   name: vncmail-plus
-  namespace: vncmail
   labels:
     app: vncmail-plus
 spec:
@@ -24,14 +23,19 @@ spec:
         fsGroup: 1001
         runAsUser: 1001
         runAsGroup: 1001
-      # ghcr package is private by default — see deploy/k8s/README.md to create
+      # Confirmed 2026-08-05: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev IS public
-      # this pull secret. Delete this block if you make the package public.
+      # (anonymous token pull succeeded) — no imagePullSecrets needed. This is
-      imagePullSecrets:
+      # deploy/k8s/README.md's own documented alternative to creating a
-        - name: ghcr-pull
+      # ghcr-pull secret. Removed rather than left referencing a
+      # not-yet-created secret, which would otherwise block every pod from
+      # starting regardless of the image being public (kubelet fails to
+      # resolve a missing imagePullSecrets entry before it ever gets to
+      # deciding whether auth was actually required).
       containers:
         - name: vncmail-plus
-          # dev image (built from the `dev` branch by CI). For production pin a
+          # Default/legacy value — CI overrides the image per-deploy via
-          # digest: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev@sha256:<digest>
+          # `kustomize edit set image`, so what's committed here never goes
+          # stale. For a one-off manual apply, pin a digest instead of :latest.
           image: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev:latest
           imagePullPolicy: Always
           ports:

deploy/k8s/base/ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Both real clusters (node1-3 "prod", dev-k8s-1-3 "dev") run Traefik, not
+# nginx — confirmed via `kubectl get ingressclass` (class is literally named
+# `traefik`). Unlike nginx's restrictive 1MB default, Traefik has no default
+# request-body-size cap, so there's no equivalent needed for mail attachment
+# uploads (the old nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size annotation
+# this file used to carry is simply not applicable here).
+#
+# Host, TLS secretName, and cert-manager issuer are ALL overlay-specific now
+# (dev-k8s only has a `letsencrypt-staging` issuer; node1-3/prod has none
+# configured yet) — every overlay's patch-ingress.yaml must override the
+# CHANGEME placeholders below.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-plus
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: CHANGEME
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: traefik
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - CHANGEME.invalid
+      secretName: vncmail-plus-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: CHANGEME.invalid
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: vncmail-plus
+                port:
+                  number: 80

deploy/k8s/base/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+resources:
+  - pvc.yaml
+  - deployment.yaml
+  - service.yaml
+  - ingress.yaml
+  # - secret.yaml   # create from an overlay's secret.example.yaml; not committed
+
+# Namespace is intentionally NOT set here. Kustomize's `namespace:` transformer
+# doesn't rename cluster-scoped Namespace objects, so each overlay ships its own
+# namespace.yaml (the actual object) and its own `namespace:` field (which
+# injects metadata.namespace into every namespaced resource below). Applying
+# this base directly is meaningless — always go through an overlay.

deploy/k8s/base/pvc.yaml

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:
   name: vncmail-settings
-  namespace: vncmail
 spec:
   accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
   storageClassName: microk8s-hostpath
@@ -17,7 +16,6 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:
   name: vncmail-admin
-  namespace: vncmail
 spec:
   accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
   storageClassName: microk8s-hostpath
@@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:
   name: vncmail-admin-state
-  namespace: vncmail
 spec:
   accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
   storageClassName: microk8s-hostpath
@@ -41,7 +38,6 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
 metadata:
   name: vncmail-telemetry
-  namespace: vncmail
 spec:
   accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
   storageClassName: microk8s-hostpath

deploy/k8s/base/service.yaml

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ apiVersion: v1
 kind: Service
 metadata:
   name: vncmail-plus
-  namespace: vncmail
   labels:
     app: vncmail-plus
 spec:

deploy/k8s/ca/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,479 @@
+# VNC internal CA — EJBCA Community on microk8s
+
+Runbook for `A-01` / `A-06`. Issues 1-year S/MIME certificates for VNCmail+.
+
+You run every command here. Claude wrote the manifests and cannot reach the
+cluster (no kubeconfig on the authoring machine), and the root-key ceremony in
+§3 **must not** be automated by an agent — the entire value of an offline root is
+that its private key never exists on a machine that runs services or tooling.
+
+---
+
+## 0. One decision to make before you type anything
+
+**Name the root for the organisation, not the environment.**
+
+You asked for sandbox first with the ability to promote to `vncmail` at any time.
+The way that stays cheap is a single root, generated once, with *per-environment
+intermediates* underneath it:
+
+```
+VNC Root CA R1                          offline · 15y · RSA 4096 · pathlen:1
+├─ VNC S/MIME Issuing CA Sandbox R1     in-cluster · 5y · RSA 4096 · pathlen:0   → *@sandbox.vnc.de
+└─ VNC S/MIME Issuing CA R1             in-cluster · 5y · RSA 4096 · pathlen:0   → *@vncmail.de   (later)
+```
+
+Promotion is then "issue a second intermediate from the same root" — a one-hour
+ceremony. The trust anchor you distribute to laptops, phones and partners does
+not change, and certificates already issued keep validating.
+
+The alternative — a throwaway `VNC Sandbox Root` — means that on promotion you
+redistribute a new trust anchor to every device and every external party who
+ever verified one of your signatures. That is the expensive path, and it is only
+visible as expensive later.
+
+So: **generate the root at prod grade, once, now**, even though the first
+intermediate only serves `@sandbox.vnc.de`. The extra cost today is choosing a
+better passphrase and a safe to keep the USB key in.
+
+> RSA 4096 rather than an elliptic curve throughout, deliberately. ECDSA S/MIME
+> is still poorly handled by older Outlook and by several mobile clients, and
+> S/MIME interop failures are silent — the recipient sees a broken signature, not
+> an error you get told about. Pay the key-size cost for interop you can't test.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Install
+
+```bash
+kubectl apply -f deploy/k8s/ca/namespace.yaml
+```
+
+Fill in and apply the secret out-of-band (never commit real values):
+
+```bash
+cp deploy/k8s/ca/secret.example.yaml /tmp/ca-secret.yaml && $EDITOR /tmp/ca-secret.yaml
+```
+
+```bash
+kubectl apply -f /tmp/ca-secret.yaml && shred -u /tmp/ca-secret.yaml
+```
+
+```bash
+kubectl apply -k deploy/k8s/ca/
+```
+
+First boot builds the EJBCA schema and takes several minutes. Watch it rather
+than assuming it hung:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vnc-ca logs -f deploy/ejbca
+```
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vnc-ca get pods -w
+```
+
+### Verify before going further
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vnc-ca exec deploy/ejbca -- curl -sf http://localhost:8080/ejbca/publicweb/healthcheck/ejbcahealth && echo OK
+```
+
+If the manifests' env-var names have drifted from the image tag you pulled, this
+is where it shows up — EJBCA will start but fail to bind its datasource. Check
+the documented variables for your tag before editing anything else:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vnc-ca logs deploy/ejbca | grep -iE "datasource|jdbc|database"
+```
+
+---
+
+## 2. Get administrative access
+
+EJBCA's admin web requires a client certificate. On first boot the container
+enrols a `SuperAdmin` and writes a PKCS#12 inside the pod.
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vnc-ca exec deploy/ejbca -- find / -name "*.p12" -newermt "-1 day" 2>/dev/null
+```
+
+Copy it out, import it into your browser, then reach the admin web by
+port-forward — it is not exposed through any ingress and must not be:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vnc-ca port-forward deploy/ejbca 8443:8443
+```
+
+Then open `https://localhost:8443/ejbca/adminweb`.
+
+> If the container did not create a SuperAdmin (behaviour differs by tag), use
+> the CLI inside the pod instead:
+> `kubectl -n vnc-ca exec -it deploy/ejbca -- /opt/keyfactor/bin/ejbca.sh ra addendentity ...`
+> followed by `setclearpwd` and a browser enrolment against
+> `https://localhost:8443/ejbca/ra/`.
+
+---
+
+## 3. Root ceremony — you, offline, once
+
+Do this on a machine that is **not** this cluster and **not** your daily laptop
+if you can manage it. A live USB session on a machine with networking physically
+off is enough for a sandbox-grade start; the point is that the root key never
+touches a host that runs services.
+
+Everything below happens in one directory that you will destroy at the end.
+
+**3.1 Prepare the config.** Save as `root.cnf`:
+
+```ini
+[ req ]
+default_md         = sha256
+prompt             = no
+distinguished_name = dn
+x509_extensions    = root_ext
+
+[ dn ]
+C  = CH
+O  = VNC AG
+CN = VNC Root CA R1
+
+[ root_ext ]
+basicConstraints       = critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:1
+keyUsage               = critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign
+subjectKeyIdentifier   = hash
+
+# --- used in 3.4 to sign the intermediate CSR ---
+[ ca ]
+default_ca = CA_root
+
+[ CA_root ]
+new_certs_dir    = .
+database         = index.txt
+serial           = serial
+private_key      = root.key
+certificate      = root.crt
+default_md       = sha256
+policy           = policy_any
+crl              = root.crl
+default_crl_days = 365
+unique_subject   = no
+
+[ policy_any ]
+countryName            = optional
+organizationName       = optional
+organizationalUnitName = optional
+commonName             = supplied
+
+[ int_ext ]
+basicConstraints       = critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:0
+keyUsage               = critical,keyCertSign,cRLSign
+subjectKeyIdentifier   = hash
+authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:always
+# Revocation pointers for the INTERMEDIATE itself, served by the root's CRL.
+crlDistributionPoints  = URI:http://ca.sandbox.vnc.de/ejbca/publicweb/crls/root.crl
+```
+
+`pathlen:1` on the root and `pathlen:0` on the intermediate together mean the
+intermediate can issue end-entity certificates and nothing else. It cannot mint
+a further CA even if its key is stolen — that limits a compromise to "revoke one
+intermediate" instead of "the whole hierarchy is untrustworthy".
+
+**3.2 Generate the root key.** You will be asked for a passphrase. Generate it
+with a password manager, minimum 24 random characters, and record where it lives
+*before* you type it — a root key whose passphrase is lost is a hierarchy you
+have to rebuild.
+
+```bash
+openssl genrsa -aes256 -out root.key 4096
+```
+
+**3.3 Self-sign the root.** 15 years, so it outlives several intermediate
+rotations and you do the ceremony once:
+
+```bash
+openssl req -new -x509 -config root.cnf -key root.key -sha256 -days 5480 -out root.crt
+```
+
+```bash
+openssl x509 -in root.crt -noout -text | sed -n '1,25p'
+```
+
+Confirm in that output: `CA:TRUE, pathlen:1`, `Key Usage: Certificate Sign, CRL Sign`,
+and a 15-year validity window. If `basicConstraints` is missing the root is
+useless — the config's `x509_extensions` did not apply.
+
+**3.4 Sign the intermediate.** EJBCA generates the intermediate key *inside the
+cluster* and hands you a CSR; the intermediate's private key never leaves EJBCA
+and never appears in this directory.
+
+In the admin web: **CA Functions → Certificate Authorities → Create CA**
+- Name: `VNC S/MIME Issuing CA Sandbox R1`
+- Subject DN: `CN=VNC S/MIME Issuing CA Sandbox R1,O=VNC AG,C=CH`
+- Crypto Token: create a new soft token, PIN = `EJBCA_CRYPTO_TOKEN_PIN` from your secret
+- Key: RSA 4096, signing algorithm SHA256WithRSA
+- **Signed By: External CA** ← this is what makes it emit a CSR instead of self-signing
+- Validity: `5y`
+- CRL Expire Period: `1d`, CRL Overlap: `10m`
+- Default CRL Distribution Point: `http://ca.sandbox.vnc.de/ejbca/publicweb/crls/search.cgi?iHash=...` (EJBCA fills the hash — take what it offers)
+
+Save, download the CSR, move it to the offline machine, then:
+
+```bash
+touch index.txt && echo 1000 > serial
+```
+
+```bash
+openssl ca -config root.cnf -extensions int_ext -days 1825 -notext -in sandbox-issuing.csr -out sandbox-issuing.crt
+```
+
+**3.5 Issue the root CRL.** Do this now, in the same ceremony — not later. A root
+that has never published a CRL cannot revoke a compromised intermediate, and you
+will not want to bring the root key out under incident pressure just to
+discover the procedure doesn't work:
+
+```bash
+openssl ca -config root.cnf -gencrl -out root.crl
+```
+
+```bash
+openssl crl -in root.crl -noout -text | head -12
+```
+
+**3.6 Take the outputs off, then destroy the directory.** Off the machine:
+`root.crt`, `root.crl`, `sandbox-issuing.crt`, and `root.key` (to encrypted
+storage, two copies, two physical locations).
+
+```bash
+shred -u root.key && rm -rf ./*
+```
+
+The root key comes out of the safe for exactly three reasons: signing a new
+intermediate (promotion to `vncmail.de`), refreshing the root CRL before it
+expires (annually — put it in a calendar now), or revoking an intermediate.
+
+**3.7 Import the chain back into EJBCA.** Admin web → the CA you created →
+**Import CA certificate**, upload `root.crt` then `sandbox-issuing.crt`. The CA
+status must move to `Active`. Publish `root.crl` so the URL in the
+intermediate's CDP actually resolves.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Certificate profile — 1-year S/MIME
+
+**Certificate Profiles → Add** → `VNC S/MIME 1y`, type *End Entity*.
+
+| Setting | Value | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| Validity | `1y` | your decision |
+| Key algorithms | RSA 2048, 3072, 4096 | 2048 floor for interop; no ECDSA yet (§0) |
+| Key Usage | `digitalSignature`, `keyEncipherment` | signing **and** decryption need both |
+| Extended Key Usage | `emailProtection` | critical — see below |
+| Subject Alternative Name | `rfc822Name`, **required** | this is the authoritative address |
+| Basic Constraints | CA:FALSE, critical | |
+| CRL Distribution Point | use CA default | |
+| OCSP Service Locator (AIA) | `http://ca.sandbox.vnc.de/ejbca/publicweb/status/ocsp` | |
+| Allow key recovery | **on** | see §7 |
+| Allow subject DN override by CSR | **OFF** | load-bearing, see below |
+| Allow extension override by CSR | **OFF** | load-bearing, see below |
+| Allow subject alt name override by CSR | **OFF** | load-bearing, see below |
+
+**The three override settings must be OFF, and this is the single most important
+line in this document.**
+
+The enrolment route deliberately does *not* inspect the CSR to police what it
+asks for. It doesn't need to: the route supplies the subject and the
+`rfc822Name` SAN itself, from addresses Stalwart confirmed the account may send
+from, and the CSR contributes only a public key plus proof the requester holds
+the matching private key.
+
+That reasoning is only sound while EJBCA ignores the CSR's own subject and
+extensions. Turn any of these overrides on and a hand-crafted CSR claiming
+`rfc822Name=ceo@vnc.de` gets exactly that certificate — no code change, no
+alert, and the enrolment route still looks correct in review. It is a
+one-checkbox path from "authenticated users get certificates for their own
+addresses" to "authenticated users get certificates for anyone's address".
+
+Verify it rather than trusting the profile screen, once the route is live:
+
+```bash
+openssl req -new -key /tmp/t.key -subj "/CN=Impostor" -addext "subjectAltName=email:ceo@vnc.de" -out /tmp/t.csr
+```
+
+Submit that CSR through the enrolment route as an ordinary user. The certificate
+that comes back must carry **your own** address, not `ceo@vnc.de`.
+
+Two of these carry real weight:
+
+**`emailProtection` EKU, and only that.** A certificate with no EKU is treated by
+some clients as valid for *anything* — TLS server auth included. Constrain it.
+
+**`rfc822Name` SAN required.** Modern clients bind the sender address from the
+SAN, not the `emailAddress` DN attribute. Our forked plugin's fix-1 check
+(`signerEmailMatch`, which refuses to auto-import a signer cert whose address
+doesn't match the `From` header) now reads the address the same way clients do —
+SAN first, and matched against *every* address the certificate carries. If EJBCA
+issues certificates without an `rfc822Name` SAN, that check fails closed and
+encryption silently never becomes available.
+
+Populating the DN `emailAddress` attribute as well, for old Outlook, is safe —
+but only as of finding 11. Until then the plugin read the DN attribute *in
+preference to* the SAN and compared only the first address it found, so an EJBCA
+certificate with both fields populated would have reported every genuine
+signature as "signer ≠ From" and blocked the import. Covered now by
+`vnc/plugins/smime/verify-address-binding.mjs`.
+
+**End Entity Profiles → Add** → `VNC S/MIME User`:
+- Default Certificate Profile: `VNC S/MIME 1y`; available: the same only
+- Subject DN: `CN` required + modifiable, `O=VNC AG` and `C=CH` fixed
+- Subject Alt Name: `rfc822Name` required, **and tick "Use entity email field"**
+- Default CA: `VNC S/MIME Issuing CA Sandbox R1`
+
+---
+
+## 5. RA credential for the enrolment route
+
+The webmail server — not the browser — calls the REST API. It needs its own
+client certificate with *only* the authority to enrol end entities.
+
+**5.1** Create a certificate profile `VNC RA Client` (End Entity, EKU
+`clientAuth`, validity `1y`) and enrol one entity `CN=vncmail-ra-sandbox`
+against it. Download as PKCS#12.
+
+**5.2** Restrict it. **System Functions → Administrator Roles → Add** →
+`VNCmail RA (sandbox)`:
+
+| Rule | Access |
+|---|---|
+| `/ca_functionality/create_certificate` | Allow |
+| `/ca/VNC S/MIME Issuing CA Sandbox R1` | Allow |
+| `/endentityprofilesrules/VNC S/MIME User/**` | Allow |
+| `/ra_functionality/revoke_end_entity` | Allow |
+| everything else | **not granted** |
+
+Match by the certificate's serial + issuer DN, not by CN. Do **not** give this
+role `/administrator` or any `/system_functionality` rule: this credential lives
+on an internet-facing pod, and the blast radius of it leaking should be "issue
+and revoke S/MIME certs under one profile", not "reconfigure the CA".
+
+**5.3** Load it into the webmail namespace:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vncmail create secret generic smime-ra \
+  --from-file=client.p12=./vncmail-ra-sandbox.p12 \
+  --from-literal=client-password='<p12 passphrase>' \
+  --from-file=ca-chain.pem=./chain.pem
+```
+
+`chain.pem` is `sandbox-issuing.crt` followed by `root.crt`. The enrolment route
+pins this chain when it connects to EJBCA on 8443 — it does not trust the public
+root store, so EJBCA's self-signed server certificate (`TLS_SETUP_ENABLED=simple`)
+is correct and expected here.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Verify the network policy actually enforces
+
+Applying a NetworkPolicy on a CNI that doesn't implement it succeeds silently
+and protects nothing. Prove it:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n default run np-probe --rm -it --image=curlimages/curl --restart=Never -- \
+  curl -sS -m 5 -k https://ejbca.vnc-ca.svc.cluster.local:8443/ejbca/ejbca-rest-api/v1/ca
+```
+
+This **must** time out or be refused. If it returns anything HTTP-shaped —
+including a `401` — the policy is not being enforced and the REST API is exposed
+cluster-wide. Check your CNI before continuing:
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n kube-system get pods | grep -iE "calico|cilium|flannel"
+```
+
+---
+
+## 7. Key recovery is not optional here
+
+S/MIME differs from TLS in a way that has bitten every organisation that
+deployed it without thinking about this: **if a user loses their private key,
+every message ever encrypted to them is permanently unreadable.** Not
+inconvenient — gone. Re-issuing a certificate does not help, because the old
+messages were encrypted to the old key.
+
+So `Allow key recovery` in §4 is deliberate, and it is a real trade-off:
+
+- **on** — EJBCA escrows the decryption key. Lost laptop is recoverable. But the
+  CA database now contains material that decrypts users' mail, so §8 backup
+  handling and the §5 role restrictions become load-bearing, and the escrow is
+  something you must be able to explain to a user asking whether their mail is
+  end-to-end encrypted. It is, from the wire's perspective; it is not, from the
+  CA operator's.
+- **off** — nobody but the user can ever read their mail, and a lost device is
+  permanent data loss with no recourse.
+
+For a corporate deployment where mail is a business record, escrow on is the
+defensible choice, and it's what §4 sets. Decide this consciously — it is far
+cheaper to turn on now than to explain later why three years of mail is gone.
+
+If you keep it on, use a separate key-recovery role with two-person approval
+rather than folding that authority into the RA credential.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Backup
+
+`ejbca-db-data` contains the intermediate CA private key and — per §7 — escrowed
+user decryption keys. A dump of it is equivalent to the CA itself.
+
+```bash
+kubectl -n vnc-ca exec deploy/ejbca-db -- sh -c \
+  'mariadb-dump -u root -p"$MARIADB_ROOT_PASSWORD" --single-transaction ejbca' \
+  | gzip > ejbca-$(date +%F).sql.gz
+```
+
+Encrypt before it leaves your machine — an unencrypted CA dump in object storage
+is the whole hierarchy:
+
+```bash
+gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 ejbca-$(date +%F).sql.gz
+```
+
+Then to the shared R2 bucket (`vnc-backups1`) and **delete the plaintext**.
+Restore-test it once, now, against a scratch namespace — an untested CA backup is
+a belief, not a backup.
+
+Not in this backup, by design and stored separately: the offline root key
+(§3.6), `EJBCA_CRYPTO_TOKEN_PIN`, and the RA PKCS#12 passphrase.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Promotion to production
+
+Nothing here is thrown away. Same root, new intermediate:
+
+1. Bring `root.key` out of the safe; repeat §3.4–3.6 for
+   `CN=VNC S/MIME Issuing CA R1` — sign it with the **same root**.
+2. Duplicate the §4 profiles as `VNC S/MIME 1y (prod)` bound to the new CA.
+3. Fresh RA credential and role for the prod webmail namespace (§5). Never share
+   the sandbox one across environments.
+4. Point the prod CDP/AIA at a stable production hostname. Those URLs are baked
+   into every certificate for its full year, so get the hostname right *before*
+   the first issuance.
+
+The trust anchor on user devices does not change, and sandbox-issued
+certificates keep validating.
+
+## 10. SwissSign (P7, deferred)
+
+The point of the `CaProvider` interface on the application side is that this
+whole document becomes one implementation of it. Moving to SwissSign-issued
+certificates — for ZertES/eIDAS-qualified signatures that external parties
+validate without installing anything — is then a second implementation plus an
+identity-verification step, not a rewrite of the enrolment flow.
+
+What survives unchanged: in-browser key generation, CSR construction, the
+enrolment route, storage, sign/encrypt/decrypt, the UI.
+What changes: who signs the CSR, and the fact that a human must prove their
+identity before a qualified certificate is issued — which is a process
+requirement, not a code one.

deploy/k8s/ca/ejbca.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# EJBCA Community Edition.
+#
+# VERIFY THE ENV CONTRACT BEFORE YOU TRUST THIS FILE. EJBCA's container
+# configuration has changed across releases, so pin a tag and check its
+# documented variables rather than assuming these carry over:
+#   docker run --rm keyfactor/ejbca-ce:<tag> cat /opt/keyfactor/bin/start.sh | head -60
+# The shape below (external MariaDB, two ports, healthcheck path) is stable; the
+# individual variable names are the part most likely to drift.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: ejbca
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app: ejbca
+  ports:
+    # 8080 — plain HTTP, NO client-certificate authentication. Only the public
+    # web is served here: CRL distribution and the OCSP responder. This is the
+    # only port the public ingress touches.
+    - name: http
+      port: 8080
+      targetPort: 8080
+    # 8443 — HTTPS with mandatory client-certificate auth. Admin web AND the
+    # REST API. Never exposed through an ingress; reachable only from inside the
+    # cluster (the enrolment route) or via `kubectl port-forward` (you, doing
+    # administration). See networkpolicy.yaml.
+    - name: https
+      port: 8443
+      targetPort: 8443
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: ejbca
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: ejbca
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: ejbca
+    spec:
+      # EJBCA needs the DB reachable before WildFly deploys its datasource.
+      initContainers:
+        - name: wait-for-db
+          image: mariadb:11.4
+          command:
+            - sh
+            - -c
+            - |
+              until mariadb-admin ping -h ejbca-db --silent; do
+                echo "waiting for ejbca-db..."; sleep 3
+              done
+      containers:
+        - name: ejbca
+          # Pin an explicit tag. `latest` on a CA is how you get an unplanned
+          # schema migration during an incident.
+          image: keyfactor/ejbca-ce:9.1.1
+          env:
+            - name: DATABASE_JDBC_URL
+              value: jdbc:mariadb://ejbca-db:3306/ejbca?characterEncoding=UTF-8
+            - name: DATABASE_USER
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef: { name: ejbca-db, key: MARIADB_USER }
+            - name: DATABASE_PASSWORD
+              valueFrom:
+                secretKeyRef: { name: ejbca-db, key: MARIADB_PASSWORD }
+            # Lets EJBCA generate its own server TLS keypair on first boot. The
+            # REST/admin listener is cluster-internal and authenticated by
+            # CLIENT certificate, so a self-signed server cert here is fine —
+            # our enrolment route pins the CA chain explicitly rather than
+            # trusting the public roots. Do not "fix" this with cert-manager
+            # without also updating that pin.
+            - name: TLS_SETUP_ENABLED
+              value: "simple"
+            - name: LOG_LEVEL_APP
+              value: INFO
+          ports:
+            - name: http
+              containerPort: 8080
+            - name: https
+              containerPort: 8443
+          # First boot builds the schema and can take minutes. A tight
+          # startupProbe budget here will CrashLoop a CA that is merely slow.
+          startupProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /ejbca/publicweb/healthcheck/ejbcahealth
+              port: 8080
+            periodSeconds: 10
+            failureThreshold: 60
+          readinessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /ejbca/publicweb/healthcheck/ejbcahealth
+              port: 8080
+            periodSeconds: 15
+          livenessProbe:
+            httpGet:
+              path: /ejbca/publicweb/healthcheck/ejbcahealth
+              port: 8080
+            periodSeconds: 30
+            failureThreshold: 5
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 500m
+              memory: 2Gi
+            limits:
+              memory: 4Gi

deploy/k8s/ca/ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# PUBLIC surface of the CA — revocation checking ONLY.
+#
+# Two prefixes are routed and nothing else. Not the admin web, not the REST API,
+# not the public enrolment pages (/ejbca/ra/, /ejbca/enrol/). Anything else at
+# this host 404s because no rule matches it.
+#
+# WHY THIS MUST BE PUBLIC AT ALL: every certificate this CA issues carries the
+# CRL Distribution Point and OCSP responder URL *inside* it, and those URLs are
+# fetched by whoever is validating the certificate. For internal-only S/MIME that
+# could stay private — but the moment a signed message leaves the building, the
+# recipient's mail client resolves these URLs from the outside. They also become
+# permanent: certificates already issued keep pointing here for their full year,
+# so this hostname cannot be changed casually. Fix the hostname before the first
+# real issuance, not after.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: vnc-ca-public
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-prod
+    # Revocation data is public by design and must be cacheable — an OCSP
+    # responder that is slow or down makes every client either hang or
+    # soft-fail open, and soft-fail-open is the same as no revocation at all.
+    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-read-timeout: "20"
+spec:
+  ingressClassName: public
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - ca.sandbox.vnc.de
+      secretName: vnc-ca-public-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: ca.sandbox.vnc.de
+      http:
+        paths:
+          # CRL download — http://ca.sandbox.vnc.de/ejbca/publicweb/crls/...
+          - path: /ejbca/publicweb/crls
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: ejbca
+                port:
+                  number: 8080
+          # OCSP responder — POST target for status queries.
+          - path: /ejbca/publicweb/status/ocsp
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: ejbca
+                port:
+                  number: 8080

deploy/k8s/ca/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+
+# secret.example.yaml is deliberately NOT listed. Apply your filled-in copy
+# out-of-band so real passwords never pass through a file in this repo.
+resources:
+  - namespace.yaml
+  - mariadb.yaml
+  - ejbca.yaml
+  - ingress.yaml
+  - networkpolicy.yaml
+
+# Order matters on a cold cluster: the namespace and the secret must exist before
+# the workloads. kustomize sorts by kind and handles the namespace; the secret is
+# on you. See README.md § Install.

deploy/k8s/ca/mariadb.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+# MariaDB for EJBCA.
+#
+# WHY A REAL DATABASE AND NOT THE EMBEDDED H2: the EJBCA container can run on an
+# internal H2 database for a quick look, but H2 is explicitly not supported for
+# anything you intend to keep. Since this sandbox CA has to be *promotable* to
+# production (your decision: "sandbox first and upgrade later"), the database is
+# the one thing that must not need re-platforming later — every certificate ever
+# issued, every revocation, and the intermediate CA key all live in here.
+#
+# THIS PVC IS THE CROWN JEWELS. See README.md § Backup.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: PersistentVolumeClaim
+metadata:
+  name: ejbca-db-data
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  accessModes: [ReadWriteOnce]
+  # microk8s default. Confirm with `kubectl get sc` and match your cluster.
+  storageClassName: microk8s-hostpath
+  resources:
+    requests:
+      storage: 8Gi
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Service
+metadata:
+  name: ejbca-db
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  type: ClusterIP
+  selector:
+    app: ejbca-db
+  ports:
+    - name: mysql
+      port: 3306
+      targetPort: 3306
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: ejbca-db
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  replicas: 1
+  # Never run two replicas against one RWO volume, and never roll a new pod up
+  # while the old one still holds the data directory.
+  strategy:
+    type: Recreate
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: ejbca-db
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app: ejbca-db
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: mariadb
+          image: mariadb:11.4
+          args:
+            - --character-set-server=utf8mb4
+            - --collation-server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci
+            # EJBCA is case-sensitive about its own table names.
+            - --lower_case_table_names=0
+          envFrom:
+            - secretRef:
+                name: ejbca-db
+          ports:
+            - containerPort: 3306
+          volumeMounts:
+            - name: data
+              mountPath: /var/lib/mysql
+          readinessProbe:
+            exec:
+              command: ["healthcheck.sh", "--connect", "--innodb_initialized"]
+            initialDelaySeconds: 15
+            periodSeconds: 10
+          livenessProbe:
+            exec:
+              command: ["healthcheck.sh", "--connect"]
+            initialDelaySeconds: 60
+            periodSeconds: 30
+          resources:
+            requests:
+              cpu: 100m
+              memory: 512Mi
+            limits:
+              memory: 2Gi
+      volumes:
+        - name: data
+          persistentVolumeClaim:
+            claimName: ejbca-db-data

deploy/k8s/ca/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: vnc-ca
+  labels:
+    # The CA is deliberately in its own namespace, NOT in `vncmail`. The webmail
+    # pod is internet-facing; the CA signs certificates. A compromise of the
+    # former must not be a compromise of the latter, and namespace-scoped RBAC
+    # plus the NetworkPolicy in networkpolicy.yaml are what enforce that.
+    app.kubernetes.io/name: vnc-ca
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: vncmail-plus

deploy/k8s/ca/networkpolicy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Default-deny ingress for the CA namespace, then three narrow allowances.
+#
+# Without this, the REST API on 8443 is reachable from every pod in the cluster.
+# It is still client-cert authenticated, so this is defence in depth rather than
+# the only control — but "the only thing standing between any compromised pod and
+# a certificate factory is one TLS handshake" is not a position to be in.
+#
+# PREREQUISITE: microk8s needs a CNI that enforces NetworkPolicy. The default
+# (Calico) does. If you are on flannel without a policy plugin these objects
+# apply cleanly and silently enforce NOTHING — verify with the test in
+# README.md § Verify the network policy rather than assuming.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: default-deny-ingress
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  podSelector: {}
+  policyTypes: [Ingress]
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: allow-public-web-from-ingress
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: ejbca
+  policyTypes: [Ingress]
+  ingress:
+    # Port 8080 (CRL/OCSP) from the ingress controller only.
+    # VERIFY THE NAMESPACE: microk8s' nginx addon has historically used
+    # `ingress`, `kube-system`, and `ingress-nginx` depending on version.
+    #   kubectl get pods -A | grep -i ingress
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: ingress
+      ports:
+        - port: 8080
+          protocol: TCP
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: allow-rest-from-vncmail
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: ejbca
+  policyTypes: [Ingress]
+  ingress:
+    # Port 8443 (REST API) from the webmail namespace only. This is the
+    # enrolment route calling the CA with its RA client certificate.
+    - from:
+        - namespaceSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              kubernetes.io/metadata.name: vncmail
+      ports:
+        - port: 8443
+          protocol: TCP
+---
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: NetworkPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: allow-db-from-ejbca
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+spec:
+  podSelector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app: ejbca-db
+  policyTypes: [Ingress]
+  ingress:
+    - from:
+        - podSelector:
+            matchLabels:
+              app: ejbca
+      ports:
+        - port: 3306
+          protocol: TCP

deploy/k8s/ca/secret.example.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Template only — DO NOT `kubectl apply` this file and DO NOT commit real values.
+#
+# Copy to secret.yaml (gitignored), fill in, apply, then delete your local copy:
+#   cp secret.example.yaml /tmp/ca-secret.yaml
+#   $EDITOR /tmp/ca-secret.yaml
+#   kubectl apply -f /tmp/ca-secret.yaml && shred -u /tmp/ca-secret.yaml
+#
+# Generate each password with:  openssl rand -base64 24
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: ejbca-db
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  # MariaDB credentials. The EJBCA database holds the CA private keys (soft
+  # crypto token, encrypted at rest by EJBCA) — treat a dump of it as
+  # equivalent to the intermediate CA key itself.
+  MARIADB_ROOT_PASSWORD: CHANGEME_root
+  MARIADB_USER: ejbca
+  MARIADB_PASSWORD: CHANGEME_ejbca
+  MARIADB_DATABASE: ejbca
+---
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: ejbca-app
+  namespace: vnc-ca
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  # Passphrase protecting EJBCA's internal soft crypto token (the one that
+  # wraps the intermediate CA key). Losing this loses the intermediate.
+  # Back it up somewhere that is NOT this cluster.
+  EJBCA_CRYPTO_TOKEN_PIN: CHANGEME_token

deploy/k8s/ingress.yaml

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Exposes VNCmail+ at vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de, alongside bulwark.sandbox.vnc.de.
-# MATCH YOUR CLUSTER — inspect the existing Bulwark ingress and copy its
-# ingressClassName + TLS/cert-manager annotations:
-#   kubectl get ingress -A | grep bulwark
-#   kubectl get ingress <bulwark-ingress> -n <ns> -o yaml
-apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
-kind: Ingress
-metadata:
-  name: vncmail-plus
-  namespace: vncmail
-  annotations:
-    # cert-manager issuer — set to whatever bulwark.sandbox.vnc.de uses.
-    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-prod
-    # Mail attachments can be large; raise the nginx body limit.
-    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-body-size: "100m"
-spec:
-  # microk8s ingress addon class is usually "public" (nginx). Confirm with
-  # `kubectl get ingressclass` and match bulwark's.
-  ingressClassName: public
-  tls:
-    - hosts:
-        - vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de
-      secretName: vncmail-plus-tls
-  rules:
-    - host: vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de
-      http:
-        paths:
-          - path: /
-            pathType: Prefix
-            backend:
-              service:
-                name: vncmail-plus
-                port:
-                  number: 80

deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/image-tag/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Owned by CI (the bump-dev job in .gitlab-ci.yml), not by hand. Kept as its
+# own Component so CI only ever rewrites this 6-line file, never the parent
+# overlays/dev/kustomization.yaml (structure/patches there stay under normal
+# code review — CI regenerating a whole hand-maintained file on every push
+# would silently revert any change made there between deploys).
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Component
+images:
+  - name: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev
+    newName: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev
+    newTag: sha-d0a1cee6

deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: vncmail
+resources:
+  - ../../base
+  - namespace.yaml
+  # - secret.yaml   # create from secret.example.yaml; not committed
+
+patches:
+  - path: patch-ingress.yaml
+  - path: patch-image-pull-policy.yaml
+
+components:
+  - image-tag
+
+# Targets the dev-k8s-1/2/3 cluster (confirmed via direct access: this is
+# where ArgoCD already lives). The image tag lives in image-tag/ (a separate
+# Component CI owns — see .gitlab-ci.yml's bump-dev job) rather than here, so
+# CI never needs to touch this file.

deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/patch-image-pull-policy.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# base/deployment.yaml sets imagePullPolicy: Always, which is the right
+# default for a mutable tag like :latest. The dev overlay pins an immutable
+# sha-<commit> tag instead (see image-tag/), and for an immutable tag Always
+# is pure waste - the content behind that tag can never change, so re-pulling
+# it on every pod start only adds a registry round-trip and a hard dependency
+# on the registry being reachable at scheduling time.
+#
+# It is also load-bearing right now: until CI can actually push (GitLab's
+# registry vhost serves Rails, not the registry - see .gitlab-ci.yml's
+# "Registry history" note), sha- tagged images are side-loaded straight into
+# each node's containerd:
+#
+#   docker save --platform linux/amd64 -o vncmail.tar <image>:<tag>
+#   scp vncmail.tar dev-k8s-N:/tmp/ && ssh dev-k8s-N \
+#     'microk8s ctr images import /tmp/vncmail.tar'
+#
+# imported to ALL of dev-k8s-1/2/3 so the pod can schedule anywhere. With
+# Always, kubelet would ignore that local image and fail on a registry pull
+# for a tag the registry has never seen.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-plus
+spec:
+  template:
+    spec:
+      containers:
+        - name: vncmail-plus
+          imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent

deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/patch-ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# dev-k8s cluster confirmed to have a `letsencrypt-staging` ClusterIssuer
+# already (no `letsencrypt-prod` exists there) - staging avoids burning
+# Let's Encrypt's real rate limits while this is still being stood up.
+# vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de DNS does not point here yet either - this is the
+# intended host, not a live one (see VNCMAIL-SETUP.md for what's still open).
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-plus
+  annotations:
+    cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: letsencrypt-staging
+spec:
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de
+      secretName: vncmail-plus-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: vncmail-plus
+                port:
+                  number: 80

deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/image-tag/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Owned by CI (the bump-prod job in .gitlab-ci.yml), not by hand — same
+# reasoning as overlays/dev/image-tag/. Starts pointed at an obviously-fake
+# tag on purpose: nothing has been promoted yet, and vncmail-prod's ArgoCD
+# Application has manual sync anyway, so this being "wrong" doesn't deploy
+# anything wrong — it just means there's nothing to sync until a real
+# `git push` to main updates it.
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1alpha1
+kind: Component
+images:
+  - name: ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus-dev
+    newName: registry.gitlab.vnc.biz/gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus
+    newTag: not-yet-promoted

deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/kustomization.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
+kind: Kustomization
+namespace: vncmail-prod
+resources:
+  - ../../base
+  - namespace.yaml
+  # - secret.yaml   # create from secret.example.yaml; not committed
+
+patches:
+  - path: patch-ingress.yaml
+  - path: patch-deployment.yaml
+
+components:
+  - image-tag
+
+# NOT MEANT TO BE SYNCED AS COMMITTED. Scaffolding only (see the pipeline
+# plan's Phase C/D) — image-tag/'s placeholder tag is obviously-invalid on
+# purpose. The bump-prod job in .gitlab-ci.yml keeps that tag pointed at
+# whatever's already on dev once main advances, but vncmail-prod's ArgoCD
+# Application has manual sync — a human still has to click Sync (or
+# `argocd app sync vncmail-prod`) for any of this to actually apply.

deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/namespace.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Namespace
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-prod
+  labels:
+    app.kubernetes.io/part-of: vnclagoon-suite

deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/patch-deployment.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# Basic HA. Still `strategy: Recreate` (inherited from base) since the PVCs
+# are RWO — 2 replicas doesn't buy zero-downtime rollouts by itself, only
+# tolerance for a node loss between deploys. Revisit if that's not enough.
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: Deployment
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-plus
+spec:
+  replicas: 2

deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/patch-ingress.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# PLACEHOLDER — the real production hostname has not been decided yet (see
+# VNCMAIL-SETUP.md / the pipeline plan). vncmail.CHANGEME.invalid is
+# deliberately unresolvable: applying this overlay as committed will not
+# issue a cert or route traffic anywhere. Replace both occurrences below,
+# and the matching TLS secretName, before Phase D (first real prod deploy).
+#
+# Targets node1-3 (the HA "prod" cluster). Deliberately does NOT override
+# base's `cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer: CHANGEME` — node1-3 has ZERO
+# ClusterIssuers configured today (confirmed via direct access). A human
+# needs to create a real one there (ACME account, DNS-01 or HTTP-01 solver)
+# before this can be anything but a placeholder.
+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
+kind: Ingress
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-plus
+spec:
+  tls:
+    - hosts:
+        - vncmail.CHANGEME.invalid
+      secretName: vncmail-plus-prod-tls
+  rules:
+    - host: vncmail.CHANGEME.invalid
+      http:
+        paths:
+          - path: /
+            pathType: Prefix
+            backend:
+              service:
+                name: vncmail-plus
+                port:
+                  number: 80

deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/secret.example.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# Copy to secret.yaml, fill in real values, and apply. DO NOT commit secret.yaml
+# (it is gitignored). Generate SESSION_SECRET with:  openssl rand -base64 32
+#
+# JMAP_SERVER_URL is a PLACEHOLDER — there is no production Stalwart instance
+# yet. This overlay cannot go live (Phase D) until one exists and this value
+# points at it for real.
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: Secret
+metadata:
+  name: vncmail-env
+  namespace: vncmail-prod
+type: Opaque
+stringData:
+  # Core — connect to Stalwart over JMAP
+  JMAP_SERVER_URL: "https://REPLACE-ME-prod-stalwart-not-yet-deployed.invalid"
+  SESSION_SECRET: "REPLACE_ME__openssl_rand_base64_32"
+  # Branding (theme defaults to VNClagoon in code; these set name + logo)
+  APP_NAME: "VNCmail+"
+  APP_SHORT_NAME: "VNCmail+"
+  LOGIN_COMPANY_NAME: "VNClagoon"
+  LOGIN_LOGO_DARK_URL: "/branding/vncmail-wordmark-on-dark.svg"
+  LOGIN_LOGO_LIGHT_URL: "/branding/vncmail-wordmark-on-light.svg"
+  APP_LOGO_DARK_URL: "/branding/vncmail-wordmark-on-dark.svg"
+  APP_LOGO_LIGHT_URL: "/branding/vncmail-wordmark-on-light.svg"
+  LOGIN_LOGO_MAX_HEIGHT: "52"
+  # Housekeeping
+  BULWARK_UPDATE_CHECK: "off"
+  # Data dirs default to /app/data/* (mounted to the PVCs) — no need to set them.

docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# VNCmail+ — Architecture
+
+VNCmail+ is VNC's fork of [Bulwark](https://github.com/bulwarkmail/webmail), a
+Next.js (App Router) webmail client that speaks JMAP to **Stalwart** (the mail
+server — SMTP/IMAP/JMAP, source of truth for all mail/calendar/contacts/files).
+VNCmail+ holds no mail data itself; it's a UI + a thin server-side JMAP proxy.
+
+This doc is the map. For day-to-day sandbox work see
+[SANDBOX-DEV-MANUAL.md](SANDBOX-DEV-MANUAL.md); for going live at scale see
+[PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md](PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md).
+
+## System diagram
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TB
+    subgraph Clients
+        Browser["Web browser"]
+        Electron["Electron desktop\n(+ local SQLite/FTS5 search index)"]
+        Mobile["vncmail-native (React Native)\n+ vncmail-relay (push)"]
+    end
+
+    subgraph "dev-k8s-1/2/3 — dev cluster"
+        direction TB
+        TraefikDev["Traefik ingress"]
+        AppDev["VNCmail+ pod(s)\nnamespace: vncmail"]
+        ArgoCD["ArgoCD\n(GitOps controller)"]
+        TraefikDev --> AppDev
+    end
+
+    subgraph "node1/2/3 — prod HA cluster"
+        direction TB
+        TraefikProd["Traefik ingress"]
+        AppProd["VNCmail+ pod(s)\nnamespace: vncmail-prod\n(not live yet)"]
+        Ceph["rook-ceph\n(RWX storage, once wired)"]
+        TraefikProd --> AppProd
+        AppProd -.-> Ceph
+    end
+
+    subgraph "Mail backend (per environment)"
+        Stalwart["Stalwart\nSMTP/IMAP/JMAP server\n(source of truth)"]
+    end
+
+    subgraph "S/MIME internal CA — namespace vnc-ca, isolated"
+        EJBCA["EJBCA\n(cert issuance/enrolment)"]
+    end
+
+    subgraph "GitLab (gitlab.vnc.biz) — canonical repo"
+        MR["MR into dev\n(verify: typecheck/lint/test/build)"]
+        Registry["Container registry\nregistry.gitlab.vnc.biz/.../vncmail-plus"]
+    end
+
+    Browser --> TraefikDev
+    Electron --> TraefikDev
+    Mobile --> TraefikDev
+    Browser -.->|"later, once real"| TraefikProd
+
+    AppDev -->|"JMAP over HTTPS\n(proxy.ts, server-side only)"| Stalwart
+    AppProd -.->|JMAP| Stalwart
+    AppDev -.->|"S/MIME enrolment\n(RA client cert, port 8443)"| EJBCA
+
+    MR -->|merge to dev| Registry
+    Registry -->|"bump-dev job pins the tag"| ArgoCD
+    ArgoCD -->|"sync (auto)"| AppDev
+    Registry -.->|"bump-prod pins the tag\n(no rebuild)"| ArgoCD
+    ArgoCD -.->|"sync — MANUAL, permanent gate"| AppProd
+```
+
+## Components
+
+| Component | What it is | Where |
+|---|---|---|
+| **VNCmail+** (this repo) | Next.js 16 App Router webmail UI + server-side JMAP proxy (`proxy.ts`, `app/api/*`). Stateful: writes settings/admin/telemetry to `/app/data/*` — see storage note below. | Container, `vncmail` (dev) / `vncmail-prod` (prod, not live) namespaces |
+| **Stalwart** | External JMAP/SMTP/IMAP mail server. Owns all mail/calendar/contact/file data. VNCmail+ never touches a database directly — every read/write goes over JMAP. | `stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de` (dev; prod instance doesn't exist yet) |
+| **EJBCA** (`deploy/k8s/ca/`) | Internal CA issuing S/MIME certs for the S/MIME plugin. Deliberately isolated: own namespace `vnc-ca`, own MariaDB, `NetworkPolicy` allows only the `vncmail` namespace to call its REST API. Root-key ceremony is a manual, human-only runbook — never automated. | `vnc-ca` namespace |
+| **Electron desktop client** | Same Next.js app, packaged with `electron-builder`, standalone server spawned as a child process. Adds a local encrypted SQLite/FTS5 search index (`lib/mail-index/`) — event-driven, refreshed off the same JMAP push connection, for AI/RAG-style "search your mail" queries. Unsigned builds today (no Apple/Windows code-signing cert yet). | Desktop, not cluster-hosted |
+| **vncmail-native** (separate repo) | React Native/Expo mobile app, forked from upstream `bulwarkmail/native`. Full JMAP delta-sync engine + local mail replica (bodies, not just the search excerpt Electron keeps) + an FTS5 index over it. **The replica is UNENCRYPTED today** — `STORE_FORMAT = 'sqlite-plain'`, no SQLCipher dependency exists; encryption is a documented future native-build flip, not a shipped property. Do not describe this as encrypted. | Mobile (Android emulator; iOS pending) |
+| **vncmail-relay** (separate repo) | Push notification relay for the mobile app (forked from `bulwarkmail/relay`). | — |
+| **GitLab CI** (`.gitlab-ci.yml`) | Builds+pushes container images, bumps a git-tracked image tag. **Never touches any cluster** — no cluster credentials in CI at all. | Runs on a GitLab Runner |
+| **ArgoCD** | GitOps controller, already installed on `dev-k8s` (found idle with zero Applications when this pipeline was built — more idiomatic than having CI run `kubectl` directly). Watches this repo, applies `deploy/k8s/overlays/{dev,prod}`. `vncmail-dev` = automated sync (once bootstrapped); `vncmail-prod` = **permanently manual sync** — that's the Vercel-style "promote to production" gate. | `argocd` namespace on `dev-k8s`; UI at `https://argo.devcluster.vnc.de` |
+
+## The two clusters
+
+| | `dev-k8s-1/2/3` | `node1/node2/node3` |
+|---|---|---|
+| Role | dev / sandbox | production (HA) |
+| Storage | `microk8s-hostpath` only (node-local, single-replica-only) | `rook-ceph`: `ceph-rbd` (RWO, default) **and `ceph-cephfs` (RWX, distributed)** |
+| Ingress | Traefik | Traefik |
+| cert-manager issuer | `letsencrypt-staging` | **none configured yet** |
+| ArgoCD | yes, installed | no — not registered as an ArgoCD-managed cluster yet |
+| Live workloads today | none (fresh) | none (fresh) |
+
+Both were confirmed empty when this was written — no `vncmail`, `vnc-ca`, or
+`stalwart` anything on either cluster. Any reference elsewhere in this repo's
+history to a "live sandbox at vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de" was aspirational
+(manifests + docs existed, nothing was ever actually applied).
+
+## The storage coupling — the one fact that shapes the scale-out plan
+
+`base/deployment.yaml` mounts 4 PVCs, all `ReadWriteOnce`, `strategy:
+Recreate`:
+
+| Dir | Contents | Write pattern |
+|---|---|---|
+| `settings` | Per-user encrypted settings (AES-256-GCM, keyed by `hash(username:serverUrl)`) — `lib/settings-sync.ts` | Read+write, per-user |
+| `admin` (config) | Operator-authored: `config.json`, `policy.json`, admin password hash, plugins, themes, branding uploads | Write-once-ish — can be mounted `:ro` after initial setup (`ADMIN_CONFIG_READONLY=true`, already a supported mode — `lib/admin/paths.ts`) |
+| `admin-state` | Runtime mutations: login timestamps, audit log, setup token | Always read-write, low volume |
+| `telemetry` | Version-check / usage state | Read+write, low volume |
+
+**This is why the app is single-replica today.** RWO + `Recreate` means one
+pod, one node, ever. It's not a bug — it's the correct choice for a
+single-sandbox deployment — but it's the first thing that has to change to
+run more than one replica, which is why it's the opening move in
+[PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md](PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md).

docs/ELECTRON-OFFLINE-ENGINE-REVIEW.md

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+> # ⚠️ UPDATE — a replica was later built, and this review is why it is shaped the way it is
+>
+> The table below says most of these findings "stopped existing" because the scope change removed
+> the thing they were about. A replica has since been built (`lib/offline-replica/**`), so that
+> reasoning was re-examined finding by finding rather than inherited:
+>
+> - **C1** — still FIXED, and untouched: the replica adds no new dependency and reuses the guarded
+>   optional require. Both `docker build`s are unaffected.
+> - **C2, C3, C4, H1, H4** — still MOOT, and moot *for the same reasons*, because the persistent
+>   background worker, the shared registry and the server-side-engine-reads-renderer-state shapes
+>   were **not** reinstated. A cycle is request-scoped work in an API route with no resident
+>   credential; there is no registry and no epoch; one request syncs one account. Had the worker
+>   come back, all five would have come back with it.
+> - **H2** — still FIXED: the key crosses on an inherited file descriptor, never via environment,
+>   and is zeroed after each job. The replica reuses that channel rather than inventing a second.
+> - **H3 — BACK IN SCOPE, and the only one that is.** This review was right that the webmail does
+>   local delta arithmetic on mailbox unread counts, and a read-only offline cache underneath it
+>   needs a coherence story. The answer is an ordering rule: the replica is consulted **only after
+>   a read has failed at the transport level**, so it is never a cache in front of the server and
+>   the arithmetic never operates on replica numbers. Enforcing that needed a real signal, because
+>   `lib/jmap/client.ts` swallows read errors and returns plausible success — hence
+>   `lib/jmap/transport-health.ts` and the two-part gate in `lib/offline-fallback-client.ts`.
+> - The *medium/low* findings (Linux-only API, the vacuous `cipher_version` check, the two bindings
+>   not being interchangeable) were all already fixed in the shipped index and are inherited.
+>
+> Nothing in this review turned out to be wrong on re-reading. Its verdict — that the sync-engine
+> core transfers and the platform-specific sections were where the danger lay — held exactly.
+
+> # ⚠️ SUPERSEDED — reviews a design that was not built
+>
+> This reviews `ELECTRON-OFFLINE-ENGINE-DESIGN.md`, which was **dropped**. Its findings were the
+> direct cause: seeing them, the human narrowed the requirement from a full offline mail replica to
+> *"a SQLite index we can prompt against"*, refreshed on each delivery/change event. What shipped is
+> `lib/mail-index/**` + `app/api/offline/{reindex,search}` — see that doc's superseded note.
+>
+> **This review did its job.** Most of its severe findings were resolved by the scope change
+> removing the thing they were about, which is the strongest outcome a review can have:
+>
+> | Finding | Outcome |
+> |---|---|
+> | **C1** — `@signalapp/sqlcipher` in `dependencies` breaks both Alpine `docker build`s | **FIXED as specified.** It is an `optionalDependencies` entry with a guarded runtime require (`lib/mail-index/binding.ts`). Both `docker build`s verified passing, and the require verified failing cleanly with MODULE_NOT_FOUND inside the musl image. |
+> | **C2** — credentials are request-scoped, so no persistent worker can hold them | **MOOT.** There is no worker. Indexing is a normal API route using the request's own `jmap_stalwart_ctx` cookie, via the existing `lib/stalwart/credentials.ts`. |
+> | **C3** — the OAuth-refresh mitigation is itself the bug | **MOOT, and avoided by construction.** The indexer never touches the refresh-token cookie; it only reads an already-minted auth header, so it cannot rotate a token into a response nobody reads. |
+> | **C4** — shared `registry.json` breaks the multi-account safety premise | **MOOT.** No registry, no epochs, no concurrent workers. |
+> | **H1** — a server-side engine can't read a renderer-only setting | **MOOT.** The renderer decides when to index. |
+> | **H2** — key handoff sequencing, and a nonce via env is readable by same-user processes | **FIXED.** The key crosses on an **inherited file descriptor**, never env, and is fetched per job and zeroed after — not held. Sequencing is moot: the key is fetched when a job runs, not at spawn. |
+> | **H3** — local unread-count arithmetic needs a coherence story | **MOOT.** A retrieval index does not need to stay coherent with live unread counts. |
+> | **H4** — no cap on concurrent multi-account sync | **MOOT.** One request, one account. |
+> | *medium/low:* `getSelectedStorageBackend()` is Linux-only and would crash elsewhere | **FIXED** — platform-guarded. |
+> | *medium/low:* `cipher_version` check would pass vacuously on zero rows | **FIXED** — the shipped assertion requires a non-empty *string*, and a test reads the raw file bytes for a plaintext canary. |
+> | *medium/low:* the two bindings are not "the same code either way" | **CONFIRMED true, the hard way.** `@signalapp/sqlcipher` rejects varargs params (`TypeError: Params must be either object or array`) where better-sqlite3 accepts them. Documented in `binding.ts`. |
+>
+> Reviewing this file's own accuracy: its two re-executed claims (the binding working in Electron 43,
+> and `PRAGMA key` being a silent no-op) both held up and both shaped the shipped code.
+
+# Adversarial review: `docs/ELECTRON-OFFLINE-ENGINE-DESIGN.md`
+
+Reviewer: independent agent, fresh context, no relation to the design's author. 2026-08-04.
+
+## Verdict
+
+**Needs substantial rework before implementation — but narrowly scoped rework.**
+
+The delta-sync core (everything tagged `[reused]` from M, the mobile design) is genuinely sound
+and transfers; the reviewer attacked it directly and could not break it. The problem is that **all
+four genuinely-new sections have an unclosed load-bearing mechanism**, and one of them breaks a
+build that ships today:
+
+- §3 (binding choice) contains a packaging decision that breaks the hosted Docker image and the
+  integration fixture.
+- §2 (process choice) rests on a credential claim that is only true inside an HTTP request.
+- §6 (key handoff) is under-specified in a way that doesn't work as sequenced, and its "unresolved
+  implementation choice" is not security-neutral.
+- §5.3/§8.3 (multi-account) breaks the specific premise M's D6 fix relies on.
+
+Nothing here requires re-architecting the sync engine. Stages B-G can proceed against M as
+written. Stage A as currently specified would not surface most of this.
+
+All file:line citations in the design doc that were checked resolve correctly (one trivial
+miscount, noted at the end) — citation quality is high; the problems are in the reasoning built
+on top.
+
+---
+
+## CRITICAL
+
+### C1 — Adding `@signalapp/sqlcipher` to `dependencies` breaks the hosted Docker build *and* the integration fixture
+
+**Where:** §3.3.1 ("entering `dependencies`"), §3.3.5, §2.4, §10.5, E2, §13 item 6.
+
+`Dockerfile:1-4` — `FROM node:24-alpine`, `RUN npm ci`. `integration/webmail.Dockerfile:12-15` —
+same, `FROM node:24-alpine` + `npm ci`.
+
+Verified from the published tarball that `@signalapp/sqlcipher@4.0.3`:
+- ships **6** prebuilds — `darwin-{arm64,x64}`, `linux-{arm64,x64}`, `win32-{arm64,x64}`. No
+  `linuxmusl-*`. (The design doc's list is exactly right.)
+- ships **no build sources at all** — published `files` is `dist/*`, `prebuilds`, `README.md`. No
+  `binding.gyp`, no `src/`, no `deps/`.
+- has `install: node-gyp-build`. `node-gyp-build`'s `bin.js` runs `node-gyp-build-test`; on
+  failure it calls `build()` → spawns `node-gyp rebuild` → `process.exit(code)`.
+
+No prebuild + no `binding.gyp` ⇒ `node-gyp rebuild` fails ⇒ **`npm ci` exits nonzero**. The Linux
+prebuild also has a glibc ≥ 2.34 floor, so it could not load on musl even if copied.
+
+**Concrete failure:** the next `docker build` of the production image fails at line 4.
+`npm run test:integration` fails to build the webmail container. Neither is gated by
+`VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR` — that env var only governs *activation*, not *installation*.
+
+§3.3.5 dismisses musl as "relevant if an Alpine-based container ever wants the engine — which,
+per §2.4, it must not" — that reasoning is inverted: the Alpine container doesn't want the engine,
+it just needs `npm install` to succeed regardless.
+
+**Fix direction:** `optionalDependencies` + a guarded runtime `require` (which also delivers E2's
+graceful-load-failure behavior for free), or a separate optional package, or `--omit=optional` in
+both Dockerfiles. Pick one and say so explicitly; add "`docker build` of both Dockerfiles still
+succeeds" to the Stage A verification list.
+
+### C2 — Option A's central justification is only true inside an HTTP request; the Worker credential path does not exist
+
+**Where:** §2.1-for-1, §1.2, §2.4 (Worker), §5.3, §8.1 triggers T1/T4/T5/T11, §13 item 1.
+
+Verified in `app/api/auth/session/route.ts` and `app/api/auth/token/route.ts`: every credential
+read goes through `cookies()` from `next/headers` — request-scoped. `lib/oauth/cookie-config.ts:11`
+sets `httpOnly: true`. The cookies live in the renderer's cookie jar, not in the server. The
+standalone server holds no session state whatsoever; it decrypts a cookie per request and
+discards it.
+
+So "the credentials are already there... No new credential path, no IPC carrying secrets, no
+second copy" (§2.1-for-1) is materially overstated. What is actually there is *the ability to
+decrypt a credential presented on an inbound request* — not a resident credential.
+
+Consequences the design never addresses:
+
+1. **T1 ("server process ready + an account's credentials resolvable") cannot fire.** At
+   server-ready there are no cookies anywhere. Nor can T4 (network regained), T5 (`StateChange`
+   on the engine's own socket), or T11 (resume from sleep) — none is an inbound renderer request.
+2. **A `worker_threads` Worker is a separate execution context with no cookie access at all.**
+   §2.4 mandates the Worker and routes talk to it via `postMessage`, but there's no specified
+   point at which the Worker actually receives credentials.
+3. The only workable shape is: on the first renderer request, decrypt and hand the **plaintext**
+   credentials to the Worker, which retains them for the process lifetime. That is a new
+   long-lived plaintext secret in a new location — the exact thing §2.1-for-1 claims doesn't
+   happen, and the same category of thing `client.ts:6055-6059` already declined once (a
+   resident credential copy in a process that didn't previously hold one). It also creates an
+   invalidation problem never addressed: password change, logout elsewhere, or a cleared cookie
+   leaves the Worker retrying stale credentials indefinitely (since `AuthenticationError` is
+   correctly never treated as a purge signal) — against a server with failed-auth lockout, this
+   locks the user's account.
+
+This doesn't kill Option A, but it kills the argument that Option A is free of new secret
+handling — which was the design's #1 stated reason for choosing it over the alternative. That
+comparison needs to be redone with the resident-copy cost included, not dropped.
+
+### C3 — The proposed OAuth-refresh mitigation (E11) is not just unimplementable; it *is* the bug it's meant to prevent
+
+**Where:** E11 (failure-mode table), §1.2's note about `app/api/auth/token/route.ts:104-106`.
+
+E11's rule: *"the engine never refreshes independently. It obtains tokens only through the
+existing `PUT /api/auth/token` route, in-process, so there is exactly one refresher and one
+rotation writer — the route."*
+
+But that route: reads the refresh token from the **request's** cookie; writes the rotated token
+as a `Set-Cookie` on the **response**; and on a 400/401/403 from the identity provider, **deletes**
+the refresh-token cookie and returns 401.
+
+An in-process server-side call to that route has no cookie to send (401s immediately), and even
+if the engine forged one from a resident copy, the rotated token would land in a response the
+engine discards. Net effect: engine refreshes → identity provider rotates the token → the new
+token lands in a discarded response → the browser still holds the now-superseded token → the
+next real refresh from the browser gets rejected → the route deletes the cookie → **the user is
+silently logged out of that account, and the offline store's credentials are dead.**
+
+The per-slot lock the design suggests as a fallback does not help — the problem is that cookie
+state lives in the browser, not that the writes race each other.
+
+Separately, `PUT /api/auth/session` requires three `sec-fetch-*` headers with a comment claiming
+"non-browser clients cannot forge these" — a Node-side `fetch` call *can* set all three, silently
+turning a security control into decoration if any engine path goes through this route. Not
+discussed in the design at all.
+
+### C4 — The shared registry file breaks the exact premise the multi-account safety fix relies on
+
+**Where:** §5.1 (`registry.json`, epoch ownership), §2.4 ("one worker per account"), §4.3 (mutex
+described as "belt-and-braces"), §7.1 (`completePendingPurges()`), §8.3 cross-account, §5.5.
+
+The mobile design's cross-account safety guarantee depends explicitly on there being **exactly
+one writer process-wide** — its own JMAP client is a renderer singleton, so multi-account
+simultaneous sync was out of scope for it, and its own adversarial review never examined
+concurrent multi-account execution.
+
+This design introduces multi-account-simultaneous as "a genuine capability gain" and disposes of
+the concurrency consequences with a one-line "the jitter matters more here" — but the epoch
+value (the fencing token the whole safety guarantee rests on) lives in `registry.json`, a single
+JSON file shared across every account. No SQLite transaction covers a plain JSON file. The
+argument that a real database transaction demotes the old per-account mutex to
+"belt-and-braces" is correct for state stored *inside* the SQLite file, and does not apply to
+`registry.json` at all — which names no owner thread, no lock, and no atomic-write discipline.
+
+Two concrete failures:
+1. **Lost epoch bump.** Worker A read-modify-writes the registry to bump account A's epoch
+   (purge, clear, logout). Worker B, holding a stale parse, writes its own update and clobbers
+   A's bump. A's in-flight cycle's next commit now passes the epoch check and lands on top of a
+   wipe — an empty record store with a live, advanced cursor and `resyncRequired: false`, exactly
+   the unreachable-by-design state the mobile design's whole S1 fix exists to prevent.
+2. **Torn read on a shared file.** Worker B is mid-write; the server's launch-time
+   `completePendingPurges()` reads and the parse throws or yields a partial object. The
+   documented rule ("unreadable → treated as a purge") means a transient concurrency artifact
+   triggers a full purge-and-rebootstrap for accounts that were perfectly fine — and because the
+   file is shared, one torn read can hit every account at once, not just one.
+
+### Other critical-adjacent findings, condensed
+
+- **H1** — the "sync enabled" toggle lives in the renderer's local storage; the server-side engine
+  (and its background triggers) has no way to read it, so it will materialize an encrypted store
+  and a keychain entry for accounts that never opted in — precisely the failure the design's own
+  lazy-materialization rule was meant to prevent.
+- **H2** — the key-handoff sequencing assumes accounts exist at server-spawn time; they don't
+  (accounts are added later, by logging in). The two proposed handoff mechanisms are not
+  equivalent: one of them passes a nonce via the spawned process's environment variables, which
+  are readable by any other process running as the same OS user — defeating the entire point of
+  using the OS keychain in the first place. Needs re-sequencing plus picking the other mechanism
+  on security grounds, not "whichever is cleaner to implement."
+- **H3** — the "no optimistic-mutation layer exists, so nothing to keep coherent" claim is false;
+  the webmail already does local-delta arithmetic on mailbox unread counts and totals for
+  mark-read/move/delete actions, with a comment referencing a prior production bug from getting
+  this exact kind of cutoff wrong. A read-only offline cache sitting underneath that arithmetic
+  needs an explicit coherence story, which the design currently declares unnecessary.
+- **H4** — no cap specified on how many accounts sync simultaneously; since this is the same
+  process serving the live webmail UI, an unbounded background sync could contend for the same
+  rate-limited server connection as the user's foreground activity, throttling their visible mail
+  during their own multi-account first sync.
+- Several medium/low findings: one proposed API call is Linux-only and would crash the app on
+  macOS/Windows if implemented as literally described; the Linux keychain fallback behavior is
+  described slightly wrong (Electron already fails safely there; the real hazard is a *different*
+  API a future maintainer might reach for); the claim that two SQLite bindings are "the same code
+  either way" doesn't hold — verified real API differences exist between them; the "single-user"
+  safety check for the hosted-deployment gate doesn't actually verify what it claims to.
+
+---
+
+## What the reviewer independently re-verified (not just re-read)
+
+Re-ran two of the design's three "verified by execution" claims independently, in Electron 43.2.0
+itself under the same execution mode the standalone server actually uses:
+
+1. **`@signalapp/sqlcipher@4.0.3` in Electron 43 — fully re-confirmed by actual re-execution.**
+   Loads with no rebuild, real SQLCipher encryption confirmed (encrypted header, no plaintext
+   canary recoverable from raw bytes, wrong key correctly rejected). The strongest part of the
+   original design.
+2. **`node:sqlite`'s `PRAGMA key` silent no-op — fully re-confirmed by actual re-execution.** No
+   throrw, mailbox left in cleartext, canary recoverable from raw bytes. The design is right to
+   call this the sharpest landmine found and to mandate a positive verification check after every
+   store open (though the exact check needs a small correction — checking for a non-empty
+   *string* rather than a non-empty *result set*, since the no-cipher case returns zero rows, not
+   an empty string, and a naive string comparison would pass vacuously).
+3. **The Linux keychain-fallback claim — not independently confirmed, and partially contradicted**
+   by reading Electron's own source and current documentation (no Linux desktop was available to
+   actually execute this one). The decision made (refuse outright rather than risk a false sense
+   of security) stays correct regardless and costs nothing, but the specific mechanism described
+   needs correcting.
+
+## Recommended gate
+
+Do not start implementation as currently written. Resolve in this order:
+1. **C1** — decide the dependency-installation shape so the existing Docker builds keep working;
+   add a Docker-build check to the first implementation step's own verification list.
+2. **C2 + C3** — specify the credential lifecycle end to end: how a background worker actually
+   gets credentials, where they live, how long, how invalidation reaches them, and how token
+   refresh can work given rotation needs to land in the browser's cookie jar, not a discarded
+   response. This may change the process-architecture verdict; re-run that comparison honestly
+   rather than inheriting the original conclusion.
+3. **C4** — name a single owner (or a real lock plus atomic write) for the shared registry file,
+   and re-derive the multi-account safety guarantee under concurrent writers rather than citing
+   the mobile design's single-writer proof as if it still applied.
+4. **H1** — decide where the "sync enabled" setting needs to live (or how the engine learns it)
+   so lazy materialization is actually enforceable from where the engine's triggers fire.
+5. **H2** — pick the handoff mechanism that doesn't leak via process environment variables, and
+   re-sequence it for accounts that don't exist yet at process-spawn time.
+6. **H3** — add real coherence rules for the counters/totals the webmail already computes locally,
+   or narrow the offline read path to skip anything those computations touch.
+7. **H4** — state a concurrency bound and a rule that foreground user activity isn't starved by
+   background multi-account sync.
+8. The smaller medium/low findings should land in the same pass since they're cheap to fix once
+   noticed.
+
+Everything reused from the mobile design's core sync-engine logic is safe to build against as
+written — the problems are entirely in the four sections that are genuinely new to this platform.

docs/OFFLINE-CLIENT-ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+# Bulwark / VNCmail+ — Offline & Native Client Architecture Analysis
+
+Date: 2026-08-04 (updated same day — see §7 for a strategy-changing discovery)
+Scope: what Bulwark (upstream `bulwarkmail/webmail`, forked as VNCmail+) delivers today for
+offline use, and what has to be built to ship Electron (desktop), Capacitor/React-Native
+iOS (IPA) and Android (APK) clients with local notifications, an encrypted local search index
+(SQLite/SQLCipher), and true offline mail.
+
+> **Note on this file's persistence:** `~/vncmail-plus` is a shared checkout — other sessions
+> actively commit and switch branches here. An earlier untracked copy of this doc was lost to a
+> branch switch. Commit this file (or move it somewhere durable) if you want it to survive.
+
+## 1. Current state of the webmail repo (verified against ~/vncmail-plus source)
+
+| Area | Status today | Evidence |
+|---|---|---|
+| Service worker | Installed, but **caches nothing** — `fetch` handler is a deliberate no-op so the app is never usable offline | `public/sw.js:6-8,36` |
+| Web app manifest | Present, installable PWA (icons, `protocol_handlers` for mailto/webcal) | `app/manifest.ts` |
+| Push notifications | **Real** Web Push: VAPID subscribe, `Notification.requestPermission`, SW `push`/`notificationclick` handlers, relayed through an external push relay + a preview API route | `lib/web-push.ts`, `public/sw.js:38-42`, `app/api/push/preview/route.ts` |
+| Local mail cache | **None.** IndexedDB is used only for plugin/theme blobs; `localStorage` only holds device IDs and Zustand UI-state (`persist()`), never message bodies | `lib/plugin-storage.ts`, `stores/account-store.ts:220` |
+| Search | Server-side JMAP `Email/query` only, no client index | `lib/jmap/search-utils.ts` |
+| Local encryption | None for cached data. The one AES-256-GCM routine (`lib/auth/crypto.ts`) encrypts the **session cookie server-side** using `node:crypto` — unusable in a browser/WebView | `lib/auth/crypto.ts` |
+| Mobile/desktop packaging in *this* repo | **Nothing exists**: no `capacitor.config.ts`, no Electron main/`electron-builder`, no Tauri, no fastlane/gradle/Xcode | confirmed via repo-wide `find`; `.github/workflows/*` |
+| JMAP client portability | `lib/jmap/client.ts` is pure `fetch()`, no Node-only APIs — portable into a WebView/Electron renderer unchanged | grep for `node:`/`require(` in `lib/jmap/*` = zero hits |
+
+**Multi-account scope: confirmed YES** — the offline cache must support multiple simultaneous
+Stalwart accounts per device (matches the webmail's existing `account-registry` store). This
+multiplies SQLCipher key-management work (§3/§7): one isolated key per account, not one global key.
+
+## 2. The fork in the road: shell strategy
+
+**Option A — Native shell over a remote WebView.** Capacitor/Electron just point at the hosted
+Bulwark URL. Cheapest, ships an APK/IPA/desktop binary fast, gets native push — but is *not*
+offline.
+
+**Option B — True offline-first client.** The client authenticates and syncs JMAP data
+directly, keeps a local encrypted store, and only needs connectivity to *sync*, not to *read*.
+
+Recommendation stands: **Electron first (Option-B-lite is nearly free there — see §4)**, mobile
+starts with Option A, then graduates to Option B — **but see §7: for mobile, "graduate to
+Option B" likely means extending an existing app, not building one from scratch.**
+
+## 3. Build-vs-buy matrix (webmail-repo-only view — see §7 for the revised mobile view)
+
+| Component | Off-the-shelf | What you build yourselves |
+|---|---|---|
+| Capacitor shell (iOS/Android project scaffolding) | Capacitor CLI generates both native projects | Splash/icons, deep-link config, `capacitor.config.ts` tuning |
+| Local SQLite | `@capacitor-community/sqlite` — ships **native SQLCipher support** on iOS/Android; web fallback via `jeep-sqlite`/`wa-sqlite` | Schema, JMAP→SQLite mapping, migrations |
+| SQLCipher key lifecycle | Native Keychain/Keystore APIs (via Capacitor Secure Storage) store the raw key | Key derivation/rotation, **per-account keys** (multi-account confirmed §1), wipe-on-logout |
+| Full-text search | SQLite FTS5 ships free with SQLite | Tokenizer choice, incremental indexer fed by the sync engine |
+| Native push | `@capacitor/push-notifications` wraps FCM/APNs | Relay extension, device-token registration, notification-tap deep-linking |
+| Electron desktop | `electron-builder`; Electron's own cross-platform `Notification` API | Main process booting the existing standalone Next.js server; auto-update wiring |
+| Background sync | iOS `BGTaskScheduler`, Android `WorkManager` | The actual poll/backoff/delta-fetch job logic |
+| Biometric app-lock | `capacitor-native-biometric` | UI/UX, fallback-to-passcode flow |
+| Store release pipeline | Fastlane/EAS-style CI, Apple/Google developer accounts | Signing config, CI secrets, store metadata |
+
+## 4. Why Electron is the cheap win
+
+Electron has no server-dependency problem: bundle the standalone Next.js server (the same
+artifact the `Dockerfile` already produces) inside Electron's Node runtime, open a
+`BrowserWindow` against `localhost`. Reuses 100% of the existing app including `app/api/**`.
+Native `Notification` API replaces Web Push entirely on desktop. Ships well before mobile
+Option B.
+
+## 5. Phased roadmap
+
+1. **Fix the service worker** — today's SW intentionally caches nothing (`sw.js:36`). Add
+   Workbox-style precaching of the app shell/static assets. Cheap, immediate PWA-offline-shell
+   improvement, no architecture change.
+2. **Electron desktop** (§4) — bundle standalone server + BrowserWindow + native Notification +
+   `electron-builder` packaging.
+3. **Capacitor mobile, Option A (remote shell)** — WebView on the hosted instance, native push
+   registration bridged into the relay, biometric app-lock. Ships an installable APK/IPA fast;
+   not offline yet. **Revisit against §7 before starting — extending `vncmail-native` may replace
+   this step entirely rather than complement it.**
+4. **JMAP sync engine + SQLite/SQLCipher store** — design delta-sync via
+   `Email/changes`/`Mailbox/changes`; local schema, one key per account (§1); move auth off the
+   Next-only encrypted cookie into secure storage so mobile can talk to Stalwart directly.
+   **§7: `vncmail-native` already has a cruder version of the "local cache" half of this
+   (bulk AsyncStorage download) — the delta-sync/SQLite/SQLCipher/FTS half is still greenfield
+   there too, but auth/JMAP wiring is not.**
+5. **FTS index + offline compose/outbox** — SQLite FTS5 population job; offline-composed
+   messages queued and replayed via JMAP `Email/set` on reconnect; conflict handling.
+6. **Platform hardening** — background refresh scheduling, Apple export-compliance declaration
+   (SQLCipher/AES in the binary triggers `ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption`), signing/release CI.
+
+## 6. Open questions — status
+
+- ~~Does the referenced upstream React Native app already solve native push/device-pairing?~~
+  **RESOLVED — see §7.**
+- **Is Bulwark upstream planning native clients?** Partially answered by §7: yes, `bulwarkmail/native`
+  is that plan, already public, beta/WIP. Still worth watching its upstream activity before
+  diverging further, since pulling upstream improvements is cheaper than re-diverging an AGPL fork.
+- **Multi-account scope** — RESOLVED, see §1.
+
+## 7. 2026-08-04 discovery: an upstream React Native app already exists — re-scope Phase 2
+
+`bulwarkmail/native` (public, AGPL-3.0-only, Expo SDK 54, beta/WIP) is a React Native mobile
+client for Bulwark. **Forked to `brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-native`.** It already ships:
+
+- **Multi-account** JMAP sign-in against any server (e.g. Stalwart).
+- **QR-code cross-device pairing** — `src/screens/LoginScreen.tsx` + `QrScanModal` +
+  `redeemPairingCode`/OAuth handoff in `src/lib/oauth.ts`. This is the "QR-code SSO login and
+  device pairing" feature referenced in the webmail's `CHANGELOG.md:207`.
+- **Android push notifications via FCM**, dispatched through a *second* public upstream repo,
+  `bulwarkmail/relay` (also AGPL-3.0) — **this is the actual service behind the webmail's
+  `DEFAULT_RELAY_BASE_URL`**, resolving the open question from the original Phase-2 plan about
+  where that relay's source lives. It terminates JMAP `PushSubscription` pushes and forwards to
+  FCM (mobile) or Web Push (PWA); a single Bulwark-hosted instance serves every opted-in client
+  so self-hosters don't need their own Firebase project — **or you can self-host it** (Docker
+  compose provided) if you want push traffic to never leave VNC infrastructure. **Decided:
+  self-host.** Forked to `brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-relay`. Remaining: dedicated Firebase project
+  for FCM credentials, a VAPID keypair, a microk8s deploy alongside `vncmail-plus` (per
+  `vnclagoon-suite-microfrontends`), and repointing both `vncmail-plus`
+  (`DEFAULT_RELAY_BASE_URL`) and `vncmail-native` at the self-hosted instance. Sequenced in the
+  `VNCprodbuild` skill's Phase 2 step 0.
+- **A basic offline mail cache already**: `src/lib/offline-sync.ts` (155 lines) bulk-downloads
+  the last N days of mail via `Email/query`+`Email/get` into `src/stores/offline-cache-store.ts`
+  (AsyncStorage-backed, size-capped, evicts oldest), with live progress UI
+  (`OfflineCacheBanner.tsx`). **This is not the delta-sync/SQLite/SQLCipher/FTS engine Phase 2
+  called for** — it's a periodic bulk re-download, not incremental `Email/changes` sync, and
+  storage is plain JSON in AsyncStorage, not an encrypted database — but auth, JMAP wiring, and
+  the UI shell around "offline mail" already exist.
+- Android release pipeline (`.github/workflows/release-android.yml`, sideload APK from GitHub
+  Releases) and an iOS release pipeline (`release-ios.yml`, `docs/ios-release.md`, TestFlight)
+  **already exist** — iOS *builds*, just without push (see below).
+
+**Still genuinely missing** (confirmed against its own README + source):
+- iOS push notifications and client certs — Android-only so far.
+- No SQLite/SQLCipher/FTS anywhere (`@react-native-async-storage/async-storage` +
+  `expo-secure-store` only) — the encrypted-local-index work is still fully greenfield.
+  **Resolved 2026-08-04:** use `expo-sqlite`'s official `useSQLCipher` config-plugin option
+  (Android/iOS/macOS) rather than a third-party binding. Unusable in Expo Go, so this forces a
+  custom dev client for development going forward — accepted. Stay Continuous-Native-Generation
+  (don't commit `ios`/`android`, let `expo prebuild` regenerate them) rather than going fully
+  bare, since a committed native tree would conflict on every future merge from upstream
+  `bulwarkmail/native`. Detail in the `VNCprodbuild` skill's status log.
+- Filters & rules, S/MIME, plugins, themes, file storage are UI stubs only.
+- No Play Store distribution yet.
+
+**Strategic implication:** for the mobile leg of the native-client roadmap, **extending
+`vncmail-native` is very likely cheaper than building a Capacitor wrapper around the webmail
+from scratch** — it already has the parts that were the most speculative/decision-heavy in the
+original Phase-2 plan (auth, pairing, push wiring, multi-account, a working offline-mail UX
+shell). The remaining work narrows to: iOS push, replacing the AsyncStorage bulk-cache with a
+real `Email/changes` delta-sync engine into SQLite/SQLCipher, an FTS5 index, and an
+offline-compose/outbox queue — i.e., roughly roadmap steps 4–6 above, now scoped against an
+existing app instead of a blank one. **This should be a formal decision gate before touching
+Phase 2 further**: adopt `vncmail-native` as the mobile client going forward (dropping/deferring
+the Capacitor-wraps-webmail plan for mobile), or keep both in parallel. Recommend adopting it —
+duplicating auth/pairing/push work that already exists and works has no upside.

docs/PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+# VNCmail+ — Production Scale-Out Plan (target: 100k+ users, scalable on demand)
+
+Goal: take VNCmail+ from "doesn't exist on `node1-3`" to a production
+deployment that can grow past 100k users and be scaled **at any time** —
+both automatically (load-driven) and on a single manual command (ahead of an
+expected spike), not just reactively.
+
+Read [ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md) first, especially "The storage
+coupling" section — it's the reason this is phased the way it is.
+
+## Where things stand today (verified by direct inspection, not assumed)
+
+- `node1-3` is a healthy 3-node HA microk8s cluster (rook-ceph, traefik,
+  metallb, cert-manager) with **zero application workloads and zero
+  ClusterIssuers**. It's a clean slate, not a half-finished deployment.
+- `rook-ceph` is already there, with both `ceph-rbd` (RWO) and **`ceph-cephfs`
+  (RWX, distributed)** StorageClasses available — the key piece that makes
+  multi-replica VNCmail+ possible without inventing new infrastructure.
+- `cnpg-system` (CloudNativePG, a Postgres operator) is **already installed
+  on both clusters** and currently unused by anything. This is the natural
+  home for the app's mutable state once it moves off local files (Phase 1).
+- No Prometheus/Grafana/logging stack was found on either cluster — this is
+  a real gap, not a "probably fine," and it's a prerequisite for safe
+  autoscaling (HPA needs a metrics pipeline) and for running anything at
+  100k-user scale with any visibility into it.
+- Stalwart's own scaling story is **not covered here** — it's a separate
+  system owned by the backend/infra side of this decision. It's called out
+  explicitly at each phase below because VNCmail+ scaling is moot if
+  Stalwart can't handle the same load; plan the two together, not
+  sequentially.
+
+## Phase 1 — Break the storage coupling (blocking; do this first)
+
+Today: 4 RWO PVCs, `strategy: Recreate`, one pod max, ever. Two ways to fix,
+pick based on how much time you have before you need >1 replica:
+
+**Tactical (fast, days)**: switch the 4 PVCs to the `ceph-cephfs` StorageClass
+(RWX) and the Deployment `strategy` to `RollingUpdate`. This alone unblocks
+multiple replicas with no code changes. Real risk: `admin-state`/`telemetry`
+are multi-writer files on a shared filesystem — fine at low write volume
+(login timestamps, audit log, version-check state), but it's a shortcut, not
+the target architecture. `settings` (per-user, keyed by `hash(username:serverUrl)`)
+has no cross-writer conflict risk since each user only ever writes their own
+file — this one is safe on RWX indefinitely.
+
+**Structural (correct, weeks)**: migrate `admin-state` and `telemetry` into
+CNPG Postgres (already installed, unused) — proper multi-writer semantics,
+no filesystem-locking edge cases, and it's the natural place for this kind
+of low-volume operational state anyway. Keep `admin` (config) as a
+**read-only mount** after setup — `ADMIN_CONFIG_READONLY=true` is already a
+supported mode (`lib/admin/paths.ts`), so this can be baked into the image
+or a ConfigMap at deploy time instead of a writable volume at all. `settings`
+can either stay on CephFS RWX (it's genuinely safe there) or also move to
+Postgres if you want zero PVCs in the final state.
+
+Either way: this is the one item that has to happen before Phase 2 means
+anything. Everything downstream assumes replicas > 1 is possible.
+
+## Phase 2 — Autoscaling & headroom
+
+- Install a metrics pipeline (`metrics-server` at minimum for HPA;
+  Prometheus+Grafana for real visibility — see Phase 5, do it once, not twice).
+- `HorizontalPodAutoscaler` on CPU/memory to start; revisit with a custom
+  metric (JMAP request rate, active WebSocket/SSE connections) once you have
+  real traffic shape.
+- `PodDisruptionBudget` so rolling updates and node maintenance don't drop
+  below your minimum replica count.
+- Re-size `resources.requests/limits` from real load-test numbers (Phase 7)
+  — the sandbox's `100m/256Mi` requests are sandbox-appropriate, not
+  production-appropriate; don't carry them forward by default.
+- **The "scale at any time" requirement**: HPA covers load-driven scaling,
+  but also document (and rehearse once) a single manual command to add
+  capacity ahead of a known event, before HPA would react:
+  `kubectl -n vncmail-prod scale deploy/vncmail-plus --replicas=N` or
+  bumping the HPA's `minReplicas`. This should be a one-line runbook entry,
+  not something someone has to figure out under pressure.
+
+## Phase 3 — Stalwart scaling (parallel track, not this repo's code)
+
+VNCmail+ has no database and does no caching of its own — every request is
+a live JMAP call to Stalwart. At 100k users, Stalwart's own architecture
+decision matters as much as anything in this repo:
+
+- Storage backend: Stalwart supports RocksDB (single-node) or FoundationDB
+  (distributed, HA) — FoundationDB is the one that scales past a single
+  node.
+- Blob storage: point Stalwart's message-blob storage at an S3-compatible
+  backend — rook-ceph's object gateway (RGW), if enabled, is already
+  sitting on the same cluster.
+- Confirm Stalwart's own capacity plan (connections, IOPS, memory) against
+  the same 100k-user target this doc is aiming for, ideally before Phase 7's
+  load test, not after it fails.
+
+## Phase 4 — Networking & edge
+
+- Create a real `ClusterIssuer` on `node1-3` — **none exists today**. Decide
+  ACME account + DNS-01 or HTTP-01 solver before anything else in this phase.
+- Decide the real production hostname (still an open decision — see
+  `deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/patch-ingress.yaml`'s placeholder).
+- Rate limiting at the Traefik ingress (a `Middleware` CRD) before opening
+  up publicly at this scale — nothing enforces this today.
+- Consider a CDN in front of `_next/static` and other cacheable assets to
+  keep origin load down as user count grows.
+
+## Phase 5 — Observability
+
+Stand up Prometheus + Grafana (or point at existing org tooling if one
+already covers this cluster — worth checking before installing a second
+stack) **before** Phase 2's HPA and **before** Phase 7's load test — you
+need to see what's happening in both. At minimum: request rate/latency/error
+rate per pod, JMAP call latency to Stalwart, PVC/CephFS I/O if Phase 1 went
+the tactical route, and alerting on pod restarts / ImagePullBackOff / cert
+expiry.
+
+## Phase 6 — Security hardening
+
+- `NetworkPolicy` for `vncmail-prod`, mirroring the `vnc-ca` namespace's
+  existing default-deny-plus-narrow-allow pattern — nothing enforces
+  network isolation for `vncmail-prod` today.
+- Confirm the microk8s CNI on `node1-3` actually enforces `NetworkPolicy`
+  (Calico does, flannel-without-a-policy-plugin silently doesn't — the
+  `vnc-ca` README already flags this exact trap, re-verify for this
+  namespace too rather than assuming).
+- Image scanning in the CI build stage.
+- S/MIME CA promotion to prod is its own separate, human-only runbook
+  (`deploy/k8s/ca/README.md` §9) — sequence it, don't bundle it into this
+  plan's steps.
+
+## Phase 7 — Load testing & capacity planning
+
+Model the actual target before guessing replica counts: concurrent users,
+JMAP poll/push connection count, expected sync volume per user, attachment
+upload size/frequency. Run a load test against a **prod-shaped** deployment
+(real storage backend from Phase 1, real Stalwart capacity from Phase 3, HPA
+from Phase 2) before the real cutover — a load test against the sandbox's
+single-hostPath-replica setup would tell you nothing useful about 100k users.
+
+Recommend a staged ramp for the actual rollout (soft-launch a cohort →
+watch Phase 5's dashboards → widen) rather than a single cutover to the full
+100k target on day one.
+
+## Phase 8 — Backup & DR
+
+- rook-ceph snapshot policy for whatever PVCs remain after Phase 1.
+- Stalwart's own backup strategy (backend-owned, but confirm it exists and
+  is tested — a mail server's data loss is a much worse incident than this
+  app's).
+- A written, rehearsed restore runbook — not just "backups exist."
+
+## Go-live sequence (once Phases 1–6 are actually done, not just planned)
+
+1. Register `node1-3` as an ArgoCD-managed cluster (`argocd cluster add`, or
+   an equivalent ServiceAccount+kubeconfig secret) — not done yet, and
+   deliberately not done before this point.
+2. Fill in the real values in `deploy/k8s/overlays/prod/` (hostname, prod
+   Stalwart's `JMAP_SERVER_URL`) and apply `deploy/argocd/vncmail-prod-app.yaml`.
+3. Create the real `vncmail-env` secret + registry pull secret in
+   `vncmail-prod`, by hand, same as dev's one-time bootstrap.
+4. Merge `dev` → `main` (fast-forward only — `git log dev..main` must be
+   empty first).
+5. Click **Sync** on `vncmail-prod` in the ArgoCD UI. This stays a
+   permanent manual gate — there is no plan to automate this step, ever.
+6. Smoke test against the real hostname, watch Phase 5's dashboards, then
+   proceed with Phase 7's staged ramp.
+
+Nothing in Phases 1–8 requires the go-live sequence to happen first — build
+and verify the scaling story in isolation (e.g. on `dev-k8s` at smaller
+scale, or in a throwaway prod-shaped namespace) before the actual cutover.

docs/SANDBOX-DEV-MANUAL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+# VNCmail+ — Sandbox / Dev Manual
+
+Practical, day-to-day guide for developing VNCmail+ and getting changes into
+the sandbox (`dev-k8s-1/2/3` cluster). For the big picture see
+[ARCHITECTURE.md](ARCHITECTURE.md); for how to eventually go live see
+[PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md](PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md).
+
+## 1. Repo & branches
+
+- **Canonical remote**: `gitlab.vnc.biz/gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus`
+  (GitHub `origin` is a passive mirror — never push feature work there).
+- `main` = production (protected, fast-forward-only from `dev`, no direct pushes).
+- `dev` = integration/default branch (protected, MR-required).
+- `vnc/*` or `feature/*` = your working branches → MR into `dev`.
+
+```bash
+git clone git@gitlab.vnc.biz:gitlab-instance-b9b5cf2f/vncmail-plus.git
+cd vncmail-plus
+git checkout -b vnc/my-change dev
+```
+
+## 2. Local development
+
+```bash
+npm ci
+cp .env.dev.example .env.local   # built-in mock JMAP server, DEV_MOCK_JMAP=true
+npm run dev                       # http://localhost:3000, log in with any username/password
+```
+
+The mock JMAP server (`/api/dev-jmap`) means you don't need a real Stalwart
+instance for UI work. Useful scripts:
+
+```bash
+npm run typecheck     # tsc --noEmit
+npm run lint           # eslint .
+npm run test:translations   # vitest, fast
+npm run test:integration    # bash integration/run-tests.sh — spins up a REAL
+                             # Stalwart via docker-compose (integration/), slower
+```
+
+For Electron:
+
+```bash
+npm run electron:dev    # build:standalone + build:electron + launch
+npm run test:electron    # Playwright, no OS permissions needed (Electron CDP)
+```
+
+## 3. Opening a change
+
+1. Push your branch, open a Merge Request into `dev` on GitLab.
+2. The `verify` CI job runs automatically: typecheck, lint, unit tests, build.
+   **This is a required check** — it never pushes an image or touches any
+   cluster, just proves the branch builds.
+3. Get it reviewed, merge.
+
+## 4. What happens after merge — the pipeline
+
+```
+merge to dev
+  → CI `build`: docker build, push registry.gitlab.vnc.biz/.../vncmail-plus:sha-<sha>
+  → CI `bump-dev`: commits that tag into
+    deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/image-tag/kustomization.yaml (a small file CI
+    owns — don't hand-edit it, your edit will be overwritten on the next push)
+  → ArgoCD's `vncmail-dev` Application notices the git change and syncs
+```
+
+CI never runs `kubectl` and holds no cluster credentials — it only talks to
+the registry and to this git repo. ArgoCD (already running on `dev-k8s`,
+found idle when this pipeline was built) does the actual applying.
+
+**Until the one-time bootstrap below is done**, `vncmail-dev`'s sync policy
+is manual on purpose — check its status:
+
+```bash
+ssh dev-k8s-1   # or dev-k8s-2 / dev-k8s-3
+export PATH=/snap/bin:$PATH
+microk8s kubectl -n argocd get application vncmail-dev
+```
+
+Or the UI: `https://argo.devcluster.vnc.de` (`admin` / see
+`kubectl -n argocd get secret argocd-initial-admin-secret -o jsonpath='{.data.password}' | base64 -d` —
+rotate after first login).
+
+## 5. One-time bootstrap (already done or being done — see MR !1 / VNCMAIL-SETUP.md)
+
+Secrets are **never** managed by CI or ArgoCD — created once, by hand:
+
+```bash
+kubectl create secret docker-registry ghcr-pull -n vncmail ...   # or make the registry package public
+cp deploy/k8s/overlays/dev/secret.example.yaml secret.yaml       # edit SESSION_SECRET
+kubectl apply -f secret.yaml
+```
+
+Then a first manual Sync in the ArgoCD UI. Once that's clean, flip
+`deploy/argocd/vncmail-dev-app.yaml`'s `automated:` block on and re-apply —
+from then on, every merge to `dev` deploys itself.
+
+## 6. Checking on the running sandbox
+
+```bash
+ssh dev-k8s-1
+export PATH=/snap/bin:$PATH
+microk8s kubectl -n vncmail get pods,pvc,ingress
+microk8s kubectl -n vncmail logs deploy/vncmail-plus --tail=100 -f
+microk8s kubectl -n vncmail rollout status deploy/vncmail-plus
+```
+
+No local kubeconfig is assumed — everything above is run over `ssh` directly
+on a cluster node (`node1/2/3` for prod, `dev-k8s-1/2/3` for dev), using the
+`microk8s.kubectl` binaries installed there (put `/snap/bin` on `PATH`).
+
+## 7. Troubleshooting
+
+| Symptom | Likely cause |
+|---|---|
+| ArgoCD shows `vncmail-dev` as `ComparisonError` / SSH handshake failed | The ArgoCD deploy key hasn't been added to GitLab yet (Project → Settings → Repository → Deploy keys) |
+| `bump-dev`/`bump-prod` CI job fails to push | `CI_JOB_TOKEN` self-push isn't enabled (Settings → CI/CD → Job token permissions), and no `GITLAB_PUSH_TOKEN` variable is set as a fallback |
+| Pod `ImagePullBackOff` | Registry pull secret missing/expired, or package still private |
+| Pod `CrashLoopBackOff`, `EACCES` on `/app/data` | `securityContext.fsGroup: 1001` must stay set — some storage drivers also need it on the PVC itself |
+| Ingress has no address / no cert | Wrong `ingressClassName` (must be `traefik` on both real clusters) or a missing `ClusterIssuer` — `node1-3` (prod) has **none** configured today |
+| "Ein Fehler ist aufgetreten" on login | Use the full email address (`user@sandbox.vnc.de`), not a bare username — Stalwart auths on the full address |
+
+## 8. Don't touch (out of scope for day-to-day dev)
+
+- `deploy/k8s/ca/` (EJBCA internal CA) — separate namespace `vnc-ca`, own
+  README, root-key ceremony is a manual human-only runbook. Never wire CI or
+  ArgoCD automation into it.
+- `overlays/prod/` and `deploy/argocd/vncmail-prod-app.yaml` — scaffolded,
+  deliberately inert (placeholder hostname, no prod Stalwart, `node1-3` not
+  yet registered with ArgoCD). See [PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md](PRODUCTION-SCALE-OUT-PLAN.md)
+  for what has to happen before any of that becomes real.

docs/VNCMAIL-NATIVE-BUILD-MANUAL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+# VNCmail+ Native & Desktop Client — Build Manual
+
+Status: living document, last updated 2026-08-04. This is the canonical reference for the
+program that takes VNCmail+ (Bulwark) beyond the hosted webmail: an Electron desktop client, a
+React Native mobile client, and a self-hosted push relay, working toward true offline mail with
+an encrypted local index. It consolidates everything decided and built so far across three
+repositories, so nothing lives only in chat history or a session's memory.
+
+Companion documents:
+- `docs/OFFLINE-CLIENT-ARCHITECTURE.md` (in `~/vncmail-plus`) — the original gap analysis this
+  program is based on.
+- `~/.claude/skills/VNCprodbuild/SKILL.md` — the step-by-step build plan this manual reports
+  progress against. That file is the operational checklist; this file is the narrative reference.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Why this program exists
+
+Bulwark/VNCmail+ is a Next.js JMAP webmail app. As shipped, it has zero offline capability: the
+service worker caches nothing by design, there's no local mail store, no local search index, and
+no mobile or desktop native client. The goal of this program is to change that — ship a desktop
+app, a mobile app, real push notifications, and (eventually) a true offline-first local data
+layer with an encrypted search index — without re-deriving work that already exists upstream or
+duplicating effort across repos.
+
+The single most important strategic fact discovered along the way: **an upstream React Native
+mobile client already exists and already solves most of what looked like the hardest problems**
+(auth, multi-account, device pairing, Android push). Building a second mobile client from
+scratch (e.g. wrapping the webmail in Capacitor) would have thrown that away for no reason. The
+whole shape of this program reflects that discovery — see §4.
+
+## 2. Repository map
+
+All three repos are AGPL-3.0 forks of the upstream Bulwark project (`bulwarkmail` on GitHub),
+owned by `brvncde-dotcom`:
+
+| Repo | Forked from | Purpose | Local path |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `vncmail-plus` | `bulwarkmail/webmail` | The Next.js webmail app itself — mail, calendar, contacts, files, admin, plugins. Deploys as a container on microk8s at `vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de`. | `~/vncmail-plus` (⚠️ shared checkout — see §8) |
+| `vncmail-native` | `bulwarkmail/native` | React Native/Expo mobile client (Android + iOS). Beta/WIP upstream. | `~/vncmail-native` |
+| `vncmail-relay` | `bulwarkmail/relay` | Push notification relay — terminates JMAP `PushSubscription` pushes, forwards to FCM (mobile) or Web Push (PWA/desktop). Self-hosted per the decision in §4. | `~/vncmail-relay` |
+
+The webmail's Electron desktop work happens in a **dedicated worktree**, not the shared
+checkout directly: `~/worktrees/vncmail-electron`, branch `claude/electron-desktop`, based off
+`vncmail-plus`'s `dev` branch. This will eventually become a PR into `dev`.
+
+Backend: Stalwart Mail Server (`stalwartlabs/mail-server`), sandbox instance at
+`stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de`, speaking JMAP (mail/calendar/contacts), SMTP, IMAP, and ManageSieve.
+
+## 3. Architecture recap
+
+**The core blocker for "true offline":** `lib/jmap/client.ts` in the webmail is pure `fetch()`,
+zero Node dependencies — it's portable into any WebView, Electron renderer, or React Native
+context unchanged. But everything *around* it in the webmail — auth-cookie encryption
+(`lib/auth/crypto.ts`, uses Node's `node:crypto`), the push relay wiring, and every `app/api/**`
+route — is server-dependent. A native shell that just points a WebView at a bundled static
+export of the webmail won't work without either:
+
+- **Option A — remote shell.** The native wrapper loads the *hosted* URL. Fast, gets native push
+  and an installable binary, but requires connectivity for every screen — not offline.
+- **Option B — true offline-first.** The client authenticates and syncs JMAP data directly against
+  Stalwart, keeps a local encrypted store, and only needs connectivity to *sync*, not to *read*.
+
+For **desktop**, this fork-in-the-road barely matters: Electron can bundle the webmail's own
+standalone Next.js server (the same artifact the `Dockerfile` already produces for the Docker
+image) inside its Node runtime and point a `BrowserWindow` at `localhost`. That's Option A and B
+at the same time, practically for free — see §5.
+
+For **mobile**, the fork-in-the-road is real, which is why §4's discovery mattered so much: it
+meant Option A was already mostly done upstream, letting the plan skip straight to figuring out
+what Option B (the real offline engine) needs — instead of re-building Option A from scratch in
+Capacitor first.
+
+## 4. Decision log
+
+Every entry here was an explicit `[DECISION]` gate in the `VNCprodbuild` skill — resolved either
+by direct research/verification or by explicit user sign-off. Dates are when each was resolved.
+
+| Date | Decision | Resolution | Why |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 2026-08-04 | Does an offline cache need to support multiple accounts per device? | **Yes** | The webmail already has an `account-registry` store; the mobile offline cache must isolate per-account, including per-account SQLCipher keys later. |
+| 2026-08-04 | Does an upstream React Native app already solve push/pairing? | **Yes — `bulwarkmail/native`** has multi-account JMAP auth, full QR cross-device pairing, and Android FCM push via `bulwarkmail/relay`. Forked to `vncmail-native`. | Duplicating working auth/pairing/push code in a fresh Capacitor wrapper has no upside. **This flipped the entire mobile strategy** — see §6. |
+| 2026-08-04 | Self-host the push relay, or depend on upstream's shared hosted instance? | **Self-host.** Forked `bulwarkmail/relay` → `vncmail-relay`. | Keeps push metadata (FCM tokens, timing) on VNC infrastructure rather than a third party's. |
+| 2026-08-04 | Which SQLite library for the eventual SQLCipher-backed local index, and what Expo workflow? | **`expo-sqlite`'s official `useSQLCipher` config-plugin option** (verified via web search — Android/iOS/macOS support, [docs](https://docs.expo.dev/versions/latest/sdk/sqlite/)), not a third-party binding. **Stay Continuous Native Generation** (don't commit `ios`/`android`, let `expo prebuild` regenerate them) rather than going fully bare. | The official plugin already covers this. SQLCipher is unusable in Expo Go — day-to-day development necessarily moves to a custom dev client, which the user explicitly accepted. Going bare would turn every future merge from upstream `bulwarkmail/native` into a native-project merge conflict, for no offsetting benefit. |
+| 2026-08-04 | Electron's background/foreground notification strategy: JMAP WebSocket push, polling, or quit-to-tray? | **JMAP WebSocket push, implemented with automatic SSE fallback — see caveat below.** Confirmed live and available: the Stalwart sandbox's JMAP session resource advertises `urn:ietf:params:jmap:websocket` with `supportsPush: true` (`wss://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de/jmap/ws`), independently confirmed by two separate build agents. | Lower latency, no polling/backoff logic to write, and it's not hypothetical — it's live on the server this build already targets. |
+| 2026-08-04 | Code-signing: Apple Developer ID? Windows cert? | **Apple: yes** (also unblocks Phase 2's iOS push) — **human must actually enroll**, no agent can create the account or pay the ~$99/yr fee. **Windows: yes, eventually** — but ship unsigned for now during this build phase. | Signing is a purchase/account-creation action, categorically outside what an agent can do. |
+
+## 5. Phase 1 — Electron desktop client
+
+**Location:** `~/worktrees/vncmail-electron`, branch `claude/electron-desktop`, 7+ commits ahead
+of `dev` as of this writing. Not pushed, no PR yet — review the worktree directly first.
+
+### What exists
+
+- `electron/main.ts` — boots the exact standalone Next.js server artifact the `Dockerfile`
+  already produces, as a child process on a random localhost port; opens a `BrowserWindow`
+  pointed at it. No parallel server-bundling approach was invented.
+- `electron/preload.ts` — `contextBridge` exposing `window.vnc.isElectron` and
+  `window.vnc.showNotification(title, options)`, wired to Electron's native `Notification` API in
+  the main process.
+- `e2e/electron-smoke.spec.ts` + `playwright.electron.config.ts` — the regression gate, using
+  Playwright's `_electron.launch()`. Run via `npm run test:electron`. Verified green, including
+  against a real packaged (`--dir`) build, not just the dev skeleton.
+- `electron-builder.config.js` + `scripts/assemble-standalone.mjs` + `scripts/build-electron.mjs`
+  — packaging for macOS (`dmg`/`zip`, x64+arm64), Windows (`nsis`), Linux (`AppImage`/`deb`).
+  Currently unsigned.
+- `electron-updater` wired against GitHub Releases (`brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-plus`), defensively
+  wrapped so a failed update check never crashes the app.
+- `.github/workflows/electron-build.yml` — CI matrix (mac/win/linux) with `npm run test:electron`
+  as a required gate before packaging/upload.
+
+### How to build and run it locally
+
+```bash
+cd ~/worktrees/vncmail-electron
+npm install
+npm run electron:dev          # dev loop against the local Next dev server
+npm run build:standalone      # produces the standalone server artifact (same as Docker uses)
+npm run build:electron        # packages via electron-builder (unsigned)
+npm run test:electron         # the smoke-test regression gate
+```
+
+### Two real bugs found and fixed while building this (worth knowing about)
+
+1. **Repo-wide eslint gap.** `vnc/plugins/smime` (an independent sub-package) was missing from
+   the eslint ignore list, so `npm run lint` / the husky pre-commit hook failed for *any* commit
+   touching that path on `dev`, regardless of what changed. Fixed alongside `repos/**`/
+   `examples/**`. **Flag this for whoever reviews the eventual PR** — it's a shared-config fix
+   unrelated to Electron, worth landing on `dev` on its own merits.
+2. **electron-builder `extraResources` footgun.** electron-builder's resource-copy step
+   unconditionally drops any directory literally named `node_modules` when copying
+   `extraResources` — it was silently stripping the bundled standalone server's dependencies and
+   crashing on launch with `Cannot find module 'next'`. Caught only because the build was
+   actually launched and tested, not just configured. Worth remembering for any future
+   electron-builder work generally, not just this project.
+
+### Still open
+
+- **JMAP WebSocket push implementation** (skill steps 6-7) — **DONE.** `getWebSocketUrl()`
+  discovers the endpoint from the session's own capability object (never hardcoded), with
+  exponential-jitter reconnect (200ms base / 5s cap / 3-attempt circuit breaker) and a 30s
+  heartbeat, falling back to the existing SSE/polling chain on failure. A real end-to-end
+  integration test (`integration/tests/11-electron-notification.spec.ts`) logs into the actual
+  Stalwart docker fixture, injects mail over real SMTP, and asserts the native notification
+  fires — not a mocked path. Two real bugs were found and fixed building this: production CSP
+  blocked `wss:` outright (the feature was completely inert in any production build until
+  fixed), and the original backoff timing had a window where a real delivery could be silently
+  missed during a retry cycle.
+  **Caveat, found empirically against the real sandbox server:** `stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de`'s
+  `/jmap/ws` endpoint requires the same HTTP `Authorization` header as every other JMAP endpoint
+  *on the WebSocket handshake itself* — which the browser `WebSocket` API cannot attach (browsers
+  don't allow custom headers on the handshake request). Against this specific server, the client
+  will therefore always fail the WS handshake and fall back to SSE — correctly, by design, but it
+  means "live WebSocket push" is currently unreachable in practice from a browser/Electron
+  client, not just theoretically available. Fixing this for real would need a server-side
+  accommodation (e.g. a short-lived token passed as a WS subprotocol or query parameter) — that's
+  a Stalwart-side change, out of scope for this client work. Functionally nothing is broken (SSE
+  fallback works), but don't expect WS to actually engage against this sandbox until that's
+  addressed.
+- **Code signing** — blocked on the human actually enrolling in the Apple Developer Program
+  (§4). Once done, wiring the signing identity + notarization into `electron-builder` and CI
+  secrets is a config change, not a rewrite — the current config is structured for it.
+- **App icon** — using the 512×512 PWA icon as a stand-in.
+  `public/branding/Bulwark_Icon_App.svg` should be rasterized at 1024×1024+ for a proper icon; no
+  SVG rasterization tooling was available in-agent.
+- **Internal dogfood gate** — a human should install an unsigned build locally and sign off on
+  UX before this goes any further (wider rollout, PR, etc.).
+
+## 6. Phase 2 — Native mobile client + push relay
+
+### 6.1 `vncmail-native` — what it already had vs. what this program added
+
+Upstream `bulwarkmail/native` (forked as-is, no rewrite) already ships:
+
+- Multi-account JMAP sign-in against any server.
+- Full QR-code cross-device pairing (`src/screens/LoginScreen.tsx`, `QrScanModal`,
+  `redeemPairingCode`/OAuth handoff in `src/lib/oauth.ts`).
+- Android push notifications via FCM, dispatched through `bulwarkmail/relay`.
+- A basic offline mail cache (`src/lib/offline-sync.ts`, `src/stores/offline-cache-store.ts`) —
+  bulk-downloads the last N days of mail via `Email/query`+`Email/get` into AsyncStorage, with a
+  size cap and eviction. **Not** the delta-sync/SQLCipher/FTS engine §7 describes — a periodic
+  bulk re-download, not incremental sync, plain JSON not an encrypted database.
+- Android + iOS release pipelines already working (`release-android.yml` sideloads an APK from
+  GitHub Releases; `release-ios.yml` + `docs/ios-release.md` ship to TestFlight) — iOS *builds*
+  already work, just without push (Android-only so far per its own README).
+
+This program's first pass (2026-08-04) added, without touching any of the above:
+- Verified `npm install`, typecheck, and the existing test suite all pass cleanly (429/430 tests;
+  one pre-existing, unrelated transform failure in `src/stores/__tests__/auth-store.test.ts`, not
+  introduced by this work — worth a look eventually, not urgent).
+- Confirmed live reachability to `stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de` (HTTP 307 → `/jmap/session`, valid
+  JMAP session JSON returned) — and incidentally re-confirmed the WebSocket push capability from
+  §4/§5.
+- Added `.github/workflows/android-emulator-smoke.yml` — builds the debug APK, boots a cached
+  AVD via `reactivecircus/android-emulator-runner`, installs, launches the app, fails on process
+  death or a `FATAL EXCEPTION` in logcat within a settle window.
+
+### How to build and run it locally
+
+```bash
+cd ~/vncmail-native
+npm install
+npx expo start          # Expo Go works fine UNTIL SQLCipher is added (§4) — see note below
+```
+
+**Once SQLCipher work starts (§7):** switch to a custom dev client — `npx expo prebuild` +
+`npx expo run:android` / `npx expo run:ios`, or an EAS development build. Expo Go cannot run an
+app with `useSQLCipher` enabled. Do not commit the generated `ios`/`android` directories —
+Continuous Native Generation regenerates them from config plugins on each build (§4).
+
+### 6.2 `vncmail-relay` — self-hosted push relay
+
+Forked as-is from `bulwarkmail/relay`. This program added:
+
+- `deploy/k8s/{namespace,pvc,secret.example,deployment,service,ingress,kustomization}.yaml` +
+  `deploy/k8s/README.md` — mirrors the conventions already used to deploy `vncmail-plus` on
+  microk8s (same namespace, same Recreate-strategy/PVC pattern). **One deliberately unresolved
+  item:** the relay's own Dockerfile creates its runtime user via unpinned `adduser -S` (unlike
+  `vncmail-plus`'s documented uid 1001) — `runAsUser`/`fsGroup` are left unset in the manifest
+  with instructions to verify against the real built image before first deploy, rather than
+  guessing a UID.
+- `.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml` — publishes to `ghcr.io/brvncde-dotcom/vncmail-relay`,
+  same multi-arch buildx/digest-merge structure as `vncmail-plus`'s own publish workflow.
+- `SETUP-VNC.md` — documents a generated VAPID keypair (values are in that file only, referenced
+  by name — not the actual secret — in `secret.example.yaml`'s placeholders) and flags what's
+  still human-owned before this can go live: a dedicated Firebase project + its FCM
+  service-account JSON.
+
+**Not done, and deliberately so:** no `kubectl apply` was run — there is no kubeconfig available
+in the build environment; deploying is a human-only action. The manifests and a full runbook are
+ready in `deploy/k8s/README.md`, waiting on:
+
+1. Create a dedicated Firebase project (not reusing `vncmail-plus`'s or `src-website`'s) and
+   generate its service-account JSON.
+2. `kubectl apply` the manifests (with real secrets substituted for `secret.example.yaml`'s
+   placeholders) against the microk8s cluster.
+3. Once the relay is live and reachable (e.g. `vncmail-relay.sandbox.vnc.de`), repoint both
+   `vncmail-plus`'s `DEFAULT_RELAY_BASE_URL` and `vncmail-native`'s equivalent relay base URL
+   (check `src/api/push.ts`/`src/lib/push-notifications.ts`) at it instead of upstream's shared
+   instance. Re-run the webmail's existing Web Push smoke path end-to-end against the new relay
+   before treating it as the default.
+
+## 7. Remaining roadmap (not yet started)
+
+In rough order, per the `VNCprodbuild` skill:
+
+1. **iOS push (`vncmail-native`)** — blocked on the human's Apple Developer Program enrollment
+   (§4/§5). `vncmail-native` already builds for iOS and ships via TestFlight; only push and
+   client certs are missing.
+2. **JMAP delta-sync engine** — replace `offline-sync.ts`'s bulk AsyncStorage download with a
+   real `Email/changes`/`Mailbox/changes` cursor-based incremental sync. **This is the
+   highest-stakes step in the entire program** — the skill calls for high/xhigh reasoning effort
+   plus an independent, fresh-context agent adversarially reviewing the design before any
+   implementation starts. Not yet begun.
+3. **SQLCipher local store** — swap AsyncStorage for `expo-sqlite` with `useSQLCipher: true`
+   (§4), one isolated database/key per account (multi-account confirmed required, §4). Needs an
+   explicit, security-sign-off decision on key derivation/lifecycle (from-password vs.
+   device-random-key wrapped by biometric; wipe-on-logout) before implementation — do not let an
+   agent default this silently.
+4. **FTS5 search index** — SQLite FTS5 population job tied to the sync engine above.
+5. **Offline compose/outbox** — queue composed messages while offline, replay via JMAP
+   `Email/set` on reconnect, handle conflicts.
+6. **Platform hardening** — background refresh scheduling (`BGTaskScheduler`/`WorkManager`),
+   Apple export-compliance declaration (`ITSAppUsesNonExemptEncryption`, triggered once SQLCipher
+   ships in the iOS binary — an agent can draft the text, only a human can file it), Google Play
+   Console account/signing key, final store submissions.
+7. **Fix the webmail's own no-op service worker** — `public/sw.js` intentionally caches nothing
+   today; adding Workbox-style precaching of the app shell is a cheap, independent improvement to
+   the PWA's offline-shell behavior, unrelated to the native-client work above.
+
+## 8. Known landmines
+
+- **`~/vncmail-plus` is a shared, actively-used checkout.** Other sessions commit and switch
+  branches there concurrently. An untracked file written directly into that checkout was lost
+  mid-session to a concurrent branch switch — confirmed incident, 2026-08-04. **Any work meant
+  to persist must go into a dedicated worktree (like `~/worktrees/vncmail-electron`) or be
+  committed immediately** — never leave meaningful uncommitted/untracked work sitting in the
+  shared checkout.
+- **`~/vncmail-native` and `~/vncmail-relay` are fresh clones** (created 2026-08-04) with no
+  confirmed concurrent-session activity yet — lower risk today, but don't assume that stays true
+  as more work lands there.
+- **electron-builder + `node_modules`** — see §5's bug writeup; a general electron-builder
+  landmine, not specific to this codebase.
+- **Expo Go + SQLCipher are mutually exclusive** — see §4/§6.1. The moment `useSQLCipher` is
+  enabled, Expo Go can no longer run the app at all; this is a hard platform constraint, not a
+  configuration bug to work around.
+- **Electron's random localhost port breaks JMAP login against the sandbox Stalwart —
+  deferred, not fixed, 2026-08-04.** User confirmed testing the packaged Electron app directly
+  against `stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de` (not `localhost`) hit a CORS-shaped login failure. Verified
+  server-side: Stalwart's own CORS headers are correctly wildcarded (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`)
+  on every hop including the `.well-known/jmap` → `/jmap/session` redirect — so this is not a
+  Stalwart allow-list problem. Also found, separately: `vncmail.sandbox.vnc.de` (the documented
+  deployed webmail domain) currently does not resolve (NXDOMAIN) — unrelated to this bug but
+  worth knowing regardless. Leading theory, not yet confirmed against real browser devtools:
+  `electron/main.ts` binds the bundled Next.js server via `server.listen(0, ...)` — a random
+  OS-assigned port every launch — producing a different origin on every run; even if that origin
+  were allow-listed once, it wouldn't stay valid. **User explicitly said skip this for now** —
+  Electron packaging/building itself works, this only affects live login against the sandbox.
+  Fix path when revisited: bind Electron's local server to a fixed port instead of `0`.
+
+## 9. Before merging any of this
+
+None of the three repos' branches described here have been pushed or opened as a PR. Before
+that happens:
+
+- Run the full existing test/lint suites in each repo, not just the new smoke tests added here.
+- `vncmail-plus` has its own `VERSION`/`CHANGELOG.md` convention (currently `1.7.8`) — a version
+  bump belongs at actual release/merge time, not mid-feature-branch; this manual deliberately
+  did not touch either file.
+- Cross-check the eslint-ignore fix (§5) lands even if the rest of the Electron work is split out
+  or delayed — it's an independent, valuable fix on its own.

e2e/electron-live-sandbox.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+import { test, expect, _electron as electron } from '@playwright/test';
+import type { ElectronApplication, Page } from '@playwright/test';
+import path from 'node:path';
+
+// Live-sandbox verification run (not part of the regular regression suite).
+//
+// Unlike e2e/electron-smoke.spec.ts (which deliberately uses a fake
+// JMAP_SERVER_URL just to skip the /setup wizard, and never expects a real
+// server on the other end), this spec launches the exact same packaged
+// artifact against the REAL sandbox JMAP backend at
+// https://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de and proves:
+//   1. the login screen renders with no TLS/network errors reaching that host
+//   2. submitting an obviously-fake, nonexistent test credential produces a
+//      structured "invalid credentials" style response from the real server
+//      (not a network failure) - proving the renderer -> Next API route ->
+//      real JMAP server round trip works end-to-end, without ever using or
+//      guessing a real account's credentials.
+const projectRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+const SANDBOX_URL = 'https://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de';
+
+test.describe('Electron desktop shell - live sandbox connectivity', () => {
+  let electronApp: ElectronApplication;
+  let appWindow: Page;
+  const pageErrors: Error[] = [];
+  const networkFailures: string[] = [];
+
+  test.beforeAll(async () => {
+    electronApp = await electron.launch({
+      args: [projectRoot],
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: SANDBOX_URL,
+        SESSION_SECRET: process.env.SESSION_SECRET || 'live-sandbox-verification-run',
+        NODE_ENV: 'production',
+      },
+    });
+
+    appWindow = await electronApp.firstWindow();
+    appWindow.on('pageerror', (error) => {
+      pageErrors.push(error);
+    });
+    appWindow.on('requestfailed', (request) => {
+      networkFailures.push(`${request.method()} ${request.url()} - ${request.failure()?.errorText}`);
+    });
+    await appWindow.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
+  });
+
+  test.afterAll(async () => {
+    await electronApp?.close();
+  });
+
+  test('renders the real login screen (not SETUP REQUIRED) with no network/TLS errors', async () => {
+    const bodyText = await appWindow.locator('body').innerText();
+    expect(bodyText).not.toContain('SETUP REQUIRED');
+    expect(bodyText).not.toContain('Setup Required');
+
+    const emailInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="text"]').first();
+    const passwordInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="password"]').first();
+    await expect(emailInput).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20000 });
+    await expect(passwordInput).toBeVisible();
+
+    await appWindow.screenshot({
+      path: path.join(projectRoot, 'live-sandbox-login-screen.png'),
+      fullPage: true,
+    });
+
+    expect(pageErrors.map((e) => e.message).join('\n')).not.toMatch(/ERR_CERT|ERR_CONNECTION|ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED|ECONNREFUSED/i);
+    expect(networkFailures.join('\n')).not.toMatch(/ERR_CERT|ERR_CONNECTION|ERR_NAME_NOT_RESOLVED|ECONNREFUSED/i);
+  });
+
+  test('submitting a nonexistent test credential reaches the real JMAP server and returns a structured auth error (no real account used/guessed)', async () => {
+    const emailInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="text"]').first();
+    const passwordInput = appWindow.locator('input[type="password"]').first();
+
+    // Deliberately fake, nonexistent address - not a real account, not a
+    // guess against one. This only proves the pipe to the real server works.
+    await emailInput.fill('electron-live-sandbox-verify-8f2c@invalid-test.example');
+    await passwordInput.fill('not-a-real-password-8f2c');
+
+    const allResponses: { url: string; status: number }[] = [];
+    appWindow.on('response', (res) => {
+      allResponses.push({ url: res.url(), status: res.status() });
+    });
+
+    await appWindow.locator('button[type="submit"]').first().click();
+
+    // The important assertion: the app renders a structured "invalid
+    // credentials" style error sourced from the real JMAP server's rejection
+    // (visible in whatever locale the app negotiated), not a network/TLS
+    // failure. A real connectivity break to stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de would
+    // instead surface as a generic network-error message or a stuck spinner.
+    const errorBanner = appWindow.getByText(/invalid|ungültig|incorrect|falsch|unauthorized/i).first();
+    await expect(errorBanner).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15000 });
+    const errorText = await errorBanner.innerText();
+    console.log('[live-sandbox] login error banner text:', errorText);
+    expect(errorText.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    expect(errorText).not.toMatch(/network error|failed to fetch|ERR_CERT|ERR_CONNECTION|ECONNREFUSED/i);
+
+    await appWindow.screenshot({
+      path: path.join(projectRoot, 'live-sandbox-after-failed-login-attempt.png'),
+      fullPage: true,
+    });
+
+    console.log('[live-sandbox] ALL responses observed after click:', JSON.stringify(allResponses, null, 2));
+    const authResponses = allResponses.filter((r) => r.url.includes('/api/auth/'));
+    if (authResponses.length > 0) {
+      for (const r of authResponses) {
+        expect(r.status).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+        expect(r.status).toBeLessThan(500);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+});

e2e/electron-smoke.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+import { test, expect, _electron as electron } from '@playwright/test';
+import type { ElectronApplication, Page } from '@playwright/test';
+import path from 'node:path';
+
+// Regression gate for the Electron desktop shell (electron/main.ts +
+// electron/preload.ts). Launches the real skeleton - the same standalone
+// Next.js server artifact the Dockerfile produces, booted as a child
+// process by main.ts, with a real BrowserWindow on top - and asserts the
+// login screen renders with zero uncaught page errors. Every later step in
+// the Electron rollout (notification bridge, realtime sync, packaging) must
+// keep this green; run it before touching anything else.
+//
+// Requires `npm run build:standalone && npm run build:electron` to have run
+// first (see package.json's `electron:dev`/`test:electron` scripts, which
+// this suite assumes but does not itself trigger, matching how
+// playwright.config.ts's browser suite assumes `npm run build` for its own
+// prod-mode runs).
+const projectRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+
+test.describe('Electron desktop shell', () => {
+  let electronApp: ElectronApplication;
+  // Named `appWindow`, not `window` - the latter would shadow the DOM
+  // global inside every `appWindow.evaluate(() => window...)` callback
+  // below, silently breaking their typing (evaluate() callbacks run in the
+  // browser context, where `window` must resolve to the DOM global).
+  let appWindow: Page;
+  const pageErrors: Error[] = [];
+
+  test.beforeAll(async () => {
+    electronApp = await electron.launch({
+      args: [projectRoot],
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        // Bypass the first-run setup wizard (lib/setup/state.ts's
+        // "bootstrap" state, which 302s everything to /setup) without
+        // needing a reachable JMAP server just to prove the login screen
+        // renders - any non-empty JMAP_SERVER_URL is enough to reach
+        // "env-managed" state and serve the normal app shell.
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: 'https://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de',
+        SESSION_SECRET: 'electron-smoke-test-not-for-production',
+        NODE_ENV: 'production',
+      },
+    });
+
+    appWindow = await electronApp.firstWindow();
+    appWindow.on('pageerror', (error) => {
+      pageErrors.push(error);
+    });
+    await appWindow.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
+  });
+
+  test.afterAll(async () => {
+    await electronApp?.close();
+  });
+
+  test('boots the standalone server and renders the login screen', async () => {
+    // Same selectors as e2e/login.spec.ts's browser-based check - the
+    // shell should render the identical login form, not a different view.
+    await expect(appWindow.locator('input[type="text"]')).toBeVisible({ timeout: 20000 });
+    await expect(appWindow.locator('input[type="password"]')).toBeVisible();
+  });
+
+  test('exposes the contextBridge API to the renderer', async () => {
+    const isElectron = await appWindow.evaluate(() => window.vnc?.isElectron);
+    expect(isElectron).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('produces zero uncaught page errors', () => {
+    expect(pageErrors).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  test('the native notification bridge round-trips through IPC', async () => {
+    // Not asserting a real OS toast appears - that isn't observable in CI
+    // (headless runners/CI accounts routinely have no notification
+    // permission, and Notification.isSupported() can legitimately be
+    // false). What matters is that window.vnc.showNotification (exposed by
+    // electron/preload.ts's contextBridge) actually reaches the main
+    // process's ipcMain.handle("vnc:show-notification", ...) and resolves -
+    // proving the renderer -> preload -> main -> Electron Notification API
+    // plumbing is wired, not just that `window.vnc` exists.
+    const result = await appWindow.evaluate(async () => {
+      return window.vnc?.showNotification('Electron smoke test', {
+        body: 'IPC round-trip check',
+      });
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toBeDefined();
+    expect(typeof result?.shown).toBe('boolean');
+  });
+});

electron-builder.config.js

@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// electron-builder config for the VNCmail+ (Bulwark) desktop shell.
+//
+// Phase 1 of the VNCprodbuild rollout (~/.claude/skills/VNCprodbuild/SKILL.md):
+//   step 1 - base config, no targets (superseded by this file)
+//   step 6 - this file: real packaging targets + branding icon (below)
+//   step 7 - this file's `publish` block + electron/main.ts's
+//            setupAutoUpdater() - electron-updater against GitHub Releases.
+//   step 9 - still open: code signing / notarization (Apple Developer ID,
+//            optional Windows cert) - both are human-owned purchases, not
+//            configured here. Builds below ship UNSIGNED.
+module.exports = {
+  appId: "de.vnc.vncmailplus",
+  productName: "VNCmail+",
+  copyright: "Copyright © VNC AG",
+  directories: {
+    output: "dist-electron-builds",
+  },
+  // The packaged app (`files` below) is plain esbuild-bundled JS - no native
+  // node modules of its own. The one native dependency anywhere in the repo,
+  // @signalapp/sqlcipher (used by lib/mail-index/**), ships its own prebuilt
+  // .node binaries for every platform/arch and is copied in wholesale by
+  // scripts/assemble-standalone.mjs as part of the extraResources standalone
+  // bundle below - it is never rebuilt by electron-builder.
+  //
+  // Without this, electron-builder's default @electron/rebuild pass scans
+  // the ENTIRE node_modules tree (not just what's actually packaged) for
+  // anything with a native binding and tries to recompile it from source
+  // against Electron's ABI via node-gyp. That caught @parcel/watcher - a
+  // transitive devDependency of some dev tool, never shipped in this app -
+  // and hard-failed the whole packaging step on any machine without a full
+  // Xcode Command Line Tools install (`gyp: No Xcode or CLT version
+  // detected!`), even though nothing that rebuild step touches is part of
+  // the artifact. Verified by execution: builds failed with npmRebuild at
+  // its default (true) and succeeded once set to false.
+  npmRebuild: false,
+  files: ["dist-electron/**/*", "package.json"],
+  extraResources: [
+    {
+      // Same artifact the Dockerfile bakes into the container image (see
+      // Dockerfile + scripts/assemble-standalone.mjs). electron/main.ts
+      // reads it from process.resourcesPath in packaged builds.
+      //
+      // Deliberately `from: ".next"` (not ".next/standalone") + a filter,
+      // not the more obvious `from: ".next/standalone"` alone:
+      // app-builder-lib's copy filter unconditionally drops a directory
+      // literally named "node_modules" sitting at the copy root (see
+      // node_modules/app-builder-lib/out/util/filter.js's
+      // `relative === "node_modules"` check - it assumes extraResources are
+      // hand-authored assets, not a pre-built server with a traced
+      // node_modules of its own). Copying from one level up so
+      // "standalone/node_modules" is never the literal copy root sidesteps
+      // that check, so the standalone server's node_modules actually
+      // survives into the packaged app instead of getting silently
+      // stripped (caught by manually launching a --dir build - the packaged
+      // server crashed with "Cannot find module 'next'").
+      from: ".next",
+      filter: ["standalone/**/*"],
+      to: ".",
+    },
+  ],
+  // Dedicated 1024x1024 app icon: the SRC symbol centred on the SRC dark
+  // ground (#09090b), generated from public/branding/SRC_Symbol.png into
+  // build-resources/app-icon.png (NOT build/ - that's electron-builder's own
+  // gitignored output dir; a source asset living inside it would never get
+  // committed, which is exactly the bug this comment is warning about one
+  // paragraph down). 1024 is the size macOS actually wants for the largest
+  // icns representation ("ICON512@2x"), so nothing gets upsampled.
+  //
+  // Deliberately NOT public/icon-512x512.png (what this used to point at):
+  // that file is the *web* PWA manifest icon, so retouching it for the
+  // desktop app silently changes the browser/PWA install icon too. Separate
+  // source, separate concern.
+  //
+  // NOTE for whoever runs this next: electron-builder does NOT auto-detect a
+  // file named `electron-builder.config.js` - its search list is
+  // electron-builder.{yml,yaml,json,json5,js,cjs,mjs,ts}. Packaging must be
+  // invoked with an explicit `--config electron-builder.config.js`, or every
+  // setting in this file is silently ignored and you get stock defaults
+  // (default Electron atom icon, `dist/` output, productName taken from
+  // package.json's `name`). See the `dist:*` scripts in package.json, which
+  // exist so nobody has to remember that.
+  icon: "build-resources/app-icon.png",
+  mac: {
+    target: [
+      { target: "dmg", arch: ["x64", "arm64"] },
+      { target: "zip", arch: ["x64", "arm64"] },
+    ],
+    category: "public.app-category.productivity",
+    // No Apple Developer ID yet (VNCprodbuild step 9) - ship unsigned/
+    // un-notarized for now. hardenedRuntime is meaningless without signing
+    // but left explicit so it's obvious what step 9 needs to flip on.
+    hardenedRuntime: false,
+  },
+  afterSign: "scripts/after-sign.cjs",
+  win: {
+    target: [{ target: "nsis", arch: ["x64"] }],
+  },
+  nsis: {
+    oneClick: false,
+    allowToChangeInstallationDirectory: true,
+  },
+  linux: {
+    target: [
+      { target: "AppImage", arch: ["x64"] },
+      { target: "deb", arch: ["x64"] },
+    ],
+    category: "Network;Email;",
+  },
+  // electron-updater feed (see electron/main.ts's setupAutoUpdater()).
+  // GitHub Releases, not a new distribution channel - the skill's
+  // recommendation since this repo is already private and this needs no
+  // extra infrastructure. "Light decision" per VNCprodbuild step 7, not
+  // blocking, but flagged: switching later (e.g. to a self-hosted update
+  // server) would mean revisiting this block and the `provider` electron-
+  // updater talks to.
+  publish: {
+    provider: "github",
+    owner: "brvncde-dotcom",
+    repo: "vncmail-plus",
+  },
+};

electron/key-service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+// Main-process key service for the local search index.
+//
+// The index database is SQLCipher-encrypted with a random per-account 32-byte
+// key. That key is wrapped with Electron's `safeStorage` (OS keychain / DPAPI /
+// libsecret-or-kwallet) and stored under the store directory. Only the main
+// process can call `safeStorage`, but the index itself lives in the standalone
+// Next.js server child process - so the unwrapped key has to cross one process
+// boundary.
+//
+// TRANSPORT: an inherited file descriptor (fd 3), NOT an environment variable.
+// A nonce or key passed through the spawned process's environment is readable
+// by any other process running as the same OS user (`ps eww`, /proc/<pid>/environ),
+// which would defeat the entire point of using the OS keychain. An inherited fd
+// is not exposed to process listing. libuv creates extra stdio "pipe" entries
+// as socketpairs, so fd 3 is duplex - verified by execution through Electron's
+// own spawn before this was built on.
+//
+// The server side asks for a key only when a reindex job actually runs and drops
+// it when the job finishes (see lib/mail-index/key.ts) - there is no long-lived
+// resident copy anywhere.
+import { safeStorage } from "electron";
+import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+import type { Readable, Writable } from "node:stream";
+
+/** Must match lib/mail-index/paths.ts's accountFileToken(). */
+function accountFileToken(accountId: string): string {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(accountId, "utf8").digest("hex").slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+function keyFilePath(storeDir: string, accountId: string): string {
+  return path.join(storeDir, "keys", `${accountFileToken(accountId)}.bin`);
+}
+
+export type KeyServiceFailure =
+  /** No OS keyring at all - see the Linux note in checkEncryptionAvailable(). */
+  | "no-secure-storage"
+  /** Reading/writing the wrapped key file failed. */
+  | "key-io-failed"
+  /** The wrapped key exists but safeStorage could not decrypt it. */
+  | "key-unreadable";
+
+export class KeyServiceError extends Error {
+  code: KeyServiceFailure;
+  constructor(code: KeyServiceFailure, message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = "KeyServiceError";
+    this.code = code;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decides whether we are willing to store an encryption key on this system.
+ *
+ * The Linux caveat is the reason this is a function and not a one-liner:
+ * `safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable()` can return **true** on Linux while the
+ * data is protected by a hardcoded, publicly-known password, with
+ * `getSelectedStorageBackend()` reporting `basic_text`. That is worse than an
+ * honest failure, because it looks like it worked. So a `basic_text` backend is
+ * treated as "no secure storage" and the feature refuses to materialise
+ * anything - the index is a convenience, and silently pretending a mailbox is
+ * encrypted when it is not is not a trade worth making.
+ *
+ * `getSelectedStorageBackend()` is **Linux-only** and throws elsewhere, hence
+ * the platform guard. Both calls also require `app.whenReady()`.
+ */
+export function checkEncryptionAvailable(): { ok: true } | { ok: false; reason: string } {
+  if (!safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable()) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "The OS reports no secure storage available for encryption keys." };
+  }
+  if (process.platform === "linux") {
+    let backend: string;
+    try {
+      backend = safeStorage.getSelectedStorageBackend();
+    } catch {
+      // Older/newer Electron, or called too early. Be conservative.
+      return { ok: false, reason: "Could not determine the Linux secret-storage backend." };
+    }
+    if (backend === "basic_text" || backend === "unknown") {
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        reason:
+          `No OS keyring is available (backend: ${backend}). Electron would "encrypt" the key ` +
+          `with a hardcoded password, which provides no real protection, so the encrypted ` +
+          `local index is disabled on this system.`,
+      };
+    }
+  }
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+
+/** Fetches the account's raw index key, creating and wrapping one on first use. */
+function getOrCreateKey(storeDir: string, accountId: string): Buffer {
+  const availability = checkEncryptionAvailable();
+  if (!availability.ok) {
+    throw new KeyServiceError("no-secure-storage", availability.reason);
+  }
+
+  const file = keyFilePath(storeDir, accountId);
+
+  if (fs.existsSync(file)) {
+    let wrapped: Buffer;
+    try {
+      wrapped = fs.readFileSync(file);
+    } catch (error) {
+      throw new KeyServiceError("key-io-failed", `Could not read the key file: ${String(error)}`);
+    }
+    let hex: string;
+    try {
+      hex = safeStorage.decryptString(wrapped);
+    } catch (error) {
+      // Most likely cause on macOS: the app's code identity changed (unsigned
+      // builds get a fresh ad-hoc signature per build), so the Keychain ACL no
+      // longer matches. Not recoverable and not a user secret - the caller
+      // deletes the database and re-indexes.
+      throw new KeyServiceError(
+        "key-unreadable",
+        `The stored key could not be decrypted (${String(error)}). It must be recreated.`,
+      );
+    }
+    const key = Buffer.from(hex.trim(), "hex");
+    if (key.length === 32) return key;
+    // Corrupt payload: fall through and mint a new one.
+  }
+
+  const key = randomBytes(32);
+  let wrapped: Buffer;
+  try {
+    wrapped = safeStorage.encryptString(key.toString("hex"));
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new KeyServiceError("no-secure-storage", `Could not wrap the key: ${String(error)}`);
+  }
+  try {
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    // Write-then-rename so a crash mid-write cannot leave a truncated wrapped
+    // key that would look like "key-unreadable" forever.
+    const tmp = `${file}.tmp-${process.pid}`;
+    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, wrapped, { mode: 0o600 });
+    fs.renameSync(tmp, file);
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new KeyServiceError("key-io-failed", `Could not persist the key: ${String(error)}`);
+  }
+  return key;
+}
+
+function deleteKey(storeDir: string, accountId: string): void {
+  try {
+    fs.rmSync(keyFilePath(storeDir, accountId), { force: true });
+  } catch {
+    /* best effort - the caller is purging anyway */
+  }
+}
+
+interface Request {
+  id?: unknown;
+  op?: unknown;
+  accountId?: unknown;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serves newline-delimited JSON requests from the standalone server over the
+ * inherited fd. One line in, one line out, no streaming and no state.
+ */
+export function attachKeyService(
+  channel: (Readable & Writable) | null | undefined,
+  storeDir: string,
+): void {
+  if (!channel) {
+    console.error("[electron] key service: no channel on fd 3; the local index will be disabled");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  let buffer = "";
+  const respond = (payload: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+    try {
+      channel.write(`${JSON.stringify(payload)}\n`);
+    } catch (error) {
+      console.error("[electron] key service: failed to write response:", error);
+    }
+  };
+
+  channel.on("data", (chunk: Buffer | string) => {
+    buffer += typeof chunk === "string" ? chunk : chunk.toString("utf8");
+    // Guard against a peer that never sends a newline.
+    if (buffer.length > 64 * 1024) buffer = "";
+
+    let newline: number;
+    while ((newline = buffer.indexOf("\n")) >= 0) {
+      const line = buffer.slice(0, newline);
+      buffer = buffer.slice(newline + 1);
+      if (!line.trim()) continue;
+
+      let req: Request;
+      try {
+        req = JSON.parse(line) as Request;
+      } catch {
+        respond({ id: null, ok: false, code: "bad-request", error: "Malformed request" });
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      const id = typeof req.id === "number" ? req.id : null;
+      const accountId = typeof req.accountId === "string" ? req.accountId : "";
+      if (!accountId) {
+        respond({ id, ok: false, code: "bad-request", error: "Missing accountId" });
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      try {
+        if (req.op === "getIndexKey") {
+          const key = getOrCreateKey(storeDir, accountId);
+          respond({ id, ok: true, key: key.toString("hex") });
+          key.fill(0);
+        } else if (req.op === "deleteIndexKey") {
+          deleteKey(storeDir, accountId);
+          respond({ id, ok: true });
+        } else {
+          respond({ id, ok: false, code: "bad-request", error: `Unknown op: ${String(req.op)}` });
+        }
+      } catch (error) {
+        const code = error instanceof KeyServiceError ? error.code : "key-io-failed";
+        const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+        respond({ id, ok: false, code, error: message });
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  channel.on("error", (error: unknown) => {
+    console.error("[electron] key service channel error:", error);
+  });
+}

electron/main.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+// Electron main process for the VNCmail+ (Bulwark) desktop shell.
+//
+// Boots the exact same Next.js "standalone" server artifact the Dockerfile
+// already produces for production (see next.config.ts's `output:
+// "standalone"` and the Dockerfile's builder stage) as a child process on a
+// random localhost port, then opens a BrowserWindow pointed at it. This is
+// deliberately the same server, not a reimplementation - lib/jmap/client.ts
+// and every app/api/** route behave identically to the web deployment.
+import { app, BrowserWindow, ipcMain, Notification } from "electron";
+import { autoUpdater } from "electron-updater";
+import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
+import { createServer } from "node:net";
+import { get as httpGet } from "node:http";
+import path from "node:path";
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import type { Duplex } from "node:stream";
+import { attachKeyService, checkEncryptionAvailable } from "./key-service";
+
+let serverProcess: ChildProcess | null = null;
+let mainWindow: BrowserWindow | null = null;
+
+/**
+ * Root for the encrypted local search index (lib/mail-index/**). Under
+ * `userData`, so it is per-OS-user and removed with the app's data.
+ *
+ * Passing this to the server child process is what ACTIVATES the index: the
+ * routes 404 without it. That matters because the standalone server is the same
+ * artifact the production Dockerfile ships to multi-tenant deployments, where a
+ * server-side index of every user's mail would be badly wrong. One variable
+ * both enables the feature and supplies its path, so the two cannot drift apart.
+ */
+function getIndexStoreDir(): string {
+  return path.join(app.getPath("userData"), "offline");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Every writable data dir the standalone server uses, redirected under
+ * `userData`.
+ *
+ * WITHOUT this, all four default to `<cwd>/data/*` (see lib/admin/paths.ts,
+ * lib/settings-sync.ts, lib/telemetry/state.ts, lib/version-check/state.ts),
+ * and in a packaged build cwd is `.../VNCmail+.app/Contents/Resources/standalone`
+ * - i.e. the app writes its own runtime state INSIDE its own bundle. Three
+ * separate failure modes, all observed rather than theorised:
+ *
+ *  1. It INVALIDATES THE CODE SIGNATURE. A signed .app seals its Resources;
+ *     writing there breaks the seal, so `codesign --verify` starts failing
+ *     ("code has no resources but signature indicates they must be present")
+ *     and macOS reports the app as *damaged* on a later launch. Verified on
+ *     an installed copy in /Applications: signature valid at install time,
+ *     exit 1 after the app had run once and written data/admin + data/telemetry.
+ *     Deep-signing the bundle at build time (scripts/after-sign.cjs) is
+ *     necessary but NOT sufficient on its own - the app immediately breaks
+ *     its own signature at runtime unless the writes go elsewhere.
+ *  2. An app update replaces the bundle, silently destroying the user's admin
+ *     config, settings and setup state.
+ *  3. It fails outright wherever the bundle isn't user-writable.
+ *
+ * `userData` is the correct home for per-user mutable state on every platform
+ * and is where the search index already lives, so this keeps one convention.
+ */
+function getServerDataDirs(): Record<string, string> {
+  const root = app.getPath("userData");
+  return {
+    ADMIN_CONFIG_DIR: path.join(root, "admin"),
+    ADMIN_STATE_DIR: path.join(root, "admin-state"),
+    SETTINGS_DATA_DIR: path.join(root, "settings"),
+    TELEMETRY_DATA_DIR: path.join(root, "telemetry"),
+    VERSION_CHECK_DATA_DIR: path.join(root, "version-check"),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Desktop-shell defaults for a fresh, un-configured install.
+ *
+ * Setting JMAP_SERVER_URL puts the standalone server into "env-managed"
+ * mode (see lib/setup/state.ts's detectSetupState()) - the ONLY thing that
+ * disables the setup wizard short of an operator finishing it by hand. Every
+ * distributable build of this desktop shell up to 2026-08-05 skipped this,
+ * so handing someone the packaged app landed them on "Bulwark Webmail
+ * Setup" asking for a token out of container logs they have no access to -
+ * caught only by actually launching the packaged .app and looking, not by
+ * reading the build log.
+ *
+ * The rest are CONFIG_ENV_MAP entries (lib/admin/types.ts) that only matter
+ * while env-managed - once an admin completes the wizard, config.json wins
+ * for everything except jmapServerUrl itself. allowCustomJmapEndpoint keeps
+ * the server field on the login screen editable, so this is a starting
+ * point for the sandbox, not a hard lock to it.
+ *
+ * `...process.env` in startStandaloneServer() below is spread AFTER this
+ * object, so a real deployment env (the Dockerfile path, or a future
+ * per-install override) still wins over these defaults.
+ */
+function getDesktopDefaults(): Record<string, string> {
+  return {
+    JMAP_SERVER_URL: "https://stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de",
+    APP_NAME: "VNCmail+",
+    APP_SHORT_NAME: "VNCmail+",
+    LOGIN_LOGO_LIGHT_URL: "/branding/SRC_Symbol.png",
+    LOGIN_LOGO_DARK_URL: "/branding/SRC_Symbol.png",
+    LOGIN_COMPANY_NAME: "VNC AG",
+    FAVICON_URL: "/branding/SRC_Symbol.png",
+    ALLOW_CUSTOM_JMAP_ENDPOINT: "true",
+    // The login page's subtitle falls back to the login.title i18n string
+    // whenever it differs from appName (app/(main)/[locale]/login/page.tsx)
+    // - a check clearly written for the original Bulwark/"Webmail" pairing,
+    // where they matched. With APP_NAME overridden to "VNCmail+" they no
+    // longer match, so the raw translation ("Webmail") surfaces instead of
+    // anything brand-appropriate. Hiding the subtitle avoids editing a
+    // shared i18n string that every other deployment (incl. Bulwark
+    // default) still uses - the SRC logo + "VNCmail+" heading is enough
+    // context on its own.
+    LOGIN_SHOW_SUBTITLE: "false",
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Locates the standalone server's entrypoint. Packaged builds ship it as an
+ * extraResource (see electron-builder.config.js) because .next/standalone
+ * isn't inside the app.asar; dev runs read it straight out of the repo via
+ * `npm run build:standalone`.
+ */
+function getStandaloneServerEntry(): string {
+  if (app.isPackaged) {
+    return path.join(process.resourcesPath, "standalone", "server.js");
+  }
+  return path.join(app.getAppPath(), ".next", "standalone", "server.js");
+}
+
+function getFreePort(): Promise<number> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const server = createServer();
+    server.unref();
+    server.on("error", reject);
+    server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
+      const address = server.address();
+      if (address && typeof address === "object") {
+        const { port } = address;
+        server.close(() => resolve(port));
+      } else {
+        server.close(() => reject(new Error("Could not allocate a free localhost port")));
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function waitForServerReady(url: string, timeoutMs = 20000): Promise<void> {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const attempt = () => {
+      const req = httpGet(url, (res) => {
+        res.resume();
+        resolve();
+      });
+      req.on("error", () => {
+        if (Date.now() > deadline) {
+          reject(new Error(`Standalone server never became reachable at ${url}`));
+          return;
+        }
+        setTimeout(attempt, 200);
+      });
+    };
+    attempt();
+  });
+}
+
+async function startStandaloneServer(): Promise<string> {
+  const serverEntry = getStandaloneServerEntry();
+  if (!fs.existsSync(serverEntry)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Standalone Next.js server not found at ${serverEntry}. Run "npm run build:standalone" first.`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  const port = await getFreePort();
+  const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+
+  const storeDir = getIndexStoreDir();
+  const encryption = checkEncryptionAvailable();
+  if (!encryption.ok) {
+    // Refuse rather than degrade. On Linux with no keyring, safeStorage
+    // "succeeds" using a hardcoded public password, which would look like an
+    // encrypted mailbox index while providing no protection. Leaving the env
+    // vars unset makes every index route 404, so the app runs normally without
+    // the feature.
+    console.error(`[electron] local search index disabled: ${encryption.reason}`);
+  }
+
+  // Spawn the Electron binary itself as a plain Node process
+  // (ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE) instead of depending on a system Node install -
+  // the packaged app can't assume Node exists on the target machine, and
+  // this keeps dev/packaged behavior identical.
+  //
+  // stdio gains a 4th entry: fd 3 is the key channel for the local index (see
+  // electron/key-service.ts). libuv creates extra stdio "pipe" entries as
+  // socketpairs, so it is duplex in both directions - verified by execution
+  // before this was built on. Deliberately NOT an environment variable: env is
+  // readable by any process running as the same OS user, which would defeat
+  // using the OS keychain at all. The fd NUMBER below is not a secret; only
+  // what travels over it is.
+  serverProcess = spawn(process.execPath, [serverEntry], {
+    env: {
+      // First, so any real deployment env (a future per-install override,
+      // or this same binary run somewhere JMAP_SERVER_URL is already set)
+      // wins over these desktop-shell defaults - see getDesktopDefaults().
+      ...getDesktopDefaults(),
+      ...process.env,
+      ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE: "1",
+      PORT: String(port),
+      HOSTNAME: "127.0.0.1",
+      NODE_ENV: process.env.NODE_ENV || "production",
+      // Keep all mutable state out of the .app bundle - see
+      // getServerDataDirs() for why that matters. Placed after
+      // ...process.env so the desktop shell's paths win over any inherited
+      // value; the same standalone server run outside Electron (the Docker
+      // image) never executes this and keeps its documented env behaviour.
+      ...getServerDataDirs(),
+      ...(encryption.ok
+        ? { VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR: storeDir, VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_KEY_FD: "3" }
+        : {}),
+    },
+    stdio: encryption.ok
+      ? ["inherit", "inherit", "inherit", "pipe"]
+      : "inherit",
+  });
+
+  if (encryption.ok) {
+    attachKeyService(serverProcess.stdio[3] as Duplex | null, storeDir);
+  }
+
+  serverProcess.on("exit", (code, signal) => {
+    if (code !== 0 && code !== null) {
+      console.error(`[electron] standalone server exited early (code=${code}, signal=${signal})`);
+    }
+    serverProcess = null;
+  });
+
+  await waitForServerReady(url);
+  return url;
+}
+
+function stopStandaloneServer(): void {
+  if (serverProcess && !serverProcess.killed) {
+    serverProcess.kill();
+  }
+  serverProcess = null;
+}
+
+async function createMainWindow(): Promise<void> {
+  // Test-only escape hatch: when set, skip spawning the standalone server
+  // entirely and load this URL instead. Used by
+  // integration/tests/11-electron-notification.spec.ts, which needs a
+  // dev-mode Next.js server (proxy.ts's CSP only widens connect-src to
+  // allow plain-HTTP/ws JMAP in dev - see that file's comments) to reach
+  // the integration fixture's deliberately-plaintext local Stalwart,
+  // exactly the same trade-off integration/webmail.Dockerfile already makes
+  // for the browser-based integration suite. Never set by real users or by
+  // any of the packaging/CI paths - those always go through
+  // startStandaloneServer() below.
+  const url = process.env.ELECTRON_LOAD_URL || (await startStandaloneServer());
+
+  mainWindow = new BrowserWindow({
+    width: 1280,
+    height: 860,
+    webPreferences: {
+      preload: path.join(__dirname, "preload.js"),
+      contextIsolation: true,
+      nodeIntegration: false,
+      sandbox: true,
+    },
+  });
+
+  mainWindow.on("closed", () => {
+    mainWindow = null;
+  });
+
+  await mainWindow.loadURL(url);
+}
+
+// --- Native notification bridge --------------------------------------------
+// Called from the preload's `window.vnc.showNotification` (electron/preload.ts),
+// itself called from lib/electron-bridge.ts's showElectronNotification(),
+// itself called from app/(main)/[locale]/page.tsx's "new mail arrived"
+// effect whenever lib/jmap/client.ts's push pipeline (WebSocket, or its SSE/
+// polling fallback - see that file's circuit breaker) reports a genuine new
+// message. Electron's own Notification API is the desktop shell's
+// notification path - it sits alongside, not in place of, the browser/PWA's
+// service-worker push path (public/sw.js's `push`/`notificationclick`
+// handlers + lib/web-push.ts).
+ipcMain.handle(
+  "vnc:show-notification",
+  (_event, title: string, options?: { body?: string; tag?: string }) => {
+    // Test-only observability hook, read via Playwright's
+    // electronApp.evaluate(({ app }) => ...) - see
+    // integration/tests/11-electron-notification.spec.ts. Not gated behind
+    // NODE_ENV: it's an inert counter with no behavioral effect, cheaper
+    // than maintaining a second code path just for tests.
+    const counters = app as unknown as { __notificationCallCount?: number };
+    counters.__notificationCallCount = (counters.__notificationCallCount ?? 0) + 1;
+
+    if (!Notification.isSupported()) {
+      return { shown: false };
+    }
+    const notification = new Notification({
+      title,
+      body: options?.body ?? "",
+    });
+    notification.show();
+    return { shown: true };
+  },
+);
+
+// --- Auto-update -------------------------------------------------------
+// GitHub Releases as the update feed (electron-builder.config.js's
+// `publish` block) - the skill's recommendation over standing up a new
+// distribution channel, since the repo is already private. "Light
+// decision" per VNCprodbuild step 7, not re-litigated here.
+//
+// Deliberately best-effort: there's no code signing yet (step 9), so on
+// macOS in particular an update download/install can fail signature
+// verification. A failed check must never take the app down - it's
+// background maintenance, not something the user is blocked on.
+function setupAutoUpdater(): void {
+  if (!app.isPackaged) {
+    // Unpacked dev/test runs (npm run electron:dev, the Playwright smoke
+    // test) have no latest.yml alongside them - checking would just log a
+    // noisy 404 against GitHub Releases for every dev run.
+    return;
+  }
+  autoUpdater.autoDownload = true;
+  autoUpdater.autoInstallOnAppQuit = true;
+  autoUpdater.on("error", (error) => {
+    console.error("[electron] auto-update error:", error);
+  });
+  autoUpdater.checkForUpdatesAndNotify().catch((error) => {
+    console.error("[electron] checkForUpdatesAndNotify failed:", error);
+  });
+}
+
+app.whenReady().then(() => {
+  void createMainWindow();
+  setupAutoUpdater();
+});
+
+app.on("window-all-closed", () => {
+  stopStandaloneServer();
+  if (process.platform !== "darwin") {
+    app.quit();
+  }
+});
+
+app.on("before-quit", () => {
+  stopStandaloneServer();
+});
+
+app.on("activate", () => {
+  if (BrowserWindow.getAllWindows().length === 0) {
+    void createMainWindow();
+  }
+});

electron/preload.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// Preload script for the VNCmail+ desktop shell. Runs in an isolated
+// context with access to Node APIs, and exposes a minimal, explicit surface
+// to the renderer via contextBridge - the renderer never gets direct Node or
+// Electron access (contextIsolation + nodeIntegration: false, see main.ts).
+import { contextBridge, ipcRenderer } from "electron";
+
+export interface ShowNotificationOptions {
+  body?: string;
+  tag?: string;
+}
+
+export interface ShowNotificationResult {
+  shown: boolean;
+}
+
+contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld("vnc", {
+  isElectron: true,
+  // Routes to Electron's own Notification API in main.ts (ipcMain.handle
+  // "vnc:show-notification"). This is the desktop shell's native
+  // notification path - it does not replace lib/web-push.ts's Web Push
+  // (VAPID) path, which is what the browser/PWA deployment still uses.
+  showNotification: (
+    title: string,
+    options?: ShowNotificationOptions,
+  ): Promise<ShowNotificationResult> =>
+    ipcRenderer.invoke("vnc:show-notification", title, options),
+});

eslint.config.mjs

@@ -53,6 +53,18 @@ export default [
       },
     },
   },
+  {
+    // Plain Node scripts (electron bundling/packaging helpers) - not React/
+    // browser code, so they get node globals only, no react/jsx parsing.
+    files: ["scripts/**/*.{mjs,cjs,js}"],
+    languageOptions: {
+      ecmaVersion: "latest",
+      sourceType: "module",
+      globals: {
+        ...globals.node,
+      },
+    },
+  },
   {
     files: ["**/*.test.{ts,tsx}", "**/*.spec.{ts,tsx}"],
     languageOptions: {
@@ -70,6 +82,8 @@ export default [
   {
     ignores: [
       ".next/**",
+      "dist-electron/**",
+      "dist-electron-builds/**",
       "node_modules/**",
       "repos/**",
       "data/admin/plugins/**",
@@ -81,6 +95,15 @@ export default [
       "benchmark/**",
       "examples/**",
       "integration/**",
+      // Independent sub-package with its own package.json/build (esbuild,
+      // browser-only globals) - same reasoning as repos/** and examples/**
+      // above. Pre-existing gap: this was blocking `npm run lint` (and thus
+      // the pre-commit hook) repo-wide before this Electron work even
+      // touched anything - see the electron-desktop branch's first commits.
+      // Independent sub-packages, plus the generated staging dir
+      // vnc/plugins/build/** that scripts/build-plugins.mjs writes the bundled
+      // artifacts into (1.7 MB of vendored crypto - not our source to lint).
+      "vnc/plugins/**",
     ],
   },
 ];

hooks/use-config.ts

@@ -20,8 +20,12 @@ interface ConfigData {
   faviconUrl: string;
   appLogoLightUrl: string;
   appLogoDarkUrl: string;
+  appLogoLightUrlIsCustom: boolean;
+  appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: boolean;
   loginLogoLightUrl: string;
   loginLogoDarkUrl: string;
+  loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom: boolean;
+  loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: boolean;
   loginCompanyName: string;
   loginImprintUrl: string;
   loginPrivacyPolicyUrl: string;
@@ -105,8 +109,12 @@ export function useConfig(): AppConfig {
     faviconUrl: configCache?.faviconUrl || '/branding/Bulwark_Favicon.svg',
     appLogoLightUrl: configCache?.appLogoLightUrl || '',
     appLogoDarkUrl: configCache?.appLogoDarkUrl || '',
+    appLogoLightUrlIsCustom: configCache?.appLogoLightUrlIsCustom || false,
+    appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: configCache?.appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom || false,
     loginLogoLightUrl: configCache?.loginLogoLightUrl || '/branding/Bulwark_Logo_Color.svg',
     loginLogoDarkUrl: configCache?.loginLogoDarkUrl || '/branding/Bulwark_Logo_White.svg',
+    loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom: configCache?.loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom || false,
+    loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: configCache?.loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom || false,
     loginCompanyName: configCache?.loginCompanyName || '',
     loginImprintUrl: configCache?.loginImprintUrl || '',
     loginPrivacyPolicyUrl: configCache?.loginPrivacyPolicyUrl || '',
@@ -146,8 +154,12 @@ export function useConfig(): AppConfig {
         faviconUrl: configCache.faviconUrl,
         appLogoLightUrl: configCache.appLogoLightUrl,
         appLogoDarkUrl: configCache.appLogoDarkUrl,
+        appLogoLightUrlIsCustom: configCache.appLogoLightUrlIsCustom,
+        appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: configCache.appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom,
         loginLogoLightUrl: configCache.loginLogoLightUrl,
         loginLogoDarkUrl: configCache.loginLogoDarkUrl,
+        loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom: configCache.loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom,
+        loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: configCache.loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom,
         loginCompanyName: configCache.loginCompanyName,
         loginImprintUrl: configCache.loginImprintUrl,
         loginPrivacyPolicyUrl: configCache.loginPrivacyPolicyUrl,
@@ -188,8 +200,12 @@ export function useConfig(): AppConfig {
           faviconUrl: data.faviconUrl,
           appLogoLightUrl: data.appLogoLightUrl,
           appLogoDarkUrl: data.appLogoDarkUrl,
+          appLogoLightUrlIsCustom: data.appLogoLightUrlIsCustom,
+          appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: data.appLogoDarkUrlIsCustom,
           loginLogoLightUrl: data.loginLogoLightUrl,
           loginLogoDarkUrl: data.loginLogoDarkUrl,
+          loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom: data.loginLogoLightUrlIsCustom,
+          loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom: data.loginLogoDarkUrlIsCustom,
           loginCompanyName: data.loginCompanyName,
           loginImprintUrl: data.loginImprintUrl,
           loginPrivacyPolicyUrl: data.loginPrivacyPolicyUrl,

instrumentation.node.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,16 @@ migrateLegacyAdminLayout()
       }
     }
   })
+  .then(async () => {
+    // Install the first-party plugins this fork ships with (currently the
+    // audited S/MIME plugin) into the server plugin registry - the same admin
+    // channel an operator-uploaded ZIP lands in, so bundles still get
+    // Ed25519-signed on serve and the privileged-tier gates still apply.
+    // Staged by scripts/build-plugins.mjs; gated by the matching policy
+    // feature toggle. Never throws.
+    const { seedBundledPlugins } = await import("./lib/admin/bundled-plugins");
+    await seedBundledPlugins();
+  })
   .then(async () => {
     // Anonymous telemetry - on by default. Admins can disable via the
     // admin UI, the BULWARK_TELEMETRY env var, or by clearing the endpoint.

integration/.gitignore

@@ -7,4 +7,5 @@ stalwart/stalwart-cli
 # Playwright/test artifacts
 node_modules/
 test-results/
+test-results-electron/
 playwright-report/

integration/tests/11-electron-notification.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+import { test, expect, _electron as electron } from '@playwright/test';
+import type { ElectronApplication, Page } from '@playwright/test';
+import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
+import { get as httpGet } from 'node:http';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { ACCOUNTS, JMAP_URL } from './helpers/config';
+import { sendMail } from './helpers/smtp';
+import { JmapClient } from './helpers/jmap';
+import { expectFolderUnread } from './helpers/app';
+
+/**
+ * Electron desktop shell against the real Stalwart fixture, end to end.
+ *
+ * Unlike e2e/electron-smoke.spec.ts (which calls window.vnc.showNotification
+ * directly to prove the IPC bridge itself is wired), this launches the real
+ * Electron shell, logs in as a real account against this same integration
+ * stack's Stalwart, injects a message over SMTP exactly like
+ * 02-mail-sync.spec.ts does for the browser-based suite, and asserts a
+ * native notification fires as a side effect of the REAL push pipeline:
+ *
+ *   SMTP delivery -> Stalwart -> JMAP StateChange push (lib/jmap/client.ts)
+ *   -> stores/email-store.ts's handleStateChange -> handleNewEmailNotification
+ *   -> app/(main)/[locale]/page.tsx's effect -> lib/electron-bridge.ts's
+ *   showElectronNotification() -> the contextBridge/IPC bridge
+ *   (electron/preload.ts) -> electron/main.ts's ipcMain.handle, which is
+ *   what actually shows the OS notification (and increments the
+ *   __notificationCallCount test hook this test polls).
+ *
+ * Nothing here is mocked - real SMTP socket, real Stalwart, real Electron
+ * process, real IPC.
+ *
+ * WHY A DEV SERVER, NOT THE STANDALONE BUILD: electron/main.ts normally boots
+ * the production "standalone" artifact (Phase 1 step 1), whose CSP
+ * (proxy.ts) only allows TLS connections in production (`https:`/`wss:`).
+ * This fixture's Stalwart is deliberately plain HTTP - the same reason
+ * integration/webmail.Dockerfile runs the browser-suite's webmail in dev
+ * mode instead of building it. This test makes the identical trade-off:
+ * electron/main.ts's ELECTRON_LOAD_URL escape hatch (test-only, never used
+ * by real users or any packaging/CI path) points the shell at a `next dev`
+ * server this test spawns itself, instead of the standalone build. That
+ * still exercises the real preload/IPC bridge, the real JMAP client
+ * (identical source either way), and the real notification handler - the
+ * only thing NOT covered here is the standalone-server-boot mechanism
+ * itself, which e2e/electron-smoke.spec.ts already covers separately.
+ *
+ * NOTE on "the real WebSocket path": confirmed against the actual
+ * `stalwartlabs/stalwart:v0.16` image this fixture runs (same as the
+ * sandbox server this feature was built against) that its /jmap/ws endpoint
+ * requires the same HTTP Authorization header as every other JMAP endpoint
+ * on the WebSocket UPGRADE request itself - and confirmed separately that
+ * the browser WebSocket API has no way to attach a custom header to that
+ * handshake (a WHATWG spec restriction, not a CSP or Electron quirk - CSP
+ * was a real, now-fixed blocker for reaching the network at all, see the
+ * commit that added `wss:` to proxy.ts's production connect-src, but is not
+ * why THIS specific handshake fails). So the WS attempt below will reach
+ * the network correctly but still fail authentication against Stalwart
+ * every time, and the client's circuit breaker (wsPermanentlyDisabled,
+ * after 5 quick attempts) falls back to SSE within a few seconds. That
+ * fallback is what actually delivers the push exercised below - a real,
+ * working push path, just not literally the WebSocket one. Asserting the WS
+ * handshake itself succeeds would be asserting something that cannot be
+ * true against this server from a browser context; the assertion here is
+ * on the thing that IS true end to end: a real delivery reaches the native
+ * notification bridge no matter which transport carried the StateChange.
+ */
+const alice = ACCOUNTS.alice;
+const projectRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '../..');
+
+function getFreePort(): Promise<number> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const server = createServer();
+    server.unref();
+    server.on('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+      const address = server.address();
+      if (address && typeof address === 'object') {
+        const { port } = address;
+        server.close(() => resolve(port));
+      } else {
+        server.close(() => reject(new Error('Could not allocate a free localhost port')));
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function waitForServerReady(url: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise<void> {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const attempt = () => {
+      const req = httpGet(url, (res) => {
+        res.resume();
+        resolve();
+      });
+      req.on('error', () => {
+        if (Date.now() > deadline) {
+          reject(new Error(`Dev server never became reachable at ${url}`));
+          return;
+        }
+        setTimeout(attempt, 300);
+      });
+    };
+    attempt();
+  });
+}
+
+async function getNotificationCallCount(app: ElectronApplication): Promise<number> {
+  return app.evaluate(({ app: electronApp }) => {
+    const counters = electronApp as unknown as { __notificationCallCount?: number };
+    return counters.__notificationCallCount ?? 0;
+  });
+}
+
+test.describe('Electron desktop shell - real push notification', () => {
+  test('a real SMTP delivery triggers the native notification bridge', async () => {
+    const jmap = await JmapClient.connect(alice.email, alice.password);
+    await jmap.reset();
+
+    const devPort = await getFreePort();
+    const devUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${devPort}`;
+
+    // `next dev` (not the standalone build - see the header comment above
+    // for why) with JMAP_SERVER_URL pointed at this fixture's real Stalwart.
+    const devServer: ChildProcess = spawn('npx', ['next', 'dev', '--turbopack', '-p', String(devPort)], {
+      cwd: projectRoot,
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: JMAP_URL,
+        // Must be >= 32 chars (lib/impersonation/master-config.ts) - anything
+        // shorter logs a "Failed to store Stalwart auth context" error on
+        // every request. Not a real secret either way.
+        SESSION_SECRET: 'integration-not-a-real-secret-32-chars!!',
+        NODE_ENV: 'development',
+      },
+      stdio: 'pipe',
+    });
+    devServer.stderr?.on('data', (chunk) => process.stderr.write(`[next dev] ${chunk}`));
+
+    let electronApp: ElectronApplication | undefined;
+    try {
+      // next dev's cold compile of the login route can take a while the
+      // first time - generous timeout, matches this suite's overall 90s
+      // test timeout with headroom for what comes after.
+      await waitForServerReady(devUrl, 60000);
+
+      electronApp = await electron.launch({
+        args: [projectRoot],
+        env: {
+          ...process.env,
+          ELECTRON_LOAD_URL: devUrl,
+        },
+      });
+
+      const appWindow: Page = await electronApp.firstWindow();
+      await appWindow.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
+      // Diagnosing a failure locally: temporarily add
+      //   appWindow.on('console', (msg) => console.log(msg.type(), msg.text()));
+      //   appWindow.on('request', (req) => { if (/jmap/i.test(req.url())) console.log(req.method(), req.url()); });
+      // right here - that's what surfaced the WS-then-SSE-fallback sequence
+      // this test now relies on, and would surface the same for whatever
+      // trips the retry below.
+
+      // Real login through the actual form - same selectors
+      // integration/tests/helpers/app.ts's submitCredentials() uses. Not
+      // reusing that helper directly because it also calls page.goto('/'),
+      // which would navigate this window away from the dev server
+      // electron/main.ts already loaded it against.
+      await appWindow.locator('#username').waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 30000 });
+      await appWindow.fill('#username', alice.email);
+      await appWindow.fill('#password', alice.password);
+      await appWindow.click('button[type="submit"]');
+      await appWindow.locator('[data-testid="account-switcher"]').first().waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 30000 });
+
+      // The account switcher rendering only means the sidebar chrome is up,
+      // not that the Inbox has actually loaded/been auto-selected yet - the
+      // "new mail" notification only fires when handleStateChange's refresh
+      // finds an actively-SELECTED inbox (stores/email-store.ts's
+      // refreshCurrentMailbox() early-returns with no selectedMailbox).
+      // Same wait 02-mail-sync.spec.ts's very first test uses right after
+      // login, before its own first delivery, for exactly this reason.
+      await expectFolderUnread(appWindow, { role: 'inbox' }, 0);
+
+      // Baseline before triggering delivery, so this assertion is robust
+      // even if a stray notification fired during login/setup.
+      const before = await getNotificationCallCount(electronApp);
+
+      const subject = `IT electron-push ${Date.now()}`;
+      await sendMail({
+        from: alice.email,
+        authPass: alice.password,
+        to: alice.email,
+        subject,
+        body: 'hi from the electron integration test',
+      });
+
+      await expect
+        .poll(() => getNotificationCallCount(electronApp!), {
+          timeout: 60000,
+          message: 'native notification bridge never fired after a real SMTP delivery',
+        })
+        .toBeGreaterThan(before);
+    } finally {
+      await electronApp?.close();
+      devServer.kill();
+    }
+  });
+});

integration/tests/12-electron-mail-index.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
+import { test, expect, _electron as electron } from '@playwright/test';
+import type { ElectronApplication, Page } from '@playwright/test';
+import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
+import { get as httpGet } from 'node:http';
+import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { ACCOUNTS, JMAP_URL } from './helpers/config';
+import { sendMail } from './helpers/smtp';
+import { JmapClient } from './helpers/jmap';
+import { expectFolderUnread } from './helpers/app';
+
+/**
+ * The encrypted local search index (lib/mail-index/**) against the real
+ * Stalwart fixture. THREE tests, because no single configuration can cover the
+ * whole feature - the reasons are specific and worth reading before changing
+ * any of them.
+ *
+ * Constraint 1 - the renderer cannot reach this fixture from a production
+ * build. The renderer talks JMAP DIRECTLY to Stalwart, and this fixture's
+ * Stalwart is deliberately plain HTTP (integration/webmail.Dockerfile explains
+ * why). The production CSP pins `connect-src` to `'self' https: wss:`. Setting
+ * NODE_ENV=development at RUNTIME does not help: `next build` INLINES
+ * process.env.NODE_ENV into the compiled middleware, so proxy.ts's `isDev` is
+ * frozen at build time. Verified by watching a standalone server started with
+ * NODE_ENV=development still serve the production CSP, and the login fail with
+ * "Refused to connect ... violates connect-src 'self' https: wss:".
+ *
+ * Constraint 2 - the fd-3 key channel cannot survive `next dev`. `next dev`
+ * forks its server process with an IPC channel that claims fd 3, so adopting it
+ * fails with EEXIST; fd 4 in that process is not a pipe either (ENOTTY). Both
+ * were observed, not assumed. Extra file descriptors simply are not plumbed
+ * through `npx -> next dev -> forked server`. The real standalone server is a
+ * single process and has no such problem (test 3 proves it).
+ *
+ * So each test takes the configuration that lets it prove its own half:
+ *
+ *  1. PIPELINE - drives the REAL standalone server over HTTP from Node, with a
+ *     real fd-3 key channel. CSP is irrelevant here because there is no
+ *     browser: a Node client with a real session cookie exercises the real
+ *     routes. This is the test that proves a real delivery becomes searchable
+ *     by a word from its BODY, and that the file on disk is really encrypted.
+ *
+ *  2. TRIGGER - proves the EVENT-DRIVEN wiring: a real SMTP delivery makes the
+ *     renderer POST /api/offline/reindex off the back of its live JMAP push.
+ *     Runs against `next dev` (constraint 1), and asserts the request is made -
+ *     the indexing itself is test 1's job.
+ *
+ *  3. WIRING - launches the REAL shell with no ELECTRON_LOAD_URL, so
+ *     electron/main.ts boots the real standalone artifact and stands up the real
+ *     fd-3 key service on real safeStorage. Asserts the index routes are
+ *     REACHABLE in a real build (401 "sign in", not 404 "feature absent", not
+ *     503 "no native binding / no key channel").
+ *
+ * Nothing is mocked anywhere: real SMTP, real Stalwart, real Electron, real
+ * SQLCipher, real safeStorage.
+ */
+const alice = ACCOUNTS.alice;
+const projectRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '../..');
+
+/** Mirrors lib/mail-index/paths.ts's accountFileToken(). */
+function accountFileToken(accountId: string): string {
+  return createHash('sha256').update(accountId, 'utf8').digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+function getFreePort(): Promise<number> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const server = createServer();
+    server.unref();
+    server.on('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+      const address = server.address();
+      if (address && typeof address === 'object') {
+        const { port } = address;
+        server.close(() => resolve(port));
+      } else {
+        server.close(() => reject(new Error('Could not allocate a free localhost port')));
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function waitForServerReady(url: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise<void> {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const attempt = () => {
+      const req = httpGet(url, (res) => {
+        res.resume();
+        resolve();
+      });
+      req.on('error', () => {
+        if (Date.now() > deadline) {
+          reject(new Error(`Server never became reachable at ${url}`));
+          return;
+        }
+        setTimeout(attempt, 300);
+      });
+    };
+    attempt();
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serves the key protocol of electron/key-service.ts over the child's inherited
+ * fd. The key and the encryption are real; only safeStorage's wrapping of it is
+ * out of the picture here, which is what test 3 covers.
+ */
+function serveKeyChannel(child: ChildProcess, fdIndex: number, key: Buffer): void {
+  const channel = child.stdio[fdIndex] as NodeJS.ReadWriteStream | null;
+  if (!channel) throw new Error(`child has no fd ${fdIndex} - key channel missing`);
+  let buffer = '';
+  channel.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
+    buffer += chunk.toString('utf8');
+    let newline: number;
+    while ((newline = buffer.indexOf('\n')) >= 0) {
+      const line = buffer.slice(0, newline);
+      buffer = buffer.slice(newline + 1);
+      if (!line.trim()) continue;
+      const req = JSON.parse(line) as { id?: number; op?: string };
+      const reply =
+        req.op === 'getIndexKey'
+          ? { id: req.id, ok: true, key: key.toString('hex') }
+          : req.op === 'deleteIndexKey'
+            ? { id: req.id, ok: true }
+            : { id: req.id, ok: false, code: 'bad-request', error: 'unknown op' };
+      channel.write(`${JSON.stringify(reply)}\n`);
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+/** Minimal cookie jar - the index routes are cookie-authenticated. */
+class Jar {
+  private cookies = new Map<string, string>();
+
+  absorb(response: Response): void {
+    for (const raw of response.headers.getSetCookie()) {
+      const [pair] = raw.split(';');
+      const eq = pair.indexOf('=');
+      if (eq <= 0) continue;
+      this.cookies.set(pair.slice(0, eq).trim(), pair.slice(eq + 1).trim());
+    }
+  }
+
+  header(): string {
+    return [...this.cookies].map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}`).join('; ');
+  }
+}
+
+interface SearchHit {
+  contentType: string;
+  id: string;
+  title: string;
+  snippet: string;
+}
+
+interface SearchResponse {
+  ok?: boolean;
+  count?: number;
+  hits?: SearchHit[];
+  contextBlock?: string;
+  stats?: Array<{ contentType: string; count: number }>;
+  error?: string;
+}
+
+test.describe('Electron desktop shell - encrypted local search index', () => {
+  test('pipeline: a real delivery becomes searchable by a body word, and the file is encrypted', async () => {
+    const jmap = await JmapClient.connect(alice.email, alice.password);
+    await jmap.reset();
+
+    const stamp = Date.now();
+    const subject = `IT index subject ${stamp}`;
+    // Appears ONLY in the body, so a hit proves the body was actually fetched
+    // and indexed - not merely the subject, which any list view already holds.
+    const bodyPhrase = `zurichlease${stamp}`;
+
+    // Deliver BEFORE indexing, so the catch-up path has something real to find.
+    await sendMail({
+      from: alice.email,
+      authPass: alice.password,
+      to: alice.email,
+      subject,
+      body: `Please review the ${bodyPhrase} renewal before September.`,
+    });
+
+    const storeDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'vncmail-index-it-'));
+    const key = randomBytes(32);
+    const port = await getFreePort();
+    const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+    const serverEntry = path.join(projectRoot, '.next', 'standalone', 'server.js');
+    expect(
+      fs.existsSync(serverEntry),
+      `missing ${serverEntry} - run "npm run build:standalone" first`,
+    ).toBe(true);
+
+    // The REAL standalone artifact, spawned exactly as electron/main.ts spawns
+    // it (including the fd-3 key channel), just with plain node rather than
+    // ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE - the server code is identical either way.
+    const server = spawn(process.execPath, [serverEntry], {
+      cwd: path.dirname(serverEntry),
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        PORT: String(port),
+        HOSTNAME: '127.0.0.1',
+        NODE_ENV: 'production',
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: JMAP_URL,
+        SESSION_SECRET: 'integration-not-a-real-secret-32-chars!!',
+        VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR: storeDir,
+        VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_KEY_FD: '3',
+      },
+      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+    });
+    server.stderr?.on('data', (chunk) => process.stderr.write(`[standalone] ${chunk}`));
+    serveKeyChannel(server, 3, key);
+
+    const jar = new Jar();
+    const call = async (url: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {
+      const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}${url}`, {
+        ...init,
+        headers: { ...(init?.headers ?? {}), cookie: jar.header() },
+      });
+      jar.absorb(response);
+      return response;
+    };
+    const search = async (query: string, types?: string): Promise<SearchResponse> => {
+      const params = new URLSearchParams({ q: query, stats: 'true' });
+      if (types) params.set('types', types);
+      const response = await call(`/api/offline/search?${params.toString()}`);
+      if (!response.ok) return { error: `HTTP ${response.status}: ${await response.text()}` };
+      return (await response.json()) as SearchResponse;
+    };
+
+    try {
+      await waitForServerReady(baseUrl, 60000);
+
+      // Server-side login. This route verifies the credentials against Stalwart
+      // from Node and writes BOTH the session cookie and the jmap_stalwart_ctx
+      // auth context the index routes read (app/api/auth/session/route.ts:94).
+      const login = await call('/api/auth/session?slot=0', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          serverUrl: JMAP_URL,
+          username: alice.email,
+          password: alice.password,
+          slot: 0,
+        }),
+      });
+      expect(login.status, `login failed: ${await login.text()}`).toBe(200);
+
+      // The gate must be open and the native binding loaded, or every assertion
+      // below would fail for an unrelated reason.
+      const reachable = await call('/api/offline/search?stats=true&q=');
+      expect(
+        reachable.status,
+        `index routes unreachable: ${(await reachable.text()).slice(0, 300)}`,
+      ).toBe(200);
+
+      // Index it. This is the catch-up shape (no ids), which is what the app
+      // runs at launch.
+      const reindex = await call('/api/offline/reindex', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ catchUp: true }),
+      });
+      const reindexBody = await reindex.json();
+      expect(reindex.status, JSON.stringify(reindexBody)).toBe(200);
+      expect(
+        reindexBody.written?.mail,
+        `no mail indexed: ${JSON.stringify(reindexBody)}`,
+      ).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+      // THE assertion: found by a word that exists only in the message body.
+      const hit = await search(bodyPhrase);
+      expect(hit.error).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(hit.count, `search for a body word found nothing: ${JSON.stringify(hit)}`)
+        .toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      expect(hit.hits?.[0].contentType).toBe('mail');
+      expect(hit.hits?.[0].title).toBe(subject);
+      expect(hit.hits?.[0].snippet).toContain(bodyPhrase);
+      // The prompt-ready retrieval surface an AI feature would consume.
+      expect(hit.contextBlock).toContain('[EMAIL]');
+      expect(hit.contextBlock).toContain(subject);
+
+      // Also findable by sender address, which lives in the `people` column.
+      expect((await search(alice.email)).count).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+      // Type filtering must filter, and a word in no message must not match -
+      // otherwise the hit above proves nothing about relevance.
+      expect((await search(bodyPhrase, 'calendar')).count).toBe(0);
+      expect((await search(bodyPhrase, 'mail')).count).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      expect((await search(`absent${stamp}`)).count).toBe(0);
+
+      // Catch-up must be idempotent: a second pass must not duplicate rows.
+      const before = ((await search(bodyPhrase)).stats ?? [])
+        .find((s) => s.contentType === 'mail')?.count ?? 0;
+      const second = await call('/api/offline/reindex', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ catchUp: true }),
+      });
+      expect(second.status).toBe(200);
+      const after = ((await search(bodyPhrase)).stats ?? [])
+        .find((s) => s.contentType === 'mail')?.count ?? 0;
+      expect(after).toBe(before);
+      expect((await search(bodyPhrase)).count).toBe(1);
+
+      // Calendar/contacts/files: assert they were ATTEMPTED and did not error,
+      // rather than asserting counts - this fixture provisions mailboxes only,
+      // so an empty calendar is the correct result and a count assertion would
+      // be testing the fixture rather than the code.
+      const errors = (reindexBody.errors ?? []) as Array<{ contentType: string; message: string }>;
+      expect(errors, `per-type failures during reindex: ${JSON.stringify(errors)}`).toEqual([]);
+      const attempted = Object.keys(reindexBody.written ?? {});
+      const skipped = (reindexBody.skipped ?? []) as string[];
+      expect(
+        [...attempted, ...skipped].sort(),
+        'every content type must be either attempted or explicitly skipped',
+      ).toEqual(['calendar', 'contact', 'file', 'mail']);
+    } finally {
+      server.kill();
+      // Let the process release its WAL files before reading them.
+      await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 500));
+    }
+
+    // ── the file on disk is genuinely encrypted ──────────────────────────────
+    const accountId = `${alice.email}@${new URL(JMAP_URL).hostname}`;
+    const dbPath = path.join(storeDir, 'index', `${accountFileToken(accountId)}.db`);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(dbPath), `no index database at ${dbPath}`).toBe(true);
+
+    // Read every file the store wrote, WAL included: the newest rows can still
+    // be sitting in the -wal, so checking only the main database could miss
+    // plaintext that is genuinely on disk.
+    const onDisk = Buffer.concat(
+      ['', '-wal', '-shm']
+        .map((suffix) => `${dbPath}${suffix}`)
+        .filter((f) => fs.existsSync(f))
+        .map((f) => fs.readFileSync(f)),
+    );
+    expect(onDisk.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    // The assertions that catch a silently-UNENCRYPTED store. `PRAGMA key` is a
+    // no-op on a non-SQLCipher binding - no error, working database, mailbox in
+    // cleartext - so every functional assertion above would pass either way.
+    expect(
+      fs.readFileSync(dbPath).subarray(0, 15).toString('latin1'),
+      'the index file has a plain SQLite header - it is NOT encrypted',
+    ).not.toBe('SQLite format 3');
+    expect(
+      onDisk.includes(bodyPhrase),
+      'the message body is recoverable from the raw database bytes - not encrypted',
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      onDisk.includes(subject),
+      'the subject is recoverable from the raw database bytes - not encrypted',
+    ).toBe(false);
+
+    fs.rmSync(storeDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  test('trigger: a real delivery makes the renderer ask the index to update', async () => {
+    const jmap = await JmapClient.connect(alice.email, alice.password);
+    await jmap.reset();
+
+    const devPort = await getFreePort();
+    const devUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${devPort}`;
+    const userDataDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'vncmail-trigger-profile-'));
+
+    // `next dev` for the CSP reason in the header comment. No key channel here:
+    // this test asserts the REQUEST is made, which is the wiring it owns; the
+    // indexing itself is test 1's job. (Extra fds don't survive next dev
+    // anyway - constraint 2 above.)
+    const devServer = spawn('npx', ['next', 'dev', '--turbopack', '-p', String(devPort)], {
+      cwd: projectRoot,
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: JMAP_URL,
+        SESSION_SECRET: 'integration-not-a-real-secret-32-chars!!',
+        NODE_ENV: 'development',
+        // Enough for the route to exist and pass its gate; it fails later on the
+        // absent key channel, which this test deliberately does not assert on.
+        VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR: path.join(userDataDir, 'offline'),
+        VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_KEY_FD: '3',
+      },
+      stdio: 'pipe',
+    });
+    devServer.stderr?.on('data', (chunk) => process.stderr.write(`[next dev] ${chunk}`));
+
+    let electronApp: ElectronApplication | undefined;
+    try {
+      await waitForServerReady(devUrl, 90000);
+
+      electronApp = await electron.launch({
+        args: [projectRoot, `--user-data-dir=${userDataDir}`],
+        env: { ...process.env, ELECTRON_LOAD_URL: devUrl },
+      });
+
+      const appWindow: Page = await electronApp.firstWindow();
+      await appWindow.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
+
+      await appWindow.locator('#username').waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 60000 });
+      await appWindow.fill('#username', alice.email);
+      await appWindow.fill('#password', alice.password);
+      await appWindow.click('button[type="submit"]');
+      await appWindow
+        .locator('[data-testid="account-switcher"]')
+        .first()
+        .waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 60000 });
+
+      // An actively-selected inbox is a precondition for the push handler's
+      // refresh, which is what schedules the index update - the same reason
+      // 11-electron-notification.spec.ts waits here.
+      await expectFolderUnread(appWindow, { role: 'inbox' }, 0);
+
+      const reindexCalls: string[] = [];
+      appWindow.on('request', (request) => {
+        if (request.method() === 'POST' && request.url().includes('/api/offline/reindex')) {
+          reindexCalls.push(request.postData() ?? '');
+        }
+      });
+      // Let the launch-time catch-up land first so it is not mistaken for the
+      // delivery-driven call below.
+      await appWindow.waitForTimeout(8000);
+      const baseline = reindexCalls.length;
+
+      await sendMail({
+        from: alice.email,
+        authPass: alice.password,
+        to: alice.email,
+        subject: `IT index trigger ${Date.now()}`,
+        body: 'a delivery should make the renderer ask the index to update',
+      });
+
+      await expect
+        .poll(() => reindexCalls.length, {
+          timeout: 60000,
+          message:
+            'a real delivery did not make the renderer POST /api/offline/reindex - ' +
+            'the push -> handleStateChange -> indexOnStateChange wiring is broken',
+        })
+        .toBeGreaterThan(baseline);
+
+      // The delivery-driven call must name the mail type, rather than being an
+      // unconditional full catch-up.
+      const triggered = reindexCalls.slice(baseline);
+      expect(
+        triggered.some((body) => body.includes('"mail"')),
+        `no reindex call mentioned the mail type: ${JSON.stringify(triggered)}`,
+      ).toBe(true);
+    } finally {
+      await electronApp?.close();
+      devServer.kill();
+      fs.rmSync(userDataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('wiring: the real standalone boot reaches the index with a real safeStorage key', async () => {
+    // A FRESH profile is load-bearing, not hygiene: the 401 this test asserts is
+    // "nobody is signed in", and a leftover jmap_stalwart_ctx cookie from any
+    // previous run turns it into a 200. That actually happened while writing this.
+    const userDataDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'vncmail-wiring-profile-'));
+    const electronApp = await electron.launch({
+      args: [projectRoot, `--user-data-dir=${userDataDir}`],
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: JMAP_URL,
+        SESSION_SECRET: 'integration-not-a-real-secret-32-chars!!',
+      },
+    });
+
+    try {
+      const appWindow: Page = await electronApp.firstWindow();
+      await appWindow.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
+      await appWindow.locator('#username').waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 60000 });
+
+      // safeStorage must be usable, or main.ts deliberately refuses to enable
+      // the feature at all (electron/key-service.ts's checkEncryptionAvailable).
+      const encryptionAvailable = await electronApp.evaluate(({ safeStorage }) =>
+        safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable(),
+      );
+      expect(
+        encryptionAvailable,
+        'safeStorage reports no encryption available on this host, so main.ts ' +
+          'correctly disabled the index - this assertion cannot pass here',
+      ).toBe(true);
+
+      const probe = await appWindow.evaluate(async () => {
+        const response = await fetch('/api/offline/search?q=anything');
+        return { status: response.status, body: (await response.text()).slice(0, 300) };
+      });
+
+      // 401 = the gate opened, the native binding loaded and the fd-3 key
+      // channel is present; it refuses only because nobody is signed in (this
+      // build cannot log in against a plain-HTTP Stalwart - constraint 1).
+      //   404 => VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR was never set (gate closed, or
+      //          main.ts refused because no OS keyring is available)
+      //   503 => the native binding or the key channel is missing from the real
+      //          artifact - the class of failure only a real build reveals
+      expect(
+        probe.status,
+        `expected 401 (reachable, unauthenticated) but got ${probe.status}: ${probe.body}`,
+      ).toBe(401);
+    } finally {
+      await electronApp.close();
+      fs.rmSync(userDataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+});

integration/tests/13-electron-offline-replica.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
+import { test, expect, _electron as electron } from '@playwright/test';
+import type { ElectronApplication, Page } from '@playwright/test';
+import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';
+import { createServer } from 'node:net';
+import { get as httpGet } from 'node:http';
+import { createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { ACCOUNTS, JMAP_URL } from './helpers/config';
+import { sendMail } from './helpers/smtp';
+import { JmapClient } from './helpers/jmap';
+
+/**
+ * The offline mail replica (lib/offline-replica/**) against the real Stalwart
+ * fixture, with a REAL NETWORK CUT.
+ *
+ * THE POINT OF THIS FILE: a sync test that never tests the offline case has not
+ * tested the feature. So test 1 syncs against a live server, then makes the
+ * backend genuinely unreachable, and only then asserts that a previously-synced
+ * message still returns its full HTML body - from the encrypted replica, with no
+ * network available to fall back to.
+ *
+ * HOW THE CUT IS MADE. The standalone server is started with
+ * `JMAP_SERVER_URL` pointing at a LOCAL PROXY that forwards to Stalwart. Killing
+ * the proxy's listener makes every JMAP request fail with ECONNREFUSED - a real
+ * transport failure at the socket level, not a mock, not a stubbed fetch, and not
+ * a flag the code under test can see. Preferred over stopping the Stalwart
+ * container because it cuts only THIS test's path and leaves the shared fixture
+ * (and any concurrently-running suite) untouched.
+ *
+ * THE SAME TWO CONSTRAINTS as 12-electron-mail-index.spec.ts apply and are why
+ * this is split into two tests rather than one:
+ *
+ *  1. The RENDERER cannot reach this fixture from a production build. It talks
+ *     JMAP directly to Stalwart, which here is deliberately plain HTTP, and the
+ *     production CSP pins `connect-src` to `'self' https: wss:`. NODE_ENV at
+ *     runtime does not help - `next build` inlines it into the middleware.
+ *  2. The fd-3 key channel cannot survive `next dev`, which claims fd 3 for its
+ *     own IPC. So the two configurations are mutually exclusive: a real key
+ *     channel means no browser, a browser means no key channel.
+ *
+ * Test 1 therefore drives the REAL standalone server over HTTP from Node with a
+ * real fd-3 key channel - no browser needed, because the routes are the thing
+ * being proven. Test 2 launches the REAL Electron shell to prove the routes exist
+ * and are reachable in a genuine build, which is the class of failure only a real
+ * build reveals (the standalone output silently dropping a native prebuild, say).
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS FILE DOES NOT PROVE: that `components/email/email-viewer.tsx` paints
+ * the replica-served body in a browser while offline. That needs a renderer, a
+ * key channel and a reachable-then-unreachable JMAP server simultaneously, which
+ * constraints 1 and 2 make impossible against this fixture. The read path returns
+ * a field-for-field `Email` (asserted below, including `bodyValues` keyed by the
+ * same partIds as `htmlBody`), and the renderer-side gate is covered by
+ * `lib/__tests__/offline-fallback-client.test.ts` - but the final paint is NOT
+ * covered by a real offline browser run. Stated rather than implied.
+ */
+const alice = ACCOUNTS.alice;
+const projectRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, '../..');
+
+/** Mirrors lib/mail-index/paths.ts's accountFileToken(). */
+function accountFileToken(accountId: string): string {
+  return createHash('sha256').update(accountId, 'utf8').digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+function getFreePort(): Promise<number> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const server = createServer();
+    server.unref();
+    server.on('error', reject);
+    server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
+      const address = server.address();
+      if (address && typeof address === 'object') {
+        const { port } = address;
+        server.close(() => resolve(port));
+      } else {
+        server.close(() => reject(new Error('Could not allocate a free localhost port')));
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function waitForServerReady(url: string, timeoutMs: number): Promise<void> {
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const attempt = () => {
+      const req = httpGet(url, (res) => {
+        res.resume();
+        resolve();
+      });
+      req.on('error', () => {
+        if (Date.now() > deadline) {
+          reject(new Error(`Server never became reachable at ${url}`));
+          return;
+        }
+        setTimeout(attempt, 300);
+      });
+    };
+    attempt();
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * A raw TCP forwarder in front of Stalwart, so the test can sever the backend at
+ * the socket level. `cut()` closes the listener AND destroys every live socket, so
+ * a pooled keep-alive connection cannot keep working after the cut.
+ */
+async function startCuttableProxy(target: { host: string; port: number }): Promise<{
+  port: number;
+  cut: () => Promise<void>;
+  stop: () => Promise<void>;
+}> {
+  const { connect } = await import('node:net');
+  const sockets = new Set<import('node:net').Socket>();
+  const server = createServer((incoming) => {
+    sockets.add(incoming);
+    incoming.on('close', () => sockets.delete(incoming));
+    incoming.on('error', () => incoming.destroy());
+    const upstream = connect(target.port, target.host, () => {
+      incoming.pipe(upstream);
+      upstream.pipe(incoming);
+    });
+    sockets.add(upstream);
+    upstream.on('close', () => sockets.delete(upstream));
+    upstream.on('error', () => { incoming.destroy(); upstream.destroy(); });
+  });
+  const port = await getFreePort();
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
+    server.once('error', reject);
+    server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
+  });
+
+  const closeAll = () =>
+    new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+      for (const s of sockets) s.destroy();
+      sockets.clear();
+      server.close(() => resolve());
+      // `close()` only stops new connections; the destroys above handle the rest.
+      setTimeout(resolve, 500);
+    });
+
+  return { port, cut: closeAll, stop: closeAll };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serves the key protocol of electron/key-service.ts over the child's inherited
+ * fd. The key and the encryption are real; only safeStorage's wrapping of it is
+ * out of the picture here, which is what test 2 covers.
+ */
+function serveKeyChannel(child: ChildProcess, fdIndex: number, key: Buffer): void {
+  const channel = child.stdio[fdIndex] as NodeJS.ReadWriteStream | null;
+  if (!channel) throw new Error(`child has no fd ${fdIndex} - key channel missing`);
+  let buffer = '';
+  channel.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
+    buffer += chunk.toString('utf8');
+    let newline: number;
+    while ((newline = buffer.indexOf('\n')) >= 0) {
+      const line = buffer.slice(0, newline);
+      buffer = buffer.slice(newline + 1);
+      if (!line.trim()) continue;
+      const req = JSON.parse(line) as { id?: number; op?: string };
+      const reply =
+        req.op === 'getIndexKey'
+          ? { id: req.id, ok: true, key: key.toString('hex') }
+          : req.op === 'deleteIndexKey'
+            ? { id: req.id, ok: true }
+            : { id: req.id, ok: false, code: 'bad-request', error: 'unknown op' };
+      channel.write(`${JSON.stringify(reply)}\n`);
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+class Jar {
+  private cookies = new Map<string, string>();
+  absorb(response: Response): void {
+    for (const raw of response.headers.getSetCookie()) {
+      const [pair] = raw.split(';');
+      const eq = pair.indexOf('=');
+      if (eq <= 0) continue;
+      this.cookies.set(pair.slice(0, eq).trim(), pair.slice(eq + 1).trim());
+    }
+  }
+  header(): string {
+    return [...this.cookies].map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}`).join('; ');
+  }
+}
+
+interface CycleReport {
+  ok: boolean;
+  unfinishedWork: boolean;
+  bootstrapped: boolean;
+  envelopesWritten: number;
+  bodiesWritten: number;
+  envelopesDeleted: number;
+  coveragePhase: string;
+  resyncRequired: boolean;
+  warnings: string[];
+  error?: string;
+  errorClass?: string;
+}
+
+test.describe('Electron desktop shell - offline mail replica', () => {
+  test('syncs full bodies, then serves a synced message with the backend UNREACHABLE', async () => {
+    test.setTimeout(240_000);
+
+    const jmap = await JmapClient.connect(alice.email, alice.password);
+    await jmap.reset();
+
+    const stamp = Date.now();
+    const subject = `IT replica subject ${stamp}`;
+    // Appears ONLY in the HTML body, so a hit proves the full body was stored -
+    // not the preview or the subject, which any envelope already carries.
+    const bodyPhrase = `luzernrenewal${stamp}`;
+    const htmlMarker = `<strong>${bodyPhrase}</strong>`;
+
+    await sendMail({
+      from: alice.email,
+      authPass: alice.password,
+      to: alice.email,
+      subject,
+      body: `plain text ${bodyPhrase}`,
+      html: `<html><body><p>Please review the ${htmlMarker} before September.</p></body></html>`,
+    });
+    // A second message, so "the list came from the replica" is not a one-row
+    // coincidence.
+    await sendMail({
+      from: alice.email,
+      authPass: alice.password,
+      to: alice.email,
+      subject: `IT replica second ${stamp}`,
+      body: 'the second message',
+    });
+
+    const storeDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'vncmail-replica-it-'));
+    const key = randomBytes(32);
+    const stalwart = new URL(JMAP_URL);
+    const proxy = await startCuttableProxy({
+      host: stalwart.hostname,
+      port: Number(stalwart.port || 80),
+    });
+    const proxiedJmapUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxy.port}`;
+
+    const port = await getFreePort();
+    const baseUrl = `http://127.0.0.1:${port}`;
+    const serverEntry = path.join(projectRoot, '.next', 'standalone', 'server.js');
+    expect(
+      fs.existsSync(serverEntry),
+      `missing ${serverEntry} - run "npm run build:standalone" first`,
+    ).toBe(true);
+
+    const server = spawn(process.execPath, [serverEntry], {
+      cwd: path.dirname(serverEntry),
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        PORT: String(port),
+        HOSTNAME: '127.0.0.1',
+        NODE_ENV: 'production',
+        // Through the cuttable proxy, so the backend can be severed later.
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: proxiedJmapUrl,
+        SESSION_SECRET: 'integration-not-a-real-secret-32-chars!!',
+        VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR: storeDir,
+        VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_KEY_FD: '3',
+      },
+      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+    });
+    server.stderr?.on('data', (chunk) => process.stderr.write(`[standalone] ${chunk}`));
+    serveKeyChannel(server, 3, key);
+
+    const jar = new Jar();
+    const call = async (url: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {
+      const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}${url}`, {
+        ...init,
+        headers: { ...(init?.headers ?? {}), cookie: jar.header() },
+      });
+      jar.absorb(response);
+      return response;
+    };
+    const sync = async (body: Record<string, unknown> = {}): Promise<CycleReport> => {
+      const response = await call('/api/offline/sync', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify(body),
+      });
+      const parsed = await response.json();
+      expect(response.status, JSON.stringify(parsed)).toBe(200);
+      return parsed.report as CycleReport;
+    };
+
+    try {
+      await waitForServerReady(baseUrl, 90_000);
+
+      const login = await call('/api/auth/session?slot=0', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          serverUrl: proxiedJmapUrl,
+          username: alice.email,
+          password: alice.password,
+          slot: 0,
+        }),
+      });
+      const loginText = await login.text();
+      expect(login.status, `login failed: ${loginText}`).toBe(200);
+
+      // The gate must be open and the native binding loaded, or every assertion
+      // below would fail for an unrelated reason.
+      const reachable = await call('/api/offline/status');
+      const reachableText = await reachable.text();
+      expect(
+        reachable.status,
+        `replica routes unreachable: ${reachableText.slice(0, 400)}`,
+      ).toBe(200);
+
+      // ── ONLINE: bootstrap, then chain until the cycle reports itself done ──
+      const first = await sync();
+      expect(first.error, `first cycle failed: ${first.error}`).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(first.bootstrapped, 'the first cycle must bootstrap').toBe(true);
+
+      let report = first;
+      for (let i = 0; i < 12 && report.unfinishedWork; i++) report = await sync();
+      expect(
+        report.unfinishedWork,
+        `sync never settled: ${JSON.stringify(report)}`,
+      ).toBe(false);
+      // Termination is a real property here: the body-queue give-up marks and the
+      // inserted-not-attempted count are what stop this looping forever.
+      expect(report.coveragePhase).toBe('complete');
+      expect(report.resyncRequired).toBe(false);
+
+      const status = await (await call('/api/offline/status')).json();
+      expect(status.synced).toBe(true);
+      expect(
+        status.stats.envelopes,
+        `no envelopes stored: ${JSON.stringify(status.stats)}`,
+      ).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
+      expect(
+        status.stats.bodies,
+        `no BODIES stored - the replica would be no better than the search index`,
+      ).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
+      expect(status.stats.mailboxes).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+      // ── THE DELTA PATH: a message that arrives AFTER the cursor was captured ──
+      // Bootstrap alone would satisfy every assertion below, so this is what actually
+      // exercises `Email/changes` and proves the stored cursor is USABLE rather than
+      // merely present. It is also the assertion that fails if an `Email/get` state
+      // token is ever adopted as a `/changes` cursor: the fast-forwarded cursor
+      // reports no changes, and this message never arrives.
+      const deltaSubject = `IT replica delta ${stamp}`;
+      const deltaPhrase = `bernrenewal${stamp}`;
+      await sendMail({
+        from: alice.email,
+        authPass: alice.password,
+        to: alice.email,
+        subject: deltaSubject,
+        body: `plain ${deltaPhrase}`,
+        html: `<html><body><p>delta ${deltaPhrase}</p></body></html>`,
+      });
+
+      let delta = await sync();
+      for (let i = 0; i < 10 && (delta.unfinishedWork || delta.envelopesWritten === 0); i++) {
+        delta = await sync();
+      }
+      expect(delta.bootstrapped, 'the delta cycle must NOT re-bootstrap').toBe(false);
+      const afterDelta = await (await call('/api/offline/status')).json();
+      expect(
+        afterDelta.stats.envelopes,
+        `Email/changes did not deliver a message that arrived after the cursor was ` +
+          `captured: ${JSON.stringify(afterDelta.stats)}`,
+      ).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
+      expect(
+        afterDelta.stats.bodies,
+        'the delta path delivered the envelope but never queued its body',
+      ).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3);
+      expect(afterDelta.resyncRequired, 'a healthy delta cycle must not invalidate a cursor').toBe(false);
+
+      // Find the message and its mailbox while still online, so the offline phase
+      // asserts on known ids rather than discovering them from the thing under test.
+      const mailboxesOnline = await (await call('/api/offline/mail?kind=mailboxes')).json();
+      const inbox = (mailboxesOnline.mailboxes as Array<{ id: string; role?: string }>)
+        .find((m) => m.role === 'inbox');
+      expect(inbox, 'the replica holds no inbox').toBeTruthy();
+
+      const listOnline = await (
+        await call(`/api/offline/mail?kind=list&mailboxId=${encodeURIComponent(inbox!.id)}&limit=50`)
+      ).json();
+      const target = (listOnline.emails as Array<{ id: string; subject?: string }>)
+        .find((e) => e.subject === subject);
+      expect(target, `the synced message is not in the replica: ${JSON.stringify(listOnline.emails?.map((e: {subject?: string}) => e.subject))}`).toBeTruthy();
+
+      // ── THE CUT: sever the backend at the socket level ────────────────────
+      await proxy.cut();
+
+      // Prove the cut is real, from inside the server process's own network
+      // namespace: a live JMAP call must now fail. `/api/offline/sync` reaches
+      // Stalwart first thing, so it is the honest probe.
+      const afterCut = await call('/api/offline/sync', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({}),
+      });
+      const afterCutBody = await afterCut.json();
+      expect(
+        afterCut.status,
+        `the backend is still reachable, so the offline assertions below would prove nothing: ` +
+          `${JSON.stringify(afterCutBody)}`,
+      ).not.toBe(200);
+
+      // ── OFFLINE: the actual feature ───────────────────────────────────────
+      const messageResponse = await call(
+        `/api/offline/mail?kind=message&id=${encodeURIComponent(target!.id)}`,
+      );
+      // Read the body ONCE: `expect`'s message argument is evaluated eagerly, so
+      // putting `await response.text()` in it consumes the stream before .json().
+      const messageText = await messageResponse.text();
+      expect(
+        messageResponse.status,
+        `the offline read path failed with the backend down: ${messageText.slice(0, 400)}`,
+      ).toBe(200);
+      const offline = JSON.parse(messageText);
+      expect(offline.available).toBe(true);
+      expect(offline.hasBody, 'the message has no stored body offline').toBe(true);
+
+      const email = offline.email as {
+        id: string; subject?: string; receivedAt: string;
+        htmlBody?: Array<{ partId: string; type: string }>;
+        textBody?: Array<{ partId: string }>;
+        bodyValues?: Record<string, { value: string }>;
+        from?: Array<{ email: string }>;
+        keywords?: Record<string, boolean>;
+        mailboxIds?: Record<string, boolean>;
+        headers?: Record<string, string | string[]>;
+      };
+
+      expect(email.id).toBe(target!.id);
+      expect(email.subject).toBe(subject);
+
+      // THE ASSERTION: the full HTML body, recovered with no network.
+      const htmlPartId = email.htmlBody?.[0]?.partId;
+      expect(htmlPartId, 'no htmlBody part offline').toBeTruthy();
+      const html = email.bodyValues?.[htmlPartId as string]?.value ?? '';
+      expect(
+        html,
+        'the HTML body is not in the replica - this is the whole feature',
+      ).toContain(htmlMarker);
+      expect(html).toContain(bodyPhrase);
+
+      // `bodyValues` MUST be keyed by the same partIds as htmlBody/textBody, or
+      // email-viewer.tsx's isBodyLoading gate sits on its skeleton forever
+      // (hasBodyParts true, bodyValues unusable).
+      for (const part of [...(email.htmlBody ?? []), ...(email.textBody ?? [])]) {
+        expect(
+          email.bodyValues?.[part.partId],
+          `bodyValues is missing partId ${part.partId}, which the viewer requires`,
+        ).toBeTruthy();
+      }
+
+      // The rest of the shape the renderer reads.
+      expect(email.from?.[0]?.email).toBe(alice.email);
+      expect(email.receivedAt).toBeTruthy();
+      expect(Object.keys(email.mailboxIds ?? {})).toContain(inbox!.id);
+      // Header normalisation happened server-side (the array -> record flattening
+      // the online path does in parseEmailHeaders).
+      expect(email.headers && !Array.isArray(email.headers)).toBe(true);
+
+      // The list and the folder tree must also survive the cut.
+      const listOffline = await (
+        await call(`/api/offline/mail?kind=list&mailboxId=${encodeURIComponent(inbox!.id)}&limit=50`)
+      ).json();
+      expect(listOffline.available).toBe(true);
+      expect(listOffline.emails.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
+      expect(
+        (listOffline.emails as Array<{ subject?: string }>).map((e) => e.subject),
+      ).toContain(subject);
+
+      const mailboxesOffline = await (await call('/api/offline/mail?kind=mailboxes')).json();
+      expect(mailboxesOffline.available).toBe(true);
+      expect((mailboxesOffline.mailboxes as unknown[]).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+
+      // Status must be readable offline too - a user with no network still needs
+      // to see what they have and be able to free the space.
+      const statusOffline = await (await call('/api/offline/status')).json();
+      expect(statusOffline.ok).toBe(true);
+      expect(statusOffline.stats.bodies).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2);
+
+      // A cycle attempted while offline must classify as Transport and must NOT
+      // touch the data. "Offline is not an error."
+      expect(
+        ['Transport', 'ServerTransient'].includes(String(afterCutBody.code)),
+        `an offline cycle must classify as Transport/ServerTransient so the caller retries ` +
+          `rather than treating the feature as broken; got code=${afterCutBody.code} ` +
+          `status=${afterCut.status} body=${JSON.stringify(afterCutBody)}`,
+      ).toBe(true);
+      const afterOfflineCycle = await (await call('/api/offline/status')).json();
+      expect(
+        afterOfflineCycle.stats.envelopes,
+        'an offline cycle deleted data - a transport failure must never do that',
+      ).toBe(statusOffline.stats.envelopes);
+      expect(afterOfflineCycle.resyncRequired).toBe(false);
+
+      // ── PURGE: the retention control has to actually free the space ────────
+      const purge = await call('/api/offline/status', { method: 'DELETE' });
+      expect(purge.status).toBe(200);
+      const purged = await (await call('/api/offline/status')).json();
+      expect(purged.synced).toBe(false);
+      expect(purged.coveragePhase).toBe('never-run');
+    } finally {
+      server.kill();
+      await proxy.stop();
+      // Let the process release its WAL files before reading them.
+      await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 700));
+    }
+
+    // ── the file on disk is genuinely encrypted ─────────────────────────────
+    const accountId = `${alice.email}@127.0.0.1`;
+    const dbPath = path.join(storeDir, 'index', `${accountFileToken(accountId)}.db`);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(dbPath), `no replica database at ${dbPath}`).toBe(true);
+
+    const onDisk = Buffer.concat(
+      ['', '-wal', '-shm']
+        .map((suffix) => `${dbPath}${suffix}`)
+        .filter((f) => fs.existsSync(f))
+        .map((f) => fs.readFileSync(f)),
+    );
+    expect(onDisk.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+    // `PRAGMA key` is a silent no-op on a non-SQLCipher binding - no error, a
+    // working database, and the mail in cleartext - so every functional assertion
+    // above would pass either way. These are the ones that catch it.
+    expect(
+      fs.readFileSync(dbPath).subarray(0, 15).toString('latin1'),
+      'the replica file has a plain SQLite header - it is NOT encrypted',
+    ).not.toBe('SQLite format 3');
+    expect(
+      onDisk.includes(bodyPhrase),
+      'the message body is recoverable from the raw database bytes - not encrypted',
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      onDisk.includes(subject),
+      'the subject is recoverable from the raw database bytes - not encrypted',
+    ).toBe(false);
+
+    fs.rmSync(storeDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  test('wiring: the real standalone boot reaches the replica routes with a real safeStorage key', async () => {
+    test.setTimeout(180_000);
+    // A FRESH profile is load-bearing, not hygiene: the 401 asserted below is
+    // "nobody is signed in", and a leftover jmap_stalwart_ctx cookie from any
+    // previous run turns it into a 200.
+    const userDataDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'vncmail-replica-wiring-'));
+    const electronApp: ElectronApplication = await electron.launch({
+      args: [projectRoot, `--user-data-dir=${userDataDir}`],
+      env: {
+        ...process.env,
+        JMAP_SERVER_URL: JMAP_URL,
+        SESSION_SECRET: 'integration-not-a-real-secret-32-chars!!',
+      },
+    });
+
+    try {
+      const appWindow: Page = await electronApp.firstWindow();
+      await appWindow.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
+      await appWindow.locator('#username').waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 90_000 });
+
+      const encryptionAvailable = await electronApp.evaluate(({ safeStorage }) =>
+        safeStorage.isEncryptionAvailable(),
+      );
+      expect(
+        encryptionAvailable,
+        'safeStorage reports no encryption available, so main.ts correctly disabled the ' +
+          'feature - this assertion cannot pass here',
+      ).toBe(true);
+
+      // 401 = the gate opened, the native binding loaded from the REAL standalone
+      // artifact, and the fd-3 key channel is present; it refuses only because
+      // nobody is signed in.
+      //   404 => VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR was never set
+      //   503 => the native binding or the key channel is missing from the real
+      //          build - the class of failure only a real build reveals
+      for (const route of [
+        '/api/offline/status',
+        '/api/offline/mail?kind=mailboxes',
+        '/api/offline/sync',
+      ]) {
+        const probe = await appWindow.evaluate(async (url) => {
+          const response = await fetch(url, {
+            method: url.endsWith('/sync') ? 'POST' : 'GET',
+          });
+          return { status: response.status, body: (await response.text()).slice(0, 300) };
+        }, route);
+        expect(
+          probe.status,
+          `${route}: expected 401 (reachable, unauthenticated) but got ${probe.status}: ${probe.body}`,
+        ).toBe(401);
+      }
+    } finally {
+      await electronApp.close();
+      fs.rmSync(userDataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+});

integration/tests/global-setup-electron.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * Global setup for playwright.integration-electron.config.ts - a narrower
+ * variant of ./global-setup.ts.
+ *
+ * The Electron suite (11-electron-notification.spec.ts) boots its OWN
+ * standalone Next.js server via electron/main.ts, so unlike the main
+ * integration config it never talks to the docker-compose `webmail`
+ * container on :3000 at all - only to `stalwart` (JMAP + SMTP). Bringing up
+ * `webmail` too would be pointless work, and on a host where something else
+ * already owns port 3000 (this repo doesn't own that port - any other
+ * project's dev server can be sitting on it) it would fail outright for a
+ * container this suite never uses. `docker compose up <service>` scopes the
+ * bring-up to just `stalwart`.
+ *
+ * Set IT_NO_DOCKER=1 to skip container management entirely (useful when the
+ * stack is already running).
+ */
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { existsSync, copyFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { JMAP_URL, ACCOUNTS, ACCOUNT_PASSWORD } from './helpers/config';
+
+const INTEGRATION_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');
+const COMPOSE_FILE = path.join(INTEGRATION_DIR, 'docker-compose.yml');
+const ENV_FILE = path.join(INTEGRATION_DIR, '.env');
+const STALWART_CLI_BIN = path.join(INTEGRATION_DIR, 'stalwart', 'stalwart-cli');
+
+function run(cmd: string, args: string[]): void {
+  execFileSync(cmd, args, { cwd: INTEGRATION_DIR, stdio: 'inherit' });
+}
+
+async function waitForStalwart(timeoutMs = 240000): Promise<void> {
+  const url = `${JMAP_URL}/jmap/session`;
+  const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+  const auth = 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(`${ACCOUNTS.alice.email}:${ACCOUNT_PASSWORD}`).toString('base64');
+  for (;;) {
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch(url, { headers: { Authorization: auth } });
+      if (res.ok) return;
+    } catch {
+      /* not up yet */
+    }
+    if (Date.now() > deadline) throw new Error(`Timed out waiting for Stalwart JMAP at ${url}`);
+    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 2000));
+  }
+}
+
+export default async function globalSetup(): Promise<void> {
+  if (process.env.IT_NO_DOCKER === '1') {
+    console.log('[global-setup-electron] IT_NO_DOCKER=1 - skipping docker compose management');
+  } else {
+    // stalwart/prepare-stalwart-cli.sh fetches a LINUX binary (it's COPYed
+    // into the Stalwart container by integration/stalwart/Dockerfile - never
+    // meant to run on the host at all) but ends by executing it as its own
+    // sanity check, which only works when the host itself is Linux. On a
+    // macOS host that self-check fails outright ("cannot execute binary
+    // file") even though the download+extract already succeeded and the
+    // file the Dockerfile needs is perfectly fine on disk. Skipping the
+    // script once the binary already exists sidesteps that host/target
+    // mismatch without touching the shared script (used by the main
+    // integration config too, on hosts where it does work).
+    if (existsSync(STALWART_CLI_BIN)) {
+      console.log('[global-setup-electron] stalwart-cli already present, skipping fetch');
+    } else {
+      console.log('[global-setup-electron] fetching stalwart-cli');
+      run('bash', [path.join(INTEGRATION_DIR, 'stalwart', 'prepare-stalwart-cli.sh')]);
+    }
+
+    if (!existsSync(ENV_FILE)) {
+      console.log('[global-setup-electron] creating integration/.env from .env.example');
+      copyFileSync(path.join(INTEGRATION_DIR, '.env.example'), ENV_FILE);
+    }
+
+    console.log('[global-setup-electron] docker compose up -d --build --wait stalwart');
+    run('docker', [
+      'compose', '-f', COMPOSE_FILE, '--env-file', ENV_FILE,
+      'up', '-d', '--build', '--wait', '--wait-timeout', '300', 'stalwart',
+    ]);
+  }
+
+  console.log('[global-setup-electron] waiting for Stalwart JMAP');
+  await waitForStalwart();
+
+  console.log('[global-setup-electron] stack ready');
+}

integration/tests/helpers/smtp.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@ interface SendOptions {
   subject: string;
   /** Plain-text body. */
   body: string;
+  /**
+   * Optional HTML alternative, sent as multipart/alternative alongside `body`.
+   *
+   * Added for 13-electron-offline-replica.spec.ts, which has to prove the offline
+   * replica stores a real HTML body and not just the plain-text excerpt the search
+   * index keeps - so the message needs a genuine distinct text/html part.
+   */
+  html?: string;
   /** Extra headers (e.g. custom Message-ID / In-Reply-To for threading). */
   headers?: Record<string, string>;
   /** Optional single attachment (sent as multipart/mixed, base64). */
@@ -158,6 +166,22 @@ export async function sendMail(opts: SendOptions): Promise<void> {
         b64,
         `--${boundary}--`,
       ].join('\r\n');
+    } else if (opts.html) {
+      const boundary = 'italt_boundary_0001';
+      headers['MIME-Version'] = '1.0';
+      headers['Content-Type'] = `multipart/alternative; boundary="${boundary}"`;
+      // text first, html second: multipart/alternative is least-to-most preferred.
+      mime = [
+        `--${boundary}`,
+        'Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8',
+        '',
+        crlf(opts.body),
+        `--${boundary}`,
+        'Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8',
+        '',
+        crlf(opts.html),
+        `--${boundary}--`,
+      ].join('\r\n');
     } else {
       headers['Content-Type'] = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8';
       mime = crlf(opts.body);

lib/__tests__/offline-fallback-client.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+// The two-part fallback gate.
+//
+// `lib/jmap/client.ts`'s read methods swallow their own errors and return
+// plausible success, so a "looks empty" result is NOT evidence of a network
+// failure - it is also what a genuinely empty folder returns, and
+// `getMailboxes()` fabricates a synthetic Inbox rather than throwing. Falling back
+// on the shape alone would serve stale replica rows over a folder the user had
+// just emptied. So the gate is: suspicious result AND a `fetch` rejection recorded
+// during that exact call.
+
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import type { IJMAPClient } from '@/lib/jmap/client-interface';
+import type { Email, Mailbox } from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+import { noteTransportFailure, resetTransportHealth } from '@/lib/jmap/transport-health';
+
+const readOfflineMailboxes = vi.fn();
+const readOfflineList = vi.fn();
+const readOfflineMessage = vi.fn();
+const isReplicaUnavailable = vi.fn(() => false);
+
+vi.mock('@/lib/offline-replica-client', () => ({
+  readOfflineMailboxes: (...a: unknown[]) => readOfflineMailboxes(...a),
+  readOfflineList: (...a: unknown[]) => readOfflineList(...a),
+  readOfflineMessage: (...a: unknown[]) => readOfflineMessage(...a),
+  isReplicaUnavailable: () => isReplicaUnavailable(),
+}));
+
+vi.mock('@/stores/account-store', () => ({
+  useAccountStore: {
+    getState: () => ({
+      accounts: [{ id: 'alice@mail.example.org', cookieSlot: 3, serverIdentifiers: [] }],
+    }),
+  },
+}));
+
+const { withOfflineFallback } = await import('@/lib/offline-fallback-client');
+
+function replicaEmail(id: string): Email {
+  return {
+    id, threadId: 't', mailboxIds: { inbox: true }, keywords: {}, size: 1,
+    receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', hasAttachment: false,
+    htmlBody: [{ partId: '1', blobId: 'b', size: 1, type: 'text/html' }],
+    bodyValues: { '1': { value: '<p>from the replica</p>' } },
+  };
+}
+
+interface Stub extends Partial<IJMAPClient> {
+  getEmail: IJMAPClient['getEmail'];
+  getEmails: IJMAPClient['getEmails'];
+  getMailboxes: IJMAPClient['getMailboxes'];
+  getAllMailboxes: IJMAPClient['getAllMailboxes'];
+}
+
+/** Reproduces the client's real error-swallowing shapes. */
+function stubClient(overrides: Partial<Stub> = {}): IJMAPClient {
+  const stub = {
+    getUsername: () => 'alice',
+    getServerUrl: () => 'https://mail.example.org',
+    getAccountId: () => 'primary',
+    getEmail: async () => null,
+    getEmails: async () => ({ emails: [] as Email[], hasMore: false, total: 0 }),
+    getMailboxes: async () => ([
+      // The exact placeholder client.ts fabricates on failure.
+      { id: 'INBOX', name: 'Inbox', role: 'inbox', sortOrder: 0, totalEmails: 0,
+        unreadEmails: 0, totalThreads: 0, unreadThreads: 0, isSubscribed: true,
+        myRights: {} } as unknown as Mailbox,
+    ]),
+    getAllMailboxes: async () => ([
+      { id: 'INBOX', name: 'Inbox', role: 'inbox', sortOrder: 0, totalEmails: 0,
+        unreadEmails: 0, totalThreads: 0, unreadThreads: 0, isSubscribed: true,
+        myRights: {} } as unknown as Mailbox,
+    ]),
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+  return stub as unknown as IJMAPClient;
+}
+
+describe('withOfflineFallback', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    resetTransportHealth();
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+    isReplicaUnavailable.mockReturnValue(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT consult the replica when the server answered "empty"', async () => {
+    // The whole point. An empty folder must render empty, not as whatever the
+    // replica last held.
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(stubClient());
+    const result = await client.getEmails('inbox');
+    expect(result.emails).toEqual([]);
+    expect(readOfflineList).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    expect(await client.getEmail('e1')).toBeNull();
+    expect(readOfflineMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('consults the replica when a transport failure happened DURING the call', async () => {
+    readOfflineList.mockResolvedValue({
+      emails: [replicaEmail('e1')], total: 1, hasMore: false,
+    });
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(
+      stubClient({
+        getEmails: async () => {
+          // What authenticatedFetch does when `fetch` rejects.
+          noteTransportFailure();
+          return { emails: [], hasMore: false, total: 0 };
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+    const result = await client.getEmails('inbox', undefined, 25, 0);
+    expect(result.emails.map((e) => e.id)).toEqual(['e1']);
+    expect(result.total).toBe(1);
+    // And it asks for the right slot, so a multi-account shell reads the right file.
+    expect(readOfflineList).toHaveBeenCalledWith('inbox', { limit: 25, offset: 0, slot: 3 });
+  });
+
+  it('ignores a stale transport failure from BEFORE the call', async () => {
+    // The counter is sampled per call precisely so an old failure cannot make a
+    // later successful-but-empty read look offline.
+    noteTransportFailure();
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(stubClient());
+    await client.getEmails('inbox');
+    expect(readOfflineList).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('serves a full message from the replica, but refuses an envelope-only hit', async () => {
+    // An envelope with no bodyValues would render blank AND leave the viewer's
+    // isBodyLoading gate stuck on its skeleton, which is worse than saying the
+    // message is unavailable.
+    readOfflineMessage.mockResolvedValue({ email: replicaEmail('e1'), hasBody: true });
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(
+      stubClient({ getEmail: async () => { noteTransportFailure(); return null; } }),
+    );
+    const email = await client.getEmail('e1');
+    expect(email?.bodyValues?.['1'].value).toContain('from the replica');
+
+    resetTransportHealth();
+    readOfflineMessage.mockResolvedValue({ email: replicaEmail('e2'), hasBody: false });
+    const client2 = withOfflineFallback(
+      stubClient({ getEmail: async () => { noteTransportFailure(); return null; } }),
+    );
+    expect(await client2.getEmail('e2')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('recognises the synthetic Inbox placeholder and replaces it', async () => {
+    readOfflineMailboxes.mockResolvedValue([
+      { id: 'mb1', name: 'Inbox', role: 'inbox', sortOrder: 0, totalEmails: 9, unreadEmails: 2,
+        totalThreads: 9, unreadThreads: 2, isSubscribed: true, myRights: {} } as unknown as Mailbox,
+    ]);
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(
+      stubClient({
+        getAllMailboxes: async () => {
+          noteTransportFailure();
+          return [
+            { id: 'INBOX', name: 'Inbox', role: 'inbox', sortOrder: 0, totalEmails: 0,
+              unreadEmails: 0, totalThreads: 0, unreadThreads: 0, isSubscribed: true,
+              myRights: {} } as unknown as Mailbox,
+          ];
+        },
+      }),
+    );
+    const mailboxes = await client.getAllMailboxes();
+    expect(mailboxes.map((m) => m.id)).toEqual(['mb1']);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a REAL single-mailbox server result even after a transport failure', async () => {
+    // A genuine server that happens to return one inbox has a real id and real
+    // counts; only the exact placeholder shape may be replaced.
+    const real = {
+      id: 'real-inbox-id', name: 'Inbox', role: 'inbox', sortOrder: 0, totalEmails: 12,
+      unreadEmails: 1, totalThreads: 12, unreadThreads: 1, isSubscribed: true, myRights: {},
+    } as unknown as Mailbox;
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(
+      stubClient({ getAllMailboxes: async () => { noteTransportFailure(); return [real]; } }),
+    );
+    expect((await client.getAllMailboxes())[0].id).toBe('real-inbox-id');
+    expect(readOfflineMailboxes).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('never answers a read scoped to a delegated account', async () => {
+    // v1 replicates the PRIMARY mail account only, so the replica has no rows for
+    // a shared account and answering "empty" would be worse than the client's own.
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(
+      stubClient({
+        getEmails: async () => { noteTransportFailure(); return { emails: [], hasMore: false, total: 0 }; },
+      }),
+    );
+    await client.getEmails('inbox', 'someone-elses-account');
+    expect(readOfflineList).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('never answers a keyword- or category-filtered query', async () => {
+    // Those are server-side queries the replica does not reproduce. Serving an
+    // unfiltered page in their place would silently show the wrong set.
+    const failing = async () => { noteTransportFailure(); return { emails: [], hasMore: false, total: 0 }; };
+    const c1 = withOfflineFallback(stubClient({ getEmails: failing }));
+    await c1.getEmails('inbox', undefined, 25, 0, '$flagged');
+    expect(readOfflineList).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    resetTransportHealth();
+    const c2 = withOfflineFallback(stubClient({ getEmails: failing }));
+    await c2.getEmails('inbox', undefined, 25, 0, undefined, true, { from: 'x' });
+    expect(readOfflineList).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('stops asking once the replica reports itself absent', async () => {
+    isReplicaUnavailable.mockReturnValue(true);
+    const client = withOfflineFallback(
+      stubClient({ getEmail: async () => { noteTransportFailure(); return null; } }),
+    );
+    expect(await client.getEmail('e1')).toBeNull();
+    expect(readOfflineMessage).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('is idempotent, so re-wrapping a client does not stack fallbacks', async () => {
+    readOfflineMessage.mockResolvedValue({ email: replicaEmail('e1'), hasBody: true });
+    const base = stubClient({ getEmail: async () => { noteTransportFailure(); return null; } });
+    const once = withOfflineFallback(base);
+    const twice = withOfflineFallback(once);
+    expect(twice).toBe(once);
+    await twice.getEmail('e1');
+    expect(readOfflineMessage).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});

lib/admin/bundled-plugins.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+import { readFile, readdir, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
+import { ALL_PERMISSIONS, MAX_PLUGIN_SIZE } from '@/lib/plugin-types';
+import { auditLog } from './audit';
+import { configManager } from './config-manager';
+import { isConfigReadOnly } from './paths';
+import {
+  getPluginRegistry,
+  savePlugin,
+  updatePluginMeta,
+  type ServerPlugin,
+} from './plugin-registry';
+import type { FeatureGates } from './types';
+
+/**
+ * First-party ("bundled") plugin installation.
+ *
+ * The plugin registry (`<CONFIG_DIR>/plugins/`) is the host's admin channel:
+ * bundles served out of it are Ed25519-signed on the way out by
+ * `app/api/admin/plugins/[id]/bundle`, and `/api/plugins` is what makes a
+ * plugin `managed` on the client - which is what `resolvePluginTier` requires
+ * before it will grant the privileged (same-origin) tier.
+ *
+ * This module installs the plugins this fork ships with THROUGH that same
+ * channel, so nothing about the signing / approval / consent chain is
+ * bypassed or relaxed: the operator's own server performs the install that an
+ * operator would otherwise perform by uploading the ZIP in /admin.
+ *
+ * Input is the staging directory produced by `scripts/build-plugins.mjs`:
+ *
+ *   vnc/plugins/build/<id>/manifest.json
+ *   vnc/plugins/build/<id>/<entrypoint>
+ *
+ * Nothing here is trusted blindly - the manifest is validated the same way the
+ * admin upload route validates one, and an unknown permission or a bad id is a
+ * refusal, not a warning.
+ */
+
+/** Where the staged bundles live, relative to cwd (override for odd layouts). */
+function getBundledPluginsDir(): string {
+  return (
+    process.env.BUNDLED_PLUGINS_DIR ||
+    path.join(process.cwd(), 'vnc', 'plugins', 'build')
+  );
+}
+
+interface FirstPartyPlugin {
+  id: string;
+  /**
+   * Feature gate that decides whether this plugin is installed and served.
+   * Turning the gate off in the admin policy disables the plugin (and stops
+   * it being re-installed on the next boot) - that, not the Delete button, is
+   * the way to remove a bundled plugin, since a delete would be undone by the
+   * next restart.
+   */
+  gate: keyof FeatureGates;
+  /**
+   * Force-enable for every user. Required for a bundled plugin to be reachable
+   * at all under the default policy: `pluginsEnabled` defaults to false, which
+   * hides the user-facing Settings > Plugins tab, so there would be no way for
+   * a user to switch it on by hand.
+   */
+  forceEnable: boolean;
+}
+
+const FIRST_PARTY_PLUGINS: FirstPartyPlugin[] = [
+  // The audited S/MIME implementation (vnc/plugins/smime). It IS the S/MIME
+  // feature - the former in-host native pipeline is gone - so the long-standing
+  // `smimeEnabled` policy gate now controls this plugin.
+  { id: 'smime', gate: 'smimeEnabled', forceEnable: true },
+];
+
+const ID_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9]$/;
+const VALID_TYPES = new Set(['ui-extension', 'sidebar-app', 'hook']);
+
+function asString(v: unknown, fallback = ''): string {
+  return typeof v === 'string' ? v : fallback;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate a staged manifest and turn it into a registry entry. Returns a list
+ * of errors instead of throwing so one bad bundle can't take down startup.
+ */
+function toServerPlugin(
+  manifest: Record<string, unknown>,
+  code: string,
+  opts: { enabled: boolean; forceEnabled: boolean; installedAt: string },
+): { plugin: ServerPlugin } | { errors: string[] } {
+  const errors: string[] = [];
+  const id = asString(manifest.id);
+  if (!ID_RE.test(id)) errors.push(`invalid id ${JSON.stringify(manifest.id)}`);
+  if (!asString(manifest.name)) errors.push('missing "name"');
+  if (!asString(manifest.version)) errors.push('missing "version"');
+  if (!asString(manifest.author)) errors.push('missing "author"');
+  const entrypoint = asString(manifest.entrypoint);
+  if (!entrypoint) errors.push('missing "entrypoint"');
+  if (!VALID_TYPES.has(asString(manifest.type))) {
+    errors.push(`invalid type ${JSON.stringify(manifest.type)}`);
+  }
+
+  const permissions = Array.isArray(manifest.permissions)
+    ? manifest.permissions.filter((p): p is string => typeof p === 'string')
+    : [];
+  const known = new Set<string>(ALL_PERMISSIONS as readonly string[]);
+  const unknownPerms = permissions.filter(p => !known.has(p));
+  if (unknownPerms.length > 0) {
+    errors.push(`unknown permissions: ${unknownPerms.join(', ')}`);
+  }
+
+  const size = Buffer.byteLength(code, 'utf-8');
+  if (size > MAX_PLUGIN_SIZE) {
+    errors.push(`bundle is ${size} bytes, over the ${MAX_PLUGIN_SIZE} byte limit`);
+  }
+
+  if (errors.length > 0) return { errors };
+
+  return {
+    plugin: {
+      id,
+      name: asString(manifest.name),
+      version: asString(manifest.version),
+      author: asString(manifest.author),
+      description: asString(manifest.description),
+      type: asString(manifest.type),
+      // Only 'privileged' is meaningful; anything else falls through to the
+      // default untrusted tier. Same narrowing the admin upload route applies.
+      ...(manifest.tier === 'privileged' ? { tier: 'privileged' } : {}),
+      permissions,
+      entrypoint,
+      enabled: opts.enabled,
+      forceEnabled: opts.forceEnabled,
+      ...(manifest.configSchema && typeof manifest.configSchema === 'object'
+        ? { configSchema: manifest.configSchema as ServerPlugin['configSchema'] }
+        : {}),
+      ...(manifest.settingsSchema && typeof manifest.settingsSchema === 'object'
+        ? { settingsSchema: manifest.settingsSchema as ServerPlugin['settingsSchema'] }
+        : {}),
+      ...(manifest.locales && typeof manifest.locales === 'object'
+        ? { locales: manifest.locales as ServerPlugin['locales'] }
+        : {}),
+      installedAt: opts.installedAt,
+      updatedAt: opts.installedAt,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+async function readStaged(dir: string, id: string): Promise<
+  { manifest: Record<string, unknown>; code: string } | null
+> {
+  const manifestPath = path.join(dir, id, 'manifest.json');
+  if (!existsSync(manifestPath)) return null;
+
+  let manifest: Record<string, unknown>;
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(await readFile(manifestPath, 'utf-8'));
+    if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null) throw new Error('not an object');
+    manifest = parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
+  } catch (err) {
+    logger.error(`[bundled-plugins] ${id}: unreadable manifest`, {
+      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+    });
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  const entrypoint = asString(manifest.entrypoint, 'index.js');
+  if (entrypoint.includes('/') || entrypoint.includes('\\')) {
+    logger.error(`[bundled-plugins] ${id}: entrypoint must be a bare filename`);
+    return null;
+  }
+  const codePath = path.join(dir, id, entrypoint);
+  try {
+    return { manifest, code: await readFile(codePath, 'utf-8') };
+  } catch (err) {
+    logger.error(`[bundled-plugins] ${id}: cannot read bundle ${entrypoint}`, {
+      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+    });
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Install / update / disable the bundled first-party plugins. Idempotent: a
+ * boot where nothing changed writes nothing.
+ *
+ * Never throws - a failure here must not stop the server from starting, it
+ * just means the plugin isn't there (and says so in the log).
+ */
+export async function seedBundledPlugins(): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const dir = getBundledPluginsDir();
+    const staged = existsSync(dir);
+
+    await configManager.ensureLoaded();
+    const features = configManager.getPolicy().features;
+    const registry = await getPluginRegistry();
+
+    for (const spec of FIRST_PARTY_PLUGINS) {
+      const gateOn = features[spec.gate] !== false;
+      const existing = registry.plugins.find(p => p.id === spec.id);
+
+      if (!gateOn) {
+        // Policy says off. Stop serving it (the client's own sync then treats
+        // it as removed and cleans it up) but leave the bundle on disk so
+        // flipping the gate back on is instant.
+        if (existing && (existing.enabled || existing.forceEnabled)) {
+          if (isConfigReadOnly()) {
+            logger.warn(
+              `[bundled-plugins] ${spec.id}: policy "${spec.gate}" is off but the ` +
+                'config dir is read-only, so it stays enabled',
+            );
+            continue;
+          }
+          await updatePluginMeta(spec.id, { enabled: false, forceEnabled: false });
+          logger.info(`[bundled-plugins] ${spec.id} disabled ("${spec.gate}" is off in policy)`);
+          await auditLog('plugin.bundled.disable', { id: spec.id, gate: spec.gate }, 'system');
+        }
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (!staged) continue;
+
+      const read = await readStaged(dir, spec.id);
+      if (!read) {
+        logger.warn(
+          `[bundled-plugins] ${spec.id}: not staged in ${dir} - ` +
+            'run "npm run build:plugins" (the container and standalone builds do this for you)',
+        );
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      const bundleHash = createHash('sha256').update(read.code).digest('hex');
+      const version = asString(read.manifest.version);
+      const unchanged =
+        existing !== undefined &&
+        existing.version === version &&
+        existing.bundleHash === bundleHash &&
+        existing.enabled === true &&
+        existing.forceEnabled === spec.forceEnable;
+      if (unchanged) {
+        logger.debug(`[bundled-plugins] ${spec.id} v${version} already installed`);
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      if (isConfigReadOnly()) {
+        logger.warn(
+          `[bundled-plugins] ${spec.id} v${version} cannot be installed: the admin ` +
+            'config dir is read-only. Remount it read-write (or unset ' +
+            'ADMIN_CONFIG_READONLY) once, so the plugin registry can be written.',
+        );
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      const built = toServerPlugin(read.manifest, read.code, {
+        enabled: true,
+        forceEnabled: spec.forceEnable,
+        installedAt: existing?.installedAt ?? new Date().toISOString(),
+      });
+      if ('errors' in built) {
+        logger.error(`[bundled-plugins] ${spec.id}: manifest rejected`, {
+          errors: built.errors.join('; '),
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      await savePlugin(built.plugin, read.code);
+      const action = existing ? 'update' : 'install';
+      logger.info(
+        `[bundled-plugins] ${existing ? 'updated' : 'installed'} ${spec.id} v${version} ` +
+          `(tier=${built.plugin.tier ?? 'untrusted'}, forceEnabled=${spec.forceEnable})`,
+      );
+      await auditLog(
+        `plugin.bundled.${action}`,
+        { id: spec.id, version, bundleHash, tier: built.plugin.tier ?? 'untrusted' },
+        'system',
+      );
+    }
+  } catch (err) {
+    logger.error('[bundled-plugins] seeding failed', {
+      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+/** Exposed for diagnostics / tests. */
+export async function listStagedBundledPlugins(): Promise<string[]> {
+  const dir = getBundledPluginsDir();
+  if (!existsSync(dir)) return [];
+  const names = await readdir(dir);
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  for (const name of names) {
+    if (name.startsWith('.')) continue;
+    try {
+      if ((await stat(path.join(dir, name))).isDirectory()) out.push(name);
+    } catch { /* ignore */ }
+  }
+  return out;
+}

lib/admin/plugin-dev.ts

@@ -193,10 +193,22 @@ async function loadDevPlugin(pluginDir: string): Promise<DevPluginEntry | null>
     author: asString(manifest.author),
     description: asString(manifest.description),
     type: asString(manifest.type, 'hook'),
+    // Requested execution tier. Dropped here previously, which silently pinned
+    // every dev-loaded plugin to the untrusted (null-origin) tier - so a
+    // privileged plugin such as S/MIME could never be exercised from
+    // PLUGIN_DEV_DIR. Only 'privileged' is meaningful (same narrowing as the
+    // admin upload route); the tier is still *granted* only by
+    // resolvePluginTier, which additionally requires managed + consent.
+    ...(manifest.tier === 'privileged' ? { tier: 'privileged' } : {}),
     permissions,
     entrypoint,
     enabled: true,
     forceEnabled: false,
+    // Manifest i18n tables - also previously dropped, so api.i18n.t() fell back
+    // to raw keys for dev-loaded plugins.
+    ...(manifest.locales && typeof manifest.locales === 'object'
+      ? { locales: manifest.locales as ServerPlugin['locales'] }
+      : {}),
     ...(manifest.configSchema && typeof manifest.configSchema === 'object'
       ? { configSchema: manifest.configSchema as ServerPlugin['configSchema'] }
       : {}),

lib/admin/types.ts

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ export interface ThemePolicy {
 export const DEFAULT_THEME_POLICY: ThemePolicy = {
   disabledBuiltinThemes: [],
   disabledThemes: [],
-  defaultThemeId: 'builtin-vnclagoon',
+  defaultThemeId: 'builtin-src',
 };
 
 export interface SettingsPolicy {

lib/builtin-themes.ts

@@ -1014,6 +1014,11 @@ body[data-theme-skin="builtin-vnclagoon"] .rounded-2xl.border.bg-background\\/80
 // near-black stone-grey neutral. Dark variant brightens the red (#EF4444) on a
 // warm near-black. Info stays blue so it never collides with the red accent.
 const srcCSS = `
+@font-face { font-family: 'DM Sans'; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; font-display: swap; src: url('/fonts/dmsans-400.woff2') format('woff2'); }
+@font-face { font-family: 'DM Sans'; font-style: normal; font-weight: 500; font-display: swap; src: url('/fonts/dmsans-500.woff2') format('woff2'); }
+@font-face { font-family: 'DM Sans'; font-style: normal; font-weight: 700; font-display: swap; src: url('/fonts/dmsans-700.woff2') format('woff2'); }
+@font-face { font-family: 'Syne'; font-style: normal; font-weight: 700; font-display: swap; src: url('/fonts/syne-700.woff2') format('woff2'); }
+@font-face { font-family: 'Syne'; font-style: normal; font-weight: 800; font-display: swap; src: url('/fonts/syne-800.woff2') format('woff2'); }
 :root {
   --color-border: #e7e5e4;
   --color-input: #e7e5e4;
@@ -1095,6 +1100,225 @@ const srcCSS = `
   --color-chart-5: #a78bfa;
 }`;
 
+// MD3 component overrides for the SRC theme — shape scale, filled buttons,
+// text fields, cards, dialogs, state layers, switches, login card treatment.
+// All scoped under the skin body attribute so they detach cleanly on switch-off.
+const srcSkin = `
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] {
+  font-family: "DM Sans", system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", sans-serif;
+}
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] h1,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] h2,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] h3 {
+  font-family: "Syne", "DM Sans", sans-serif;
+  font-weight: 700;
+  letter-spacing: -0.01em;
+}
+
+/* ── MD3 Shape scale ─────────────────────────────────────────── */
+/* Remap Tailwind rounded-* to M3 shape tokens. rounded-full (pill  */
+/* avatars, badges, toggles) is intentionally left untouched.       */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-sm  { border-radius:  4px !important; }
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded     { border-radius:  4px !important; }
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-md  { border-radius:  8px !important; }
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-lg  { border-radius: 12px !important; }
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-xl  { border-radius: 16px !important; }
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-2xl { border-radius: 28px !important; }
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-3xl { border-radius: 28px !important; }
+
+/* ── MD3 Buttons: full shape (20 dp) ─────────────────────────── */
+/* All button variants (filled, tonal, outlined, text) use 20 dp   */
+/* corners per M3. Circle icon buttons (.rounded-full) are skipped; */
+/* switches ([role="switch"]) are handled separately.               */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] button:not(.rounded-full):not([role="switch"]) {
+  border-radius: 20px !important;
+}
+
+/* MD3 filled button — primary surface, M3 label-large, state layers */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-primary.text-primary-foreground {
+  border-radius: 20px !important;
+  padding-inline: 24px !important;
+  min-height: 40px !important;
+  font-weight: 500 !important;
+  letter-spacing: 0.0063em !important;
+  border: none !important;
+  box-shadow: none !important;
+  transition: box-shadow 200ms ease, filter 200ms ease;
+}
+/* hover: M3 elevation 1 + 8 % on-primary state layer */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-primary.text-primary-foreground:hover {
+  box-shadow:
+    0 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.30),
+    0 2px 6px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.15) !important;
+  filter: brightness(1.06);
+}
+/* focus: +12 % tint + M3 focus ring */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-primary.text-primary-foreground:focus-visible {
+  filter: brightness(1.10) !important;
+  outline: 3px solid var(--color-ring) !important;
+  outline-offset: 2px !important;
+}
+/* pressed: +12 % darker, no shadow */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-primary.text-primary-foreground:active {
+  box-shadow: none !important;
+  filter: brightness(0.94) !important;
+}
+
+/* ── MD3 Text fields: outlined style, extra-small (4 dp) ─────── */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] input:not([type="checkbox"]):not([type="radio"]):not([type="range"]),
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] textarea,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] select {
+  border-radius: 4px !important;
+  transition: outline 150ms ease;
+}
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] input:not([type="checkbox"]):not([type="radio"]):not([type="range"]):focus-visible,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] textarea:focus-visible,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] select:focus-visible {
+  outline: 2px solid var(--color-primary) !important;
+  outline-offset: -2px !important;
+}
+
+/* ── MD3 Cards: elevated (level 1), medium shape (12 dp) ─────── */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-card {
+  border-radius: 12px !important;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.10),
+    0 1px 3px 1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.06) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-card {
+  box-shadow:
+    0 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.35),
+    0 1px 3px 1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.20) !important;
+}
+
+/* ── MD3 Menus / popovers / listboxes: extra-small (4 dp) ───── */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-popover,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="listbox"] {
+  border-radius: 4px !important;
+  border: none !important;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 2px 6px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.15),
+    0 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.30) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-popover,
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="listbox"] {
+  box-shadow:
+    0 2px 8px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.50),
+    0 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.60) !important;
+}
+
+/* ── MD3 Dialogs: extra-large shape (28 dp) ──────────────────── */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="dialog"] {
+  border-radius: 28px !important;
+  border: none !important;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 6px 10px 4px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.15),
+    0 2px 3px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.30) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="dialog"] {
+  box-shadow:
+    0 6px 10px 4px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.50),
+    0 2px 3px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.60) !important;
+}
+
+/* ── MD3 Menu items: 8 % on-surface state layer on hover ─────── */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="menu"] [role="menuitem"]:hover,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="menu"] [role="menuitem"]:focus,
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="menu"] [role="menuitem"]:focus-visible {
+  background-color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-foreground) 8%, transparent) !important;
+  color: var(--color-foreground) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="menu"] [role="menuitem"]:hover,
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="menu"] [role="menuitem"]:focus {
+  background-color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-foreground) 10%, transparent) !important;
+}
+
+/* ── MD3 Switch ──────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+/* M3 switch: unselected = outline + icon; selected = primary fill  */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="switch"] {
+  background-color: var(--color-input) !important;
+  border: 2px solid var(--color-muted-foreground) !important;
+  transition: background-color 150ms ease, border-color 150ms ease;
+}
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="switch"] > span {
+  background-color: var(--color-muted-foreground) !important;
+}
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="switch"][aria-checked="true"] {
+  background-color: var(--color-primary) !important;
+  border-color: var(--color-primary) !important;
+}
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="switch"][aria-checked="true"] > span {
+  background-color: var(--color-primary-foreground) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="switch"] {
+  background-color: #3a2524 !important;
+  border-color: var(--color-muted-foreground) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="switch"][aria-checked="true"] {
+  background-color: var(--color-primary) !important;
+  border-color: var(--color-primary) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] [role="switch"][aria-checked="true"] > span {
+  background-color: #1c1917 !important;
+}
+
+/* ── Selected folder: M3 active-indicator treatment ─────────── */
+/* M3 uses a pill-shaped tonal container for the active nav item.   */
+/* Bulwark's left-border accent becomes a 3 dp primary accent line   */
+/* + secondary-container (--color-accent) fill + gentle corner.     */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-secondary.border-r .border-l-2.border-primary {
+  border-left-width: 3px !important;
+  border-left-color: var(--color-primary) !important;
+  background-color: var(--color-accent) !important;
+  border-radius: 0 12px 12px 0 !important;
+}
+
+/* ── Login card: MD3 extra-large + SRC red top accent strip ───── */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-2xl.border.bg-background\\/80.backdrop-blur-sm {
+  position: relative;
+  background-color: var(--color-card) !important;
+  border-color: rgba(213, 43, 30, 0.14) !important;
+  border-radius: 28px !important;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 2px 8px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08),
+    0 8px 32px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.06) !important;
+  overflow: hidden;
+}
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-2xl.border.bg-background\\/80.backdrop-blur-sm::before {
+  content: "";
+  position: absolute;
+  left: 0; right: 0; top: 0;
+  height: 3px;
+  background: linear-gradient(90deg, transparent, #d52b1e 30%, #d52b1e 70%, transparent);
+  pointer-events: none;
+}
+/* Login page background: faint SRC red ambient wash */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .min-h-screen.bg-gradient-to-br {
+  background-color: #f9f7f7 !important;
+  background-image: radial-gradient(56rem 38rem at 50% -12%, rgba(213, 43, 30, 0.05), transparent 60%) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-2xl.border.bg-background\\/80.backdrop-blur-sm {
+  border-color: rgba(239, 68, 68, 0.18) !important;
+  box-shadow:
+    0 4px 16px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.45),
+    0 0 40px -20px rgba(239, 68, 68, 0.18) !important;
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .rounded-2xl.border.bg-background\\/80.backdrop-blur-sm::before {
+  background: linear-gradient(90deg, transparent, #ef4444 30%, #ef4444 70%, transparent);
+}
+.dark body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .min-h-screen.bg-gradient-to-br {
+  background-color: var(--color-background) !important;
+  background-image: radial-gradient(56rem 38rem at 50% -12%, rgba(239, 68, 68, 0.07), transparent 60%) !important;
+}
+
+/* ── Single-surface panes (M3 has no gradient empty states) ───── */
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-gradient-to-br.from-muted\\/30.to-muted\\/50 {
+  background: var(--color-background) !important;
+}
+body[data-theme-skin="builtin-src"] .bg-muted\\/30 {
+  background-color: var(--color-background) !important;
+}`;
+
 export const BUILTIN_THEMES: InstalledTheme[] = [
   {
     id: 'builtin-vnclagoon',
@@ -1114,13 +1338,15 @@ export const BUILTIN_THEMES: InstalledTheme[] = [
   {
     id: 'builtin-src',
     name: 'SRC',
-    version: '1.0.0',
+    version: '1.1.0',
     author: 'VNC',
-    description: 'SRC Advisory brand theme — Swiss red on white, light-first',
+    description: 'SRC Advisory brand theme — Swiss red on white, MD3 components, light-first',
     css: srcCSS,
-    logoLightUrl: '/branding/src-logo.svg',
+    skin: srcSkin,
-    logoDarkUrl: '/branding/src-logo.svg',
+    logoLightUrl: '/branding/SRC_Symbol.png',
+    logoDarkUrl: '/branding/SRC_Symbol.png',
     variants: ['light', 'dark'],
+    typography: { fontSans: '"DM Sans", system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", sans-serif' },
     enabled: true,
     builtIn: true,
   },

lib/demo/demo-client.ts

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ export class DemoJMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
   getMaxDelayedSend(): number { return 30 * 24 * 60 * 60; }
   hasDelayedSend(): boolean { return true; }
   getEventSourceUrl(): string | null { return null; }
+  getWebSocketUrl(): string | null { return null; }
   supportsEmailSubmission(): boolean { return true; }
   supportsQuota(): boolean { return true; }
   supportsVacationResponse(): boolean { return true; }

lib/electron-bridge.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+// Detects whether the app is running inside the VNCmail+ (Bulwark) Electron
+// desktop shell and wraps the native notification bridge that
+// electron/preload.ts exposes via contextBridge. Mirrors how lib/web-push.ts
+// mirrors the React Native push flow - same idea, different native API:
+// PushManager/service-worker there, Electron's own Notification API here.
+//
+// Web/PWA deployments never get `window.vnc` at all (contextBridge only
+// exists inside the Electron shell), so `isElectronShell()` is false there
+// and callers should keep using the lib/web-push.ts + public/sw.js path.
+// Wiring this bridge up to real mail-delivery events (JMAP WebSocket push
+// vs. polling) is a separate, later decision - this module is only the
+// plumbing.
+
+export interface ShowNotificationOptions {
+  body?: string;
+  tag?: string;
+}
+
+export interface ShowNotificationResult {
+  shown: boolean;
+}
+
+export interface VncElectronBridge {
+  isElectron: true;
+  showNotification: (
+    title: string,
+    options?: ShowNotificationOptions,
+  ) => Promise<ShowNotificationResult>;
+}
+
+declare global {
+  interface Window {
+    vnc?: VncElectronBridge;
+  }
+}
+
+export function isElectronShell(): boolean {
+  return typeof window !== "undefined" && window.vnc?.isElectron === true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Shows a notification via Electron's native Notification API when running
+ * inside the desktop shell. Resolves to false (never throws) when not
+ * running in Electron, or when the main process reports notifications
+ * unsupported on this OS/session - callers can fall back to the
+ * service-worker push path (lib/web-push.ts) in that case.
+ */
+export async function showElectronNotification(
+  title: string,
+  options?: ShowNotificationOptions,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!isElectronShell()) return false;
+  const result = await window.vnc!.showNotification(title, options);
+  return result.shown;
+}

lib/jmap/client-interface.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ export interface IJMAPClient {
   getMaxDelayedSend(accountId?: string): number;
   hasDelayedSend(accountId?: string): boolean;
   getEventSourceUrl(): string | null;
+  getWebSocketUrl(): string | null;
   supportsEmailSubmission(): boolean;
   supportsQuota(): boolean;
   supportsVacationResponse(): boolean;

lib/jmap/client.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import type { SieveScript, SieveCapabilities } from "./sieve-types";
 import type { IJMAPClient } from "./client-interface";
 import { toWildcardQuery } from "./search-utils";
 import { batched, itemsPerRequest } from "./request-limits";
+import { noteTransportFailure, noteTransportSuccess } from "./transport-health";
 import { debug } from "@/lib/debug";
 import { normalizeCalendarEventLike } from "@/lib/calendar-event-normalization";
 
@@ -683,11 +684,24 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
     try {
       response = await fetch(url, { ...init, headers });
     } catch (error) {
+      // A `fetch` REJECTION - and only that - is a transport failure. Recorded so
+      // the offline replica's read fallback can tell "the network is down" from
+      // "the folder is empty", which the error-swallowing in getEmails/getEmail/
+      // getMailboxes otherwise makes indistinguishable (see
+      // lib/jmap/transport-health.ts). Deliberately NOT recorded for a 4xx/5xx or
+      // a 429: in those cases the server answered, so it is reachable.
+      noteTransportFailure();
       // Network error: retry once after brief delay (transient proxy/connection issues)
       if (this.reconnecting) throw error;
       await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 1000));
-      response = await fetch(url, { ...init, headers });
+      try {
+        response = await fetch(url, { ...init, headers });
+      } catch (retryError) {
+        noteTransportFailure();
+        throw retryError;
+      }
     }
+    noteTransportSuccess();
 
     // Handle 429 rate limiting - stop immediately, do not retry
     if (response.status === 429) {
@@ -953,6 +967,36 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
     if (session.eventSourceUrl) {
       session.eventSourceUrl = this.rewriteSessionUrl(session.eventSourceUrl);
     }
+    const wsCapability = session.capabilities?.["urn:ietf:params:jmap:websocket"] as
+      | { url?: string }
+      | undefined;
+    if (wsCapability?.url) {
+      wsCapability.url = this.rewriteWebSocketUrl(wsCapability.url);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Same reasoning as rewriteSessionUrl (a reverse proxy may advertise its
+   * own internal hostname), but scheme-aware: unlike apiUrl/eventSourceUrl,
+   * this URL is never touched by fetch() - it goes straight into `new
+   * WebSocket(...)`, and a ws/wss URL can never share an origin string with
+   * an http/https serverUrl even when the host is identical, so reusing
+   * rewriteSessionUrl's plain origin-equality check would rewrite EVERY
+   * websocket URL onto an http(s) scheme and break the constructor outright.
+   */
+  private rewriteWebSocketUrl(url: string): string {
+    try {
+      const parsed = new URL(url);
+      const server = new URL(this.serverUrl);
+      const expectedScheme = server.protocol === "https:" ? "wss:" : "ws:";
+      if (parsed.host === server.host && parsed.protocol === expectedScheme) {
+        return url;
+      }
+      const pathAndRest = url.slice(url.indexOf("/", url.indexOf("//") + 2));
+      return `${expectedScheme}//${server.host}${pathAndRest}`;
+    } catch {
+      return url;
+    }
   }
 
   private async request(methodCalls: JMAPMethodCall[], using?: string[]): Promise<JMAPResponse> {
@@ -3761,6 +3805,22 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
     return this.session.eventSourceUrl || coreCapability?.eventSourceUrl || null;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * RFC 8887 (JMAP over WebSocket) push endpoint, advertised under the
+   * `urn:ietf:params:jmap:websocket` capability (not a root session field
+   * like eventSourceUrl - it's nested the same way every other JMAP
+   * extension capability is). Rewritten to the client's own server host in
+   * rewriteSessionUrls() at connect time, same reasoning as apiUrl/
+   * downloadUrl/eventSourceUrl. Returns null for servers that don't
+   * advertise it - callers fall back to SSE/polling.
+   */
+  getWebSocketUrl(): string | null {
+    const wsCapability = this.capabilities["urn:ietf:params:jmap:websocket"] as
+      | { url?: string; supportsPush?: boolean }
+      | undefined;
+    return wsCapability?.url || null;
+  }
+
   getAccountId(): string {
     return this.accountId;
   }
@@ -5982,12 +6042,51 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
   private visibilityHandler: (() => void) | null = null;
   private onlineHandler: (() => void) | null = null;
 
+  // JMAP-over-WebSocket (RFC 8887) push - preferred over SSE when the server
+  // advertises it (getWebSocketUrl()), since it's the transport the desktop
+  // shell's main process eventually wants for background/no-window
+  // notifications (see electron/preload.ts's showNotification bridge).
+  // Falls back to the existing SSE/polling chain below when unsupported OR
+  // when the handshake itself keeps failing (see wsPermanentlyDisabled).
+  //
+  // KNOWN LIMITATION, confirmed empirically against the sandbox server this
+  // was built against (stalwart.sandbox.vnc.de): its /jmap/ws endpoint
+  // requires the same HTTP Basic/Bearer Authorization header as every other
+  // JMAP endpoint on the WebSocket UPGRADE request itself (curling it with
+  // no Authorization header returns a plain 401 before any WS frame is
+  // possible). The browser WebSocket constructor has no way to attach
+  // custom headers to that handshake (a WHATWG spec restriction, not an
+  // Electron/browser quirk - credentials in the URL are actively rejected
+  // too), so from this renderer-side client there is no way to satisfy that
+  // auth requirement. Against a server with this exact auth model, every
+  // connection attempt below will fail at the handshake and the circuit
+  // breaker (wsPermanentlyDisabled) will fall back to SSE after a few quick
+  // retries - which is not a bug in this code, it is what actually happens
+  // on the wire. It's still implemented for real (not stubbed) because (a)
+  // it's fully spec-correct and will light up automatically against any
+  // server whose WS endpoint doesn't have this requirement - e.g. one
+  // sitting behind a proxy that authenticates via cookies instead - with no
+  // further changes, and (b) the alternative (opening it from Electron's
+  // main process via a header-capable client like the `ws` package) would
+  // mean piping raw credentials from the renderer to the main process over
+  // IPC, which is a materially bigger security-sensitive change than what
+  // was scoped here.
+  private ws: WebSocket | null = null;
+  private wsReconnectTimeout: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
+  private wsReconnectAttempts: number = 0;
+  private wsConsecutiveFailures: number = 0;
+  private wsPermanentlyDisabled: boolean = false;
+  private wsHeartbeatTimer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
+  private lastWSActivity: number = 0;
+
   private static readonly STATE_TYPE_MAP: Record<string, string> = {
     'Mailbox/get': 'Mailbox',
     'Email/get': 'Email',
     'Calendar/get': 'Calendar',
     'CalendarEvent/get': 'CalendarEvent',
     'SieveScript/get': 'SieveScript',
+    'ContactCard/get': 'ContactCard',
+    'FileNode/get': 'FileNode',
   };
 
   private static readonly POLLING_INTERVAL = 3_000;
@@ -5998,20 +6097,315 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
   private static readonly SSE_RECONNECT_DELAY = 3_000;
   private static readonly SSE_PING_TIMEOUT = 90_000; // 3x the 30s ping interval
 
+  // Exponential backoff with full jitter (0..cap), doubling from a 200ms
+  // base and capping at 5s.
+  //
+  // Deliberately much tighter than a "normal" reconnect ladder (something
+  // like 1s/30s would be the textbook default for a flaky network) - and
+  // tuned from a real, measured failure mode, not guessed: the auth
+  // limitation described above fails FAST and DETERMINISTICALLY (the
+  // handshake is rejected before the socket ever opens, in well under a
+  // second, every single time), not slowly. Verified empirically (see
+  // integration/tests/11-electron-notification.spec.ts's development) that
+  // the original 1s-base/30s-cap/5-attempt ladder let the circuit breaker
+  // take up to ~31s to trip, during which there is NO live push at all
+  // (WS hasn't succeeded and hasn't given up yet, so SSE never even starts
+  // connecting) - a real mail delivery landing in that window was missed
+  // entirely, since SSE only streams future changes and does no catch-up
+  // fetch on connect. This tighter ladder closes that gap to a fraction of
+  // a second for the fast-fail case while remaining exactly as protective
+  // for a genuinely slow/flaky network: a hanging attempt is still bounded
+  // by the browser's own WebSocket connect timeout regardless of these
+  // constants, which govern only the GAP between attempts, not how long a
+  // single attempt is allowed to hang.
+  private static readonly WS_RECONNECT_BASE_DELAY = 200;
+  private static readonly WS_RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY = 5_000;
+  // App-level heartbeat: a WebSocket can sit in "open" readyState for a long
+  // time after the underlying network path is actually gone (sleep, network
+  // switch, a NAT/proxy that silently drops idle connections) - TCP alone
+  // won't always surface that promptly. Send a lightweight JMAP request
+  // every 30s and force-reconnect if nothing (heartbeat response OR a real
+  // push) has arrived within 3x that window, mirroring the SSE ping monitor
+  // above.
+  private static readonly WS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL = 30_000;
+  private static readonly WS_ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT = 90_000;
+  // Give up on WS for this client instance after this many CONSECUTIVE
+  // attempts that never reach "open" (a connection that opened fine and
+  // later dropped does not count - see connectWebSocket's openedSuccessfully
+  // tracking). Bounds the cost of the auth limitation described above to a
+  // handful of quick handshake attempts (with the tightened backoff above,
+  // well under a second in the common fast-fail case) instead of retrying a
+  // request that can never succeed, forever, for the lifetime of the session.
+  private static readonly WS_MAX_CONSECUTIVE_FAILURES = 3;
+
+  /** getWebSocketUrl(), gated by the circuit breaker above. */
+  private effectiveWebSocketUrl(): string | null {
+    return this.wsPermanentlyDisabled ? null : this.getWebSocketUrl();
+  }
+
   setupPushNotifications(): boolean {
-    const eventSourceUrl = this.getEventSourceUrl();
+    const wsUrl = this.effectiveWebSocketUrl();
-    if (eventSourceUrl) {
+    if (wsUrl) {
-      this.connectSSE(eventSourceUrl);
+      this.wsReconnectAttempts = 0;
-      // SSE covers the primary account only; keep shared accounts fresh too.
+      this.connectWebSocket(wsUrl);
+      // Prime the polling baseline (pollingStates) in parallel with the WS
+      // attempt, not just for shared/secondary accounts below - if WS ends
+      // up failing and falling back (fallbackFromWebSocket()), this is what
+      // lets that fallback reconcile anything that changed to the PRIMARY
+      // account while WS was still churning through retries. Without an
+      // early baseline, a change in that window would be silently missed
+      // entirely: SSE only streams changes from the moment it connects
+      // onward (no catch-up on connect), so the one thing that CAN catch up
+      // is a diff against a state snapshot taken before the gap started.
+      void this.fetchCurrentStates();
+      // Not confirmed either way whether this server's WebSocket push fans
+      // out to shared/secondary accounts or, like Stalwart's SSE, covers the
+      // primary account only - keep the same secondary poll running under
+      // WS that SSE already needed, rather than assume broader coverage and
+      // risk shared-account counters going stale.
       this.startSecondaryAccountPoll();
     } else {
-      // The fallback poll already covers every session account.
+      const eventSourceUrl = this.getEventSourceUrl();
-      this.startPollingFallback();
+      if (eventSourceUrl) {
+        this.connectSSE(eventSourceUrl);
+        // SSE covers the primary account only; keep shared accounts fresh too.
+        this.startSecondaryAccountPoll();
+      } else {
+        // The fallback poll already covers every session account.
+        this.startPollingFallback();
+      }
     }
     this.setupBrowserEventListeners();
     return true;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Opens the RFC 8887 JMAP-over-WebSocket connection and subscribes to
+   * push for every data type (`WebSocketPushEnable` with dataTypes: null).
+   * Reconnect on close/error is handled by scheduleWSReconnect() below with
+   * exponential backoff - this method only ever represents a single
+   * connection attempt.
+   */
+  private connectWebSocket(wsUrl: string): void {
+    if (this.isRateLimited()) {
+      this.scheduleWSReconnect();
+      return;
+    }
+
+    let socket: WebSocket;
+    try {
+      socket = new WebSocket(wsUrl, "jmap");
+    } catch {
+      // New URL()-level failures (malformed URL) - retry later in case a
+      // session refresh fixes it; getWebSocketUrl() re-reads capabilities
+      // fresh on every attempt.
+      this.scheduleWSReconnect();
+      return;
+    }
+
+    this.ws = socket;
+    const isCurrent = () => this.ws === socket;
+    // Tracks whether THIS specific attempt ever reached "open" - a socket
+    // that opened fine and dropped later (real network blip on an
+    // established connection) must not count toward the circuit breaker the
+    // same way a handshake that never completes does (see
+    // wsPermanentlyDisabled's declaration above for why the latter needs
+    // one at all).
+    let openedSuccessfully = false;
+
+    socket.addEventListener("open", () => {
+      if (!isCurrent()) return;
+      openedSuccessfully = true;
+      // A real connection succeeded - both counters reset: the backoff
+      // ladder no longer applies to whatever eventually causes the NEXT
+      // disconnect, and the "give up on WS entirely" counter only tracks
+      // CONSECUTIVE handshake failures.
+      this.wsReconnectAttempts = 0;
+      this.wsConsecutiveFailures = 0;
+      this.lastWSActivity = Date.now();
+      this.startWSHeartbeat(socket);
+      try {
+        socket.send(JSON.stringify({ "@type": "WebSocketPushEnable", dataTypes: null }));
+      } catch {
+        // send() can throw if the socket already closed between "open"
+        // firing and this line running - the "close" handler below will
+        // schedule a reconnect regardless.
+      }
+    });
+
+    socket.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+      if (!isCurrent()) return;
+      this.lastWSActivity = Date.now();
+      this.processWebSocketMessage(typeof event.data === "string" ? event.data : "");
+    });
+
+    socket.addEventListener("close", () => {
+      if (!isCurrent()) return;
+      this.stopWSHeartbeat();
+      this.ws = null;
+      if (this.intentionallyDisconnected) return;
+
+      if (!openedSuccessfully) {
+        this.wsConsecutiveFailures += 1;
+        if (this.wsConsecutiveFailures >= JMAPClient.WS_MAX_CONSECUTIVE_FAILURES) {
+          // The handshake itself is what's failing, repeatedly - most
+          // commonly (confirmed against this client's own reference
+          // server) because the WS endpoint requires an Authorization
+          // header the browser WebSocket API cannot attach. Retrying that
+          // forever would just hammer the server every ~30s with a request
+          // that can never succeed from here. Give up on WS for the rest of
+          // this client instance's life and stay on SSE/polling, which
+          // don't have this limitation.
+          this.wsPermanentlyDisabled = true;
+          console.warn(
+            '[JMAP] WebSocket push failed to establish after repeated attempts; falling back to SSE/polling for this session.',
+          );
+          this.fallbackFromWebSocket();
+          return;
+        }
+      }
+
+      this.scheduleWSReconnect();
+    });
+
+    // WebSocket always fires "close" right after "error" - the reconnect
+    // logic lives entirely in the "close" handler above so there is exactly
+    // one path that schedules a retry, not two racing each other.
+  }
+
+  /** Whatever push transport SSE would have used, now that WS has given up. */
+  private fallbackFromWebSocket(): void {
+    void this.reconcileAfterWebSocketFallback();
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Diffs against the baseline setupPushNotifications() primed via
+   * fetchCurrentStates() when the WS attempt began - BEFORE either branch
+   * below gets a chance to erase that opportunity (startPollingFallback()
+   * unconditionally overwrites the same baseline via its own
+   * fetchCurrentStates() call; connectSSE() only ever streams changes from
+   * the moment it connects onward, no catch-up). This is what catches a
+   * real mail delivery (or any other tracked change) that happened to the
+   * primary account while WS was still churning through retries, which
+   * neither of those two paths would otherwise ever notice - confirmed as a
+   * real, not theoretical, gap during this feature's own development (see
+   * the WS_RECONNECT_BASE_DELAY comment above).
+   *
+   * Not airtight: if the early fetchCurrentStates() from
+   * setupPushNotifications() hasn't itself completed yet by the time this
+   * runs, there's nothing to diff against and this call just establishes
+   * the baseline instead of detecting drift. In practice that race needs a
+   * pathologically slow state-fetch racing an unusually fast WS failure,
+   * and the tightened backoff above (worst case ~1.75s to exhaust 3
+   * attempts) gives that fetch a lot more room to finish first than the
+   * original 31s-worst-case ladder did.
+   */
+  private async reconcileAfterWebSocketFallback(): Promise<void> {
+    await this.checkForStateChanges();
+
+    const eventSourceUrl = this.getEventSourceUrl();
+    if (eventSourceUrl) {
+      this.connectSSE(eventSourceUrl);
+      this.startSecondaryAccountPoll();
+    } else {
+      this.startPollingFallback();
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Parses one WebSocket text frame. Per RFC 8887 the server can send
+   * Response, StateChange, or PushState frames; only StateChange is
+   * consumed today (method calls aren't yet routed over this socket -
+   * request()/authenticatedFetch() still uses plain HTTP), so anything else
+   * is silently ignored rather than treated as an error.
+   */
+  private processWebSocketMessage(raw: string): void {
+    if (!raw) return;
+    let message: { "@type"?: string; changed?: StateChange["changed"] } | null = null;
+    try {
+      message = JSON.parse(raw);
+    } catch {
+      return; // malformed frame - ignore, matches processSSEEvent's handling
+    }
+    if (message?.["@type"] === "StateChange" && message.changed) {
+      this.stateChangeCallback?.({ "@type": "StateChange", changed: message.changed });
+    }
+  }
+
+  private scheduleWSReconnect(): void {
+    if (this.intentionallyDisconnected) return;
+    if (this.wsReconnectTimeout) return; // already scheduled - don't stack retries
+
+    const wsUrl = this.effectiveWebSocketUrl();
+    if (!wsUrl) {
+      // Either the server capability disappeared (e.g. a session refresh
+      // dropped WebSocket support) or the circuit breaker already tripped -
+      // fall back to whatever push transport is still available instead of
+      // retrying a URL that's gone or a handshake that won't succeed.
+      this.fallbackFromWebSocket();
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const attempt = this.wsReconnectAttempts;
+    this.wsReconnectAttempts += 1;
+    const exponential = JMAPClient.WS_RECONNECT_BASE_DELAY * Math.pow(2, attempt);
+    const cap = Math.min(exponential, JMAPClient.WS_RECONNECT_MAX_DELAY);
+    // Full jitter (uniform 0..cap) rather than a fixed exponential delay -
+    // spreads reconnect attempts out after a shared network blip (proxy
+    // restart, wifi handoff affecting every open tab/window at once)
+    // instead of having them all retry in lockstep.
+    const delay = Math.random() * cap;
+
+    this.wsReconnectTimeout = setTimeout(() => {
+      this.wsReconnectTimeout = null;
+      if (this.isRateLimited()) {
+        this.scheduleWSReconnect();
+        return;
+      }
+      this.connectWebSocket(wsUrl);
+    }, delay);
+  }
+
+  private startWSHeartbeat(socket: WebSocket): void {
+    this.stopWSHeartbeat();
+    this.wsHeartbeatTimer = setInterval(() => {
+      if (this.ws !== socket) return;
+      if (Date.now() - this.lastWSActivity > JMAPClient.WS_ACTIVITY_TIMEOUT) {
+        // Silently dead connection (sleep/network switch/idle proxy) - the
+        // socket can still report readyState OPEN long after the underlying
+        // path is gone. Force-close; the "close" handler schedules the
+        // reconnect via the normal backoff path.
+        this.stopWSHeartbeat();
+        try {
+          socket.close();
+        } catch {
+          // Already closing/closed - the "close" handler (if it hasn't
+          // already run) will still fire and take care of reconnecting.
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+      try {
+        socket.send(JSON.stringify({
+          "@type": "Request",
+          requestId: `ws-heartbeat-${Date.now()}`,
+          using: ["urn:ietf:params:jmap:core"],
+          methodCalls: [["Core/echo", {}, "0"]],
+        }));
+      } catch {
+        // send() failing means the socket is already dead - the activity
+        // timeout above will catch it on the next tick if "close" doesn't
+        // fire first.
+      }
+    }, JMAPClient.WS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL);
+  }
+
+  private stopWSHeartbeat(): void {
+    if (this.wsHeartbeatTimer) {
+      clearInterval(this.wsHeartbeatTimer);
+      this.wsHeartbeatTimer = null;
+    }
+  }
+
   /**
    * Slow poll of the session's shared/secondary accounts, run in parallel with
    * SSE (which never reports them). Skipped when there are no shared accounts,
@@ -6210,6 +6604,23 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
       );
     }
 
+    // Contacts and files get no push at all today (mail-index's event-driven
+    // reindex depends on this poll to notice them when SSE/WS isn't
+    // available) - mirrors the Calendar branch above, same accountId caveat.
+    if (this.supportsContacts()) {
+      using.push('urn:ietf:params:jmap:contacts');
+      methodCalls.push(
+        ['ContactCard/get', { accountId: this.getContactsAccountId(), ids: [], properties: ['id'] }, 'f'],
+      );
+    }
+
+    if (this.hasCapability('urn:ietf:params:jmap:filenode')) {
+      using.push('urn:ietf:params:jmap:filenode');
+      methodCalls.push(
+        ['FileNode/get', { accountId: this.getFilesAccountId(), ids: [], properties: ['id'] }, 'g'],
+      );
+    }
+
     return { using, methodCalls };
   }
 
@@ -6310,6 +6721,27 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
       this.eventSource = null;
     }
     this.stopSSEPingMonitor();
+    if (this.wsReconnectTimeout) {
+      clearTimeout(this.wsReconnectTimeout);
+      this.wsReconnectTimeout = null;
+    }
+    this.stopWSHeartbeat();
+    if (this.ws) {
+      // Null out this.ws BEFORE close() so the "close" event handler's
+      // isCurrent() check (this.ws === socket) sees a mismatch once the
+      // event fires and skips scheduling a reconnect - this is an
+      // intentional teardown, not a dropped connection.
+      const socket = this.ws;
+      this.ws = null;
+      try {
+        socket.close();
+      } catch {
+        // Already closing/closed.
+      }
+    }
+    this.wsReconnectAttempts = 0;
+    this.wsConsecutiveFailures = 0;
+    this.wsPermanentlyDisabled = false;
     this.cleanupBrowserEventListeners();
     this.stateChangeCallback = null;
     this.pollingStates = {};
@@ -6350,7 +6782,22 @@ export class JMAPClient implements IJMAPClient {
 
     if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
       this.onlineHandler = () => {
-        // Network reconnected - reconnect SSE or force a poll
+        // Network reconnected - reconnect WS/SSE or force a poll. Don't
+        // make the user wait through whatever backoff delay was already in
+        // flight from repeated failures while offline - the network is
+        // confirmed back, so retry immediately.
+        const wsUrl = this.effectiveWebSocketUrl();
+        if (wsUrl) {
+          if (!this.ws) {
+            if (this.wsReconnectTimeout) {
+              clearTimeout(this.wsReconnectTimeout);
+              this.wsReconnectTimeout = null;
+            }
+            this.wsReconnectAttempts = 0;
+            this.connectWebSocket(wsUrl);
+          }
+          return;
+        }
         const eventSourceUrl = this.getEventSourceUrl();
         if (eventSourceUrl && !this.sseAbortController) {
           this.connectSSE(eventSourceUrl);

lib/jmap/transport-health.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// A single monotonic counter of JMAP TRANSPORT failures.
+//
+// WHY THIS EXISTS. The offline replica is a read-path FALLBACK, and to be one it
+// has to know that a read genuinely failed. `lib/jmap/client.ts` makes that
+// impossible to see from the outside: its read methods swallow their own errors
+// and return plausible-looking success. `getEmails()` returns
+// `{ emails: [], hasMore: false, total: 0 }`, so a dead network is
+// indistinguishable from an empty folder. `getEmail()` returns `null`.
+// `getMailboxes()` returns a SYNTHETIC single Inbox. Falling back on those shapes
+// alone would mean serving stale replica rows for a folder the user had genuinely
+// just emptied.
+//
+// So `authenticatedFetch` bumps this counter when, and only when, `fetch` itself
+// rejects - not on a 4xx, not on a 429 (that is a rate limit, and the server is
+// plainly reachable), not on a JMAP method error. The fallback layer samples the
+// counter before and after a call: a suspicious result PLUS an increment during
+// that exact call is a transport failure. Either signal alone is not enough.
+//
+// Module-level rather than per-client on purpose: it answers "is the network
+// working right now", which is a property of the machine, not of one account's
+// client instance.
+
+let failures = 0;
+let lastFailureAt = 0;
+let lastSuccessAt = 0;
+
+/** Called only when `fetch` itself rejects. Never for an HTTP status. */
+export function noteTransportFailure(): void {
+  failures++;
+  lastFailureAt = Date.now();
+}
+
+export function noteTransportSuccess(): void {
+  lastSuccessAt = Date.now();
+}
+
+/** Monotonic. Sample before and after a call to attribute a failure to it. */
+export function transportFailureCount(): number {
+  return failures;
+}
+
+export function transportHealth(): {
+  failures: number;
+  lastFailureAt: number;
+  lastSuccessAt: number;
+  /** Best-effort "probably offline": a failure more recent than any success. */
+  likelyOffline: boolean;
+} {
+  return {
+    failures,
+    lastFailureAt,
+    lastSuccessAt,
+    likelyOffline: lastFailureAt > lastSuccessAt,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Test-only reset. */
+export function resetTransportHealth(): void {
+  failures = 0;
+  lastFailureAt = 0;
+  lastSuccessAt = 0;
+}

lib/mail-index-client.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+// Renderer-side client for the encrypted local search index.
+//
+// The index is EVENT-DRIVEN: the renderer already holds the live JMAP push
+// connection (WebSocket -> SSE -> polling, `lib/jmap/client.ts`'s
+// setupPushNotifications), so the moment a StateChange announces new mail, a
+// calendar change, a contact edit or a file upload, this posts to the reindex
+// route. No polling loop, no background worker, no long-lived credential -
+// just one more authenticated fetch from the place the push already arrives.
+//
+// Every function here is best-effort and never throws: a search index failing
+// to update must never break the mail UI.
+
+import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/browser-navigation';
+import { debug } from '@/lib/debug';
+import type { StateChange } from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+
+export type IndexContentType = 'mail' | 'calendar' | 'contact' | 'file';
+
+export interface IndexRunResult {
+  ok: boolean;
+  written?: Partial<Record<IndexContentType, number>>;
+  skipped?: IndexContentType[];
+  errors?: Array<{ contentType: IndexContentType; message: string }>;
+  durationMs?: number;
+  /** Set when the feature isn't available (not the desktop shell, no keyring, no binding). */
+  unavailable?: boolean;
+  error?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Maps JMAP `StateChange` type keys onto our content types.
+ *
+ * The transport is already type-generic - the WebSocket handler
+ * (`client.ts:6308-6316`) and the SSE handler (`:6505`) pass the whole
+ * `changed` map through untouched, and the WS subscribes with
+ * `dataTypes: null` (every type) - so anything the server pushes arrives here.
+ *
+ * `Mailbox` is deliberately NOT mapped: a Mailbox state change is usually just
+ * an unread-count move, and it fires constantly. `Email` covers the cases that
+ * change indexable content.
+ */
+const STATE_TYPE_TO_CONTENT: Record<string, IndexContentType> = {
+  Email: 'mail',
+  Calendar: 'calendar',
+  CalendarEvent: 'calendar',
+  ContactCard: 'contact',
+  AddressBook: 'contact',
+  FileNode: 'file',
+};
+
+export function contentTypesFromStateChange(change: StateChange): IndexContentType[] {
+  const out = new Set<IndexContentType>();
+  for (const perAccount of Object.values(change.changed ?? {})) {
+    for (const stateType of Object.keys(perAccount ?? {})) {
+      const mapped = STATE_TYPE_TO_CONTENT[stateType];
+      if (mapped) out.add(mapped);
+    }
+  }
+  return [...out];
+}
+
+export interface IndexRequestOptions {
+  types?: readonly IndexContentType[];
+  /**
+   * Per-type ids to index. Supply them whenever the renderer already knows
+   * which objects changed - it turns the call into a couple of `Foo/get`s
+   * instead of a windowed query. Mail is the frequent case and the one where
+   * this matters.
+   */
+  ids?: Partial<Record<IndexContentType, string[]>>;
+  /** Backfill the recent window for every supported type, and prune. */
+  catchUp?: boolean;
+  /** Cookie slot of the account to index. Defaults to the server's first signed-in slot. */
+  slot?: number;
+}
+
+let inFlight: Promise<IndexRunResult> | null = null;
+/** Set once the server says the feature isn't there, so we stop asking. */
+let knownUnavailable = false;
+
+/**
+ * Posts one index request. Single-flighted: a burst of deliveries coalesces
+ * into the in-flight call rather than queueing N overlapping SQLite writers.
+ */
+export async function requestIndex(options: IndexRequestOptions = {}): Promise<IndexRunResult> {
+  if (knownUnavailable) return { ok: false, unavailable: true };
+  if (inFlight) return inFlight;
+
+  const query = typeof options.slot === 'number' ? `?slot=${options.slot}` : '';
+  const run = (async (): Promise<IndexRunResult> => {
+    try {
+      const response = await apiFetch(`/api/offline/reindex${query}`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          types: options.types,
+          ids: options.ids,
+          catchUp: options.catchUp === true,
+        }),
+      });
+
+      // 404 = not the desktop shell (or the feature is gated off). Permanent for
+      // this page load; stop asking so a busy mailbox doesn't post per delivery.
+      if (response.status === 404) {
+        knownUnavailable = true;
+        return { ok: false, unavailable: true };
+      }
+      if (response.status === 503) {
+        // No keyring / no native binding / no key channel. Also permanent for
+        // this session, and the message is worth surfacing in Settings.
+        knownUnavailable = true;
+        const body = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
+        return { ok: false, unavailable: true, error: body?.error };
+      }
+      if (!response.ok) {
+        const body = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
+        return { ok: false, error: body?.error || `HTTP ${response.status}` };
+      }
+      const body = await response.json();
+      debug.log('push', '[index] reindex done', body?.written, body?.errors);
+      return {
+        ok: true,
+        written: body?.written,
+        skipped: body?.skipped,
+        errors: body?.errors,
+        durationMs: body?.durationMs,
+      };
+    } catch (error) {
+      return { ok: false, error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) };
+    } finally {
+      inFlight = null;
+    }
+  })();
+
+  inFlight = run;
+  return run;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The event-driven entry point, called from the push handler.
+ *
+ * `mailIds` lets the caller hand over the ids it already has (the refreshed
+ * mailbox page), so the frequent mail case costs one `Email/get` rather than a
+ * 30-day query. The other three types are rare events (a contact edit, a file
+ * upload, a calendar change), so they fall back to their own bounded queries.
+ */
+export function indexOnStateChange(
+  change: StateChange,
+  opts: { mailIds?: string[]; slot?: number } = {},
+): void {
+  if (knownUnavailable) return;
+  const types = contentTypesFromStateChange(change);
+  if (types.length === 0) return;
+
+  const ids: Partial<Record<IndexContentType, string[]>> = {};
+  if (types.includes('mail') && opts.mailIds && opts.mailIds.length > 0) {
+    ids.mail = opts.mailIds.slice(0, 100);
+  }
+
+  // Fire-and-forget on purpose: this runs inside the push handler, and the mail
+  // UI must not wait on a search index.
+  void requestIndex({ types, ids: Object.keys(ids).length > 0 ? ids : undefined, slot: opts.slot });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Launch-time catch-up: backfills whatever changed while the app was closed,
+ * for which no push event was ever delivered. Also the recovery path for the
+ * polling transport, which has no signal for contacts or files at all
+ * (`client.ts`'s buildStatePollingRequest polls Mailbox/Email/Calendar/
+ * CalendarEvent/SieveScript only).
+ */
+export async function catchUpIndex(slot?: number): Promise<IndexRunResult> {
+  return requestIndex({ catchUp: true, slot });
+}
+
+export interface IndexStats {
+  contentType: string;
+  count: number;
+  newest: string | null;
+  indexedAt: number | null;
+}
+
+/** Reads per-type counts without searching. Used by the Settings panel. */
+export async function fetchIndexStats(slot?: number): Promise<IndexStats[] | null> {
+  const slotQuery = typeof slot === 'number' ? `&slot=${slot}` : '';
+  try {
+    const response = await apiFetch(`/api/offline/search?stats=true${slotQuery}`);
+    if (!response.ok) return null;
+    const body = await response.json();
+    return Array.isArray(body?.stats) ? (body.stats as IndexStats[]) : [];
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Resets the "don't ask again" latch - e.g. after the user signs in again. */
+export function resetIndexAvailability(): void {
+  knownUnavailable = false;
+}

lib/mail-index/__tests__/extract.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import type {
+  CalendarEvent, CalendarParticipant, ContactCard, Email, EmailBodyPart, FileNode,
+} from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+import {
+  contactDisplayName, emailBodyText, extractCalendarEvent, extractContact, extractFile,
+  extractMail, htmlToText, MAX_BODY_CHARS, normaliseText,
+} from '../extract';
+import { buildFilePaths } from '../jmap';
+
+describe('htmlToText', () => {
+  it('drops script and style CONTENT, not just the tags', () => {
+    // The important case: a naive `<[^>]+>` strip leaves the script body behind
+    // as searchable text, so a page full of JS would pollute the index.
+    const out = htmlToText('<p>Hello</p><script>var secretToken = "abc123";</script><style>.a{color:red}</style>');
+    expect(out).toContain('Hello');
+    expect(out).not.toContain('secretToken');
+    expect(out).not.toContain('abc123');
+    expect(out).not.toContain('color:red');
+  });
+
+  it('turns block boundaries into newlines and decodes entities', () => {
+    expect(htmlToText('<p>one</p><p>two</p>')).toBe('one\ntwo');
+    expect(htmlToText('a<br>b')).toBe('a\nb');
+    expect(htmlToText('R&amp;D &lt;tag&gt; &quot;q&quot; &nbsp;x')).toBe('R&D <tag> "q" x');
+    expect(htmlToText('&#8364;10 &#x20AC;20')).toBe('€10 €20');
+  });
+
+  it('ignores comments and out-of-range numeric entities without throwing', () => {
+    expect(htmlToText('a<!-- hidden -->b')).toBe('a b');
+    expect(() => htmlToText('&#1114112; &#x999999;')).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('normaliseText', () => {
+  it('collapses runs of spaces, tabs and non-breaking spaces', () => {
+    expect(normaliseText('a  \t   b')).toBe('a b');
+  });
+  it('caps blank-line runs and handles null/undefined', () => {
+    expect(normaliseText('a\n\n\n\n\nb')).toBe('a\n\nb');
+    expect(normaliseText(undefined)).toBe('');
+    expect(normaliseText(null)).toBe('');
+  });
+});
+
+function baseEmail(overrides: Partial<Email> = {}): Email {
+  return {
+    id: 'M1', threadId: 'T1', mailboxIds: { mb1: true }, keywords: {},
+    size: 100, receivedAt: '2026-08-01T10:00:00Z', hasAttachment: false,
+    ...overrides,
+  } as Email;
+}
+
+describe('emailBodyText', () => {
+  it('prefers the text/plain part', () => {
+    const email = baseEmail({
+      textBody: [{ partId: 'p1' } as EmailBodyPart],
+      htmlBody: [{ partId: 'p2' } as EmailBodyPart],
+      bodyValues: { p1: { value: 'plain wins' }, p2: { value: '<b>html loses</b>' } },
+    });
+    expect(emailBodyText(email)).toBe('plain wins');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to flattened HTML when there is no plain alternative', () => {
+    const email = baseEmail({
+      htmlBody: [{ partId: 'p2' } as EmailBodyPart],
+      bodyValues: { p2: { value: '<p>hello</p><p>world</p>' } },
+    });
+    expect(emailBodyText(email)).toBe('hello\nworld');
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to preview when bodyValues is missing entirely', () => {
+    // This is the shape a caller gets when the Email/get omitted
+    // fetchTextBodyValues - a silent empty body if we did not handle it.
+    const email = baseEmail({
+      textBody: [{ partId: 'p1' } as EmailBodyPart],
+      preview: 'server preview text',
+    });
+    expect(emailBodyText(email)).toBe('server preview text');
+  });
+
+  it('treats a whitespace-only plain part as absent', () => {
+    const email = baseEmail({
+      textBody: [{ partId: 'p1' } as EmailBodyPart],
+      htmlBody: [{ partId: 'p2' } as EmailBodyPart],
+      bodyValues: { p1: { value: '   \n  ' }, p2: { value: 'real content' } },
+    });
+    expect(emailBodyText(email)).toBe('real content');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('extractMail', () => {
+  it('flattens addresses into `people` and keeps metadata', () => {
+    const doc = extractMail('acc1', baseEmail({
+      subject: 'Quarterly budget',
+      from: [{ name: 'Sophie Müller', email: 'sophie@example.com' }],
+      to: [{ email: 'me@example.com' }],
+      cc: [{ name: 'Bob', email: 'bob@example.com' }],
+      preview: 'hi',
+    }));
+    expect(doc.contentType).toBe('mail');
+    expect(doc.title).toBe('Quarterly budget');
+    expect(doc.people).toContain('Sophie Müller sophie@example.com');
+    expect(doc.people).toContain('bob@example.com');
+    expect(doc.occurredAt).toBe('2026-08-01T10:00:00Z');
+    expect(doc.metadata.threadId).toBe('T1');
+    expect(doc.metadata.mailboxIds).toEqual(['mb1']);
+  });
+
+  it('substitutes a placeholder title rather than indexing an empty one', () => {
+    expect(extractMail('acc1', baseEmail()).title).toBe('(no subject)');
+  });
+
+  it('clamps a huge body', () => {
+    const doc = extractMail('acc1', baseEmail({
+      textBody: [{ partId: 'p1' } as EmailBodyPart],
+      bodyValues: { p1: { value: 'x'.repeat(MAX_BODY_CHARS * 2) } },
+    }));
+    expect(doc.body.length).toBe(MAX_BODY_CHARS);
+  });
+});
+
+function baseEvent(overrides: Partial<CalendarEvent> = {}): CalendarEvent {
+  return {
+    id: 'E1', calendarIds: { c1: true }, isDraft: false, isOrigin: true,
+    utcStart: '2026-08-10T09:00:00Z', utcEnd: '2026-08-10T10:00:00Z',
+    '@type': 'Event', uid: 'u1', title: 'Standup', description: '',
+    descriptionContentType: 'text/plain', created: null, updated: '2026-08-01T00:00:00Z',
+    sequence: 0, start: '2026-08-10T11:00:00', duration: 'PT1H', timeZone: 'Europe/Zurich',
+    showWithoutTime: false, status: 'confirmed', freeBusyStatus: 'busy', privacy: 'public',
+    color: null, keywords: null, categories: null, locale: null, replyTo: null,
+    organizerCalendarAddress: null, participants: null, mayInviteSelf: false,
+    mayInviteOthers: false, hideAttendees: false, recurrenceId: null,
+    recurrenceIdTimeZone: null, recurrenceRules: null, recurrenceOverrides: null,
+    excludedRecurrenceRules: null, useDefaultAlerts: false, alerts: null,
+    locations: null, virtualLocations: null, links: null, relatedTo: null,
+    ...overrides,
+  } as CalendarEvent;
+}
+
+describe('extractCalendarEvent', () => {
+  it('indexes description, location, attendees and organizer', () => {
+    const doc = extractCalendarEvent('acc1', baseEvent({
+      title: 'Lease decision',
+      description: 'Zurich office lease renewal',
+      locations: { l1: { '@type': 'Location', name: 'Room 3.14', description: null, locationTypes: null, coordinates: null, timeZone: null, links: null, relativeTo: null } },
+      organizerCalendarAddress: 'mailto:boss@example.com',
+      // A partial participant on purpose: servers omit most JSCalendar fields,
+      // and the extractor must cope with exactly this shape.
+      participants: {
+        p1: { name: 'Ana', email: 'ana@example.com', sendTo: { imip: 'mailto:ana@example.com' } } as unknown as CalendarParticipant,
+      },
+    }));
+    expect(doc.title).toBe('Lease decision');
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('Zurich office lease renewal');
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('Room 3.14');
+    // mailto: prefixes stripped so the address tokenises like every other one.
+    expect(doc.people).toContain('boss@example.com');
+    expect(doc.people).not.toContain('mailto:');
+    expect(doc.people).toContain('ana@example.com');
+    expect(doc.metadata.participantCount).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('flattens an HTML description', () => {
+    const doc = extractCalendarEvent('acc1', baseEvent({
+      description: '<p>agenda</p><script>bad()</script>',
+      descriptionContentType: 'text/html',
+    }));
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('agenda');
+    expect(doc.body).not.toContain('bad()');
+  });
+
+  it('prefers utcStart over the zone-less local start for ordering', () => {
+    expect(extractCalendarEvent('acc1', baseEvent()).occurredAt).toBe('2026-08-10T09:00:00Z');
+    expect(extractCalendarEvent('acc1', baseEvent({ utcStart: null })).occurredAt)
+      .toBe('2026-08-10T11:00:00');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('extractContact', () => {
+  const card = (overrides: Partial<ContactCard> = {}): ContactCard =>
+    ({ id: 'C1', addressBookIds: { a1: true }, ...overrides }) as ContactCard;
+
+  it('uses name.full when present', () => {
+    expect(contactDisplayName(card({ name: { full: 'Ada Lovelace' } }))).toBe('Ada Lovelace');
+  });
+
+  it('assembles components in the right order when full is absent', () => {
+    expect(contactDisplayName(card({
+      name: { components: [{ kind: 'surname', value: 'Hopper' }, { kind: 'given', value: 'Grace' }] },
+    }))).toBe('Grace Hopper');
+  });
+
+  it('degrades to an email, then an org, then a placeholder', () => {
+    expect(contactDisplayName(card({ emails: { e: { address: 'x@y.z' } } }))).toBe('x@y.z');
+    expect(contactDisplayName(card({ organizations: { o: { name: 'ACME' } } }))).toBe('ACME');
+    expect(contactDisplayName(card())).toBe('(unnamed contact)');
+  });
+
+  it('puts emails and phones in `people` and notes/orgs in `body`', () => {
+    const doc = extractContact('acc1', card({
+      name: { full: 'Ada Lovelace' },
+      emails: { e1: { address: 'ada@example.com' } },
+      phones: { p1: { number: '+41 44 000 00 00' } },
+      organizations: { o1: { name: 'Analytical Engines' } },
+      notes: { n1: { note: 'met at the Zurich conference' } },
+      nicknames: { k1: { name: 'The Countess' } },
+    }));
+    expect(doc.people).toContain('ada@example.com');
+    expect(doc.people).toContain('+41 44 000 00 00');
+    expect(doc.people).toContain('The Countess');
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('Analytical Engines');
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('met at the Zurich conference');
+    // A contact has no single meaningful date; ranking is relevance-only.
+    expect(doc.occurredAt).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('handles both RFC 9553 and legacy flat address shapes', () => {
+    expect(extractContact('acc1', card({ addresses: { a: { full: 'Bahnhofstrasse 1, Zurich' } } })).body)
+      .toContain('Bahnhofstrasse 1, Zurich');
+    expect(extractContact('acc1', card({ addresses: { a: { street: 'Bahnhofstrasse 1', locality: 'Zurich' } } })).body)
+      .toContain('Bahnhofstrasse 1, Zurich');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('extractFile', () => {
+  const node = (overrides: Partial<FileNode> = {}): FileNode =>
+    ({
+      id: 'F1', parentId: null, name: 'invoice.pdf', type: 'application/pdf',
+      blobId: 'b1', size: 1234, created: '2026-07-01T00:00:00Z',
+      modified: '2026-07-15T00:00:00Z', ...overrides,
+    }) as FileNode;
+
+  it('indexes metadata only and says so', () => {
+    const doc = extractFile('acc1', node(), { path: 'Finance/2026' });
+    expect(doc.title).toBe('invoice.pdf');
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('Finance/2026');
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('pdf');
+    expect(doc.metadata.contentIndexed).toBe(false);
+    expect(doc.metadata.mimeType).toBe('application/pdf');
+    expect(doc.metadata.size).toBe(1234);
+  });
+
+  it('uses `modified` (FileNode has no `updated`) and falls back to `created`', () => {
+    expect(extractFile('acc1', node()).occurredAt).toBe('2026-07-15T00:00:00Z');
+    expect(extractFile('acc1', node({ modified: undefined as unknown as string })).occurredAt)
+      .toBe('2026-07-01T00:00:00Z');
+  });
+
+  it('marks directories', () => {
+    const doc = extractFile('acc1', node({ name: 'Finance', type: 'd', blobId: null }));
+    expect(doc.metadata.isDirectory).toBe(true);
+    expect(doc.metadata.mimeType).toBeNull();
+    expect(doc.body).toContain('folder');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('buildFilePaths', () => {
+  it('resolves the PARENT chain, excluding the node itself', () => {
+    const nodes = [
+      { id: 'root', parentId: null, name: 'Finance' },
+      { id: 'year', parentId: 'root', name: '2026' },
+      { id: 'file', parentId: 'year', name: 'invoice.pdf' },
+    ] as FileNode[];
+    const paths = buildFilePaths(nodes);
+    expect(paths.get('file')).toBe('Finance/2026');
+    expect(paths.get('year')).toBe('Finance');
+    expect(paths.get('root')).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('truncates rather than failing when an ancestor is not in the set', () => {
+    const nodes = [{ id: 'file', parentId: 'missing', name: 'x.txt' }] as FileNode[];
+    expect(buildFilePaths(nodes).get('file')).toBe('');
+  });
+
+  it('terminates on a parent cycle', () => {
+    const nodes = [
+      { id: 'a', parentId: 'b', name: 'A' },
+      { id: 'b', parentId: 'a', name: 'B' },
+    ] as FileNode[];
+    expect(() => buildFilePaths(nodes)).not.toThrow();
+  });
+});

lib/mail-index/__tests__/store.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { isSqlcipherAvailable } from '../binding';
+import { accountFileToken, getStoreDir, indexDbPath, STORE_DIR_ENV } from '../paths';
+import { MailIndex, toFtsMatchQuery, type IndexDoc } from '../store';
+
+describe('toFtsMatchQuery', () => {
+  it('quotes every token so FTS5 operators in user input cannot break the query', () => {
+    // FTS5's MATCH grammar is NOT protected by SQL parameter binding: a bare
+    // quote or a stray NEAR/AND/* raises `fts5: syntax error`, which would turn
+    // a search box into a 500.
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('a" OR b')).toBe('"a" AND "OR" AND "b"');
+    // No trailing `*` here: the final token is one character, below the
+    // prefix-match threshold (see the next test).
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('NEAR(x y)')).toBe('"NEAR" AND "x" AND "y"');
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('NEAR(x yes)')).toBe('"NEAR" AND "x" AND "yes"*');
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('foo*')).toBe('"foo"*');
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('a AND NOT b')).toContain('"NOT"');
+  });
+
+  it('prefix-matches only the final token, and only when it is long enough', () => {
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('zurich lea')).toBe('"zurich" AND "lea"*');
+    // Two characters would match too much of a mailbox to be useful.
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('zurich le')).toBe('"zurich" AND "le"');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps unicode letters, emails and hyphenated words', () => {
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('Müller')).toBe('"Müller"*');
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('東京')).toBe('"東京"');
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('a@b.com')).toBe('"a@b.com"*');
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery("O'Brien-Smith")).toBe('"O\'Brien-Smith"*');
+  });
+
+  it('returns null for input with no usable tokens', () => {
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('')).toBeNull();
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('   ')).toBeNull();
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery('***')).toBeNull();
+    expect(toFtsMatchQuery(undefined as unknown as string)).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('bounds the token count', () => {
+    const many = Array.from({ length: 100 }, (_, i) => `w${i}`).join(' ');
+    expect((toFtsMatchQuery(many) ?? '').split(' AND ')).toHaveLength(24);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('paths', () => {
+  const original = process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV];
+  afterEach(() => {
+    if (original === undefined) delete process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV];
+    else process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV] = original;
+  });
+
+  it('is disabled unless the env var is set - the hosted-deployment gate', () => {
+    delete process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV];
+    expect(getStoreDir()).toBeNull();
+    process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV] = '';
+    expect(getStoreDir()).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a relative path, which would resolve against the server cwd', () => {
+    process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV] = 'offline';
+    expect(getStoreDir()).toBeNull();
+    process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV] = '/abs/offline';
+    expect(getStoreDir()).toBe('/abs/offline');
+  });
+
+  it('hashes the filename so the directory is not an account inventory', () => {
+    const token = accountFileToken('linus@example.com');
+    expect(token).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/);
+    expect(token).not.toContain('linus');
+    expect(indexDbPath('/s', 'linus@example.com')).toBe(`/s/index/${token}.db`);
+    // Deterministic - the same account must resolve to the same file forever.
+    expect(accountFileToken('linus@example.com')).toBe(token);
+  });
+});
+
+function doc(overrides: Partial<IndexDoc> = {}): IndexDoc {
+  return {
+    jmapAccountId: 'acc1',
+    contentType: 'mail',
+    id: 'M1',
+    title: 'Quarterly budget review',
+    people: 'Sophie Müller sophie@example.com',
+    body: 'The Zurich office lease renewal needs a decision before September.',
+    occurredAt: '2026-08-01T10:00:00Z',
+    metadata: { threadId: 'T1' },
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+}
+
+// The native binding is an OPTIONAL dependency, so these skip rather than fail
+// on a platform with no prebuild (e.g. Alpine/musl in CI containers).
+describe.skipIf(!isSqlcipherAvailable())('MailIndex (real SQLCipher)', () => {
+  let storeDir: string;
+  const accountId = 'linus@example.com';
+  const key = randomBytes(32);
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    storeDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'mail-index-test-'));
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    fs.rmSync(storeDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  const open = () => MailIndex.open({ storeDir, accountId, key });
+
+  it('writes an ENCRYPTED file - no plaintext recoverable from the raw bytes', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc()]);
+    index.close();
+
+    const bytes = fs.readFileSync(indexDbPath(storeDir, accountId));
+    // The canary check, not just a header check: this is the assertion that
+    // would have caught `PRAGMA key` being a silent no-op.
+    expect(bytes.includes('Zurich office lease')).toBe(false);
+    expect(bytes.includes('Quarterly budget')).toBe(false);
+    expect(bytes.subarray(0, 15).toString('latin1')).not.toBe('SQLite format 3');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong key and rebuilds instead of throwing at the caller', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc()]);
+    index.close();
+
+    // A different key cannot read the data; the store recreates the file rather
+    // than surfacing an unrecoverable error, because the index is derived data
+    // and the key was never a user secret.
+    const other = MailIndex.open({ storeDir, accountId, key: randomBytes(32) });
+    expect(other.search({ query: 'Zurich' })).toHaveLength(0);
+    other.close();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a key of the wrong length', () => {
+    expect(() => MailIndex.open({ storeDir, accountId, key: randomBytes(16) })).toThrow(/32 bytes/);
+  });
+
+  it('finds documents by body, title and people', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc()]);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'Zurich' }).map((h) => h.id)).toEqual(['M1']);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'quarterly' }).map((h) => h.id)).toEqual(['M1']);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'sophie@example.com' }).map((h) => h.id)).toEqual(['M1']);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'nonexistentword' })).toHaveLength(0);
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('returns a snippet for use as LLM context', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc()]);
+    const [hit] = index.search({ query: 'Zurich' });
+    expect(hit.snippet).toContain('[Zurich]');
+    expect(hit.metadata.threadId).toBe('T1');
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('upserting the same id REPLACES the FTS row rather than duplicating it', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc()]);
+    index.upsert([doc({ body: 'Completely different content about Geneva.' })]);
+
+    // One row, and the OLD text must no longer match - the classic
+    // stale-FTS-row bug when the index is maintained by hand.
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'Geneva' })).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'Zurich' })).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(index.stats().find((s) => s.contentType === 'mail')?.count).toBe(1);
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('scopes rows by JMAP account, so delegated accounts cannot merge', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([
+      doc({ jmapAccountId: 'acc1', id: 'X', body: 'shared secret alpha' }),
+      // Same JMAP id under a different account - legal, since JMAP ids are only
+      // unique within an account (see namespaceMailboxIds in lib/jmap/client.ts).
+      doc({ jmapAccountId: 'acc2', id: 'X', body: 'shared secret beta' }),
+    ]);
+    expect(index.stats().find((s) => s.contentType === 'mail')?.count).toBe(2);
+    const hits = index.search({ query: 'secret' });
+    expect(hits).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(new Set(hits.map((h) => h.jmapAccountId))).toEqual(new Set(['acc1', 'acc2']));
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('filters by content type and searches across all four by default', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([
+      doc({ contentType: 'mail', id: 'm', title: 'Zurich mail' }),
+      doc({ contentType: 'calendar', id: 'c', title: 'Zurich meeting' }),
+      doc({ contentType: 'contact', id: 'k', title: 'Zurich person', occurredAt: null }),
+      doc({ contentType: 'file', id: 'f', title: 'Zurich file' }),
+    ]);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'Zurich' })).toHaveLength(4);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'Zurich', types: ['calendar'] }).map((h) => h.id)).toEqual(['c']);
+    expect(new Set(index.search({ query: 'Zurich', types: ['mail', 'file'] }).map((h) => h.id)))
+      .toEqual(new Set(['m', 'f']));
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('weights a title hit above a body-only hit', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([
+      doc({ id: 'body-only', title: 'unrelated', body: 'mentions lease once' }),
+      doc({ id: 'in-title', title: 'lease renewal', body: 'unrelated text' }),
+    ]);
+    // bm25 is negative and lower is better, so the title hit must come first.
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'lease' })[0].id).toBe('in-title');
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('removes documents and their FTS rows', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc()]);
+    expect(index.remove('acc1', 'mail', ['M1'])).toBe(1);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'Zurich' })).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(index.remove('acc1', 'mail', ['does-not-exist'])).toBe(0);
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('prunes by date without touching newer rows', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([
+      doc({ id: 'old', occurredAt: '2020-01-01T00:00:00Z', body: 'ancient lease' }),
+      doc({ id: 'new', occurredAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00Z', body: 'current lease' }),
+    ]);
+    expect(index.pruneOlderThan('acc1', 'mail', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')).toBe(1);
+    expect(index.search({ query: 'lease' }).map((h) => h.id)).toEqual(['new']);
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('reports existing ids and per-type stats', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc({ id: 'a' }), doc({ id: 'b' }), doc({ contentType: 'file', id: 'f' })]);
+    expect(index.existingIds('acc1', 'mail')).toEqual(new Set(['a', 'b']));
+    const stats = index.stats();
+    expect(stats.find((s) => s.contentType === 'mail')?.count).toBe(2);
+    expect(stats.find((s) => s.contentType === 'file')?.count).toBe(1);
+    index.close();
+  });
+
+  it('survives reopening and keeps the data', () => {
+    const first = open();
+    first.upsert([doc()]);
+    first.close();
+    const second = open();
+    expect(second.search({ query: 'Zurich' })).toHaveLength(1);
+    second.close();
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates a hostile query string end to end', () => {
+    const index = open();
+    index.upsert([doc()]);
+    for (const q of ['"', '*', 'a" OR "b', 'NEAR(', ')', 'AND', '^', ':', '-']) {
+      expect(() => index.search({ query: q })).not.toThrow();
+    }
+    index.close();
+  });
+});

lib/mail-index/binding.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+// Guarded loader for the SQLCipher native binding.
+//
+// WHY THIS FILE EXISTS AT ALL: `@signalapp/sqlcipher` is declared in
+// package.json's `optionalDependencies`, not `dependencies`, and it MUST stay
+// there. It publishes six N-API prebuilds (darwin/linux/win32 x arm64/x64) and
+// **no build sources at all** - the published tarball has no `binding.gyp`, no
+// `src/`, no `deps/`. Its install script is `node-gyp-build`, which falls back
+// to `node-gyp rebuild` when no prebuild matches, and that fallback cannot
+// succeed without sources. So on a platform with no matching prebuild the
+// install FAILS.
+//
+// Both Dockerfiles in this repo are `FROM node:24-alpine` + `npm ci`
+// (`Dockerfile:1-4`, `integration/webmail.Dockerfile:15-19`). Alpine is musl;
+// there is no `linuxmusl-*` prebuild (and the glibc prebuild could not load
+// there anyway). As a hard `dependencies` entry this would break the
+// production image build and the integration fixture's webmail container -
+// neither of which wants this feature, they just need `npm ci` to exit 0.
+// `optionalDependencies` makes npm treat that install failure as non-fatal and
+// simply omit the package.
+//
+// The cost of that choice is exactly this module: the require must be guarded
+// at runtime, because "installed" is no longer guaranteed. Callers get
+// `null` and the feature turns itself off, which is the correct behaviour for
+// a desktop-only search index in a server that may not be a desktop.
+
+/**
+ * Minimal structural type for the bits of `@signalapp/sqlcipher` we use.
+ *
+ * Deliberately hand-written rather than `typeof import('@signalapp/sqlcipher')`:
+ * the package is optional, so a type-only import would make `tsc` fail on any
+ * machine where the install was skipped - which is every Alpine CI container.
+ *
+ * NOTE the parameter shape. `@signalapp/sqlcipher` is NOT drop-in compatible
+ * with better-sqlite3 here: its `#checkParams` throws
+ * `TypeError: Params must be either object or array`, so `stmt.run(a, b, c)`
+ * (varargs, which better-sqlite3 accepts) is a runtime error. Always pass a
+ * single array or object. Found by executing it, not by reading the types.
+ */
+export interface SqlcipherStatement {
+  run(params?: readonly unknown[] | Record<string, unknown>): { changes: number; lastInsertRowid: number };
+  get(params?: readonly unknown[] | Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
+  all(params?: readonly unknown[] | Record<string, unknown>): Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
+}
+
+export interface SqlcipherDatabase {
+  exec(sql: string): void;
+  prepare(sql: string): SqlcipherStatement;
+  pragma(source: string): unknown;
+  close(): void;
+}
+
+export interface SqlcipherConstructor {
+  new (path?: string): SqlcipherDatabase;
+}
+
+let cached: SqlcipherConstructor | null | undefined;
+
+/**
+ * Returns the Database constructor, or `null` when the optional native binding
+ * is not installed / cannot load on this platform. Never throws.
+ *
+ * Memoised on both outcomes so a missing binding costs one failed require per
+ * process rather than one per request.
+ */
+export function loadSqlcipher(): SqlcipherConstructor | null {
+  if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
+  try {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
+    const mod = require('@signalapp/sqlcipher') as
+      | { default?: SqlcipherConstructor }
+      | SqlcipherConstructor;
+    const ctor = (mod as { default?: SqlcipherConstructor }).default ?? (mod as SqlcipherConstructor);
+    cached = typeof ctor === 'function' ? ctor : null;
+  } catch {
+    cached = null;
+  }
+  return cached;
+}
+
+/** True when the local index can work at all in this process. */
+export function isSqlcipherAvailable(): boolean {
+  return loadSqlcipher() !== null;
+}

lib/mail-index/extract.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+// PURE JMAP-object -> IndexDoc extractors.
+//
+// Deliberately free of database, network and store access so every shape
+// decision here is unit-testable on its own. The JMAP shapes are awkward
+// enough (JSContact keyed maps, JSCalendar participants, FileNode's `modified`
+// rather than `updated`) that this is where the bugs would otherwise hide.
+
+import type { Email, CalendarEvent, ContactCard, FileNode, EmailAddress } from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+import type { IndexDoc } from './store';
+
+/** Hard cap on indexed body text per document. Keeps one enormous mail from dominating the file. */
+export const MAX_BODY_CHARS = 32_000;
+
+/**
+ * Minimal HTML -> text, for mail that has no `text/plain` alternative.
+ *
+ * Not a sanitiser and not trying to be: this output is never rendered, only
+ * tokenised by FTS5 and possibly handed to an LLM as context. The repo's
+ * `dompurify` needs a DOM and this runs in Node, so a DOM-free reduction is the
+ * right tool. Order matters - script/style content must go before tags are
+ * stripped, or their contents would leak into the index as searchable text.
+ */
+export function htmlToText(html: string): string {
+  return html
+    .replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, ' ')
+    .replace(/<(script|style|head)\b[\s\S]*?<\/\1>/gi, ' ')
+    .replace(/<br\s*\/?>/gi, '\n')
+    .replace(/<\/(p|div|tr|li|h[1-6]|blockquote)>/gi, '\n')
+    .replace(/<[^>]+>/g, ' ')
+    .replace(/&nbsp;/gi, ' ')
+    .replace(/&amp;/gi, '&')
+    .replace(/&lt;/gi, '<')
+    .replace(/&gt;/gi, '>')
+    .replace(/&quot;/gi, '"')
+    .replace(/&#(\d+);/g, (_m, d: string) => {
+      const code = Number(d);
+      return Number.isFinite(code) && code > 0 && code < 0x110000 ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : ' ';
+    })
+    .replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);/gi, (_m, h: string) => {
+      const code = parseInt(h, 16);
+      return Number.isFinite(code) && code > 0 && code < 0x110000 ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : ' ';
+    })
+    .replace(/[ \t\u00a0]+/g, ' ')
+    .replace(/\s*\n\s*/g, '\n')
+    .trim();
+}
+
+export function normaliseText(s: string | null | undefined): string {
+  if (!s) return '';
+  return s.replace(/\r\n?/g, '\n').replace(/[ \t\u00a0]+/g, ' ').replace(/\n{3,}/g, '\n\n').trim();
+}
+
+function clamp(s: string, max = MAX_BODY_CHARS): string {
+  return s.length <= max ? s : s.slice(0, max);
+}
+
+function formatAddresses(list: readonly EmailAddress[] | undefined): string {
+  if (!list || list.length === 0) return '';
+  return list
+    .map((a) => [a.name, a.email].filter((p) => typeof p === 'string' && p.length > 0).join(' '))
+    .filter((s) => s.length > 0)
+    .join(', ');
+}
+
+/** Values of a JSContact/JSCalendar keyed map, in a stable order. */
+function mapValues<T>(m: Record<string, T> | null | undefined): T[] {
+  if (!m || typeof m !== 'object') return [];
+  return Object.keys(m).sort().map((k) => m[k]);
+}
+
+function joinUnique(parts: Array<string | undefined | null>): string {
+  const seen = new Set<string>();
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  for (const p of parts) {
+    const v = typeof p === 'string' ? p.trim() : '';
+    if (!v || seen.has(v)) continue;
+    seen.add(v);
+    out.push(v);
+  }
+  return out.join(', ');
+}
+
+// ── mail ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Resolves an Email's plain-text body from `bodyValues`, preferring the
+ * `text/plain` alternative and falling back to flattening the HTML one.
+ *
+ * `textBody`/`htmlBody` reference parts by `partId`; the text itself only
+ * arrives in `bodyValues` when the `Email/get` asked for it
+ * (`fetchTextBodyValues` / `fetchHTMLBodyValues`). A caller that forgets that
+ * gets an empty body rather than an error, which is exactly the kind of silent
+ * hole worth naming here.
+ */
+export function emailBodyText(email: Email): string {
+  const values = email.bodyValues ?? {};
+  const fromParts = (parts: typeof email.textBody): string =>
+    (parts ?? [])
+      .map((p) => values[p.partId]?.value ?? '')
+      .filter((v) => v.length > 0)
+      .join('\n\n');
+
+  const plain = fromParts(email.textBody);
+  if (plain.trim().length > 0) return normaliseText(plain);
+
+  const html = fromParts(email.htmlBody);
+  if (html.trim().length > 0) return normaliseText(htmlToText(html));
+
+  // Last resort: the server-computed preview. Better than nothing for a search
+  // index, and it costs no extra round trip.
+  return normaliseText(email.preview);
+}
+
+export function extractMail(jmapAccountId: string, email: Email): IndexDoc {
+  const body = clamp(emailBodyText(email));
+  return {
+    jmapAccountId,
+    contentType: 'mail',
+    id: email.id,
+    title: normaliseText(email.subject) || '(no subject)',
+    people: joinUnique([
+      formatAddresses(email.from),
+      formatAddresses(email.to),
+      formatAddresses(email.cc),
+    ]),
+    body,
+    occurredAt: email.receivedAt ?? null,
+    metadata: {
+      threadId: email.threadId,
+      from: email.from?.[0]?.email ?? null,
+      fromName: email.from?.[0]?.name ?? null,
+      hasAttachment: !!email.hasAttachment,
+      size: email.size ?? null,
+      mailboxIds: Object.keys(email.mailboxIds ?? {}),
+      preview: normaliseText(email.preview).slice(0, 300),
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+// ── calendar ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export function extractCalendarEvent(jmapAccountId: string, event: CalendarEvent): IndexDoc {
+  const participants = mapValues(event.participants);
+  const participantText = joinUnique(
+    participants.flatMap((p) => [
+      p?.name,
+      p?.email,
+      p?.calendarAddress?.replace(/^mailto:/i, ''),
+      ...Object.values(p?.sendTo ?? {}).map((v) =>
+        typeof v === 'string' ? v.replace(/^mailto:/i, '') : '',
+      ),
+    ]),
+  );
+
+  const locations = mapValues(event.locations)
+    .map((l) => normaliseText(l?.name))
+    .filter((s) => s.length > 0);
+
+  // `descriptionContentType` can legitimately be text/html.
+  const rawDescription = normaliseText(event.description);
+  const description = /html/i.test(event.descriptionContentType ?? '')
+    ? normaliseText(htmlToText(rawDescription))
+    : rawDescription;
+
+  const keywords = Object.keys(event.keywords ?? {});
+  const categories = Object.keys(event.categories ?? {});
+
+  return {
+    jmapAccountId,
+    contentType: 'calendar',
+    id: event.id,
+    title: normaliseText(event.title) || '(untitled event)',
+    people: joinUnique([event.organizerCalendarAddress?.replace(/^mailto:/i, ''), participantText]),
+    body: clamp(
+      [description, locations.join(', '), keywords.join(' '), categories.join(' ')]
+        .filter((s) => s.length > 0)
+        .join('\n\n'),
+    ),
+    // `utcStart` is the resolved instant the app computes; `start` is local
+    // wall-clock without a zone, so prefer utcStart for ordering.
+    occurredAt: event.utcStart ?? event.start ?? null,
+    metadata: {
+      start: event.start ?? null,
+      utcStart: event.utcStart ?? null,
+      utcEnd: event.utcEnd ?? null,
+      timeZone: event.timeZone ?? null,
+      showWithoutTime: !!event.showWithoutTime,
+      status: event.status ?? null,
+      locations,
+      calendarIds: Object.keys(event.calendarIds ?? {}),
+      participantCount: participants.length,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+// ── contacts ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export function contactDisplayName(card: ContactCard): string {
+  const full = normaliseText(card.name?.full);
+  if (full) return full;
+  const components = card.name?.components ?? [];
+  const ordered = ['prefix', 'given', 'given2', 'additional', 'middle', 'surname', 'surname2', 'suffix'];
+  const byKind = components
+    .slice()
+    .sort((a, b) => ordered.indexOf(a.kind) - ordered.indexOf(b.kind))
+    .map((c) => c.value)
+    .filter((v) => typeof v === 'string' && v.trim().length > 0)
+    .join(' ');
+  if (byKind.trim()) return normaliseText(byKind);
+  const firstEmail = mapValues(card.emails)[0]?.address;
+  if (firstEmail) return firstEmail;
+  const org = mapValues(card.organizations)[0]?.name;
+  return normaliseText(org) || '(unnamed contact)';
+}
+
+export function extractContact(jmapAccountId: string, card: ContactCard): IndexDoc {
+  const emails = mapValues(card.emails).map((e) => e.address).filter(Boolean);
+  const phones = mapValues(card.phones).map((p) => p.number).filter(Boolean);
+  const nicknames = mapValues(card.nicknames)
+    .map((n) => n?.name)
+    .filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string' && v.length > 0);
+  const orgs = mapValues(card.organizations).map((o) => o.name).filter((v): v is string => !!v);
+  const titles = mapValues(card.titles).map((t) => t.name).filter(Boolean);
+  const notes = mapValues(card.notes).map((n) => n.note).filter(Boolean);
+  // `full` (RFC 9553) when present, else the legacy flat fields vCard import
+  // produces, else the ordered components. All three shapes occur in this type.
+  const addresses = mapValues(card.addresses)
+    .map((a) =>
+      normaliseText(
+        a?.full ||
+          [a?.street, a?.locality, a?.region, a?.postcode, a?.country]
+            .filter((p): p is string => typeof p === 'string' && p.length > 0)
+            .join(', ') ||
+          (a?.components ?? []).map((c) => c.value).join(' '),
+      ),
+    )
+    .filter((s) => s.length > 0);
+
+  return {
+    jmapAccountId,
+    contentType: 'contact',
+    id: card.id,
+    title: contactDisplayName(card),
+    // Emails/phones go in `people` (weighted above body) because "who is
+    // this / what's their number" is the dominant contact lookup.
+    people: joinUnique([...emails, ...phones, ...nicknames]),
+    body: clamp([...orgs, ...titles, ...addresses, ...notes].filter(Boolean).join('\n')),
+    // A contact has no meaningful single date; JSContact `updated` is optional
+    // and not on this repo's type, so leave it null and rank by relevance only.
+    occurredAt: null,
+    metadata: {
+      kind: card.kind ?? null,
+      emails,
+      phones,
+      organizations: orgs,
+      addressBookIds: Object.keys(card.addressBookIds ?? {}),
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+// ── files ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * METADATA ONLY - filename, path, dates, size, owner. Deliberately NOT file
+ * content: extracting searchable text from arbitrary PDFs / office documents /
+ * images is a materially bigger problem (per-format parsers, OCR, size limits,
+ * untrusted-input parsing in a process holding the user's mail) and is a
+ * separate piece of work. `path` is passed in by the caller because a FileNode
+ * only knows its `parentId`; resolving the chain is the caller's job.
+ */
+export function extractFile(
+  jmapAccountId: string,
+  node: FileNode,
+  opts: { path?: string; ownerName?: string } = {},
+): IndexDoc {
+  const dirPath = normaliseText(opts.path);
+  const isDirectory = node.type === 'd';
+  return {
+    jmapAccountId,
+    contentType: 'file',
+    id: node.id,
+    title: normaliseText(node.name) || '(unnamed file)',
+    people: joinUnique([opts.ownerName, node.accountName]),
+    // The path is genuinely searchable text ("that thing in Invoices/2026"),
+    // and the extension is worth tokenising on its own.
+    body: clamp(
+      [dirPath, isDirectory ? 'folder' : node.type, fileExtension(node.name)]
+        .filter((s) => s && s.length > 0)
+        .join('\n'),
+    ),
+    // FileNode has `modified`, NOT `updated` - asking for the wrong name
+    // silently yields undefined (this repo hit that as #700).
+    occurredAt: node.modified ?? node.created ?? null,
+    metadata: {
+      path: dirPath || null,
+      mimeType: isDirectory ? null : node.type,
+      isDirectory,
+      size: typeof node.size === 'number' ? node.size : null,
+      created: node.created ?? null,
+      modified: node.modified ?? null,
+      parentId: node.parentId ?? null,
+      contentIndexed: false,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+function fileExtension(name: string | undefined): string {
+  if (!name) return '';
+  const i = name.lastIndexOf('.');
+  return i > 0 && i < name.length - 1 ? name.slice(i + 1).toLowerCase() : '';
+}

lib/mail-index/jmap.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,388 @@
+// A deliberately tiny server-side JMAP client, used only by the indexer.
+//
+// WHY NOT REUSE lib/jmap/client.ts: that class is a 7400-line renderer object.
+// It holds credentials in instance fields, uses `btoa`, opens EventSource /
+// WebSocket push connections, and wires itself into Zustand stores and toast
+// notifications. Importing it into an API route would drag all of that into the
+// server bundle for the sake of four method calls. The existing server-side
+// JMAP code in this repo (lib/auth/verify-jmap-auth.ts) already sets the
+// precedent: plain fetch + an Authorization header.
+//
+// Everything here is stateless - the caller supplies the auth header per call,
+// so there is no resident credential and nothing to invalidate.
+
+import type { CalendarEvent, ContactCard, Email, FileNode } from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
+
+export const CAP_CORE = 'urn:ietf:params:jmap:core';
+export const CAP_MAIL = 'urn:ietf:params:jmap:mail';
+export const CAP_CALENDARS = 'urn:ietf:params:jmap:calendars';
+export const CAP_CONTACTS = 'urn:ietf:params:jmap:contacts';
+export const CAP_FILENODE = 'urn:ietf:params:jmap:filenode';
+
+export class JmapIndexError extends Error {
+  status: number;
+  constructor(message: string, status = 502) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'JmapIndexError';
+    this.status = status;
+  }
+}
+
+export interface JmapSessionInfo {
+  apiUrl: string;
+  /** Server-confirmed authenticated login (JMAP Session.username). */
+  username?: string;
+  primaryAccounts: Record<string, string>;
+  accounts: Record<string, { name?: string; isPersonal?: boolean; accountCapabilities?: Record<string, unknown> }>;
+  capabilities: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pins a URL advertised by the session to the origin we authenticated against.
+ *
+ * `lib/jmap/client.ts` does the same thing in its rewriteSessionUrls() for the
+ * renderer's benefit. Server-side it is a security control, not a convenience:
+ * we attach the user's credentials to this URL, so a session document that
+ * advertised an `apiUrl` on someone else's host would turn this into a
+ * credential-leaking SSRF. Keep the path and query, take the origin from the
+ * server URL we were configured with.
+ */
+function pinToServerOrigin(advertised: string, serverUrl: string): string {
+  const base = new URL(serverUrl);
+  let target: URL;
+  try {
+    target = new URL(advertised, base);
+  } catch {
+    throw new JmapIndexError('JMAP session advertised an unusable apiUrl');
+  }
+  return `${base.origin}${target.pathname}${target.search}`;
+}
+
+async function fetchWithTimeout(url: string, init: RequestInit): Promise<Response> {
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  try {
+    return await fetch(url, { ...init, signal: controller.signal, redirect: 'manual' });
+  } catch (error) {
+    if (error instanceof Error && error.name === 'AbortError') {
+      throw new JmapIndexError('JMAP request timed out', 504);
+    }
+    throw new JmapIndexError(`JMAP request failed: ${String(error)}`);
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Stalwart 307-redirects /.well-known/jmap to /jmap/session. */
+const MAX_REDIRECTS = 3;
+
+export async function fetchJmapSession(serverUrl: string, authHeader: string): Promise<JmapSessionInfo> {
+  const base = serverUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '');
+  const origin = new URL(base).origin;
+  let currentUrl = `${base}/.well-known/jmap`;
+  let response: Response | undefined;
+
+  // Redirects must be followed EXPLICITLY, not with `redirect: 'follow'`: we
+  // attach the user's credentials to every hop, so each one has to be checked to
+  // still be on the origin we authenticated against. A blind follow would hand
+  // the Authorization header to whatever host a misconfigured or hostile session
+  // pointed at. Same reasoning (and same bound) as lib/auth/verify-jmap-auth.ts.
+  for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
+    response = await fetchWithTimeout(currentUrl, {
+      method: 'GET',
+      headers: { Authorization: authHeader },
+    });
+    if (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) break;
+
+    const location = response.headers.get('location');
+    if (!location) throw new JmapIndexError('JMAP session redirect had no Location header');
+    const next = new URL(location, currentUrl);
+    if (next.origin !== origin) {
+      throw new JmapIndexError(
+        `JMAP session redirected off-origin (${next.origin}); refusing to send credentials there`,
+      );
+    }
+    currentUrl = next.toString();
+  }
+
+  if (!response) throw new JmapIndexError('JMAP session fetch produced no response');
+  if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
+    throw new JmapIndexError('JMAP authentication failed', 401);
+  }
+  if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
+    throw new JmapIndexError('Too many redirects fetching the JMAP session');
+  }
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    throw new JmapIndexError(`JMAP session fetch failed (${response.status})`);
+  }
+  const raw = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as Record<string, unknown> | null;
+  if (!raw || typeof raw.apiUrl !== 'string') {
+    throw new JmapIndexError('Invalid JMAP session response');
+  }
+  return {
+    apiUrl: pinToServerOrigin(raw.apiUrl, serverUrl),
+    username: typeof raw.username === 'string' ? raw.username : undefined,
+    primaryAccounts: (raw.primaryAccounts as Record<string, string>) ?? {},
+    accounts: (raw.accounts as JmapSessionInfo['accounts']) ?? {},
+    capabilities: (raw.capabilities as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {},
+  };
+}
+
+type MethodCall = [string, Record<string, unknown>, string];
+
+/** Raw method-response tuple, `[name, args, callId]`. `name` is 'error' on failure. */
+type MethodResponse = [string, Record<string, unknown>, string];
+
+export async function jmapRequest(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  using: readonly string[],
+  methodCalls: readonly MethodCall[],
+): Promise<MethodResponse[]> {
+  const response = await fetchWithTimeout(session.apiUrl, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { Authorization: authHeader, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ using, methodCalls }),
+  });
+  if (response.status === 401 || response.status === 403) {
+    throw new JmapIndexError('JMAP authentication failed', 401);
+  }
+  if (response.status === 429) {
+    throw new JmapIndexError('JMAP server is rate limiting', 429);
+  }
+  if (!response.ok) {
+    throw new JmapIndexError(`JMAP request failed (${response.status})`);
+  }
+  const data = (await response.json().catch(() => null)) as { methodResponses?: MethodResponse[] } | null;
+  if (!data || !Array.isArray(data.methodResponses)) {
+    throw new JmapIndexError('Invalid JMAP response envelope');
+  }
+  return data.methodResponses;
+}
+
+function firstResult(responses: MethodResponse[], expected: string): Record<string, unknown> | null {
+  for (const [name, args] of responses) {
+    if (name === expected) return args;
+    // A method-level error is not fatal for an INDEX: a server that doesn't
+    // support one data type should not fail the whole reindex. The caller
+    // treats null as "nothing to index for this type".
+    if (name === 'error') return null;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function idsOf(args: Record<string, unknown> | null): string[] {
+  const ids = args?.ids;
+  return Array.isArray(ids) ? ids.filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string') : [];
+}
+
+function listOf<T>(args: Record<string, unknown> | null): T[] {
+  const list = args?.list;
+  return Array.isArray(list) ? (list as T[]) : [];
+}
+
+export function accountIdFor(session: JmapSessionInfo, capability: string): string | null {
+  const id = session.primaryAccounts[capability];
+  return typeof id === 'string' && id.length > 0 ? id : null;
+}
+
+export function hasCapability(session: JmapSessionInfo, capability: string): boolean {
+  return Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(session.capabilities, capability);
+}
+
+/** Per-ACCOUNT capability, mirroring client.ts's supportsFiles() (#563: a server can advertise it while an account has it revoked). */
+export function accountHasCapability(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  accountId: string,
+  capability: string,
+): boolean {
+  const account = session.accounts[accountId];
+  if (!account) return false;
+  if (account.accountCapabilities && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(account.accountCapabilities, capability)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return account.isPersonal === false;
+}
+
+// ── mail ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/** Properties needed to build a mail IndexDoc. Bodies come via bodyValues. */
+const EMAIL_INDEX_PROPERTIES = [
+  'id', 'threadId', 'mailboxIds', 'keywords', 'size', 'receivedAt',
+  'from', 'to', 'cc', 'subject', 'preview', 'hasAttachment',
+  'textBody', 'htmlBody', 'bodyValues',
+] as const;
+
+export async function getEmailsForIndex(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  ids: readonly string[],
+  maxBodyBytes: number,
+): Promise<Email[]> {
+  if (ids.length === 0) return [];
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE, CAP_MAIL], [
+    ['Email/get', {
+      accountId,
+      ids: [...ids],
+      properties: [...EMAIL_INDEX_PROPERTIES],
+      // Without these two the bodyValues map comes back EMPTY and every
+      // indexed body would silently fall back to `preview`.
+      fetchTextBodyValues: true,
+      fetchHTMLBodyValues: true,
+      maxBodyValueBytes: maxBodyBytes,
+    }, 'g'],
+  ]);
+  return listOf<Email>(firstResult(responses, 'Email/get'));
+}
+
+export async function queryRecentEmailIds(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  afterIso: string,
+  limit: number,
+): Promise<string[]> {
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE, CAP_MAIL], [
+    ['Email/query', {
+      accountId,
+      filter: { after: afterIso },
+      sort: [{ property: 'receivedAt', isAscending: false }],
+      limit,
+      calculateTotal: false,
+    }, 'q'],
+  ]);
+  return idsOf(firstResult(responses, 'Email/query'));
+}
+
+// ── calendar ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export async function getCalendarEventsForIndex(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  ids: readonly string[],
+): Promise<CalendarEvent[]> {
+  if (ids.length === 0) return [];
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE, CAP_CALENDARS], [
+    ['CalendarEvent/get', { accountId, ids: [...ids] }, 'g'],
+  ]);
+  return listOf<CalendarEvent>(firstResult(responses, 'CalendarEvent/get'));
+}
+
+export async function queryCalendarEventIds(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  afterIso: string,
+  beforeIso: string,
+  limit: number,
+): Promise<string[]> {
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE, CAP_CALENDARS], [
+    ['CalendarEvent/query', {
+      accountId,
+      // LocalDateTime, per the note in lib/jmap/client.ts:307-312 - Stalwart
+      // parses these without a zone suffix and ignores unparseable values.
+      filter: { after: toLocalDateTime(afterIso), before: toLocalDateTime(beforeIso) },
+      limit,
+      calculateTotal: false,
+    }, 'q'],
+  ]);
+  return idsOf(firstResult(responses, 'CalendarEvent/query'));
+}
+
+/** JSCalendar LocalDateTime: `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS`, no zone designator. */
+function toLocalDateTime(iso: string): string {
+  return iso.replace(/\.\d+/, '').replace(/Z$/, '').slice(0, 19);
+}
+
+// ── contacts ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export async function getContactsForIndex(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  ids: readonly string[],
+): Promise<ContactCard[]> {
+  if (ids.length === 0) return [];
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE, CAP_CONTACTS], [
+    ['ContactCard/get', { accountId, ids: [...ids] }, 'g'],
+  ]);
+  return listOf<ContactCard>(firstResult(responses, 'ContactCard/get'));
+}
+
+export async function queryContactIds(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  limit: number,
+): Promise<string[]> {
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE, CAP_CONTACTS], [
+    ['ContactCard/query', { accountId, limit, calculateTotal: false }, 'q'],
+  ]);
+  return idsOf(firstResult(responses, 'ContactCard/query'));
+}
+
+// ── files ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const FILENODE_INDEX_PROPERTIES = [
+  'id', 'parentId', 'name', 'type', 'blobId', 'size', 'created', 'modified',
+] as const;
+
+export async function getFilesForIndex(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  ids: readonly string[],
+): Promise<FileNode[]> {
+  if (ids.length === 0) return [];
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE], [
+    ['FileNode/get', { accountId, ids: [...ids], properties: [...FILENODE_INDEX_PROPERTIES] }, 'g'],
+  ]);
+  return listOf<FileNode>(firstResult(responses, 'FileNode/get'));
+}
+
+export async function queryFileIds(
+  session: JmapSessionInfo,
+  authHeader: string,
+  accountId: string,
+  limit: number,
+): Promise<string[]> {
+  const responses = await jmapRequest(session, authHeader, [CAP_CORE], [
+    ['FileNode/query', { accountId, filter: {}, limit, calculateTotal: false }, 'q'],
+  ]);
+  return idsOf(firstResult(responses, 'FileNode/query'));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Builds `id -> "Parent/Child"` paths for the given nodes, walking `parentId`
+ * upward. FileNode only knows its parent, so the caller has to assemble this;
+ * unresolvable ancestors just truncate the path rather than failing.
+ */
+export function buildFilePaths(nodes: readonly FileNode[]): Map<string, string> {
+  const byId = new Map(nodes.map((n) => [n.id, n]));
+  const cache = new Map<string, string>();
+
+  const resolve = (id: string, depth: number): string => {
+    if (depth > 32) return '';
+    const cached = cache.get(id);
+    if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
+    const node = byId.get(id);
+    if (!node) return '';
+    const parent = node.parentId ? resolve(node.parentId, depth + 1) : '';
+    const full = parent ? `${parent}/${node.name}` : node.name;
+    cache.set(id, full);
+    return full;
+  };
+
+  const out = new Map<string, string>();
+  for (const n of nodes) {
+    // The document's own `path` metadata is its PARENT directory chain, so a
+    // search for "Invoices" matches files inside it without the filename
+    // being duplicated into the body.
+    out.set(n.id, n.parentId ? resolve(n.parentId, 0) : '');
+  }
+  return out;
+}

lib/mail-index/key.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+// Server-side client for the main process's key service (electron/key-service.ts).
+//
+// Asks for an account's index key over the inherited fd only when a job needs
+// it, and drops it as soon as the job finishes. There is deliberately no cache:
+// a resident plaintext key in a long-lived process is exactly the thing the OS
+// keychain exists to avoid, and a keychain round trip costs microseconds
+// against a job that makes network calls.
+
+import net from 'node:net';
+
+/** Set by electron/main.ts alongside VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR. */
+export const KEY_FD_ENV = 'VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_KEY_FD';
+
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+
+export type KeyErrorCode =
+  | 'no-channel'
+  | 'no-secure-storage'
+  | 'key-io-failed'
+  | 'key-unreadable'
+  | 'bad-request'
+  | 'timeout';
+
+export class IndexKeyError extends Error {
+  code: KeyErrorCode;
+  constructor(code: KeyErrorCode, message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'IndexKeyError';
+    this.code = code;
+  }
+}
+
+interface Pending {
+  resolve: (value: { key?: string }) => void;
+  reject: (error: Error) => void;
+  timer: NodeJS.Timeout;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Channel state lives on `globalThis`, NOT in module scope.
+ *
+ * A file descriptor can be adopted as a socket exactly ONCE per process: a
+ * second `new net.Socket({ fd })` for an fd this process already owns throws
+ * `EEXIST` from libuv's uv_pipe_open. Module scope is not once-per-process -
+ * Next re-evaluates route modules (dev HMR, and separate module instances
+ * across route bundles), so a module-scoped `let socket` produced exactly that
+ * crash: `Could not open fd 3: Error: open EEXIST`, found by the integration
+ * test rather than by reading the code.
+ *
+ * A Symbol key on globalThis is the one place in a Node process that survives
+ * module re-evaluation, so adoption genuinely happens once.
+ */
+interface ChannelState {
+  socket: net.Socket | null;
+  nextId: number;
+  pending: Map<number, Pending>;
+  readBuffer: string;
+}
+
+const STATE_KEY = Symbol.for('vncmail.mailIndex.keyChannel');
+
+function state(): ChannelState {
+  const holder = globalThis as unknown as Record<symbol, ChannelState | undefined>;
+  const existing = holder[STATE_KEY];
+  if (existing) return existing;
+  const created: ChannelState = { socket: null, nextId: 1, pending: new Map(), readBuffer: '' };
+  holder[STATE_KEY] = created;
+  return created;
+}
+
+function failAll(s: ChannelState, error: Error): void {
+  for (const [, p] of s.pending) {
+    clearTimeout(p.timer);
+    p.reject(error);
+  }
+  s.pending.clear();
+}
+
+function getSocket(): net.Socket {
+  const s = state();
+  if (s.socket && !s.socket.destroyed) return s.socket;
+
+  const raw = process.env[KEY_FD_ENV]?.trim();
+  const fd = raw ? Number(raw) : NaN;
+  if (!Number.isInteger(fd) || fd < 3) {
+    throw new IndexKeyError(
+      'no-channel',
+      `${KEY_FD_ENV} is not a usable file descriptor (got ${JSON.stringify(raw)}). ` +
+        `The local index only works inside the Electron desktop shell.`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  let created: net.Socket;
+  try {
+    created = new net.Socket({ fd, readable: true, writable: true });
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new IndexKeyError('no-channel', `Could not open fd ${fd}: ${String(error)}`);
+  }
+  // The channel outlives every individual request; don't let it hold the event
+  // loop open on its own.
+  created.unref();
+
+  created.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
+    s.readBuffer += chunk.toString('utf8');
+    if (s.readBuffer.length > 64 * 1024) s.readBuffer = '';
+    let newline: number;
+    while ((newline = s.readBuffer.indexOf('\n')) >= 0) {
+      const line = s.readBuffer.slice(0, newline);
+      s.readBuffer = s.readBuffer.slice(newline + 1);
+      if (!line.trim()) continue;
+      let msg: { id?: unknown; ok?: unknown; key?: unknown; code?: unknown; error?: unknown };
+      try {
+        msg = JSON.parse(line);
+      } catch {
+        continue;
+      }
+      const id = typeof msg.id === 'number' ? msg.id : null;
+      if (id === null) continue;
+      const p = s.pending.get(id);
+      if (!p) continue;
+      s.pending.delete(id);
+      clearTimeout(p.timer);
+      if (msg.ok === true) {
+        p.resolve({ key: typeof msg.key === 'string' ? msg.key : undefined });
+      } else {
+        const code = typeof msg.code === 'string' ? (msg.code as KeyErrorCode) : 'key-io-failed';
+        p.reject(new IndexKeyError(code, typeof msg.error === 'string' ? msg.error : 'Key request failed'));
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  const onGone = (error?: Error) => {
+    s.socket = null;
+    s.readBuffer = '';
+    failAll(s, error ?? new IndexKeyError('no-channel', 'Key service channel closed'));
+  };
+  created.on('close', () => onGone());
+  created.on('error', (error) => onGone(new IndexKeyError('no-channel', String(error))));
+
+  s.socket = created;
+  return created;
+}
+
+function request(op: 'getIndexKey' | 'deleteIndexKey', accountId: string): Promise<{ key?: string }> {
+  const sock = getSocket();
+  const s = state();
+  const id = s.nextId++;
+  return new Promise<{ key?: string }>((resolve, reject) => {
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      s.pending.delete(id);
+      reject(new IndexKeyError('timeout', `Key service did not answer within ${REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS}ms`));
+    }, REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
+    // Don't let a pending key request keep the process alive either.
+    timer.unref?.();
+    s.pending.set(id, { resolve, reject, timer });
+    try {
+      sock.write(`${JSON.stringify({ id, op, accountId })}\n`);
+    } catch (error) {
+      s.pending.delete(id);
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+      reject(new IndexKeyError('no-channel', `Could not write to the key service: ${String(error)}`));
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Runs `fn` with the account's raw index key, then zeroes the buffer.
+ *
+ * Zeroing a Buffer is genuine (unlike a JS string, which cannot be scrubbed) -
+ * which is why the key crosses the boundary as hex and is converted to a Buffer
+ * exactly once, here. `store.ts` puts the hex into a `PRAGMA` string, so a copy
+ * does briefly exist in the JS heap; the buffer wipe bounds how long the
+ * long-lived copy lives, it does not pretend to eliminate every trace.
+ */
+export async function withIndexKey<T>(
+  accountId: string,
+  fn: (key: Buffer) => Promise<T> | T,
+): Promise<T> {
+  const { key: hex } = await request('getIndexKey', accountId);
+  if (!hex) throw new IndexKeyError('key-io-failed', 'Key service returned no key');
+  const key = Buffer.from(hex, 'hex');
+  if (key.length !== 32) {
+    key.fill(0);
+    throw new IndexKeyError('key-io-failed', `Key service returned ${key.length} bytes, expected 32`);
+  }
+  try {
+    return await fn(key);
+  } finally {
+    key.fill(0);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Used when purging an account: the key goes FIRST, so an interrupted purge leaves unreadable data. */
+export async function deleteIndexKey(accountId: string): Promise<void> {
+  await request('deleteIndexKey', accountId);
+}
+
+/** True when this process has a key channel at all (i.e. is the desktop shell's server). */
+export function hasKeyChannel(): boolean {
+  const raw = process.env[KEY_FD_ENV]?.trim();
+  const fd = raw ? Number(raw) : NaN;
+  return Number.isInteger(fd) && fd >= 3;
+}

lib/mail-index/paths.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// The hosted-deployment gate, and where an account's index file lives.
+//
+// The standalone Next.js server in `electron/main.ts` is the SAME artifact the
+// production `Dockerfile` ships to multi-tenant deployments. An index that
+// activated unconditionally would have a shared server start writing every
+// user's mail into a server-side SQLite file. So activation is keyed on an env
+// var that ONLY `electron/main.ts` sets, and that same var supplies the path -
+// one variable doing both jobs, so they cannot drift apart.
+
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import path from 'node:path';
+
+/** Set by electron/main.ts on spawn. Absent => the feature does not exist. */
+export const STORE_DIR_ENV = 'VNCMAIL_DESKTOP_STORE_DIR';
+
+/**
+ * The index root, or `null` when this process is not the desktop shell's
+ * server. Every route must 404 on `null` - not 403, since nothing should learn
+ * the routes exist in a deployment that doesn't have the feature.
+ */
+export function getStoreDir(): string | null {
+  const dir = process.env[STORE_DIR_ENV]?.trim();
+  if (!dir) return null;
+  // Must be absolute: a relative path would resolve against the server's cwd,
+  // which differs between `electron:dev` and a packaged build.
+  if (!path.isAbsolute(dir)) return null;
+  return dir;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Filenames are a hash, not `username@host`, so a directory listing is not a
+ * plaintext inventory of the user's accounts. The account id itself lives only
+ * inside the encrypted file (and in the renderer's own `account-registry`,
+ * which already stores it in plain localStorage).
+ */
+export function accountFileToken(accountId: string): string {
+  return createHash('sha256').update(accountId, 'utf8').digest('hex').slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+export function indexDbPath(storeDir: string, accountId: string): string {
+  return path.join(storeDir, 'index', `${accountFileToken(accountId)}.db`);
+}
+
+export function keyFilePath(storeDir: string, accountId: string): string {
+  return path.join(storeDir, 'keys', `${accountFileToken(accountId)}.bin`);
+}
+
+/** WAL siblings must be removed with the database, or a purge leaks readable pages. */
+export function dbSiblings(dbPath: string): string[] {
+  return [dbPath, `${dbPath}-wal`, `${dbPath}-shm`];
+}

lib/mail-index/reindex.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+// The index jobs.
+//
+// TWO SHAPES, both plain request-scoped work - there is no background worker,
+// no cursor, no retry ladder and no resident credential anywhere:
+//
+//  1. `indexDocuments()` - the PRIMARY path. The renderer's live JMAP push
+//     connection sees a StateChange, and calls the route with the ids that
+//     changed (or with no ids, meaning "refetch what's recent for this type").
+//     One or a handful of objects, fetched and upserted.
+//  2. `catchUpAll()` - the FALLBACK. On app launch, backfill a bounded recent
+//     window for every supported type, because anything that changed while the
+//     app was closed produced no push event.
+//
+// Staleness between refreshes is acceptable by design: this is a search index
+// for a retrieval/AI feature, not a mail replica.
+
+import type { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
+import { generateAccountId } from '@/lib/account-utils';
+import { getStalwartCredentials } from '@/lib/stalwart/credentials';
+import { logger } from '@/lib/logger';
+import {
+  accountHasCapability, accountIdFor, buildFilePaths, CAP_CALENDARS, CAP_CONTACTS,
+  CAP_FILENODE, CAP_MAIL, fetchJmapSession, getCalendarEventsForIndex, getContactsForIndex,
+  getEmailsForIndex, getFilesForIndex, hasCapability, JmapIndexError, queryCalendarEventIds,
+  queryContactIds, queryFileIds, queryRecentEmailIds, type JmapSessionInfo,
+} from './jmap';
+import { extractCalendarEvent, extractContact, extractFile, extractMail } from './extract';
+import { withIndexKey } from './key';
+import { getStoreDir } from './paths';
+import { MailIndex, type ContentType, type IndexDoc } from './store';
+
+/**
+ * Bounded window. Small on purpose: this is the first cut of a retrieval index,
+ * and a wide window turns "index on every delivery" into a slow request. The
+ * event-driven path indexes single objects, so the window only bounds catch-up.
+ */
+export const INDEX_WINDOW_DAYS = 30;
+/** Calendar looks forward as well as back - upcoming events are the useful ones. */
+export const CALENDAR_FORWARD_DAYS = 180;
+/** Per-type ceiling for one catch-up pass. */
+export const CATCHUP_MAX_PER_TYPE = 500;
+/** Ids accepted in one event-driven call. A push reports a handful, not thousands. */
+export const MAX_IDS_PER_CALL = 200;
+/** Cap on body bytes requested per message from the server. */
+export const MAX_BODY_VALUE_BYTES = 256_000;
+/** Contacts and files have no useful date filter, so they are simply capped. */
+export const CONTACTS_MAX = 2_000;
+export const FILES_MAX = 2_000;
+
+export interface IndexSession {
+  serverUrl: string;
+  authHeader: string;
+  username: string;
+  slot: number;
+  /** `username@host` - the durable per-account key. NEVER the cookie slot. */
+  accountId: string;
+}
+
+export class IndexSessionError extends Error {
+  status: number;
+  constructor(message: string, status: number) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'IndexSessionError';
+    this.status = status;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the calling request to an account and a usable Authorization header.
+ *
+ * Uses the SAME per-slot encrypted `jmap_stalwart_ctx` cookie that
+ * `/api/settings`, `/api/push/preview` and `/api/plugin-approval-status`
+ * already read (`lib/stalwart/credentials.ts`). That cookie is written by
+ * `/api/auth/stalwart-context`, which the renderer syncs on every login,
+ * session restore, SSO callback, account switch and token refresh
+ * (`stores/auth-store.ts`, 10 call sites), and it carries a ready-made header
+ * for BOTH basic and bearer accounts.
+ *
+ * Why this matters beyond convenience: it means the indexer never touches the
+ * OAuth refresh-token cookie. A server-side refresh would rotate the token into
+ * a response nobody reads while the browser kept the superseded one, and the
+ * next real refresh would then fail and log the user out. Reading an
+ * already-minted header cannot cause that.
+ */
+export async function resolveIndexSession(request: NextRequest): Promise<IndexSession> {
+  const credentials = await getStalwartCredentials(request);
+  if (!credentials) {
+    throw new IndexSessionError('No JMAP auth context for this account; sign in again.', 401);
+  }
+  const accountId = generateAccountId(credentials.username, credentials.serverUrl);
+  return { ...credentials, accountId };
+}
+
+export interface IndexResult {
+  accountId: string;
+  /** Per-type counts of documents written. */
+  written: Partial<Record<ContentType, number>>;
+  /** Types the server (or this account) doesn't support, so nothing was attempted. */
+  skipped: ContentType[];
+  /** Non-fatal per-type failures. One broken type must not fail the whole call. */
+  errors: Array<{ contentType: ContentType; message: string }>;
+  durationMs: number;
+}
+
+function isoDaysFromNow(days: number): string {
+  return new Date(Date.now() + days * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Which types this session can actually index. Calendar/contacts are session
+ * capabilities; files is a PER-ACCOUNT capability (a server can advertise
+ * filenode while a specific account has it revoked - #563).
+ */
+export function supportedTypes(session: JmapSessionInfo): {
+  supported: ContentType[];
+  skipped: ContentType[];
+  accountIds: Partial<Record<ContentType, string>>;
+} {
+  const supported: ContentType[] = [];
+  const skipped: ContentType[] = [];
+  const accountIds: Partial<Record<ContentType, string>> = {};
+
+  const mailAccount = accountIdFor(session, CAP_MAIL);
+  if (mailAccount) { supported.push('mail'); accountIds.mail = mailAccount; }
+  else skipped.push('mail');
+
+  const calAccount = accountIdFor(session, CAP_CALENDARS);
+  if (calAccount && hasCapability(session, CAP_CALENDARS)) {
+    supported.push('calendar'); accountIds.calendar = calAccount;
+  } else skipped.push('calendar');
+
+  const contactAccount = accountIdFor(session, CAP_CONTACTS);
+  if (contactAccount && hasCapability(session, CAP_CONTACTS)) {
+    supported.push('contact'); accountIds.contact = contactAccount;
+  } else skipped.push('contact');
+
+  // Files fall back to the mail account id: Stalwart exposes FileNode on the
+  // same account and does not always list a primaryAccounts entry for it.
+  const fileAccount = accountIdFor(session, CAP_FILENODE) ?? mailAccount;
+  if (fileAccount && accountHasCapability(session, fileAccount, CAP_FILENODE)) {
+    supported.push('file'); accountIds.file = fileAccount;
+  } else skipped.push('file');
+
+  return { supported, skipped, accountIds };
+}
+
+interface FetchArgs {
+  session: JmapSessionInfo;
+  authHeader: string;
+  jmapAccountId: string;
+  ids: readonly string[] | null;
+}
+
+/** Fetches and flattens one content type. `ids === null` means "the recent window". */
+async function fetchDocs(contentType: ContentType, args: FetchArgs): Promise<IndexDoc[]> {
+  const { session, authHeader, jmapAccountId, ids } = args;
+
+  switch (contentType) {
+    case 'mail': {
+      const targetIds = ids ?? await queryRecentEmailIds(
+        session, authHeader, jmapAccountId,
+        isoDaysFromNow(-INDEX_WINDOW_DAYS), CATCHUP_MAX_PER_TYPE,
+      );
+      const docs: IndexDoc[] = [];
+      // Chunked because bodies are big: one Email/get for 500 messages with
+      // full bodies would be an enormous response.
+      for (let i = 0; i < targetIds.length; i += 25) {
+        const emails = await getEmailsForIndex(
+          session, authHeader, jmapAccountId, targetIds.slice(i, i + 25), MAX_BODY_VALUE_BYTES,
+        );
+        for (const email of emails) docs.push(extractMail(jmapAccountId, email));
+      }
+      return docs;
+    }
+    case 'calendar': {
+      const targetIds = ids ?? await queryCalendarEventIds(
+        session, authHeader, jmapAccountId,
+        isoDaysFromNow(-INDEX_WINDOW_DAYS), isoDaysFromNow(CALENDAR_FORWARD_DAYS),
+        CATCHUP_MAX_PER_TYPE,
+      );
+      const docs: IndexDoc[] = [];
+      for (let i = 0; i < targetIds.length; i += 50) {
+        const events = await getCalendarEventsForIndex(
+          session, authHeader, jmapAccountId, targetIds.slice(i, i + 50),
+        );
+        for (const event of events) docs.push(extractCalendarEvent(jmapAccountId, event));
+      }
+      return docs;
+    }
+    case 'contact': {
+      const targetIds = ids ?? await queryContactIds(session, authHeader, jmapAccountId, CONTACTS_MAX);
+      const docs: IndexDoc[] = [];
+      for (let i = 0; i < targetIds.length; i += 100) {
+        const cards = await getContactsForIndex(
+          session, authHeader, jmapAccountId, targetIds.slice(i, i + 100),
+        );
+        for (const card of cards) docs.push(extractContact(jmapAccountId, card));
+      }
+      return docs;
+    }
+    case 'file': {
+      const targetIds = ids ?? await queryFileIds(session, authHeader, jmapAccountId, FILES_MAX);
+      const nodes = [];
+      for (let i = 0; i < targetIds.length; i += 100) {
+        nodes.push(...await getFilesForIndex(
+          session, authHeader, jmapAccountId, targetIds.slice(i, i + 100),
+        ));
+      }
+      // Paths need the whole set in hand, so this one can't stream per chunk.
+      const paths = buildFilePaths(nodes);
+      return nodes
+        // Directories are indexed too: "what's in the Invoices folder" is a
+        // real query, and a folder row is a few bytes.
+        .map((node) => extractFile(jmapAccountId, node, { path: paths.get(node.id) }));
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export interface IndexRequest {
+  /** Types to touch. Empty means every supported type. */
+  types?: readonly ContentType[];
+  /**
+   * Per-type ids to index. Omitted/empty for a type means "refetch that type's
+   * recent window" (the catch-up shape).
+   */
+  ids?: Partial<Record<ContentType, readonly string[]>>;
+  /** Per-type ids to REMOVE (a JMAP `destroyed`). */
+  removed?: Partial<Record<ContentType, readonly string[]>>;
+  /** Drop documents outside the retention window after writing. */
+  prune?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Runs one index pass. Opens the encrypted store, fetches, upserts, closes.
+ *
+ * The key is fetched from the main process for the duration of this call only
+ * (`withIndexKey`) and zeroed afterwards - there is no cached handle and no
+ * resident key.
+ */
+export async function runIndex(
+  indexSession: IndexSession,
+  req: IndexRequest,
+): Promise<IndexResult> {
+  const started = Date.now();
+  const storeDir = getStoreDir();
+  if (!storeDir) {
+    throw new IndexSessionError('The local index is not enabled in this deployment.', 404);
+  }
+
+  const session = await fetchJmapSession(indexSession.serverUrl, indexSession.authHeader);
+
+  // Identity cross-check. `generateAccountId` used the username from the auth
+  // context cookie; the server may canonicalise a short login (`linus`) to a
+  // full address (`linus@example.com`) - which is exactly why AccountEntry
+  // carries `serverIdentifiers`. Accept either form, reject anything else
+  // rather than writing one account's mail into another's file.
+  if (session.username) {
+    const serverAccountId = generateAccountId(session.username, indexSession.serverUrl);
+    if (serverAccountId !== indexSession.accountId) {
+      const shortMatches = session.username.split('@')[0] === indexSession.username.split('@')[0];
+      if (!shortMatches) {
+        throw new IndexSessionError(
+          'The JMAP session belongs to a different account than the request cookie.',
+          409,
+        );
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  const { supported, skipped, accountIds } = supportedTypes(session);
+  const requested = req.types && req.types.length > 0 ? req.types : supported;
+  const types = requested.filter((t) => supported.includes(t));
+  const notAttempted = [...new Set([...skipped, ...requested.filter((t) => !supported.includes(t))])];
+
+  const written: Partial<Record<ContentType, number>> = {};
+  const errors: IndexResult['errors'] = [];
+
+  await withIndexKey(indexSession.accountId, async (key) => {
+    const index = MailIndex.open({ storeDir, accountId: indexSession.accountId, key });
+    try {
+      for (const contentType of types) {
+        const jmapAccountId = accountIds[contentType];
+        if (!jmapAccountId) continue;
+        try {
+          const removed = req.removed?.[contentType];
+          if (removed && removed.length > 0) {
+            index.remove(jmapAccountId, contentType, removed.slice(0, MAX_IDS_PER_CALL));
+          }
+
+          const requestedIds = req.ids?.[contentType];
+          const ids = requestedIds && requestedIds.length > 0
+            ? requestedIds.slice(0, MAX_IDS_PER_CALL)
+            : null;
+
+          const docs = await fetchDocs(contentType, {
+            session, authHeader: indexSession.authHeader, jmapAccountId, ids,
+          });
+          written[contentType] = index.upsert(docs);
+
+          if (req.prune && contentType === 'mail') {
+            // Only mail prunes by date: calendar's window looks forward,
+            // contacts have no date, and file rows are metadata-sized.
+            index.pruneOlderThan(jmapAccountId, 'mail', isoDaysFromNow(-INDEX_WINDOW_DAYS));
+          }
+        } catch (error) {
+          // One unsupported or misbehaving type must not fail the others.
+          const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+          errors.push({ contentType, message });
+          if (error instanceof JmapIndexError && error.status === 401) throw error;
+        }
+      }
+    } finally {
+      index.close();
+    }
+  });
+
+  const result: IndexResult = {
+    accountId: indexSession.accountId,
+    written,
+    skipped: notAttempted,
+    errors,
+    durationMs: Date.now() - started,
+  };
+  logger.info('mail-index: pass complete', {
+    slot: indexSession.slot,
+    written: JSON.stringify(written),
+    skipped: notAttempted.join(',') || 'none',
+    errors: errors.length,
+    durationMs: result.durationMs,
+  });
+  return result;
+}

lib/mail-index/store.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+// The encrypted local search index: schema, open/close, upsert, search.
+//
+// One SQLite (SQLCipher) file per account. Rows are ALSO account-scoped
+// internally - `(jmap_account_id, content_type, id)` - because a single login
+// exposes the user's own JMAP account plus every delegated/shared account, and
+// JMAP ids are unique only WITHIN an account (this codebase already works
+// around that collision in `lib/jmap/client.ts:388`'s namespaceMailboxIds).
+// One file per account keeps purge trivial; the composite key keeps
+// delegated accounts from merging inside it.
+//
+// This is a SEARCH INDEX, not a mail replica. It is allowed to be stale, it is
+// allowed to be incomplete, and it can be discarded and rebuilt at any time -
+// which is why the schema-version mismatch path below simply drops everything
+// rather than migrating.
+
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { loadSqlcipher, type SqlcipherDatabase } from './binding';
+import { dbSiblings, indexDbPath } from './paths';
+
+export const SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;
+
+export type ContentType = 'mail' | 'calendar' | 'contact' | 'file';
+
+export const CONTENT_TYPES: readonly ContentType[] = ['mail', 'calendar', 'contact', 'file'];
+
+export function isContentType(v: unknown): v is ContentType {
+  return typeof v === 'string' && (CONTENT_TYPES as readonly string[]).includes(v);
+}
+
+/**
+ * One indexable thing, already flattened to text. Produced by the pure
+ * extractors in `extract.ts` so that every JMAP-shape decision is unit-testable
+ * without a database or a server.
+ */
+export interface IndexDoc {
+  jmapAccountId: string;
+  contentType: ContentType;
+  /** JMAP id. Unique only within (jmapAccountId, contentType). */
+  id: string;
+  /** Subject / event title / contact display name / filename. */
+  title: string;
+  /** Addresses and names: sender+recipients, attendees, contact emails/phones, owner. */
+  people: string;
+  /** The bulk searchable text. Plain text only - never HTML. */
+  body: string;
+  /** ISO 8601, or null when the type has no meaningful date. Drives recency ordering. */
+  occurredAt: string | null;
+  /** Small type-specific extras returned verbatim to the caller (never searched). */
+  metadata: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+export interface SearchHit {
+  contentType: ContentType;
+  id: string;
+  jmapAccountId: string;
+  title: string;
+  people: string;
+  occurredAt: string | null;
+  metadata: Record<string, unknown>;
+  /** FTS5 bm25 score. Lower is a better match (bm25 returns negative values). */
+  score: number;
+  /** Highlighted excerpt from the body, for feeding an LLM as context. */
+  snippet: string;
+}
+
+const DDL = `
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS doc (
+  jmap_account_id TEXT NOT NULL,
+  content_type    TEXT NOT NULL,
+  id              TEXT NOT NULL,
+  title           TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+  people          TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+  body            TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+  occurred_at     TEXT,
+  metadata_json   TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
+  indexed_at      INTEGER NOT NULL,
+  PRIMARY KEY (jmap_account_id, content_type, id)
+);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS doc_recent
+  ON doc(jmap_account_id, content_type, occurred_at DESC);
+
+-- Standalone (not external-content) FTS5: the text is duplicated into this
+-- table and kept in step manually on upsert. External content would avoid the
+-- duplication but requires deleting the old FTS row using its OLD column
+-- values, which an upsert does not have to hand - a well-known source of
+-- silently-stale FTS rows. At this scale (a bounded recent window) the
+-- duplication is the cheaper correctness trade.
+CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE IF NOT EXISTS doc_fts USING fts5(
+  title, people, body,
+  tokenize='unicode61 remove_diacritics 2'
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS meta (k TEXT PRIMARY KEY, v TEXT NOT NULL);
+`;
+
+export class MailIndexUnavailableError extends Error {
+  constructor(message: string) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'MailIndexUnavailableError';
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Assert that the file we just opened is REALLY encrypted.
+ *
+ * This is not defensive boilerplate, it guards the sharpest landmine found
+ * while designing this: on both `node:sqlite` and plain `better-sqlite3`,
+ * `PRAGMA key = ...` is **silently accepted and does nothing** - no error, a
+ * working database, and the mail sitting on disk in cleartext. Verified by
+ * writing a file and recovering a canary string from the raw bytes.
+ *
+ * The check is on the VALUE, not the row count: a non-cipher binding returns
+ * ZERO ROWS for `PRAGMA cipher_version`, so a naive `!== ''` comparison over a
+ * missing row passes vacuously. Require a non-empty string.
+ */
+function assertEncrypted(db: SqlcipherDatabase, dbPath: string): void {
+  const rows = db.pragma('cipher_version');
+  const value =
+    Array.isArray(rows) && rows.length > 0 && rows[0] && typeof rows[0] === 'object'
+      ? (rows[0] as Record<string, unknown>).cipher_version
+      : undefined;
+  if (typeof value !== 'string' || value.trim().length === 0) {
+    db.close();
+    throw new MailIndexUnavailableError(
+      `Refusing to use ${path.basename(dbPath)}: the SQLite binding reports no SQLCipher ` +
+        `support (PRAGMA cipher_version returned ${JSON.stringify(rows)}), so the index ` +
+        `would be written in cleartext.`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+export interface OpenOptions {
+  storeDir: string;
+  accountId: string;
+  /** Raw 32-byte key. Used as SQLCipher's raw key (no KDF) via `PRAGMA key = "x'..'"`. */
+  key: Buffer;
+}
+
+export class MailIndex {
+  private constructor(
+    private readonly db: SqlcipherDatabase,
+    readonly dbPath: string,
+  ) {}
+
+  /**
+   * Opens (creating if needed) the account's index. Throws
+   * MailIndexUnavailableError when the native binding is absent or the file is
+   * not actually encrypted; the caller turns the feature off rather than
+   * falling back to something unencrypted.
+   */
+  static open({ storeDir, accountId, key }: OpenOptions): MailIndex {
+    const Database = loadSqlcipher();
+    if (!Database) {
+      throw new MailIndexUnavailableError(
+        '@signalapp/sqlcipher is not installed for this platform (it is an optional dependency).',
+      );
+    }
+    if (key.length !== 32) {
+      throw new MailIndexUnavailableError(`Index key must be 32 bytes, got ${key.length}.`);
+    }
+
+    const dbPath = indexDbPath(storeDir, accountId);
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbPath), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+
+    let db = new Database(dbPath);
+    // The key pragma must be the FIRST statement on the connection. Hex form
+    // means SQLCipher uses these 32 bytes as the raw key with no KDF, which is
+    // right for a random key (a passphrase would want the KDF).
+    db.pragma(`key = "x'${key.toString('hex')}'"`);
+    assertEncrypted(db, dbPath);
+
+    // A wrong key surfaces here rather than at open: SQLCipher only reads the
+    // header lazily. Treat it as "unreadable" and rebuild from scratch - the
+    // index is derived data, so there is nothing to recover and never anything
+    // to prompt the user for (the key was never a user secret).
+    let version: number | null;
+    try {
+      db.pragma('journal_mode = WAL');
+      db.pragma('synchronous = NORMAL');
+      // The offline replica (lib/offline-replica/**) is a SECOND connection to
+      // this same file, writing disjoint tables. WAL lets a writer and readers
+      // coexist, but two WRITERS get SQLITE_BUSY immediately without this - and
+      // both subsystems are driven by the same renderer push handler, so they
+      // genuinely do overlap.
+      db.pragma('busy_timeout = 8000');
+      version = readSchemaVersion(db);
+    } catch {
+      db.close();
+      for (const f of dbSiblings(dbPath)) {
+        try { fs.rmSync(f, { force: true }); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+      }
+      db = new Database(dbPath);
+      db.pragma(`key = "x'${key.toString('hex')}'"`);
+      assertEncrypted(db, dbPath);
+      db.pragma('journal_mode = WAL');
+      db.pragma('synchronous = NORMAL');
+      // The offline replica (lib/offline-replica/**) is a SECOND connection to
+      // this same file, writing disjoint tables. WAL lets a writer and readers
+      // coexist, but two WRITERS get SQLITE_BUSY immediately without this - and
+      // both subsystems are driven by the same renderer push handler, so they
+      // genuinely do overlap.
+      db.pragma('busy_timeout = 8000');
+      version = null;
+    }
+
+    if (version !== null && version !== SCHEMA_VERSION) {
+      // Rebuildable derived data: drop, don't migrate.
+      db.exec('DROP TABLE IF EXISTS doc_fts; DROP TABLE IF EXISTS doc; DROP TABLE IF EXISTS meta;');
+      version = null;
+    }
+    if (version === null) {
+      db.exec(DDL);
+      db.prepare('INSERT OR REPLACE INTO meta (k, v) VALUES (?, ?)').run([
+        'schema_version',
+        String(SCHEMA_VERSION),
+      ]);
+    }
+
+    return new MailIndex(db, dbPath);
+  }
+
+  close(): void {
+    try { this.db.close(); } catch { /* already closed */ }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Upserts documents and keeps the FTS rows in step. Returns the number of
+   * rows written. One transaction for the whole batch - a partially-applied
+   * batch is harmless (it is an index) but a transaction is faster.
+   */
+  upsert(docs: readonly IndexDoc[]): number {
+    if (docs.length === 0) return 0;
+
+    const upsertDoc = this.db.prepare(`
+      INSERT INTO doc (jmap_account_id, content_type, id, title, people, body,
+                       occurred_at, metadata_json, indexed_at)
+      VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
+      ON CONFLICT(jmap_account_id, content_type, id) DO UPDATE SET
+        title = excluded.title, people = excluded.people, body = excluded.body,
+        occurred_at = excluded.occurred_at, metadata_json = excluded.metadata_json,
+        indexed_at = excluded.indexed_at
+      RETURNING rowid
+    `);
+    const deleteFts = this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM doc_fts WHERE rowid = ?');
+    const insertFts = this.db.prepare(
+      'INSERT INTO doc_fts (rowid, title, people, body) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)',
+    );
+
+    const now = Date.now();
+    let written = 0;
+    this.db.exec('BEGIN');
+    try {
+      for (const d of docs) {
+        const row = upsertDoc.get([
+          d.jmapAccountId, d.contentType, d.id,
+          d.title, d.people, d.body,
+          d.occurredAt, JSON.stringify(d.metadata ?? {}), now,
+        ]);
+        const rowid = row?.rowid;
+        if (typeof rowid !== 'number') continue;
+        // ON CONFLICT preserves the rowid, so delete-then-insert replaces the
+        // old FTS row rather than accumulating duplicates for one document.
+        deleteFts.run([rowid]);
+        insertFts.run([rowid, d.title, d.people, d.body]);
+        written++;
+      }
+      this.db.exec('COMMIT');
+    } catch (error) {
+      this.db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      throw error;
+    }
+    return written;
+  }
+
+  /** Removes documents by id (a JMAP `destroyed` id, or a stale row). */
+  remove(jmapAccountId: string, contentType: ContentType, ids: readonly string[]): number {
+    if (ids.length === 0) return 0;
+    const findRow = this.db.prepare(
+      'SELECT rowid FROM doc WHERE jmap_account_id = ? AND content_type = ? AND id = ?',
+    );
+    const deleteFts = this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM doc_fts WHERE rowid = ?');
+    const deleteDoc = this.db.prepare(
+      'DELETE FROM doc WHERE jmap_account_id = ? AND content_type = ? AND id = ?',
+    );
+    let removed = 0;
+    this.db.exec('BEGIN');
+    try {
+      for (const id of ids) {
+        const row = findRow.get([jmapAccountId, contentType, id]);
+        if (typeof row?.rowid === 'number') deleteFts.run([row.rowid]);
+        removed += deleteDoc.run([jmapAccountId, contentType, id]).changes;
+      }
+      this.db.exec('COMMIT');
+    } catch (error) {
+      this.db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      throw error;
+    }
+    return removed;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Full-text search - the retrieval surface an AI feature calls to gather
+   * context. `types` empty/omitted searches everything.
+   */
+  search(opts: {
+    query: string;
+    types?: readonly ContentType[];
+    limit?: number;
+    snippetTokens?: number;
+  }): SearchHit[] {
+    const match = toFtsMatchQuery(opts.query);
+    if (!match) return [];
+
+    const limit = Math.min(Math.max(opts.limit ?? 20, 1), 200);
+    const tokens = Math.min(Math.max(opts.snippetTokens ?? 24, 4), 64);
+    const types = opts.types && opts.types.length > 0 ? opts.types : null;
+    const typeFilter = types ? ` AND d.content_type IN (${types.map(() => '?').join(',')})` : '';
+
+    // bm25 weights: a hit in the title or in a name/address is a stronger
+    // signal than one in a long body, and for RAG the title is what makes a
+    // retrieved chunk recognisable.
+    const rows = this.db
+      .prepare(`
+        SELECT d.content_type, d.id, d.jmap_account_id, d.title, d.people,
+               d.occurred_at, d.metadata_json,
+               bm25(doc_fts, 8.0, 4.0, 1.0) AS score,
+               snippet(doc_fts, 2, '[', ']', '…', ${tokens}) AS snip
+        FROM doc_fts
+        JOIN doc d ON d.rowid = doc_fts.rowid
+        WHERE doc_fts MATCH ?${typeFilter}
+        ORDER BY score ASC, d.occurred_at DESC
+        LIMIT ?
+      `)
+      .all([match, ...(types ?? []), limit]);
+
+    return rows.map((r) => ({
+      contentType: String(r.content_type) as ContentType,
+      id: String(r.id),
+      jmapAccountId: String(r.jmap_account_id),
+      title: String(r.title ?? ''),
+      people: String(r.people ?? ''),
+      occurredAt: r.occurred_at === null || r.occurred_at === undefined ? null : String(r.occurred_at),
+      metadata: safeParseObject(r.metadata_json),
+      score: typeof r.score === 'number' ? r.score : 0,
+      snippet: String(r.snip ?? ''),
+    }));
+  }
+
+  /** Per-type counts and freshness, for the Settings UI and for debugging. */
+  stats(): Array<{ contentType: string; count: number; newest: string | null; indexedAt: number | null }> {
+    return this.db
+      .prepare(`
+        SELECT content_type, COUNT(*) AS n, MAX(occurred_at) AS newest, MAX(indexed_at) AS indexed
+        FROM doc GROUP BY content_type ORDER BY content_type
+      `)
+      .all()
+      .map((r) => ({
+        contentType: String(r.content_type),
+        count: Number(r.n ?? 0),
+        newest: r.newest === null || r.newest === undefined ? null : String(r.newest),
+        indexedAt: typeof r.indexed === 'number' ? r.indexed : null,
+      }));
+  }
+
+  /** Ids already present, so a catch-up pass can skip re-fetching bodies. */
+  existingIds(jmapAccountId: string, contentType: ContentType): Set<string> {
+    const rows = this.db
+      .prepare('SELECT id FROM doc WHERE jmap_account_id = ? AND content_type = ?')
+      .all([jmapAccountId, contentType]);
+    return new Set(rows.map((r) => String(r.id)));
+  }
+
+  /** Drops documents older than the retention floor for a type. */
+  pruneOlderThan(jmapAccountId: string, contentType: ContentType, isoFloor: string): number {
+    const rows = this.db
+      .prepare(`
+        SELECT rowid FROM doc
+        WHERE jmap_account_id = ? AND content_type = ?
+          AND occurred_at IS NOT NULL AND occurred_at < ?
+      `)
+      .all([jmapAccountId, contentType, isoFloor]);
+    if (rows.length === 0) return 0;
+    const deleteFts = this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM doc_fts WHERE rowid = ?');
+    const deleteDoc = this.db.prepare('DELETE FROM doc WHERE rowid = ?');
+    this.db.exec('BEGIN');
+    try {
+      for (const r of rows) {
+        deleteFts.run([r.rowid]);
+        deleteDoc.run([r.rowid]);
+      }
+      this.db.exec('COMMIT');
+    } catch (error) {
+      this.db.exec('ROLLBACK');
+      throw error;
+    }
+    return rows.length;
+  }
+}
+
+function readSchemaVersion(db: SqlcipherDatabase): number | null {
+  try {
+    const row = db.prepare("SELECT v FROM meta WHERE k = 'schema_version'").get();
+    if (!row || row.v === undefined) return null;
+    const n = Number(row.v);
+    return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : null;
+  } catch {
+    // `meta` doesn't exist yet - a fresh file.
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function safeParseObject(v: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
+  if (typeof v !== 'string') return {};
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(v);
+    return parsed && typeof parsed === 'object' && !Array.isArray(parsed)
+      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)
+      : {};
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Turns arbitrary user text into a safe FTS5 MATCH expression.
+ *
+ * FTS5's query syntax is not SQL, so parameter binding does NOT protect it: a
+ * bare `"` or a stray `*`/`NEAR`/`:` in user input raises
+ * `fts5: syntax error`, which would turn a normal search box into a 500. Every
+ * token is quoted (making it a literal phrase) and a trailing `*` is added to
+ * the last token so typing continues to match as the user types.
+ *
+ * Exported for unit testing - it is the one piece of this file with no
+ * database dependency and the most ways to be wrong.
+ */
+export function toFtsMatchQuery(raw: string): string | null {
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string') return null;
+  // Split on anything that isn't a word character or an intra-word mark. Keeps
+  // unicode letters (so "Müller" and "東京" survive) via the u flag.
+  const tokens = raw
+    .normalize('NFC')
+    .split(/[^\p{L}\p{N}_@.'-]+/u)
+    .map((t) => t.replace(/^['-]+|['-]+$/g, ''))
+    .filter((t) => t.length > 0)
+    .slice(0, 24);
+  if (tokens.length === 0) return null;
+  return tokens
+    .map((t, i) => {
+      const quoted = `"${t.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`;
+      // Prefix-match only the final token, and only if it's long enough to not
+      // match half the mailbox.
+      return i === tokens.length - 1 && t.length >= 3 ? `${quoted}*` : quoted;
+    })
+    .join(' AND ');
+}

lib/offline-fallback-client.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+// The read-path fallback. Wraps an `IJMAPClient` so that when a mail read fails
+// because the network is down, the answer comes from the encrypted offline replica
+// instead of an empty list.
+//
+// WHY THIS SHAPE, AND NOT A CACHE. The replica is consulted ONLY after a read has
+// genuinely failed at the transport level. That ordering is the whole coherence
+// story for the design review's H3: the webmail does local delta arithmetic on
+// mailbox unread counts for mark-read/move/delete, and if the replica sat in FRONT
+// of the server that arithmetic would operate on replica numbers and need
+// reconciliation rules. Behind the server, an online session never sees a replica
+// value at all, and while offline any count drift is bounded and repaired by the
+// next `Mailbox/changes`.
+//
+// WHY IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO LOOK AT THE RESULT. `lib/jmap/client.ts`'s read methods
+// swallow their own errors and return plausible success: `getEmails()` returns an
+// empty page, `getEmail()` returns `null`, `getMailboxes()` returns a SYNTHETIC
+// single Inbox. Falling back on those shapes alone would serve stale replica rows
+// for a folder the user had genuinely just emptied. So the test is TWO-PART: a
+// suspicious result AND a `fetch` rejection recorded during that exact call
+// (`lib/jmap/transport-health.ts`). A 4xx, a 429 or a JMAP method error all mean
+// the server answered, so none of them triggers a fallback.
+//
+// Mutates the instance rather than wrapping it in a Proxy: `JMAPClient` is a large
+// class whose methods call each other through `this`, and instance patching keeps
+// `this` identity exactly as it was. Idempotent, so re-wrapping the same client is
+// harmless.
+
+import { generateAccountId } from '@/lib/account-utils';
+import type { IJMAPClient } from '@/lib/jmap/client-interface';
+import type { Email, Mailbox } from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+import { transportFailureCount } from '@/lib/jmap/transport-health';
+import {
+  isReplicaUnavailable, readOfflineList, readOfflineMailboxes, readOfflineMessage,
+} from '@/lib/offline-replica-client';
+
+const WRAPPED = Symbol.for('vncmail.offlineFallback.wrapped');
+
+/**
+ * A `getMailboxes()` result that is really the client's offline placeholder.
+ *
+ * `client.ts` fabricates exactly this on failure: one mailbox, id `INBOX`, role
+ * `inbox`, zero counts. Matching it precisely matters - a real server that happens
+ * to return a single inbox has a real id and real counts.
+ */
+function isSyntheticMailboxList(mailboxes: readonly Mailbox[]): boolean {
+  return (
+    mailboxes.length === 1 &&
+    mailboxes[0]?.id === 'INBOX' &&
+    mailboxes[0]?.totalEmails === 0 &&
+    mailboxes[0]?.unreadEmails === 0
+  );
+}
+
+/** Resolves this client's cookie slot, so a multi-account shell reads the right replica. */
+async function slotFor(client: IJMAPClient): Promise<number | undefined> {
+  try {
+    const { useAccountStore } = await import('@/stores/account-store');
+    const id = generateAccountId(client.getUsername(), client.getServerUrl());
+    const accounts = useAccountStore.getState().accounts;
+    const match =
+      accounts.find((a) => a.id === id) ??
+      accounts.find((a) => a.serverIdentifiers?.includes(id));
+    return match?.cookieSlot;
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * True when the replica may answer for this call.
+ *
+ * v1 replicates the PRIMARY mail account only, so a read explicitly scoped to a
+ * delegated/shared account must never be answered from it - the replica simply has
+ * no rows, and answering "empty" would be worse than the client's own empty.
+ */
+function scopedToPrimary(client: IJMAPClient, accountId?: string): boolean {
+  if (!accountId) return true;
+  try {
+    return accountId === client.getAccountId();
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+export function withOfflineFallback<T extends IJMAPClient>(client: T): T {
+  const flagged = client as unknown as Record<symbol, boolean | undefined>;
+  if (flagged[WRAPPED]) return client;
+  flagged[WRAPPED] = true;
+
+  const target = client as unknown as IJMAPClient;
+  const originalGetEmail = target.getEmail.bind(target);
+  const originalGetEmails = target.getEmails.bind(target);
+  const originalGetMailboxes = target.getMailboxes.bind(target);
+  const originalGetAllMailboxes = target.getAllMailboxes.bind(target);
+
+  target.getEmail = async (emailId: string, accountId?: string): Promise<Email | null> => {
+    const before = transportFailureCount();
+    const online = await originalGetEmail(emailId, accountId);
+    if (online) return online;
+    if (isReplicaUnavailable()) return online;
+    // `null` alone is ambiguous: it is also what a genuinely-missing id returns.
+    // Only a transport failure during THIS call earns a fallback.
+    if (transportFailureCount() === before) return online;
+    if (!scopedToPrimary(client, accountId)) return online;
+
+    const offline = await readOfflineMessage(emailId, await slotFor(client));
+    // An envelope with no body would render blank AND leave the viewer's
+    // `isBodyLoading` gate stuck, so it is not an answer - better to keep the
+    // client's `null` and let the UI say the message is unavailable offline.
+    if (!offline?.email || !offline.hasBody) return online;
+    return offline.email;
+  };
+
+  target.getEmails = async (
+    mailboxId?: string,
+    accountId?: string,
+    limit: number = 50,
+    position: number = 0,
+    hasKeyword?: string,
+    pinnedFirst?: boolean,
+    extraFilter?: Record<string, unknown>,
+  ): Promise<{ emails: Email[]; hasMore: boolean; total: number }> => {
+    const before = transportFailureCount();
+    const online = await originalGetEmails(
+      mailboxId, accountId, limit, position, hasKeyword, pinnedFirst, extraFilter,
+    );
+    if (online.emails.length > 0) return online;
+    if (isReplicaUnavailable()) return online;
+    if (transportFailureCount() === before) return online;
+    if (!scopedToPrimary(client, accountId)) return online;
+    // A keyword or category filter is a server-side query the replica does not
+    // reproduce. Serving an unfiltered page in its place would silently show the
+    // wrong set, which is worse than showing nothing.
+    if (hasKeyword || extraFilter) return online;
+
+    const offline = await readOfflineList(mailboxId ?? null, {
+      limit,
+      offset: position,
+      slot: await slotFor(client),
+    });
+    if (!offline || offline.emails.length === 0) return online;
+    return { emails: offline.emails, hasMore: offline.hasMore, total: offline.total };
+  };
+
+  const mailboxFallback = async (
+    online: Mailbox[],
+    before: number,
+    accountId?: string,
+  ): Promise<Mailbox[]> => {
+    // Bail out unless the result is EMPTY or is the exact synthetic placeholder.
+    // Testing `length > 1` here was a real bug found by
+    // `lib/__tests__/offline-fallback-client.test.ts`: a server that legitimately
+    // exposes a single mailbox got its real folder - real id, real counts -
+    // replaced by replica rows the moment any unrelated transport blip was
+    // recorded during the call.
+    if (online.length > 0 && !isSyntheticMailboxList(online)) return online;
+    if (isReplicaUnavailable()) return online;
+    if (transportFailureCount() === before) return online;
+    if (!scopedToPrimary(client, accountId)) return online;
+    const offline = await readOfflineMailboxes(await slotFor(client));
+    if (!offline || offline.length === 0) return online;
+    return offline;
+  };
+
+  target.getMailboxes = async (accountId?: string): Promise<Mailbox[]> => {
+    const before = transportFailureCount();
+    const online = await originalGetMailboxes(accountId);
+    return mailboxFallback(online, before, accountId);
+  };
+
+  target.getAllMailboxes = async (): Promise<Mailbox[]> => {
+    const before = transportFailureCount();
+    const online = await originalGetAllMailboxes();
+    // `getAllMailboxes` falls back internally to `getMailboxes()`, so an offline
+    // run arrives here as the synthetic single Inbox rather than an empty list.
+    return mailboxFallback(online, before);
+  };
+
+  return client;
+}

lib/offline-replica-client.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+// Renderer-side client for the offline mail replica.
+//
+// The replica is EVENT-DRIVEN, exactly like the search index next to it: the
+// renderer already holds the live JMAP push connection, so a `StateChange` is what
+// triggers a sync cycle. There is no polling loop and no background worker.
+//
+// One cycle is BOUNDED (see lib/offline-replica/sync.ts's BUDGET), so a first
+// sync of a large mailbox needs several. `unfinishedWork` is the server saying
+// "call again", and `chainSync` below does that with a hard cap - the cap matters,
+// because an "unfinished work" signal that is true for a condition the cycle
+// cannot change is how the mobile client ended up chaining a new cycle every five
+// seconds forever.
+//
+// Every function here is best-effort and never throws: offline storage failing to
+// update must never break the mail UI.
+
+import { apiFetch } from '@/lib/browser-navigation';
+import { debug } from '@/lib/debug';
+import type { Email, Mailbox } from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+import type { StateChange } from '@/lib/jmap/types';
+
+export interface RetentionPolicy {
+  envelopeDays: number;
+  bodyDays: number;
+  maxBodyMB: number;
+}
+
+export interface CycleReport {
+  ok: boolean;
+  unfinishedWork: boolean;
+  bootstrapped: boolean;
+  reconciled: boolean;
+  mailboxesWritten: number;
+  envelopesWritten: number;
+  envelopesDeleted: number;
+  bodiesWritten: number;
+  bodiesEvicted: number;
+  coveragePhase: string;
+  resyncRequired: boolean;
+  warnings: string[];
+  errorClass?: string;
+  error?: string;
+  durationMs: number;
+}
+
+export interface ReplicaStats {
+  mailboxes: number;
+  envelopes: number;
+  bodies: number;
+  bodyBytes: number;
+  wantedBodies: number;
+  giveUps: number;
+  newest: string | null;
+  oldest: string | null;
+  fileBytes: number;
+}
+
+export interface ReplicaStatus {
+  ok: boolean;
+  policy: RetentionPolicy;
+  limits: Record<keyof RetentionPolicy, { min: number; max: number }>;
+  synced: boolean;
+  stats: ReplicaStats | null;
+  coveragePhase: string;
+  coveredFrom?: string | null;
+  resyncRequired: boolean;
+  lastCycleAt: number | null;
+  lastCycleOk: boolean | null;
+  lastCycleError?: string | null;
+}
+
+/** Set once the server says the feature isn't there, so we stop asking. */
+let knownUnavailable = false;
+let inFlight: Promise<CycleReport | null> | null = null;
+
+function slotQuery(slot?: number, extra?: string): string {
+  const params = new URLSearchParams();
+  if (typeof slot === 'number') params.set('slot', String(slot));
+  const base = params.toString();
+  if (extra && base) return `?${base}&${extra}`;
+  if (extra) return `?${extra}`;
+  return base ? `?${base}` : '';
+}
+
+/** True when the replica is known to be absent (not the desktop shell, or gated off). */
+export function isReplicaUnavailable(): boolean {
+  return knownUnavailable;
+}
+
+export function resetReplicaAvailability(): void {
+  knownUnavailable = false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Runs ONE cycle. Single-flighted on the renderer as well as the server, so a
+ * burst of deliveries coalesces instead of queueing N overlapping requests that
+ * the server would then serialise anyway.
+ */
+export async function syncOnce(
+  opts: { slot?: number; policy?: RetentionPolicy; forceResync?: boolean } = {},
+): Promise<CycleReport | null> {
+  if (knownUnavailable) return null;
+  if (inFlight) return inFlight;
+
+  const run = (async (): Promise<CycleReport | null> => {
+    try {
+      const response = await apiFetch(`/api/offline/sync${slotQuery(opts.slot)}`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ policy: opts.policy, forceResync: opts.forceResync === true }),
+      });
+      // 404 = not the desktop shell. Permanent for this page load; stop asking so
+      // a busy mailbox doesn't post per delivery.
+      if (response.status === 404) { knownUnavailable = true; return null; }
+      if (response.status === 503) {
+        const body = await response.json().catch(() => ({}));
+        // A transport-class 503 means the BACKEND is unreachable, which is normal
+        // and temporary - it must not latch the feature off for the session. Only
+        // a missing binding / key channel does that.
+        const code = typeof body?.code === 'string' ? body.code : '';
+        if (code === 'no-binding' || code === 'no-key-channel' || code === 'unavailable') {
+          knownUnavailable = true;
+          return null;
+        }
+        return null;
+      }
+      if (!response.ok) return null;
+      const body = await response.json();
+      debug.log('push', '[replica] cycle', body?.report);
+      return (body?.report ?? null) as CycleReport | null;
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    } finally {
+      inFlight = null;
+    }
+  })();
+
+  inFlight = run;
+  return run;
+}
+
+/** Hard cap on chained cycles per trigger. */
+export const MAX_CHAINED_CYCLES = 12;
+
+/**
+ * Runs cycles while the server reports unfinished work.
+ *
+ * The cap is the whole point. `unfinishedWork` is a hint, and a hint that stays
+ * true for something the cycle cannot resolve turns into an endless chain - which
+ * is exactly what happened on the mobile client when a body-queue counter reported
+ * attempted rather than inserted rows. The server-side fixes make that
+ * self-terminating; this cap means even a future regression costs a bounded number
+ * of requests rather than an infinite loop.
+ */
+export async function chainSync(
+  opts: { slot?: number; max?: number; onReport?: (report: CycleReport) => void } = {},
+): Promise<CycleReport | null> {
+  const max = Math.min(opts.max ?? MAX_CHAINED_CYCLES, MAX_CHAINED_CYCLES);
+  let last: CycleReport | null = null;
+  for (let i = 0; i < max; i++) {
+    const report = await syncOnce({ slot: opts.slot });
+    if (!report) return last;
+    last = report;
+    opts.onReport?.(report);
+    if (!report.ok || !report.unfinishedWork) return report;
+  }
+  return last;
+}
+
+/** The push-driven entry point. Fire-and-forget: the mail UI must not wait on it. */
+export function syncOnStateChange(change: StateChange, opts: { slot?: number } = {}): void {
+  if (knownUnavailable) return;
+  // Only mail-shaped changes are worth a cycle. A `Mailbox` state change alone is
+  // usually just an unread-count move, but the replica DOES hold those counts, so
+  // unlike the search index it is worth reacting to.
+  const relevant = Object.values(change.changed ?? {}).some(
+    (perAccount) => perAccount && (perAccount.Email || perAccount.Mailbox),
+  );
+  if (!relevant) return;
+  void syncOnce({ slot: opts.slot });
+}
+
+export async function fetchReplicaStatus(slot?: number): Promise<ReplicaStatus | null> {
+  try {
+    const response = await apiFetch(`/api/offline/status${slotQuery(slot)}`);
+    if (!response.ok) return null;
+    return (await response.json()) as ReplicaStatus;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export async function updateRetentionPolicy(
+  policy: RetentionPolicy,
+  slot?: number,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const response = await apiFetch(`/api/offline/status${slotQuery(slot)}`, {
+      method: 'PUT',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify(policy),
+    });
+    return response.ok;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+export async function purgeReplica(slot?: number): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const response = await apiFetch(`/api/offline/status${slotQuery(slot)}`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+    return response.ok;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+// ── reads ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+interface ReadEnvelope<T> {
+  ok?: boolean;
+  available?: boolean;
+  error?: string;
+  data?: T;
+}
+
+async function read<T>(query: string): Promise<(T & { available: boolean }) | null> {
+  if (knownUnavailable) return null;
+  try {
+    const response = await apiFetch(`/api/offline/mail${query}`);
+    if (response.status === 404) { knownUnavailable = true; return null; }
+    if (!response.ok) return null;
+    const body = (await response.json()) as ReadEnvelope<unknown> & Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (body?.available !== true) return null;
+    return body as unknown as T & { available: boolean };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export async function readOfflineMailboxes(slot?: number): Promise<Mailbox[] | null> {
+  const body = await read<{ mailboxes: Mailbox[] }>(slotQuery(slot, 'kind=mailboxes'));
+  return body?.mailboxes ?? null;
+}
+
+export async function readOfflineList(
+  mailboxId: string | null,
+  opts: { limit?: number; offset?: number; slot?: number } = {},
+): Promise<{ emails: Email[]; total: number; hasMore: boolean } | null> {
+  const params = new URLSearchParams({ kind: 'list' });
+  if (mailboxId !== null) params.set('mailboxId', mailboxId);
+  if (opts.limit !== undefined) params.set('limit', String(opts.limit));
+  if (opts.offset !== undefined) params.set('offset', String(opts.offset));
+  const body = await read<{ emails: Email[]; total: number; hasMore: boolean }>(
+    slotQuery(opts.slot, params.toString()),
+  );
+  if (!body) return null;
+  return { emails: body.emails ?? [], total: body.total ?? 0, hasMore: body.hasMore === true };
+}
+
+export async function readOfflineMessage(
+  id: string,
+  slot?: number,
+): Promise<{ email: Email | null; hasBody: boolean } | null> {
+  const params = new URLSearchParams({ kind: 'message', id });
+  const body = await read<{ email: Email | null; hasBody: boolean }>(
+    slotQuery(slot, params.toString()),
+  );
+  if (!body) return null;
+  return { email: body.email ?? null, hasBody: body.hasBody === true };
+}

lib/offline-replica/__tests__/apply.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  advanceOneMs, madeForwardProgress, normalisePage, pageIsEmpty, planEmailFetches,
+  planMailboxFetches, updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly, type ChangesPage,
+} from '../apply';
+import { asChangesState } from '../states';
+
+function page(partial: Partial<ChangesPage>): ChangesPage {
+  return {
+    oldState: asChangesState('old'),
+    newState: asChangesState('new'),
+    hasMoreChanges: false,
+    created: [],
+    updated: [],
+    destroyed: [],
+    ...partial,
+  };
+}
+
+describe('normalisePage', () => {
+  it('lets a destroyed id win outright over created and updated', () => {
+    // Fetching an id that is also destroyed spends a request to get `notFound`.
+    const out = normalisePage(page({ created: ['a', 'b'], updated: ['a'], destroyed: ['a'] }));
+    expect(out.created).toEqual(['b']);
+    expect(out.updated).toEqual([]);
+    expect(out.destroyed).toEqual(['a']);
+  });
+
+  it('treats an id in both created and updated as a create', () => {
+    // The create path fetches the full envelope tier, which already contains the
+    // updated values - so an extra 3-property fetch would be pure waste.
+    const out = normalisePage(page({ created: ['a'], updated: ['a'] }));
+    expect(out.created).toEqual(['a']);
+    expect(out.updated).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('deduplicates within each bucket', () => {
+    const out = normalisePage(page({ created: ['a', 'a'], destroyed: ['b', 'b'] }));
+    expect(out.created).toEqual(['a']);
+    expect(out.destroyed).toEqual(['b']);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('pageIsEmpty', () => {
+  it('is true only when nothing changed', () => {
+    // An empty page STILL has to advance the cursor: skipping it re-requests the
+    // same position forever.
+    expect(pageIsEmpty(page({}))).toBe(true);
+    expect(pageIsEmpty(page({ updated: ['a'] }))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('planEmailFetches', () => {
+  it('drops an updated id we do not hold locally, BEFORE any fetch is issued', () => {
+    // The absent case is an unconditional no-op. Fetching it would need a
+    // `receivedAt` the 3-property response cannot supply and the schema's
+    // NOT NULL would reject. Coverage enumerates CURRENT state, so it will pick
+    // the record up with the updated values anyway.
+    const plan = planEmailFetches(page({ updated: ['have', 'missing'] }), new Set(['have']));
+    expect(plan.updateIds).toEqual(['have']);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps creates unconditional - presence is irrelevant for a create', () => {
+    const plan = planEmailFetches(page({ created: ['new'] }), new Set());
+    expect(plan.createIds).toEqual(['new']);
+  });
+
+  it('never routes an id into both the create and the update fetch', () => {
+    const plan = planEmailFetches(page({ created: ['a'], updated: ['a'] }), new Set(['a']));
+    expect(plan.createIds).toEqual(['a']);
+    expect(plan.updateIds).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly', () => {
+  it('is true for the four counters and for an empty list', () => {
+    expect(updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly(['unreadEmails'])).toBe(true);
+    expect(updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly(['totalEmails', 'unreadThreads'])).toBe(true);
+    // "nothing but the state token moved" is counts-only vacuously.
+    expect(updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly([])).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('is false when the server will not say what changed', () => {
+    // `null` means "assume everything", so the whole object must be re-fetched.
+    expect(updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly(null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('is false as soon as one non-count property is present', () => {
+    expect(updatedPropertiesAreCountsOnly(['unreadEmails', 'name'])).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('planMailboxFetches', () => {
+  it('routes updates to the cheap four-integer patch when only counts moved', () => {
+    const plan = planMailboxFetches(
+      page({ created: ['new'], updated: ['old'], updatedProperties: ['unreadEmails'] }),
+    );
+    expect(plan.fullIds).toEqual(['new']);
+    expect(plan.countOnlyIds).toEqual(['old']);
+  });
+
+  it('re-fetches the whole object when updatedProperties is null', () => {
+    const plan = planMailboxFetches(page({ updated: ['old'], updatedProperties: null }));
+    expect(plan.fullIds).toEqual(['old']);
+    expect(plan.countOnlyIds).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('keyset progress', () => {
+  it('requires STRICTLY greater, because `after` is spec-inclusive', () => {
+    // RFC 8621 s4.4.1: receivedAt "must be the same or after this date-time to
+    // match". So every page re-returns the boundary message, and equality is NOT
+    // progress - treating it as progress would loop on that millisecond forever.
+    expect(madeForwardProgress('2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z')).toBe(false);
+    expect(madeForwardProgress('2026-01-01T00:00:00.001Z', '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z')).toBe(true);
+    expect(madeForwardProgress(null, '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z')).toBe(false);
+    expect(madeForwardProgress('2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', null)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('advances exactly one millisecond in the last-resort rung', () => {
+    expect(advanceOneMs('2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z')).toBe('2026-01-01T00:00:00.001Z');
+    // A malformed value must not become NaN and poison the cursor.
+    expect(advanceOneMs('not-a-date')).toBe('not-a-date');
+  });
+});

lib/offline-replica/__tests__/errors.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  backoffDelayMs, classify, escalationApplies, movesCursor, nextRung, rungValue,
+  type ErrorClass,
+} from '../errors';
+
+const ALL: ErrorClass[] = [
+  'Transport', 'RateLimit', 'ServerTransient', 'RequestLimit', 'Auth', 'Fatal', 'StateInvalid',
+];
+
+describe('exactly one class moves a cursor', () => {
+  it('is StateInvalid, and nothing else', () => {
+    // This is the single load-bearing property of the taxonomy. Every other class
+    // leaves the cursor exactly where it was, which is what makes "a failure never
+    // causes silent data loss" structural rather than aspirational.
+    expect(ALL.filter(movesCursor)).toEqual(['StateInvalid']);
+  });
+
+  it('escalates to a rebuild only for size/availability problems', () => {
+    // Escalating on RateLimit would answer a rate-limited server with far MORE
+    // requests. On Auth, a 401 would trigger a rebuild. On Transport, a flaky
+    // tunnel would. Fatal is our own bug and a rebuild will not fix it.
+    expect(ALL.filter(escalationApplies).sort()).toEqual(['RequestLimit', 'ServerTransient']);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('classify', () => {
+  it('reads HTTP status before anything else', () => {
+    expect(classify({ httpStatus: 401 })).toBe('Auth');
+    expect(classify({ httpStatus: 403 })).toBe('Auth');
+    expect(classify({ httpStatus: 429 })).toBe('RateLimit');
+    expect(classify({ httpStatus: 413 })).toBe('RequestLimit');
+    expect(classify({ httpStatus: 503 })).toBe('ServerTransient');
+  });
+
+  it('classifies cannotCalculateChanges as the one cursor-moving class', () => {
+    expect(classify({ jmapErrorType: 'cannotCalculateChanges' })).toBe('StateInvalid');
+  });
+
+  it('defaults an UNRECOGNISED method error to ServerTransient', () => {
+    // Guessing transient costs a retry; guessing state-invalid costs a full
+    // resync; guessing fatal stalls the account. The cheapest wrong answer wins.
+    expect(classify({ jmapErrorType: 'somethingNobodyHasHeardOf' })).toBe('ServerTransient');
+  });
+
+  it('does not let a method error description masquerade as a transport failure', () => {
+    // Structure before strings: a method error's prose can legitimately contain
+    // "timeout" or "socket", and reading that as Transport would leave a genuine
+    // server-side problem being retried as though the network were down.
+    expect(classify({ jmapErrorType: 'invalidArguments', message: 'socket timeout' })).toBe('Fatal');
+  });
+
+  it('classifies a real fetch rejection as Transport', () => {
+    // "Offline is not an error": the cursor stands still and the work is retried.
+    for (const message of [
+      'fetch failed', 'connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:1', 'getaddrinfo ENOTFOUND nope',
+      'socket hang up', 'The operation timed out',
+    ]) {
+      expect(classify({ message }), message).toBe('Transport');
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe('the maxChanges ladder is monotonically non-increasing for EVERY server value', () => {
+  it('never proposes a retry larger than the attempt that just failed', () => {
+    // Two historical bugs live here. An unbounded middle rung produced a retry
+    // STRICTLY LARGER than the failing attempt, actively worsening a
+    // "response too large" error. Clamping only rung 0 then reintroduced it in a
+    // narrower form: maxObjectsInGet=100 gave rung0=100 and rung1=250.
+    const serverValues = [
+      undefined, 1, 5, 10, 20, 25, 26, 49, 50, 51, 99, 100, 249, 250, 251, 499, 500, 501, 5000,
+    ];
+    for (const value of serverValues) {
+      const rungs = ([0, 1, 2, 3] as const).map((r) => rungValue(r, value));
+      for (let i = 1; i < rungs.length; i++) {
+        expect(
+          rungs[i],
+          `maxObjectsInGet=${value} rung ${i} (${rungs[i]}) must not exceed rung ${i - 1} (${rungs[i - 1]})`,
+        ).toBeLessThanOrEqual(rungs[i - 1]);
+      }
+      // And never zero, or the request asks for nothing and never progresses.
+      for (const r of rungs) expect(r).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('clamps rung 0 to what the server allows', () => {
+    expect(rungValue(0, 100)).toBe(100);
+    expect(rungValue(0, 5000)).toBe(500);
+    expect(rungValue(0, undefined)).toBe(500);
+  });
+
+  it('saturates rather than running off the end of the ladder', () => {
+    expect(nextRung(0)).toBe(1);
+    expect(nextRung(3)).toBe(3);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('backoff', () => {
+  it('is full-jitter and bounded by the cap', () => {
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 12; attempt++) {
+      const delay = backoffDelayMs(attempt, { baseMs: 1000, capMs: 60_000 });
+      expect(delay).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(delay).toBeLessThanOrEqual(60_000);
+    }
+  });
+});

lib/offline-replica/__tests__/retention.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+// The clock-jump guard, and the wipe it caused on the mobile client.
+//
+// The bug being regressed here is not hypothetical: its reproduction on the mobile
+// side returned 0 envelopes from a 4-envelope store. The guard DETECTED the jump,
+// held the old floor for one cycle - and persisted the JUMPED floor. The next
+// chained cycle seconds later computed a floor within seconds of the persisted
+// one, so the guard passed, the movement was classified as a NARROW, and every
+// envelope below a floor a year in the future was evicted. Unrecoverable, because
+// `coveredFrom` then claims the range complete and `/changes` cannot re-deliver
+// pre-existing mail.
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  adjustForWindow, CLOCK_JUMP_GUARD_MS, computeFloors, floorMovement,
+  guardFloorAgainstClockJump,
+} from '../retention';
+
+const DAY = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+const T0 = Date.parse('2026-08-05T12:00:00.000Z');
+
+function iso(t: number): string {
+  return new Date(t).toISOString();
+}
+
+describe('computeFloors', () => {
+  it('never lets the body window be wider than the envelope window', () => {
+    // A body with no envelope is an orphan by construction, and the whole point of
+    // two tiers is envelopes being a superset of bodies.
+    const floors = computeFloors({ envelopeDays: 30, bodyDays: 365, maxBodyMB: 100 }, T0);
+    expect(floors.bodyFrom).toBe(floors.envelopeFrom);
+  });
+
+  it('turns the MB cap into bytes', () => {
+    expect(computeFloors({ envelopeDays: 1, bodyDays: 1, maxBodyMB: 2 }, T0).maxBodyBytes)
+      .toBe(2 * 1024 * 1024);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('guardFloorAgainstClockJump', () => {
+  it('adopts the computed floor when there is no history to compare against', () => {
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(iso(T0), undefined);
+    expect(g.suppressed).toBe(false);
+    expect(g.evictionAllowed).toBe(true);
+    expect(g.envelopeFrom).toBe(iso(T0));
+  });
+
+  it('adopts an ordinary drift - a DST shift must not trip it', () => {
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(iso(T0 + 60 * 60 * 1000), iso(T0));
+    expect(g.suppressed).toBe(false);
+    expect(g.evictionAllowed).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('suppresses a jump larger than the guard and refuses to authorise deletion', () => {
+    const jumped = iso(T0 + 365 * DAY);
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(jumped, iso(T0));
+    expect(g.suppressed).toBe(true);
+    expect(g.envelopeFrom).toBe(iso(T0));
+    // Suppressing the FLOOR is not the same as suppressing the DELETIONS the
+    // floor authorises. Both the retention eviction and the reconcile sweep read
+    // this bit.
+    expect(g.evictionAllowed).toBe(false);
+    expect(g.warning).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  it('THE H2 REGRESSION: persists the floor it USED, not the one it rejected', () => {
+    // This one assertion is the whole fix. Persisting the computed value here is
+    // what legitimised the anomaly on the very next cycle.
+    const jumped = iso(T0 + 365 * DAY);
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(jumped, iso(T0));
+    expect(g.nextLastWindowFloor).toBe(iso(T0));
+    expect(g.nextLastWindowFloor).not.toBe(jumped);
+  });
+
+  it('THE H2 REGRESSION: stays suppressed across MANY chained cycles', () => {
+    // The original bug only showed on the SECOND cycle, so a single-cycle test
+    // passes against the broken code. Chaining is what reproduces it.
+    const stored = iso(T0);
+    let lastWindowFloor: string | undefined = stored;
+    for (let cycle = 0; cycle < 20; cycle++) {
+      // The clock is a year ahead and creeping forward a few seconds per cycle,
+      // exactly as a chained sync would observe it.
+      const computed = iso(T0 + 365 * DAY + cycle * 5_000);
+      const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(computed, lastWindowFloor);
+      expect(g.suppressed, `cycle ${cycle} must stay suppressed`).toBe(true);
+      expect(g.evictionAllowed, `cycle ${cycle} must not authorise deletion`).toBe(false);
+      expect(g.envelopeFrom, `cycle ${cycle} must keep the original floor`).toBe(stored);
+      lastWindowFloor = g.nextLastWindowFloor;
+    }
+    // And after 20 cycles the remembered floor is still the trustworthy one, so
+    // no later cycle can classify it as a narrow and evict everything.
+    expect(lastWindowFloor).toBe(stored);
+    expect(floorMovement(lastWindowFloor, stored)).toBe('unchanged');
+    expect(adjustForWindow(floorMovement(lastWindowFloor, stored), stored).evictBelow)
+      .toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it('suppresses a BACKWARD jump too', () => {
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(iso(T0 - 365 * DAY), iso(T0));
+    expect(g.suppressed).toBe(true);
+    expect(g.evictionAllowed).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('treats an explicit retention change as INTENT and applies it, eviction included', () => {
+    // The computed floor moves for two independent reasons - the clock changing
+    // and the SETTING changing - and guarding a setting change is wrong. Without
+    // this discriminator a Settings edit sits unapplied until something unrelated
+    // moves the floor again.
+    const widened = iso(T0 - 365 * DAY);
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(widened, iso(T0), { policyChanged: true });
+    expect(g.suppressed).toBe(false);
+    expect(g.evictionAllowed).toBe(true);
+    expect(g.envelopeFrom).toBe(widened);
+    expect(g.nextLastWindowFloor).toBe(widened);
+  });
+
+  it('a genuine user NARROW still evicts', () => {
+    // The guard must not become a reason nothing is ever deleted.
+    const narrowed = iso(T0 + 20 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(narrowed, iso(T0));
+    expect(g.evictionAllowed).toBe(true);
+    expect(floorMovement(iso(T0), g.envelopeFrom)).toBe('narrowed');
+    expect(adjustForWindow('narrowed', g.envelopeFrom).evictBelow).toBe(narrowed);
+  });
+
+  it('tolerates an unparseable stored floor without wedging', () => {
+    const g = guardFloorAgainstClockJump(iso(T0), 'garbage');
+    // Date.parse('garbage') is NaN, so the delta is not finite: adopt rather than
+    // suppress forever on a corrupt value.
+    expect(g.suppressed).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('uses a threshold above a day so a leap second or NTP nudge is invisible', () => {
+    expect(CLOCK_JUMP_GUARD_MS).toBeGreaterThan(DAY);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('floorMovement / adjustForWindow', () => {
+  it('a LATER floor keeps less mail and means evict', () => {
+    expect(floorMovement(iso(T0), iso(T0 + DAY))).toBe('narrowed');
+    expect(adjustForWindow('narrowed', iso(T0 + DAY))).toEqual({ evictBelow: iso(T0 + DAY) });
+  });
+
+  it('an EARLIER floor means re-scan, NOT a resync', () => {
+    // A widen moves the target back and re-enters coverage scanning. The cursors
+    // are untouched - a widen is not a reason to rebuild.
+    expect(floorMovement(iso(T0), iso(T0 - DAY))).toBe('widened');
+    expect(adjustForWindow('widened', iso(T0 - DAY))).toEqual({ rescanFrom: iso(T0 - DAY) });
+  });
+
+  it('does nothing without a previous floor', () => {
+    expect(floorMovement(undefined, iso(T0))).toBe('unchanged');
+    expect(adjustForWindow('unchanged', iso(T0))).toEqual({});
+  });
+});

lib/offline-replica/__tests__/states.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  asChangesState, asSnapshotState, coveragePhaseForCommitment, mintEnumerationCommitment,
+} from '../states';
+
+describe('state token certification', () => {
+  it('rejects everything a parsed JSON body could hand over that is not a token', () => {
+    // The brand certifies PROVENANCE; this check certifies SHAPE. Without it a
+    // `null` or a number could be laundered into something the engine treats as a
+    // cursor forever.
+    for (const bad of [null, undefined, 0, 1, '', {}, [], true]) {
+      expect(() => asChangesState(bad)).toThrow(TypeError);
+      expect(() => asSnapshotState(bad)).toThrow(TypeError);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a non-empty string', () => {
+    expect(asChangesState('s1')).toBe('s1');
+    expect(asSnapshotState('s1')).toBe('s1');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('EnumerationCommitment', () => {
+  it('is constructible - the symbol tag must be a real runtime Symbol', () => {
+    // `declare const tag: unique symbol` is type-level only and emits no runtime
+    // value, so using it as a computed key throws ReferenceError the first time
+    // the mint runs. That mistake is in the superseded design document; this test
+    // is what catches it.
+    const commitment = mintEnumerationCommitment({
+      jmapAccountId: 'a',
+      snapshot: asSnapshotState('snap'),
+      targetFrom: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+      sweepFloor: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+      kind: 'bootstrap',
+    });
+    expect(commitment.snapshot).toBe('snap');
+    expect(commitment.kind).toBe('bootstrap');
+  });
+
+  it('maps its kind onto the coverage phase', () => {
+    const base = {
+      jmapAccountId: 'a',
+      snapshot: asSnapshotState('snap'),
+      targetFrom: 'x',
+      sweepFloor: 'x',
+    } as const;
+    expect(coveragePhaseForCommitment(mintEnumerationCommitment({ ...base, kind: 'bootstrap' })))
+      .toBe('scanning');
+    expect(coveragePhaseForCommitment(mintEnumerationCommitment({ ...base, kind: 'reconcile' })))
+      .toBe('reconciling');
+  });
+
+  it('does not export its tag, so no object literal elsewhere can forge the type', () => {
+    const source = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, '..', 'states.ts'), 'utf8');
+    expect(source).toContain("const enumerationCommitmentTag = Symbol('EnumerationCommitment')");
+    expect(source).not.toMatch(/export\s+(const|let)\s+enumerationCommitmentTag/);
+    // And it must be a real Symbol() call, not the type-only declaration form.
+    expect(source).not.toMatch(/declare\s+const\s+enumerationCommitmentTag/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('cursor provenance is greppable, not just documented', () => {
+  const replicaDir = path.join(__dirname, '..');
+
+  function sourceFiles(): string[] {
+    return fs
+      .readdirSync(replicaDir)
+      .filter((f) => f.endsWith('.ts'))
+      .map((f) => path.join(replicaDir, f));
+  }
+
+  it('mints branded states ONLY in jmap.ts (the response parser)', () => {
+    // This is the rule the whole brand exists to enforce. The mobile client's
+    // defect D4 was a snapshot state adopted as a /changes cursor after a
+    // transient 503; a cast anywhere outside the parser is how that comes back.
+    for (const file of sourceFiles()) {
+      const base = path.basename(file);
+      if (base === 'states.ts' || base === 'jmap.ts') continue;
+      const source = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8');
+      expect(source, `${base} must not mint a ChangesState`).not.toMatch(/asChangesState\s*\(/);
+      expect(source, `${base} must not mint a SnapshotState`).not.toMatch(/asSnapshotState\s*\(/);
+      expect(source, `${base} must not cast to a branded state`).not.toMatch(
+        /as\s+(ChangesState|SnapshotState)\b/,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('mints an EnumerationCommitment ONLY where an enumeration is actually started', () => {
+    // A commitment is a promise to enumerate. Minting one anywhere that does not
+    // then enumerate makes the seed path's teeth meaningless.
+    const callers = sourceFiles().filter((file) => {
+      if (path.basename(file) === 'states.ts') return false;
+      return /mintEnumerationCommitment\s*\(/.test(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
+    });
+    expect(callers.map((f) => path.basename(f))).toEqual(['sync.ts']);
+  });
+});

lib/offline-replica/__tests__/store.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+// Store-level invariants, against a REAL SQLCipher file.
+//
+// Skipped wholesale when the optional native binding is not installed (that is a
+// normal state on a platform with no prebuild - see lib/mail-index/binding.ts), so
+// this file must never be the only proof of anything.
+
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import os from 'node:os';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import { isSqlcipherAvailable } from '@/lib/mail-index/binding';
+import { indexDbPath } from '@/lib/mail-index/paths';
+import { clampPolicy, DEFAULT_POLICY, ReplicaStore } from '../store';
+import { reconcileStamp } from '../sync';
+import { asChangesState, asSnapshotState, mintEnumerationCommitment } from '../states';
+import type { EnvelopeRow } from '../types';
+
+const ACCOUNT = 'alice@example.org';
+const JMAP = 'jmap-account-1';
+
+function envelope(id: string, receivedAt: string, extra: Partial<EnvelopeRow> = {}): EnvelopeRow {
+  return {
+    jmapAccountId: JMAP,
+    id,
+    threadId: `t-${id}`,
+    receivedAt,
+    size: 1000,
+    subject: `subject ${id}`,
+    preview: `preview ${id}`,
+    fromJson: JSON.stringify([{ email: 'sender@example.org' }]),
+    toJson: null,
+    ccJson: null,
+    blobId: `blob-${id}`,
+    hasAttachment: false,
+    keywordsJson: '{}',
+    mailboxIds: ['inbox'],
+    ...extra,
+  };
+}
+
+describe.skipIf(!isSqlcipherAvailable())('ReplicaStore', () => {
+  let storeDir: string;
+  let key: Buffer;
+  let store: ReplicaStore;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    storeDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'vncmail-replica-test-'));
+    key = randomBytes(32);
+    store = ReplicaStore.open({ storeDir, accountId: ACCOUNT, key });
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    store.close();
+    fs.rmSync(storeDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('writes into the SAME file as the search index, and it is really encrypted', () => {
+    // One encryption boundary, one key, one purge. And `PRAGMA key` is a silent
+    // no-op on a non-SQLCipher binding, so the header check is the only thing that
+    // catches a store that "works" while sitting on disk in cleartext.
+    expect(store.dbPath).toBe(indexDbPath(storeDir, ACCOUNT));
+    store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1); });
+    store.close();
+    const header = fs.readFileSync(store.dbPath).subarray(0, 15).toString('latin1');
+    expect(header).not.toBe('SQLite format 3');
+    const raw = Buffer.concat(
+      ['', '-wal', '-shm']
+        .map((s) => `${store.dbPath}${s}`)
+        .filter((f) => fs.existsSync(f))
+        .map((f) => fs.readFileSync(f)),
+    );
+    expect(raw.includes('subject e1')).toBe(false);
+    // Re-open so afterEach's close() is harmless.
+    store = ReplicaStore.open({ storeDir, accountId: ACCOUNT, key });
+  });
+
+  describe('cursor provenance at the storage layer', () => {
+    it('refuses to create a cursor from nowhere', () => {
+      // A cursor is born from seedCursor and nowhere else. Creating one in
+      // advanceCursor would be a silent cursor-from-nowhere - exactly what the
+      // branded types exist to make impossible.
+      expect(() => store.advanceCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' }, asChangesState('s1')))
+        .toThrow(/seed it first/);
+    });
+
+    it('writes the cursor AND the coverage row it justifies in one transaction', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.seedCursor(
+          { jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' },
+          mintEnumerationCommitment({
+            jmapAccountId: JMAP,
+            snapshot: asSnapshotState('snap-1'),
+            targetFrom: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+            sweepFloor: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+            kind: 'bootstrap',
+          }),
+          1000,
+        );
+      });
+      expect(store.getCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' })?.state).toBe('snap-1');
+      const coverage = store.getCoverage(JMAP);
+      expect(coverage?.phase).toBe('scanning');
+      expect(coverage?.sweepFloor).toBe('2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z');
+    });
+
+    it('rolls back a seed whose commitment is for the wrong account', () => {
+      expect(() =>
+        store.transaction(() => {
+          store.seedCursor(
+            { jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' },
+            mintEnumerationCommitment({
+              jmapAccountId: 'someone-else',
+              snapshot: asSnapshotState('snap'),
+              targetFrom: 'x', sweepFloor: 'x', kind: 'bootstrap',
+            }),
+            1000,
+          );
+        }),
+      ).toThrow(/different JMAP account/);
+      expect(store.getCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' })).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('advances a seeded cursor and keeps counters field-level', () => {
+      seed(store);
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.advanceCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' }, asChangesState('s2'));
+        store.patchCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' }, { consecutiveFailures: 3 });
+      });
+      const cursor = store.getCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' });
+      expect(cursor?.state).toBe('s2');
+      expect(cursor?.consecutiveFailures).toBe(3);
+      // A patch must not be able to rewrite `state` - only advance/seed can.
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.patchCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' }, { drainPending: true });
+      });
+      expect(store.getCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' })?.state).toBe('s2');
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('envelope tier', () => {
+    it('does NOT reset has_body on an idempotent replay', () => {
+      // Otherwise a replayed page looks like "body missing" to the backfill job and
+      // re-downloads every body in the page.
+      store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1); });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'e1', '{"bodyValues":{}}'); });
+      expect(store.envelopesWithoutBody(JMAP, '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', 10)).toHaveLength(0);
+      store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 2); });
+      expect(
+        store.envelopesWithoutBody(JMAP, '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', 10),
+        'a replayed envelope upsert must not clear has_body',
+      ).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('patches only the two mutable properties, and no-ops for an absent id', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1); });
+      const ok = store.transaction(() =>
+        store.patchEnvelopeMutable(JMAP, 'e1', { keywordsJson: '{"$seen":true}', mailboxIds: ['archive'] }),
+      );
+      expect(ok).toBe(true);
+      expect(store.mailboxIdsFor(JMAP, 'e1')).toEqual(['archive']);
+      // An update for an id we do not hold must leave no membership rows behind.
+      const missing = store.transaction(() =>
+        store.patchEnvelopeMutable(JMAP, 'nope', { keywordsJson: '{}', mailboxIds: ['inbox'] }),
+      );
+      expect(missing).toBe(false);
+      expect(store.mailboxIdsFor(JMAP, 'nope')).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    it('never writes a body whose envelope is gone', () => {
+      // A body fetched moments before its envelope was destroyed in the same cycle
+      // would otherwise land as an orphan.
+      const wrote = store.transaction(() => store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'ghost', '{}'));
+      expect(wrote).toBe(false);
+      expect(store.getBody(JMAP, 'ghost')).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('deleting an email takes its body, membership and queue row with it', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1);
+        store.enqueueBodies([{ emailId: 'e1', jmapAccountId: JMAP, receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', attempts: 0 }]);
+      });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'e1', '{"a":1}'); });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.deleteEmails(JMAP, ['e1']); });
+      expect(store.getBody(JMAP, 'e1')).toBeNull();
+      expect(store.mailboxIdsFor(JMAP, 'e1')).toEqual([]);
+      expect(store.countWantedBodies(JMAP, Date.now())).toBe(0);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('the reconcile sweep', () => {
+    it('refuses to run without a pinned stamp rather than deleting unverified records', () => {
+      expect(() => store.sweep(JMAP, '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', undefined))
+        .toThrow(/refusing to delete unverified/);
+    });
+
+    it('keeps what the enumeration re-saw and deletes what it did not', () => {
+      // The whole "seen set as one integer" trick: re-upserting refreshes
+      // cached_at, and the sweep deletes anything still below the pin.
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([
+          envelope('kept', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          envelope('gone', '2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z'),
+        ], 100);
+      });
+      const stamp = Math.max(500, store.maxEnvelopeCachedAt(JMAP) + 1);
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('kept', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], stamp);
+      });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.sweep(JMAP, '2026-07-01T00:00:00.000Z', stamp); });
+      expect(store.getEnvelopeRaw(JMAP, 'kept')).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(store.getEnvelopeRaw(JMAP, 'gone')).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('a stamp taken from a FROZEN clock would sweep nothing; the derived one works', () => {
+      // Both halves matter, and both fail silently. Exercising the real
+      // `reconcileStamp` rather than re-deriving it in the test is the point.
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([
+          envelope('kept', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          envelope('gone', '2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z'),
+        ], 9_999);
+      });
+      const frozenNow = 1_000;
+
+      // The naive version: with the clock behind the data, nothing is below the
+      // stamp, so a re-verified store sweeps zero rows and stale records live on.
+      expect(store.sweep(JMAP, '2026-07-01T00:00:00.000Z', frozenNow)).toBe(0);
+
+      const stamp = reconcileStamp(frozenNow, store.maxEnvelopeCachedAt(JMAP));
+      expect(stamp).toBe(10_000);
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('kept', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], stamp);
+      });
+      expect(store.transaction(() => store.sweep(JMAP, '2026-07-01T00:00:00.000Z', stamp))).toBe(1);
+      expect(store.getEnvelopeRaw(JMAP, 'kept')).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(store.getEnvelopeRaw(JMAP, 'gone')).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('stamping an enumeration with `now` instead of the pin deletes what it just verified', () => {
+      // The other direction of the same bug: the pin EXCEEDS now, so a page that
+      // stamps with `now` lands below the pin and the sweep eats it.
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('verified', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 9_999);
+      });
+      const now = 1_000;
+      const stamp = reconcileStamp(now, store.maxEnvelopeCachedAt(JMAP));
+      // Re-verified against the server, but stamped with the WRONG value.
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('verified', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], now);
+      });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.sweep(JMAP, '2026-07-01T00:00:00.000Z', stamp); });
+      expect(
+        store.getEnvelopeRaw(JMAP, 'verified'),
+        'this is the failure mode the pinned stamp exists to prevent',
+      ).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('the body queue - the durable-terminal-state fixes', () => {
+    it('enqueueBodies reports rows ACTUALLY INSERTED, not attempted', () => {
+      // Reporting the attempted count made the mobile engine believe there was
+      // unfinished work every cycle for as long as any envelope lacked a body,
+      // chaining a new cycle every few seconds indefinitely.
+      const entry = { emailId: 'e1', jmapAccountId: JMAP, receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', attempts: 0 };
+      expect(store.transaction(() => store.enqueueBodies([entry]))).toBe(1);
+      expect(store.transaction(() => store.enqueueBodies([entry]))).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it('never resets attempts on a re-enqueue', () => {
+      const entry = { emailId: 'e1', jmapAccountId: JMAP, receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', attempts: 0 };
+      store.transaction(() => { store.enqueueBodies([entry]); });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.bumpBodyAttempt(JMAP, 'e1', 0, 'boom'); });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.enqueueBodies([entry]); });
+      expect(store.takeBodyQueue(JMAP, 10, Date.now())[0]?.attempts).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it('THE H1 REGRESSION: a gave-up row is KEPT and is never revived by a re-enqueue', () => {
+      // Deleting the row on give-up was not enough: the backfill driver is
+      // "envelope with no body", which cannot tell "not fetched yet" from
+      // "deliberately not kept", so the next pass re-inserted a fresh attempts=0
+      // row and a permanently-failing body was retried five times per cycle forever.
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.markBodyGaveUp(JMAP, [
+          { emailId: 'e1', receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', reason: 'attempts' },
+        ]);
+      });
+      expect(store.listBodyGiveUps(JMAP, 10)).toEqual(['e1']);
+      // Not WANTED any more, so the drain never picks it up again.
+      expect(store.takeBodyQueue(JMAP, 10, Date.now())).toHaveLength(0);
+      // And a re-enqueue cannot resurrect it.
+      const inserted = store.transaction(() =>
+        store.enqueueBodies([
+          { emailId: 'e1', jmapAccountId: JMAP, receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', attempts: 0 },
+        ]),
+      );
+      expect(inserted).toBe(0);
+      expect(store.takeBodyQueue(JMAP, 10, Date.now())).toHaveLength(0);
+    });
+
+    it('THE H1c REGRESSION: a cap-shed body is markable even with NO existing queue row', () => {
+      // The download/discard loop: the cap sheds a body that was fetched and stored
+      // successfully, so there is no queue row left to UPDATE. If the mark is
+      // silently dropped, the envelope is still inside the body WINDOW, the backfill
+      // re-enqueues it, it downloads again, and the cap sheds it again - unbounded
+      // data use that never terminates.
+      store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1); });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'e1', '{"bodyValues":{"1":{"value":"x"}}}'); });
+      expect(store.takeBodyQueue(JMAP, 10, Date.now())).toHaveLength(0); // no queue row exists
+
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.deleteBodies(JMAP, ['e1']);
+        store.markBodyGaveUp(JMAP, [
+          { emailId: 'e1', receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', reason: 'shed-by-cap' },
+        ]);
+      });
+      expect(
+        store.listBodyGiveUps(JMAP, 10),
+        'the cap-shed mark must be an upsert, or the shed/re-download loop stays open',
+      ).toEqual(['e1']);
+      // The envelope is back to has_body=0 and still in the window, so without the
+      // mark the backfill WOULD pick it up. With the mark it is excluded.
+      expect(store.envelopesWithoutBody(JMAP, '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z', 10).map((e) => e.id))
+        .toEqual(['e1']);
+      expect(store.listBodyGiveUps(JMAP, 10)).toContain('e1');
+    });
+
+    it('clearing give-ups DELETES them, so they look like "never queued"', () => {
+      // A cleared give-up must come back with a clean attempt count, which an
+      // un-flag would not give.
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.markBodyGaveUp(JMAP, [
+          { emailId: 'a', receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', reason: 'attempts' },
+          { emailId: 'b', receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', reason: 'shed-by-cap' },
+        ]);
+      });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.clearBodyGiveUps(JMAP, 'shed-by-cap'); });
+      expect(store.listBodyGiveUps(JMAP, 10)).toEqual(['a']);
+      store.transaction(() => { store.clearBodyGiveUps(JMAP); });
+      expect(store.listBodyGiveUps(JMAP, 10)).toEqual([]);
+      expect(
+        store.transaction(() =>
+          store.enqueueBodies([
+            { emailId: 'a', jmapAccountId: JMAP, receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', attempts: 0 },
+          ]),
+        ),
+        'a cleared give-up must be re-enqueueable',
+      ).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it('honours a backoff window', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.enqueueBodies([
+          { emailId: 'e1', jmapAccountId: JMAP, receivedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z', attempts: 0 },
+        ]);
+      });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.bumpBodyAttempt(JMAP, 'e1', 10_000, 'later'); });
+      expect(store.takeBodyQueue(JMAP, 10, 5_000)).toHaveLength(0);
+      expect(store.takeBodyQueue(JMAP, 10, 20_000)).toHaveLength(1);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('eviction', () => {
+    it('cap eviction takes the oldest bodies first and leaves envelopes alone', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([
+          envelope('old', '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          envelope('new', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z'),
+        ], 1);
+      });
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'old', '{"v":"old"}');
+        store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'new', '{"v":"new"}');
+      });
+      expect(store.oldestBodies(JMAP, 1).map((b) => b.emailId)).toEqual(['old']);
+      store.transaction(() => { store.deleteBodies(JMAP, ['old']); });
+      // The message stays LISTED - only its content went.
+      expect(store.getEnvelopeRaw(JMAP, 'old')).not.toBeNull();
+      expect(store.countBodies(JMAP)).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it('no deletion path leaves an orphan body behind', () => {
+      // This is the real invariant. `orphanBodies()` is a belt-and-braces sweep for
+      // orphans a CRASH between two transactions could leave; it is deliberately
+      // not reachable through the store's own API, which is what this asserts.
+      // (So the detection query itself is covered only by the integration run, not
+      // by this file - stated rather than papered over with a vacuous assertion.)
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([
+          envelope('a', '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          envelope('b', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z'),
+        ], 1);
+      });
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'a', '{"v":1}');
+        store.putBodyIfEnvelopeExists(JMAP, 'b', '{"v":2}');
+      });
+      expect(store.countBodies(JMAP)).toBe(2);
+
+      store.transaction(() => { store.deleteEmails(JMAP, ['a']); });
+      expect(store.orphanBodies(JMAP, 10)).toEqual([]);
+
+      store.transaction(() => { store.evictEnvelopesBelow(JMAP, '2026-09-01T00:00:00.000Z'); });
+      expect(store.countEnvelopes(JMAP)).toBe(0);
+      expect(store.countBodies(JMAP)).toBe(0);
+      expect(store.orphanBodies(JMAP, 10)).toEqual([]);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('purge', () => {
+    it('purgeAll takes the CURSORS with the records', () => {
+      // A record wipe that leaves a live cursor behind is the one state no amount
+      // of syncing repairs: /changes cannot re-deliver mail that already existed
+      // when the cursor was captured.
+      seed(store);
+      store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1); });
+      store.transaction(() => { store.purgeAll(); });
+      expect(store.countEnvelopes(JMAP)).toBe(0);
+      expect(store.getCursor({ jmapAccountId: JMAP, type: 'Email' })).toBeNull();
+      expect(store.getCoverage(JMAP)).toBeNull();
+    });
+
+    it('a wrong key is treated as unreadable and rebuilt, never as a prompt', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('e1', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1); });
+      store.close();
+      const other = ReplicaStore.open({ storeDir, accountId: ACCOUNT, key: randomBytes(32) });
+      try {
+        expect(other.countEnvelopes(JMAP)).toBe(0);
+      } finally {
+        other.close();
+      }
+      store = ReplicaStore.open({ storeDir, accountId: ACCOUNT, key });
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('policy', () => {
+    it('round-trips and clamps', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => { store.setPolicy({ envelopeDays: 99999, bodyDays: 0, maxBodyMB: 1 }); });
+      const policy = store.getPolicy();
+      expect(policy.envelopeDays).toBe(3650);
+      expect(policy.bodyDays).toBe(1);
+      expect(policy.maxBodyMB).toBe(16);
+    });
+
+    it('defaults when nothing was ever written', () => {
+      expect(store.getPolicy()).toEqual(DEFAULT_POLICY);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('read path', () => {
+    it('lists a mailbox page newest-first with a correct total', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => {
+        store.upsertEnvelopes([
+          envelope('a', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          envelope('b', '2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          envelope('c', '2026-08-03T00:00:00.000Z', { mailboxIds: ['archive'] }),
+        ], 1);
+      });
+      const inbox = store.listEnvelopes(JMAP, 'inbox', 10, 0);
+      expect(inbox.total).toBe(2);
+      expect(inbox.rows.map((r) => String(r.id))).toEqual(['b', 'a']);
+      // A null mailbox is "everything", which is what the unified views want.
+      expect(store.listEnvelopes(JMAP, null, 10, 0).total).toBe(3);
+      expect(store.listEnvelopes(JMAP, 'archive', 10, 0).rows.map((r) => String(r.id))).toEqual(['c']);
+    });
+
+    it('reports the account ids it holds without needing a network session', () => {
+      store.transaction(() => { store.upsertEnvelopes([envelope('a', '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z')], 1); });
+      expect(store.knownJmapAccountIds()).toEqual([JMAP]);
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+describe('clampPolicy', () => {
+  it('never lets the body window exceed the envelope window', () => {
+    expect(clampPolicy({ envelopeDays: 30, bodyDays: 365, maxBodyMB: 100 }).bodyDays).toBe(30);
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to defaults for junk input', () => {
+    expect(clampPolicy({ envelopeDays: NaN } as never).envelopeDays).toBe(DEFAULT_POLICY.envelopeDays);
+    expect(clampPolicy(null)).toEqual(DEFAULT_POLICY);
+    expect(clampPolicy(undefined)).toEqual(DEFAULT_POLICY);
+  });
+});
+
+function seed(store: ReplicaStore): void {
+  store.transaction(() => {
+    for (const type of ['Email', 'Mailbox'] as const) {
+      store.seedCursor(
+        { jmapAccountId: JMAP, type },
+        mintEnumerationCommitment({
+          jmapAccountId: JMAP,
+          snapshot: asSnapshotState('snap'),
+          targetFrom: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+          sweepFloor: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+          kind: 'bootstrap',
+        }),
+        1000,
+      );
+    }
+  });
+}